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*THE MEANING OF FAITH IN THE THOUGHT OF KANT
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The objective of this exercise is to give as full as 
possible an explanation of Kant's famous statement:
"I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge 
in oraer to make room for faith". While this state­
ment occupies an important and significant place in 
Kant's introduction to the second edition of his great 
KRV, it seldom has much respect paid to it by Kant 
commentators. Kant is generally characterised as the 
critic of metaphysics or the establisher of the autonomy 
of science or ethics, but seldom as a defender of the 
faith. This enquiry concerns Kant's claim to have 
found grounds for affirming that room has to be made
for faith in human understanding. It centres upon both 
the nature of the faith he seeks to defend, and the 
manner in which he defends it.
However, before such a position can be reached, 
two diametrically opposed lines of Kant interpretation 
require to be discussed. The first would preclude the 
possibility of this enquiry at all, by affirming that 
Kant embraced no religious faith whatsoever. Since 
this view is held either explicitly or implicitly by 
many Kant scholars, its claim to truth must be care­
fully examined. This examination is conducted in 
terms of the detailed case argued by Hans Vaihinger.
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would produce great confusion in the field of Kant 
studies. It recognises Kant's attempt to defend faith. 
However, it wrongly defines the nature of the faith Kant 
sought to defend, by relating it to romanticist 
expressions of religious faith. The views are examined 
of some who have tried to read Kant in this manner.
Botn extremes having been rejected, Kant's move­
ment in thought is followed from his rejection of the 
theology of the rationalists to his own doctrine of 
rational faith. The argument commences in the KPV, 
where Kant's distinction between Phenomena and Noumena 
is identified as the key to the possibility of future 
discussion, after limits have been set upon human 
knowledge. In the KPV, Kant is thus enabled to speak 
with the voice of practical reason about matters upon 
which the voice of theoretical reason must be silent. 
Practical Reason postulates certain Ideas. The 
epistemic mode of holding them is practical faith.
Tnis position leads to the necessity to study R, in 
order to see the full movement of Kant's thought.
While developing the concept of faith implied in 
the KPV, R expands and amplifies it by first enlarging 
Kant's conception of freedom. It then develops the 
notion of faith as both rational and moral. The nature 
of faith as involved in the act of willing, the ultimate 
expression of human freedom, is defined.
Having established that Kant did indeed have a 
religious faith for which to make room, and having 
attempted to define it, the question is raised of what
this faith has in common with Christian Faith. Are 
there any identifiable 'Christian' elements in this 
faith? It is maintained that Kant's position should 
not be regarded as mere etnical Theism. A point by 
point comparison between any classic statement of the 
Churcn's faith and the elements of Kant's faith is 
rejected as a means of answering this question. The 
argument turns on the fact that there is within the 
history of Christian thought, a tension which starts 
with the opposition between Law and Gospel and runs 
through the long history of theology. The tension 
represents a basic conflict of ideas between those who 
have tried to restrict the manner in which the faith 
of the Church is expressed, and those who have tried 
to 'universalise' it. Those who have engaged in 
'universalist' experiments have often been accused of 
heresy. Kant attempted to erect a Christian universalism 
on the basis of moral experience, and in doing so, fell 
foul of both the Aufkl&rung and the Prussian Church.
The fact that he encountered opposition from two 
opposed groups illustrates the tension within himself 
between dogmatism and scepticism, a balance between 
which, he tried to maintain on philosophical grounds.
The originality of this work 1 would claim lies 
in three directions. First, it attempts to establish 
that Aant's religious faith was anjntegral part of his 
whole critical programme. Secondly, it tries to argue 
for the unity of thought which leads to the establish­
ment of this faith. Thirdly, it attempts to interpret 
Kant's view of faith, not as mere ethical theism, but 
as a representative of a valid expression of Christian
*thought. Kant's Christian universalism has many 
inherent problems, which are recognised, but it is the 
culmination of his system. Only from this vantage 
point is it possible to have proper and adequate 
perspective of the entire territory of his thought.
The last chapter deals with the relevance and 
significance of Kant's view of faith. His alleged 
impact on theology in certain directions is examined. 
Finally, my own views are set out concerning those 
philosophers and theologians who, whether or not 
acknowledging any debt to Kant, I regard as most 
closely attempting to continue the task which i^ant 
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SUMMARY UK ARCmMhhT
The objective of this exercise is to give as full as 
possible an explanation of Kant's famous statement:
"I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge 
in order to make room for f a i t h " W h i l e  this state­
ment occupies an important and significant place in 
Kant's introduction to the second edition of his great 
KRV, it seldom has much respect paid to it by Kant 
commentators. Kant is generally characterised as the 
critic of metaphysics or the establisher of the autonomy 
of science or ethics, but seldom as a defender of the 
faith. This enquiry concerns Kant's claim to have 
found grounds for affirming that room has to be made 
for faith in human understanding, it centres upon both 
the nature of the faith he seeks to defend, and the 
manner in which he defends it.
However9 before such a position can be reached, 
two diametrically opposed lines of Kant interpretation 
require to be discussed. The first would preclude the 
possibility of this enquiry at all9 by affirming that 
Kant embraced no religious faith whatsoever. Since 
this view is held either explicitly or implicitly by 
many Kant scholars9 its claim to truth must be care­
fully examined. This examination is conducted in 
terms of the detailed case argued by Hans Vaikin er.
The second, and opposing view, if defensible,
^ B p. xxx.
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would produce great confusion In the field of Kant 
studies. It recognises Kant's attempt to defend faith. 
However, it wrongly defines the nature of the faith Kant 
sought to defend, by relating it to romanticist 
expressions of religious faith. The views are examined 
of some who have tried to read Kant in this manner.
Both extremes having been rejected, Kant's move­
ment in thought is followed from his rejection of the 
theology of the rationalists to nis own doctrine of 
rational faith. The argument commences in the KPV, 
where Kant's distinction between Phenomena and Uoumena 
is identified as the key to the possibility of future 
discussion, after limits have been set upon human 
knowledge. In the KPV, Kant is thus enabled to speak 
with the voice of practical reason about matters upon 
which the voice of theoretical reason must be silent. 
Practical Reason postulates certain Ideas. The 
epistemic mode of holding them is practical faitn. This 
position leads to the necessity to study R, in oraer to 
see the full movement of Kant's thought.
while developing the concept of faith implied in 
the KPV, R expands and amplifies it by first enlarging 
Kant's conception of freedom. It then develops the 
notion of faith as both rational and moral. The nature 
of faith as involved in the act of willing, the ultimate 
expression of human freedom, is defined.
Having established that Kant did indeed have a 
religion faith for which to make room, and having 
attempted to define it, the question is raised of what
ill
this faith has in common with Christian Paith. Are 
there are identifiable 'Christian' elements in this 
faith? It is maintained that Kant's position should 
not be regarded as mere ethical Theism. A point by 
point comparison between aity classic statement of the 
Church's faith and the elements of Kant's faith is 
rejected as a means of answering this question. The 
argument turns on the fact that there is within the 
history of Christian thougnt, a tension which starts 
with the opposition between Law and Gospel and runs 
through the long history of theology. The tension 
represents a basic conflict of ideas between those who 
have tried to restrict the manner in which the faith 
of the Church is expressed, and those who have tried 
to 'univerealise' it. Those who have engaged in 
'universalist' experiments have often been accused of 
heresy. Kant attempted to erect a Christian universalism 
on the basis of moral experience, and in doing so, fell 
foul of both the Aui'kl&rung and the Prussian Church.
The fact that he encountered opposition from two 
opposed groups illustrates the tension within himself 
between dogmatism and scepticism, a balance between 
which, he tried to maintain on xhilosophical grounds.
The originality of this work I would claim lies 
in three directions. Pirst, it attempts to establish 
that Kant's religious faith was an integral .art of his 
whole critical programme. Secondly, it tries to argue 
lor the unity of thought which leads to tne establish­
ment of this faith. Thirdly, it attempts to interpret 
Kant'8 view of faith, not as mere ethical theism, but 
as a representative of a valid expression of Christian
iv
thought. Kant's Christian universalism has many 
inherent problems, which are recognised, but it is the 
culmination of his system. Only from this vantage 
point is it possible to have proper and adequate 
perspective of the entire territory of nis thought.
The last chapter deals with the relevance and 
significance of Kant's view of faith. His alleged 
impact on theology in certain directions is examined, 
finally, my own views are set out concerning those 
philosophers and theologians who, whether or not 
acknowledging any debt to Kant, 1 regard as most 
closely attempting to continue the task which Kant 




"I have therefore found it necessary to deny 
knowledge in order to make room for faith11. With 
this statement (in the introduction to the second 
edition of the KRV)1, Kant indicates the conclusion 
he has reached in his attempt to determine the 
relationship between knowledge (Wissen) and faith 
(Glaubej. Taken as a general statement of the 
conclusions of the Critical Philosophy as a whole, 
or simply of the KliV in particular, it is too wide 
and general. This is at most one consequence of 
the critical investigations which Kant undertook. 
However, taken as a statement in which Kant brings 
together the terms knowledge and faith in a suggestive, 
significant and apparently conclusive manner, it is 
a starting point. Much philosophical endeavour has 
been expended in continuous efforts to clarify what 
Kant meant by knowledge thus d e n i e d 1 or limited.
Far less concern has been exercised over what Kant 
meant when he spoke of faith, for which he claimed 
to have made room. This quotation is a beginning 
for thought.
Kant's famous statement falls into two natural 
parts. It is his conclusion that he must DKOT 
KNOWjjJ^DGK. It is perhaps banal to make this comment, 
but there are two ways in which one may proceed to 
deny knowledge. A vivid illustration of tnis point 
is found in a passage in the HJournals" of Kierkegaard:
■ ......... . a scholar who has used the twenty best
1 Bxxx
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years of his life (the years in which a man really 
studies; for the most intense study, and in his forty- 
eighth year, at the pinnacle of knowledge, has not 
found the satisfaction he sought, and finuin himself 
suddenly at the end of his tether is brought to the 
o posite extreme, closes his books and says *No, it
is not knowledge that matters* .........  is this not
a very different thing from an innkeeper, who was 
just passing and heard the scholar (for he lived there, 
the windows were open, and the scholar spoke in his 
passion in a loud voice), and this innkeeper could not 
even write his own name, and scarcely read it when 
someone else wrote it for hiiu: is it not a very different 
thing when the innkeeper goes on his way, takes what
he he rd as a result, and says *it is not knowledgeothat matters*? There are those who would crassly deny 
or limit the value of knowledge out of i^  norance, and 
there are those who a±ter serious minded consideration, 
feel impelled to do so. Admittedly, Kierkegaard was 
attackiri bad expositions of Luther, but the point 
he maites is clear enough to stand by itself, deealess 
to say, if^ ant is serious in Lis conclusion, ana hie 
statement is therefore not to be fastened upon as 
a x cile justxxieation for the rejection of reasoned 
thought. This particular quotation from ant has 
suffered terrible abuse in this direction and is still 
occasionally to be heard in that species of Christian
L * i ** b .nix - journals xl 2 A 3C1 tr. R. Gregor
^mith ixie i ast Years p. ;j17. (Fontana Library
19b8;
- 3 -
preaching which seeks to vilify human reason. Perhaps 
Kierkegaard may be allowed a comment upon this: "What 
an abomination are those Protestant pastors who at most 
read what has cost others mortal struggles, and then 
use it as purple passages in their sermons1'! "I have 
found it necessary" implies a carefully reasoned 
judgement.
ihe second part of want's statement introduces 
the otner principal term - 10 ftAKn ROOM FOR FAITH. In 
clarifying a little what he means by faith, he later
on says   all objections to morality and
religion will be forever silenced, and this in Socratic 
fashion, by the clearest proof of the ignorance of the 
objectors".^ In what sense then is the word faith 
being used? Kant sees the defence of faith as silencing 
all objections to morality' and religion. Prima facie, 
then, faith pertains to ethics and religion. The term 
faith relates, therefore, not merely to supersensible 
religious categories, concepts, or theological dogmas, 
but also to ethics and human conduct.
One may ponder to ask why Kant’s equal emphasis 
upon the denial of knowledge and the place of faith has 
not been reflected in the great mass of Kant commen­
taries which exist. At the decided risk of being too 
general, the comment could be ventured that Kant's
3 XI 1 A 86 op. cit. p. 53.
4 Bxx^ri
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denial of metaphysics 5 has been taken by some in 
isolation from the remainuer of his Critical Philosophy 
and has been misrepresented as the moot significant 
aspect of Kant's work. However, it is not only unfair 
to Kant, but more so untrue to the psychology of the man 
not to take his statement complete, when attempting to 
see what he is saying. To suggest as some have done, 
that Kant did not take this statement seriously himself 
betrays little understanding of the man who regarded 
truth-telling and promise-keeping as 'Categorical 
Imperatives' from God Himself. When iLant maintained 
that he had made room for faith, he was saying something 
significant, and it is necessary for students of Kant to 
ask, not only what he understood by knowledge, but what 
he meant by faith.
What then indeed does Kant mean when he speaks of 
FAITH? What is he defending, and does he defend it in 
a valid manner? This question immediately launches us 
into a preliminary investigation of Kant's philosophy 
of religion.
Kant gives a useful ana illuminating summary account 
of his philosophy of religion, primarily in terms of his 
views on morality in the KIP. Kant here links up the 
idea of faith with religion and morality, and even the 
title of the paragraph 91 contains the expression
^The metaphysics of Descartes, Leibniz and Wolff are 
particular examples of what Aant denied as will be 
later explained.
°Part II Kritik der teleoloftischen Urteilskraft *91 
D IV018} p. W 7  KU p. 140.
-5 -
"praktischen GKLuuben* (practical faith) which of course 
has the overtone of morality since the sphere of 
praktischen Vernunft is moral judgement. (The whole 
argument commences at $84, but the relevant important 
ideas for this discussion are sketched as from 8^1).
How can something be the object of knowledge?
This is Kant's problem, and his answer is that in 
asking tne question, we are concerning ourselves not 
with the things themselves, but with our powers of 
knowing them, that is, with the possibility of our 
knowing them. To say that we can know something means 
not that we are able to be in direct contact with it, 
but that we may have the idea of the possibility of 
whatever it is.
This is difficult and requires clarification, but 
of course, behind this statement lies the whole work of 
the KRV. However, not to shrink from the duty of 
clarification, we could ask: Does Kant mean that we have 
(in terms of his terminology in the KRV) impressions or 
intuitions which the mind organises according to certain 
rules of procedure or presuppositions in order to give 
these intuitions coherence and meaning? To answer this 
in the affirmative would imply the judgement that the 
KHV merely explains how we come by our knowledge of the 
external world. Or we could ask: Is Kant implicitly 
saying that knowledge of anj sort is all mere 1 possibility'9 
possessing no degree of certainty, and that our knowledge 
depends upon now we connect up our intuitions. If this 
is so, we therefore can never know whether or not our 
ideas thus formed correspond to reality.
6 -
These two lines of interpretation could both be 
eloquently sustained from the KRV. While Kant insists 
that experience through intuitions is the basis of 
knowledge, and that the mind creates for us what is 
indubitably our external world, at the same time our 
experience is limited to a phenomenal realm. Things 
in themselves may be different. One easy way to escape 
the dilemma would be to suggest that the fir6t inter­
pretation concerns empirical knowledge end the latter 
concerns a prioii knowledge. This would be too simple 
a solution. The KRV, in Kant's language is a 
"transcendental enquiry", and Kant says: "I entitle 
all Knowledge transcendental which is occupied not so 
much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of 
objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be 
possible a p r i o r i " T h e  KRV is an examination of Pure 
Reason to determine whether or not synthetic a priori 
propositions are possible.6 In other words, Kant wants 
to know how much knowledge is possible apart from 
experience. Mathematics, natural philosophy and 
metaphysics are, in his view, the three disciplines 
which make fundamental use of these propositions.
Now bearing in mina the classic statement from 
Kant with which I began, Kant appears to hold the view 
that Knowledge has its limitations, and this would also 
appear to be the import of the opening paragraph.(§91 
of the KU). No branch of human knowledge is beyond
7 a 25. 
6 B 19.
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question or doubt: Can we be any more certain that 
the angles of a triangle added together equal 160 degrees 
than that life exists on Mars or that man's freedom to 
achieve the summum bonum depends upon God making 
immortality possible? It is through probing the 
different forms of assurances possible in each case 
that Kant gives classification of possible objects of 
knowledge, and therefore of the different forms of 
knowledge possible, under three headings:- matters of 
opinion, matters of fact, and matters of faith.
net us briefly examine these:
1. Sachen der Meinung (Matters of opinion - opinabile)
These are defined as being ''always Objects of empirical
knowledge   at least intrinsically possible"?.
They belong to the world of sense, but are not possible 
objects of knowledge now, because of the limitations of 
knowledge at the present. The question of whether or 
not there is life on other planets is an example. Given 
the proper conditions, we could resolve the question by 
factual empirical investigation. However, the question 
of whether or not there exist fictitious logical entities 
such as pure disembodied spirits is not a matter of 
opinion in this sense. It is an idea of the imagination 
pure and simple.
2* Tatsachen (Matters of fact - scibile)
These are objects which answer to conceptions whose
9 KU p. 140 line 21.
objective validity may be proved. But what does 
"objective reality" mean in this context? This does 
suggest that we can square our impressions with things 
in themselves, and that we can know more than the 
possibility of things. Kant however, clarifies his 
position by saying that we must have an intuition which 
corresponds to our 'Object of knowledge1. Geometrical 
sizes and mathematical properties fall into this class.
If all the angles of a triangle are the same size, then 
all the sides will be of equal length. lean simply pick 
up a ruler, and measure such a triangle of equal angles 
to discover whether or not the idea may be substantiated 
by fact. Bo elaborate deductions are required.
Matters of fact are thus directly verifiable by 
experience. However, Kant extends this heading to 
include all properties of things which we or anyone 
else can verify. (It can only be assumed that the 
existence of other people is not merely a creation of 
my mind. I can experience them, and use their experience 
to verify my knowledge).
Kant then includes Fhh&BON, viewed as a form of 
causality, as a matter of fact. This clearly refers 
back to G, where Kant makes the distinction between an 
action viewed as part of a causal process, and the same 
action viewed as the free action of an agent doing his 
duty. Looked at from the standpoint of appearance,
freedom is explained by the law of causality, but looked 
at as an intelligence, man is a causal agent in certain 
situations.^ Freedom, Kant affirms, is the only idea 
of reason, whose object is a matter of fact.
G Chapter 111 p. Ic7«
- 9 -
This said, Kant proceeds to the third heading.
2. qiaubenssachen (Matters of faith - mere credibile)
Matters of faith are defined as objects that must be 
thought a priori either as grounds or as consequences, 
if pure practical reason is to be used as duty commands, 
but which are transcendent for the theoretical use of 
reason.
Matters of faith are a priori, ideas which come not 
directly from experience, but which are the grounds or 
consequences of moral action. In that context, we have 
these ideas before us. However, viewed theoretically, 
they are transcendent, and we cannot speak of them as 
objects of knowledge. Kant is arguing that certain 
things which cannot be spoken of in the context of 
theoretical reason, may be spoken of in the context 
of moral action.
Kant includes the cummum bonum in this category.
It is something which cannot be verified by any possible 
experience, and which has to be realised through freedom, 
and which is only conceivable under the two further 
conditions of the existence of God and the immortality 
of the soul. Kant states ^  that these objects are the 
only ones that can be called matters of faith.
Of the three fundamental problems of philosophy,
God, freedom and immortality, the solution to understanding 




In a footnote on the same page,—  Kant helpfully 
distinguishes between Glaubenssachen and Glaubensartikel. 
Articles of faith are things we may be bound to acknowledge 
inwardly or outwardly, like the ’Virgin Birth’, or the 
'doctrine of the Atonement', the 'Communion of the Bainte' 
or the 'Forgiveness of Sins'. These are not the subject 
of natural theology. Natural theology for Kant would 
appear to be that of which we may speak a priori, with 
moral assurance, independently of tradition or relevation.^
Kant's main thoughts about faith in this section may 
be summarised and highlighted by four direct quotations 
from the text:
la; "It is only objects of pure reason tnat can be
matters of faith at all, and even then they must 
not be regarded as objects simply of pure
speculative reason • •••.....   they are ideas,
that is, conceptions, whose objective reality 
cannot be guaranteed theoretically" .14
lb) "Faith as habitus, not as actus. is the moral
attitude of reason in its assurance of the truth 
of what is beyond the reach of theoretical 
knowledge".15
(c) "Assurance in matters of faith is an assurance from 
a purely practical point of view".
^  KU p. 143 D 600 (Vol. 8)
13 This distinction will be discussed more fully later.
14 KU p. 145 line 13 .. lb.
^  op. cit. p. 143 line 4.^  cit. p. 143 line 2b.
11 -
(d) "Faith in the plain acceptation of the term is a 
confidence of attaining a purpose, the furthering 
of which is a duty, but whose achievement is a 
thing of which we are unable to perceive the 
possibility - or, consequently the possibility of 
what we can alone conceive to be its condition.
Thus the faith that has reference to particular 
objocts is entirely a matter of morality, provided 
such objects are not objects of possible knowledge 
or opinion, in which latter case and above all in 
matters of history, it must be called credulity and 
not faitn".!?
There would appear to be more than one line of 
thought about faith present in these words: First of
all, in quotation (a) faith is contrasted with theo­
retical Knowledge. Knowledge concerns the possibility 
of an object, and by this, Kant means not the logical 
possibility, but the real possibility.^ This real 
possibility is proved either from its actuality as 
attested by experience, or by means of reason, a priori. 
The KRV argues the case that synthetic a priori judge­
ments form the basis of knowledge. We use them in order 
to make our intuitions form a coherent picture of the 
world, and even the world itself only can be understood 
by using a priori judgements in the same way. Faith is 
concerned with what is beyond the reach of theoretical 
knowledge, and with what Kant calls the Ideas of Pure 
Reason. The "Transcendental Dialectic" of the KRV is
^  op. cit. p. 146 line 3 
KRV B xxvii - footnote.
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where we find a fuller account of these ideas.
in the KRV, Kant says ’Reason is never in immediate 
relation to an object, but only to the understanding; 
cind it is only through the understanding that it has its 
own (specific) empirical employment. It does not create 
concepts of objects, but only orders them •••••••••••
reason has therefore as its sole object the understanding 
and the effectiveness of its application. Just as the 
understanding unifies the m nifold in the object by 
means of concepts, so reason unifies the manifold of 
concepts by means of ideas, positing a certain collective 
unity as the goal of the activities of the understanding, 
which otherwise are concerned with distributive unity.
I accordingly maintain tnat transcendental ideas 
never allow of anj constitutive employment”. ^
The Ideas of Reason are used to give our concepts 
systematic and meaningful unity. Kant argues in a 
perplexing chapter of the KRV entitled ”The Ground and 
Distinction of all Concepts in general into Phenomena 
and Noumena”,20 that the world may be divided (but not 
in a positive actual sense of "divided”) into a world 
of sense and of understanding. Concepts may be employed 
empirically to appearances which come from the senses. 
They may not be employed transoendentally to 'Things in 
themselves1 The things he calls 'noumena1 -
19 B 671 - 2.
20 B 295 
21 B 298
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unknowable realities, he speaks of to curb the 
pretensions of our sensibility when we try to sa that 
we have knowledge of certain things.^2
The concept Trasscendental laeas is introduced 
into the argument at this point. They arc defined w- 
as special a priori coucoits which are contained in the 
synthetic unity of intuitions under the direction of 
the categories and which determine aocording to 
principles how understanding is to be employed in dealin 
with experience in its totality. But by their nature, 
we can never have any intuition which corresponds to 
these ideas. Tuey are oru^ iaeas ana we can nevei know 
whether or not objects exist which correspond to them.
how what are the ideas 01 Reason if they were to 
be listed? In the Appendix to the Transcendental 
Lialectic, it emerges that the idet?s are of two classes: 
first the three metaphysical ideas - God, fre . , and
i. urtaiity.4-^  The second class, howeverf appear to 
refer to phenomenal objects. They consist of principles* 
u eful, but not held to be roved (even ethi ally; and 
which ore not objects of belief. The utility of these 
irincipies is in connection with science, . the 
principle of Ideology, homogeneity of the species, 
principle of specification, principle of affinity and 
continuity, luie eartn, air, water (in t. e sensL uiider- 
stood in Kant's day> are also Ideas of reason.
22 b 311.
-3 B ^7b.
^  cl*. H footnote. R.B* * o . 147 line refers
to tne same point.
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The epistemic mode in which tuese Ideas of Reason 
are held is an interesting question. Are they matters 
of faith, by virtue of being Ideas of Reason, in the 
same sense in which God, freedom and immortality are 
matters of faith? If the epistemic status of the two 
classes is equivalent, then certain fundamental issues 
are at stake for botn science and theology.
Three distinct possibilities arise from this con­
sideration. It cculd be asked first, that if the Ideas 
of Reason used in science are matters of faith in an 
identical sense in which God, freedom and immortality 
are matters of faith, can the basic concepts of science 
be any more securely believed than the basic concepts 
of natural theology? Since it would thus be implied 
that scientific 'faith* in certain basic concepts was 
necessary for our understanding of the world, it could 
be argued with effect that belief or faith, and not 
merely a theoretical, intellectual assent, is necessary 
as an element in all human knowledge.
This is one sense in which knowledge is denied in 
order to make room for faith. The sense of faith, 
however, is an extended one, which includes not only 
the basic concepts of theology, but also the basic 
concepts of science.
uhile this first possibility gives the advantage to 
theology, by suggesting that science has no more secure 
a conceptual foundation than does theology, the second 
possibility reverses the advantage. It could be argued 
from the same premises, (namely that the epistemic mode 
in which both the scientific and theological classes of 
Ideas of Reason are held is identical), that there is no
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greater justification for the theological concepts, 
than there is for certain working scientific hypotheses.
If it could be argued that there is no difference between 
how Kant defends his scientific ideas of Reason and how 
he defends belief in God, freedom and immort iity, then 
there are serious repercussions for the nature of faith.
If Kant regarded the scientific class of Ideas as merely 
heuristic principles or justified hypotheses, then his 
treatment of the Ideas becomes a form of methodological 
pragmatism. On this basis God, freedom and Immortality 
become merely useful hypotheses or semi-justified 
opinions, whose value depends only on their usefulness.
It may be observed in the passing that this interpretation 
would require Kant to 'go back* on his statement about 
making room for faith. It would imply that he held faith 
in low regard, and was at heart, perhaps, at least agnostic, 
if not in fact an atheist. As I have suggested earlier, 
this position would not be in keeping with the psychology 
of the man himself, however, a Kant scholar such as Hans 
Vaihinger, who was a pragmatist in his outlook, has 
maintained that Kant held such a negative view of faith.
His views on Aant will shortly be examined.
The third possibility to be considered is that, 
while the epistemic mode of holding the Ideas of Reason 
may be same for both the classes of Ideas specified, 
there may be other possible forms of assurance in either 
or both cases, bince it is not the purpose of this 
work to establish in wfcu.t manner the scientific Ideas 
of eason should be used, or defended, except in so far 
as it makes clear an., difference in status between the 
two claaoes of Ideas of Reason, 1 would simply offer the
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view that the KRV affords the scientific Ideas status 
as working hypotheses which assist the ordering of 
experience into knowledge. This is what I take * ant 
to mean when he speaks about limiting knowledge. The 
possibility of giving another form of assurance to the 
Ideas of God, freedom and immortllity therefore remains 
open.
To develop this ti ird possibility, at least in 
embryo, it is necessary to refer back to the second 
line of thought about faith, presented by /.art in 
quotations (b), ^c), and from the idJ. Quotation 
(b) speaks of tne possibility of an assurance of the 
truth of what lies beyond the reach of speculative 
knowledge to prove, ^uoxation (c) connects this form 
of assurance with morality, and by this, Kant makes the 
formal connection between assurance in matters of faith 
and moral experience. In quotation (d), Kant speaks of 
faith as a reason for performing a duty. He sug ests 
that we implicitly believe that by obeying the command 
of duty, we are expressing something more than the thought, 
'This 1 must do'. The something extra is the belief that 
our duty is contributing to a total moral purpose for the 
world.
i rima facie. tnis is far removed from the severity 
of insistence upon the authority of duty spoken of in 
G. However, it could also be argued that the latter 
treatment in the KU is at a different level of argument.
At any rate, Kant looks to the realm of morality for 
assurance in matters of faith, and this issue will be 
duly examined in the context of the question 'How did 
Kant see the connection between ethics and theology'?
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One final question remains to be considered, arising 
out of the quotations from the ivU. Are there two distinct 
emphases in isAnt's conception of faith, emphases which 
do not entirely coincide with each other - tne one 
concerned with tne epistemological status of faith, and 
the other concerned with ethical assurances of God, 
freedom and immortality? The first conception would 
then have resulted from the recognition that knowledge 
has definite limitations, and the second would have 
derived its significance from the problems of practical 
reason.
If I may venture a solution to the difficulty at this 
stage, 1 would suggest that this reflects something of 
the manner in which want's defence of faith develops.
The seveie limitations upon knowledge which he recognises 
is expressed by the fact that the scientific ideas of 
Reason are concerned merely with the possibility of 
knowledge, xrom the standpoint of speculative knowledge, 
the theological Ideas of Reason have no greater standing. 
However, Kant recognises that another form of assurance 
may be possible for these IdeaE, wnich is not possible 
for the former class of Ideas. Central to this line of 
argument is the existence of the 1Thing-in-itself1, which 
is the assurance that knowledge is limited to the pheno­
menal realm. In this way, Kant makes room for forms of 
assurance in matters of faith, which is not possible for 
the scientific Ideas of Reason.
This discussion, however, is no more than a 
preliminary sketch of some aspects of Kant's remarks 
aoout faith. It is hopea to establish two simple points: 
first, to demonstrate that Kant uses tne term 'Faith1,
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(irrespective of the precise meaning he gives to the 
term) as an integral theme of his Critical Philosophy; 
and second, to indicate that there is a worthwhile 
problem in investigating not only Kant's conception of 
faith in and by itself, but also in relation to the 
entire Critical Philosophy. ouch an investigation I 
believe is necessary for a balanced view of the Critical 
Philosophy of Immanuel Kant.
Two extreme views of the meaning of Faith in Kant 
have emerged in stark opposition to each other. The 
one extreme is that j^ant had no religious faith at all, 
and that his statement about faith in the KRV must be 
totally disregarded. The other extreme connects Kant 
witn the Romantic thinkers, and makes faith (in one 
s ecific sense of the tern) the basis of his philosophy, 
extremes of interpretation are always dangerous, 
especially in the matter of interpreting such a profound 
thinker as Kant. However, these views have been sincerely 
held at different times by different thinkers. Therefore 
an honest examination of Kant's views of Faith requires 
that they be accorded respectful treatment.
I propose, therefore, to examine first one and then 
the other, beginning with the question of "Kant's alleged 
- ragmatism". This discussion will be centred upon the 
writings of Hans Vaihinger, the most thorough-going and 
competent exponent of this view.
Hans Vaihinger, in his book translated under the
rrtitle "The Philosophy of As-If",° expounds a version
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of what would now be called the ' pragruatist' thesis.
He does so in terms of the method of 'As-if', which he 
traces through various eras of the history of thought.
He analyses the philosophy of Kant, and adduces evidence 
from the total opera of Kant to support his view that Kant 
was an exponent and practitioner of the method of as-if.
i.ixhout doubt, Vaihinger was a very able i^ant 
commentator in his day, but his particular interests and 
e^phasis^ made him rather one-sided in how he understood 
Kant. The phrase 'as-if' does belon^ to Kant, and it 
could be argued that the seeds of pragmatism lie in Kant.
o too could it be argued that seeds of many more 
doctrines are present in Kant also. It is not Kant's 
use of 'as-if' that is in doubt. *hat is in doubt is 
whether or not all th t Vaihinger attributes to Kant, in 
his assessment of how Kant used the idea, is actually
2 C A art from Vaihinger'>. nredilection towards a prag­
matist position, the key .o hie attitude towards the text 
of the KRV is found in an essay entitled "Die Transcend- 
entale Deduktion Kategorien" (l^OK/, in which 
Vaihinger maintains xhe view that the 'transcendental 
ueduktion' in the KRV (1769) is the result of the 
conflation of more than one version. H.J. laton replied 
to him in his essay "Is the Transcenden al Deduction a 
ratchwork?" i, In Defence uf ..eason iIUL 1951, p* 65) • 
hrofessor Heiroun J . de Vleeschwauer in L*evolution de 
la pensee 1 antienne (Tr. A.R.C. Duncan as The Develop­
ment oi' Kantian Thought Nelson 196c:/ replies by tracing 
the development of Kantian thought as the key to the 
apparent discrepancies. However, this is a highly 
technical question oi nantian exposition, into wi ich 1 
do not propose to enter. I mention it for two reasons - 
first to indicate that Vaihinger was a reputable Kantian 
scholar, and second to explain why he seems to take 
liberties with Kant's writings.
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present. It is the question of whether or not what 
Vaihinger purports to be Kant is, in fact, the real ^ant.
He himself is in no doubt: "Throughout the whole period
between x^ant's appearance and the present day, only a 
very few people have realised that this (Vaihinger's 
pragmatist version of Kant) was the real Kant. Gome 
disciples, as well as opponents, were more or less 
clearly aware of it; others noticed it but had not the 
courage to speak out. The only writer to recognise and 
expound Kant's true doctrine in this respect was 
Torberg".^7
Vaihinger almost could be accused of 'preaching' 
his position, so fervidly does he proclaim it. Howe\er, 
in spite of his zeal to convert, he makes some valuable 
contributions to the debate, and helps to clarify at 
least i.i part, what -.ant did not mean by faith.
1 have liberally used the term 'pragmatism', and by 
it 1 have meant the view ich holds there are no necessary 
objective truths, but merely working hypotheses which are 
stron. ly evidenced oy experience, and sufficiently vouched 
for in that way, for us to regard them 'as-if' they wore 
true in an objective way.
In a somewhat devastating paragraph on Kant#s 
religious philosophy, Vaihinger describes the implications 
of this for Kant, assuming as he does, that Kant's view 
on faith is pragmatist in that sense: "Our presentation
..........  introduces us to quite a new Kant, a Kant in
27 V p. 32«.
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one respect more radical, in another more conservative
than the Kant we have heretofore known. He reveals
himself to us as a theoretical non-theiet, in the sense
that he comes to regard the existence of a Supreme Spirit
etc. in the ordinary sense of existence, as not only not
probable, but extremely improbable - unbelievable and
- 26indeed impossible". '
The passage quoted is then followed by this state­
ment: "buch agnosticism (which xwant's views prevent us
from using as an escape j which is indeed also found in 
Kant and which the majority of his disciples have adopted, 
appears as a weak compromise compared with the radicalism 
of the passages quoted above (in his commentary) wherein 
Kant takes his seat on the extreme 3.eft of the 
philosophical parliament: to him all transcendental 
conceptions are nothing but "self-formed ideas"."
Tnis raises the question quite bluntly "was Kant an 
atheist?" Indeed, this question must be faced. Vaihinger 
appears to be suggesting that Kant held such views by 
arguing that Kant refutes the agnosticism which avoids 
the completely radical step. This naturally poses the 
further problem, of why Kant began his KRV by saying that 
he had made room for faith, if, in fact, he had no faith 
for which to make room, flo^e.theless, Vaihinger argues 
strongly for Kant's 1 pragmatism', which he states in 
these extreme terms.
uther commentators on Kant have followed this line 
ox tnought, ana otner thinkers have fastened on to
V p. 319.
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Vaihinger*s views. The famous Vienna Circle of the 1920s 
was working on views which were the direct descendants of 
Vaihinger. In the Anglo-Saxon world, A.J. Ayer developed 
a position not dissimilar, in which Ayer claims to start 
from Kant’s rejection of transcendent metaphysics, and 
ends up by solving some great philosophical problems by 
accepting only factually significant sentences, viz, 
sentences which the speaker knows how to verify, knowing 
under what conditions the proposition would be true or 
false. He uses this starting point to reach hie view 
of Kant's religious faith.
"Our own analysis has shown that the phenomena of 
moral experience cannot fairly be used to support any 
rationalist or metaphysical doctrine whatsoever. In 
particular, they cannot, as Kant hoped, be used to 
establish the existence of a transcendent god".'
This, of course, is not identical with what Vaihinger 
is saying,; Ayer does not insist that Kant was an atheist. 
He merely claims that Kant’s theism cannot be supported 
on his (Ayer’s) analysis of moral experience, which is 
conducted ostensibly on the principles of Kant’s Critical 
Philosophy. Therefore, however, it could be taken that 
he is saying that Kant’s own premises will not sustain 
the conclusion. This judgement must be faced. Meantime, 
it 15 sufficient to show that, in Vaihinger*s 
terminology, ’left wing’ views have emanated from Kant, 
and that this fact must be taken into account.
29 Ay er - 'Language, Truth and Logic - Victor 
Gollancz, I960.
3° Ibid p . H 4 .
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tte may now proceed to an outline of Vaihinger1s 
doctrine of 'as-if*.
The book itself, in style and expression, is a 
period piece. It contains many assertions which would 
now be tested by scientific research, but which, in 
Vaihinger* s day, would be permitted as being philosophy 
uone according to the grand manner. In recounting wx*at 
he claims, tne truth of this should emerge.
iie enunciates the fiaw of ireponuerance of the Means 
over the -nd1 according to which it is a universal 
phenomenon of nature that means which serve a purpose 
often undergo a more complete development than is 
necessary for the attainment of their purpose, he argues 
that the means may, however, emancipate itself partly or 
wholly, and become an end in itself. Ideas, judgement 
and conclusion, tnat is to say, thought, really was 
intended to serve the will to live, ana was primarily only 
a biological function, however, it too has developed 
according to the saiu law, and thought has lost sight 
of its original practical purpose ana ic practised for 
its own sake, as theoretical thought. Thought thus sets 
itself problems whic- are really impossible, such as the 
problems of the origin and the meaning of the universe, 
and by looking backwards psychologically, we can see how 
some of these problems have arisen, ^ome are purely 
meaningless, such as the iroblem of the square root minus 
one.
Thought-constructs and thought-processes are 
primarily biological phenomena. These phenomena are, 
in manj cases, apparently consciously false asaumxitions
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which either contradict reality or even themselves, but 
which are intentionally formeu to overcome the 
difficulties of thought bj this artificial deviation, 
and reach the goal of thought by roundabout ways and 
paths. These artificial thought-conetructs he calls 
'scientific fictions', and are distinguished as conscious 
creations Dy their 'as-if1 character. The 'as-if' world 
is as important as the so-called real world, and indeed 
is more important for ethics and aesthetics. This world, 
however, which finally becomes a world of v;lues in the 
form of religion must be distinguished from the world of 
becoming.
This then is a simple outline of Vaihinger's position. 
He develops it with all the complicated terminology of a 
scientific deduction. Chapter is entitled "Outline 
of a General Theory of fictional Constructs'', and here 
the gist of the position is stated that fictional 
constructs are ideas useu because of tneir logical 
utility, but from this their objective reality should 
not be inferred. Tney are subjective categories or 
generai. ideas whicn are useful as a method of understanding, 
out their value in this respect should not be used to 
suggest that they have any reality beyond that of their 
usefulness. It is to nave a convenient way of understand­
ing the world that we use them, and in tne end, truth 
becomes not much more than the most helpful and expedient 
fiction. "As-if” is the key to how such fictional 
constructs are used, we speak and act 'as-if' they were 
the case, for the purpose of making sense and being 
understood, but the question of the actuality of the 
constructs is another matter. It ma^ well require the
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answer 'We cannot know....1.
Clearly, of course, imnt'e views of our use of the 
categories of the ^nderstandir^ to organise our intuitions 
into the world we know is echoed here, and so too, the 
problem of whether our experience of the phenomenal can 
be verified by an appeal to reality.
This said, we must now look in detail at the passages 
cited by Vaihinger from kant, as evidence o± want's use 
of the 'as-if' method.
He opens with the KRV. In the "Transcendental 
dialectic", the 'as-if' method makes its appearance.
Vaihinger concenir tes his case upon the classic 
statement found in section 3 of the "Transcendental 
Doctrine of ketho ", which is entitled "The Discipline 
of ure Reason in Hypothesis". Lant says: "The concepts
of reason are, we have said, mere ideas, and have no 
object that can be met with in an„ e. rience. Nona the. 
less, they do not, on this account, signify objects tliat, 
having been invented, are thereupon assumed to be 
possible. They are thought oiuv problc -.'cally in order 
that, upon them, (as heuristic fictions) we may base 
regulative principles of the systematic employment of 
the understanding in the field of experience".
He continues and illustrates his point: "Dave in
t*ds connection they are merely thought entities, the 
possibility of which is not demonstrable, and which, 
therefore do not allow of bein^ employed,in the 
character oi hypotheses, in explanation of actual
e.trances. It is quite permissible to think the soml os siinp(e/ 
in order, in conformity with this idea to employ as the
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principle of our interpretation of its inner appearances 
a complete and necessary unity of all its faculties; and 
this is in spite of the fact that this unity can never 
be apprehended in concreto. But to assume the soul as 
a simple substance (a transcendent concept) would be (to 
propound; a proposition which is not only indemonstrable - 
as is the case with many physical hypotheses, but is 
haphazard in a quite blind ana arbitrary fashion".21
, ailiinger asserts that here, Kant is distinguishing 
between the Ideas 01 Reason, which he describes as 
'heuristic fictions', and hypotheses, which are linked 
with the given in experience, and are therefore genuine 
explanations. Kant may be adduced in amplification of 
this: "A transcendental hypothesis, in which a mere idea 
of reason is useo. in explanation of natural existences 
would really be no explanation; so to proceed would be 
to explain something which, in terms of known empirical 
principles, we do not understand sufficiently, by some­
thing which we do not understand at all. Moreover, the 
principle of such an hypothesis would, at most, serve 
* only for the satisfaction of reason, not for tne further­
ance of the employment of the understanding in respect 
of objects, order anu purposiveness in nature must 
themselves be explained from natural grounds and 
according to natur 1 laws; and the wildest hypothesis, 
if only they are physical are here ^hier; more tolerable 
than a hyper-physic 1 hypothesis, such as the appeal to 
a divine Author assumed simply in order that we may have 
an ex planation .&
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This, says Vaihinger, opens and closes his ccse 
because, ’’Had we always this famous passage before our 
eyes, hant's whole doctrine of Ideas would have been 
better understood from the first”.53 i shall follow 
Vaihinger's further exposition of ^ant, asking at every 
stage; 'Is ..ant saying what Vaihinger claims th^t he 
says?'
nven at this early stage, it is possible to have 
reservations about Vaihingerfs interpretation of uant, 
merely on the basis of the way in which Kant speaks, 
rirstly, A.ant does not condemn the use of the term soul 
in any context whatsoever. He appears to be concerned 
only that an illicit; extension of the significance of 
the term should rot be i^ade so tnat an Idea of reason 
should function a description of something empirical. 
The whole emphasis of ..ant is upon the context of the use 
and abuse oi the Ideas, anu the context is made clear when 
he speaks about anything being more tolerable than using 
the Idea of God merely as an explanation ... •KLbfl. The 
addition of hier has the sense of 'in this context', 
with perhaps the sug, estion imprred tnat rrom another 
standpoint, speaking about God may be legitimate, but 
certainly not merely through the hypostatisation of the 
Ideas of Reason.
Then, from B 805 to 81G, mant hints about the 
nature 01 the otner ways in which the Ideas may be 
discussed, or at least ways in which reference may be 
legitimately maue to them. 'But, although in dealing 
with the merely speculative questions of pure reason,
/ . <-72
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hypotheses are not available for the purposes of 
basing propositions upon them, they are yot entirely 
,ermissiole for the purposes of defending propositions; 
that is to say, they may not be employed in any dogmatic, 
but onl^ in polemical fashion61.54
rhe burden of proof would thus rest with the 
opponent, because in the practical (moral; sphere, reason 
has certain ‘rights of possession1, which it does not 
need to p r o v e . ~ i n c e  the advocate of the Ideas is 
utting forward something necessary for the practical 
employment of reason, then he is at an advantage, and 
the burden of proof against must lie with the opponent.
hant says quite explicitly: "hypot .eses are
therefore, in t- domain of pure reason, permissible 
on-L., as weapons 01 war, and onlj for the purpose of 
defending a right, not in order to establish it".55
Aihat is Kant in effect saying? He is surely 
implying that it is as reasonable to believe in the 
existence of the Ideas, as it is to have reservations 
about them as Ideas which have reality ond their 
merely problematic use. Since, further, there is a 
measure of practical (moral) necessity about them, 
then from the point of view of lure speculative heascn, 
there is, indeed, must be, room for faith. There is as 
much to ,'ustify faith as there is to cast doubt.
Vaihinger seems to ignore Xant!s claim that 
hypotheses may be used as ‘weapons of war* in the domain 
of pure reason, and he does so to the discredit of his




overall aigument. Kant’s admission of this would ippear 
to give the Ideas of Reason somewhat more status than 
mere ‘heuristic fictions' and 'as-if‘ notions.
moving back now to Vaihinger's treatment of the 
earlier part of the 'Dialectic1, Kant says: "1 undex-
stand by idea a necessary concept of reason, to which 
no corresponding object can be given in sense experience. 
Thus, the pure concepts of reason now under consideration 
are transcendental ideas. They are concepts of pure 
reason, in that they view all knowledge gained in 
experience as being determined through an absolute 
tot .lity of conditions. They are not arbitrarily 
invented; they are imposed by the very nature of reason 
itself, and therefore stand in necessary ielation to the 
whole employment oi understanding. Rinally, they are 
transcendent, and overstep the limits of all experience; 
no object adequate to the transcendental idea can ever 
be found within experience'5.56
nant indeed does say that the Ideas of rare Reason 
are transcendental ideas, whicl cannot determine any 
object, but which may be used as a canon for the proper 
employment of unuerstanding. Thus, says Vaihinger, they 
are heuristic fictions. However, Vaihin er appears to 
disiegard what  ^ant says further on; ’’Although we must 
say of the transcendental concepts of reason that they 
are onlj ideas, this is not by any means to be taken as
signifying: that they are superfluous and void .........
further - what we need nere no more tuan mention - 
concepts of reason may perhaps make possible a transition
D ^64.
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from the concepts of nature (Haturbegriffen)57 to the 
Iractical concepts (proktischen)^, and in that way, may 
givu support to the moral ideas (moralischen Ideen)37 
themselves, bringing them into connection with the 
speculative knowledge of reason". Kant finishes with 
the significant sentence: "As to all this, we must await
the explanation in the sequel".
*.ant here again appears to be denying knowledge to 
make room for some other possibility, hinting very 
broadly (from the sense of selbst^ •). that there is a 
spont neous connection between Ideas of reason and 
concepts necessary for understanding our moral reason.
The Ideas of reason iz appears, may be approached in 
another way, an; if Kant's sinceri y is not to be called 
into question, Vu^ninger's exposition of nant certainly 
pays attention to only half of what i.ant claims to be 
saying. It is want's sense of the term 'fiction' that 
is at stake, i^ant sees the Ideas as fictions, from the 
point of view of objective Knowledge empirically 
acquired, but suggests that the-e are othej. ways of 
seeing the Ideas, and that from these okc. points of 
view (or point of view), the Ideas ma^ not be fictions 
in the s. me sense, or indeed, may not be fictions at 
all.
next Vaihinger considers a passage from the 'Antinomy 
of lure Reason*. At section t, the title reads 'The 
regulative xrii.ciple ol xure xteason in its application
57 D Vol. 4 i. 332
58 B p. 565 and 386.
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tc the Cosmological Ideas’. He equates the term
’regulative principle’ with the expression 'rules for
understanding'. Then he moves to the section entitled
"The Final Purpose of the Natural Dialectic of Human •*gReason", where Kant uses the expression 'as-if' in
the following way: (This, Vaihinger takes, is Kant
clarifying what he means by the regulative use of the
Ideas of Reason). "In conformity with these ideas and
principles, we shall first in psychology, under the
guidance of inner experience, connect all the appearances,
all the actions and receptivity of our mind, AS IF the
mind were a simple substance which persists with persoxxal
identity   Secondly, in cosmology, we must follow
up the conditions of both inner and outer natural
appearances, in an enquiry which is to be regarded as
never allowing of completion, just AS IF the series of
appearances were in itself endless, without any first
or supreme m e m b e r ........ Thirdly, and finally in
the domain of theology, we must view everything that can
belong to the context of possible experience AS IF this
experience formed an absolute, but at the same time,
completely dependent and sensibly conditioned unity,
and yet also at the same time Ad IF the sum of all
appearances Ithe sensible world itself; had a single,
highest and all sufficient ground beyond itself, a
namely, a self-suosistent, original, creative
».40reason  ...... " r
Kant is saying that we must connect our appearances
39 a p. o97 ff. 
4P B p. 700.
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and intuitions in sue*- a way, as-if there were for us 
a soul, a world and God. Tliis is how we make experience 
comprehensible.
but is Kant not doing more tuan postulating a mere 
method, or a way of understanding? Further on, Ant 
says: "now ther«- as nothing whatsoever to n m d e r  us
from assuming these ideas to be also objective, that 
is, from hypostatising them - except in the case of 
the cosmological Ideas, where reason is so proceeding, 
falls into antinomy. The psychological and theological 
ideas contain no antinomy and involve no contradiction, 
how then ca.. anyone dispute their (possible, objective 
reality? He who denies their possibility must do so 
with as little knowledge ( 0 1 this possibility) as we 
can have in affirming it".41
Kant again returns to the point that to deny the 
possibility of the soul and Goci requires equally as 
much proof as does the pc.itive afiirmation of these 
entities. Jinoe there is need to posit them, then, of 
course, the burden e* disproof rests u on the opponent.
In summarising the purpose of the natural dialectic 
of human reason, Kant says: "lure Reason is in fact 
occupied with nothing but itself. It is not a 
constitutive principle that enables us to aetermine 
anything in respect of its direct object, but only a 
merely regulative principle and maxim to further and 




..hat does he mean by 1 regulative principle1? Does 
he mean no more than ’heuristic fiction1? nant seems 
to stress the ’as-if' character of his views.
"This object as tnue entertained by reason is a 
mere idea; it is not assumed as something tx±at is real 
absolutely in itself, but is postulated only problem­
atically ..........  in oraer that we may view all
connection of the things of the world of sense A- II 
they had their grounds in such a being”.4-/
"The speculative interest of reason matces it 
necessary to regard all order in the world AU-Ii it 
originated in the purpose (Absicht) of a supreme 
reason .44
"Can we, on ouch grounds, assume a wise and 
omnipotent Author of the world? Undoubtedly we may; 
and we not only may, but IUUT do so. iut do we then 
extend our knowledge beyond the lielu of possible 
experience? by no means. All that we have aone is 
merely to presuppoce a something, a merely transcend­
ental object of which, as it is in itself, we have no 
concept whatsoever .45
"Thus pure reason, which at first seemed to promise 
nothi.^ less than the extension of knowledge beyond all 
limits of experience, contains if properly understood, 
nothing but regulative principles, which indeed, while 
prescribing greater unity than the empirical employment




of the understanding can a c h i e v e..........  carry its
agreement with itself, by means of systematic unity, 
to thv* highest possible degree, nut if, 011 the other 
hand, they be misunderstood and treated as constitutive 
principles of transcendent knowledge, they give rise, by 
aassling and deceptive illusion, to persuasion and a 
merely fictitious knowledge, and therewith to contra­
dictions ane eternal disputes".46
These passages do seem to substantiate Vaihinger’s 
tnesis, namely, that kant regarded the Ideas as ’as-if1 
tools 01 method and nothing more. However, more 
properly, what Kant seems to say is that the Ideas of 
keason, from the standpoint of pure speculative reason, 
must be seen in that light, as being possessed only of 
an ’as-if’ character. However, he does no. preclude the 
possibility t±iat there are other standpoints from which 
the iueas may be viewed. .e is only emphatic about 
their regulative employment when speaking in terms of 
their use by pure reason. This fact should not be 
forgotten. The considerations oi iractical ueason, of 
course, ^ant later developed, ana it is ci^ar that he 
is leaving the question open in the IIV.
Lant’s argument is now taken u by Vaihinger as 
from the beginning of the Dialectic Book II Chapter III
’The Ideal of xure ^eason’: ” ....  ideas are even
further removed from the objective reauity than the 
categories, for no appearance can be found in which 
they can be represented in concreto ............But what
B 12.-}U.
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I e-title the Ideal seems to be further removed from 
objective reality t .an even the idea. By the Ideal 1 
understand the idea, not merely in concreto, but in 
individuo, that is, as an individual thing, determinable, 
or even determined by the idea alone".47
The Idea of God is spoken of as the omnitudo 
realitatis, and with regard to thi3 transcendental idea, 
x^ant says: "In any such use of the transcendental idea,
we should, however, be overstepping the limits of its 
purpose and validity. For reason in employing it as a 
basis for tne complete determination of things has used 
1 nly as the concept of all reality without requiring 
That all this reality be objectively given, and be a 
tiling itself. Such a thing is a mere fiction in which 
we combine ana realise the manifold oi our iaea in an 
ideal, as an individual being".
In this particular section of the TV, and in these 
passages, Vaihinger1s interpretation of Kant seems 
correct, up to a point. If however, the passages are 
set properly in the full context of the surrounding 
ar ament, it becomes clear that, for int, any reference
to God seems to hinge upon the idea of the totality of
reality, and any purposeful movement within it. This 
is where God comes in to his thought, but naturally, 
in keeping with the limits set by negative employment,
.ant tlius is still 3.eavi?ig the doorway to metical
reason open.
47 B
40 b  606.
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section III is next discussed: Hnotwithstanding 
this pressing need of reason to presuppose something 
that may afford t ie understanding a sufficient foundation 
for the complete determination of its concepts, it is yet 
much too easily conscious of tL^ ideaf and merely 
fictitious character of such a presu osition to allow 
itcoli, on tixis ground alone, to be -rsuadod that a 
mere creature of its own thought is a real being ..... "49
Kant is refuting the traditional and rationalist 
proofs of God's existence, as may be found in Descartes, 
for example. He shows that speculative reason cannot 
xrove that od exists. Kant analyses the three possible 
w ijs of proving that u-ou exists bv speculative reason, 
and points oui the impossibility of these. However, is 
Vaihinger justified in implying that i^ant is refuting 
the Idea of God altogether, .nd saying that, when it is 
used, it can have no more than an *as-if character? 
from the point of specula ive reason, it has to be 
underiineu, QIThY, is Kant saying this, from that 
standpoint, God is convenient fictional construct, 
but this for nant clearly does not exhaust the idea of 
all its possibilities.
Vaihinger then quotes Kant in answer to those who 
would argue that the idea of God is inscrutable:
11 ....... the transcendental object lying at the basis
oi appearances ........ is and remains for us inscrutable
. •. Hut it is quite otherwise with an ideal of pure 
reason; it can never ue said to be inscrutable, for 
since it is not required to give any credentials of 
its reality save oni., tue need on the part of reason
49 B 6 1 1 -2 .
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to complete all synthetic unity by means of it; and 
since therefore, it is in no wise given as a thin :able 
object, it cannot be inscrutable in the manner in which 
an object is .5
Rant indeed does say that, if there is not a 
conceivable object, then it cannot be inscrutable. 
Vaihinger, however, perhaps states his case too strongly 
when he argues that the Ideas are the mere creations of 
r e a s o n.51 Reason often presupposes them as riant says, 
but it does not create them. Reason can be accused of 
allowing illusion to arise when we are tempted to 
hy ostasise its Ideas, but reason as ’creating1 God, and 
the world, is merely seeing the question in favour of 
fas-if’.
.Further, thi~ passage at h b4£, vaihinger regards 
as crucial. Strangely enough, Kemp Smith omitted it 
from his abbreviated edition of the KRV! It cdrains 
in Vaihinger*s words: "a disavowal of the traditional
view of the Kantian doctrine of the ideas which represents 
i.nnt as having in the idiV taught the inscrutability of 
the intelligible world, whereas in the KPV he had on 
moral lines proved the reality of the ideas relating 
thereto, such as those of God, freedom and immortality".52
In answer to this point, it must be said that there 
is here a play on two senses of the word 1 inscrutable1. 
There is inscrutable in the sense that something cannot
50 13 6 4 2 .
51 V p. ^77.
52 V 2o 6.
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be known or explained at all by its very nature. In 
attacking those who try to defend God in this , 
Vaihinger perhaps correctly uses .ant.
However, there is the other sense of inscrutable 
ae meaning somethin^ which is inaccessible to reason in
its speculative employment ....  inscrutable to
speculative examination. This would refer to something 
of whose existence we know, but about wnich we can really 
know little other t.mn that there is a reason to believe 
it exists. If Vaihinger was correct, then ,nnt would be 
refuting his distinction between ’..hencmena* and 
’noumena1, which i3 really the keystone of the XRV, and 
which makes fundamenta-u^ clear Kant’s ov rail position.
In txie apps ix to section V,53 an-t cays that 
hy ostasising is a natural illusion. The principle of 
seeking a necessary first cause is heuristic and 
regulative. Both are distinct functions. »Ve are to 
philcso KsLze about nature As IF there were a first cause 
anu we have the regulative use of this idea, but the 
idea, of course, is not the assertion of an existence. 
Vaihinger does not seem to see the negative employment 
of the Ideas as a separate matter from the benefit of 
having the idea. The benefit is that science may proceed
with the px-agmatic assumption of G o d  and the two
ways of using the idea are 'distinct. Section VI54 
emphasises again the usefulness of the Ideas for science 
and the domain of experience, well and good, but is this 
i ant audits may be said for these ideas.
\ 53 3  6 4 5 £f. 
>4 3 o4b f£.
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significantly, in section VII, which V ..ihinger 
never mentions, we find these words of Kant: "The
objective reality (of the -u,reme Bein^/ cannot indeed 
be proved, but also cannot be disproved by merely 
speculative reason. If THLN IHEXk* 0 t Bs A MORAL 
Th_.G- jGT which can make _ood this deficiency, trans­
cendental theology, which before was only problematic, 
will ]rove itself indispensable in determining the 
conce t of this su1 reme being and, in co. l tantly testing 
reason, wh:ch is so often deceived by sensibility, and
bowhich is frequently out of harmony with its own ideas .
Inis passage appears to support th^ view 1 have 
been suggesting, that Vaihinger, apart from being too 
selective in the passages he quotes, also I ils to see 
that Kjuit is constantly reiterating tne theme that the 
-Limitations he sees upon knowledge exist , rimarily from 
the standpoint Oi speculative reason.
57The Appendix to the JDiaiectic h *s man,, 
interesting passages in it, and some of these are 
discussed.
Kant refutes Vaihinger*s assertion that reason 
creates the world and dod when he •ays: "Reason is 
never in i mediate relation to an object, b t only to 
the understanding; and it is only through the under- 
st-ndirr tnat it has its own spe .iiic em] iric 1 employ­
ment. it does not tnerefore create concepts ^ol objects) 
but only orders them ana gives tneru th t unity which 
they c n have only if they be employet in tneir widest
k' u . 65$ If .
57 iJ 1 jJ> p. o l±. •
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possible application, that is with a view to obtaining 
totality in the various s e r i e s " . 58
The ideas are regulative, and this we have already 
acknowledged, but Kant says that reason does not create 
them, only orders them.
The ‘Final jurpose of the hatural Dialectic of 
Human neason* has already been mention- ,and,of course, 
the same caveat applies in considering Vaihinger*s 
exposition of Kant. While nant speaks of *As-if* with 
regard to the status of God and the soul and the world, he 
nowhere affirms that these entities do not exist at all. 
Only from the point of view of speculative reason do they 
have the *as-if* character.
"The transcendental Doctrine of Method" is next 
discussed. However, here .ant takes a firmer stand, 
and one cannot escape the feeling that Vaihinger is on 
very treacnerous ground when trying to read his version 
of pragmatism into Kant. In Lection 4 *The Discipline 
of Pure Reason in Regard to its .roofs*, Kant underlines 
the view that in transcendental knowledge, "so long as 
we -re concerned only with the concepts of the under­
standing, our guide is the possibility of ex p e rience".59
Vaihinger*s point is that all the way through his 
argument, Kant is using illustrations which are really 
methodological fictions of the pragmatist variety. without 
probing further into detailed exegetical points at this 
stage (since 1 believe that the earlier analyses of the 
text of nant show that Vaihinger is selective in hie 
quotations,, I would like to focus attention on a passage
5b b  671 
59 B bll
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from the ‘Canon of iiire Reason*f section y, entitled: 
"Opinion, Anowledge and Belief". Rant says: "Moreover
the outcome of my attempts (in explanation of nature) so 
frequently confirms the usefulness of this postulate, 
while nothing decisive can be cited against it, that 1 
am saying too little if 1 proceed to declare that 1 hold
it merely as an opinion, nven in this theoretical
relation it can be said that I firmly believe in God".^
Irior to this, at Section d *The Ideal of the .lighest
Good as a determining Ground of the Ultimate ^nd of lure
Reason*, Rant says, in suggestion that there is another 
way to approach tne Ideas of Reason: "One other line
oi enquiry remains open to us: namely whether pure reason 
may not also be met with in the practical sphere, and 
wnether it may not there conduct us to ideas which reach 
to those highest ends of pure reason that we have just 
stated, and whether therefore reason may not be able to 
supply us from the standpoint of its practical interest 
what it altogether refuses to supply in respect of its 
speculative interest" .*>1
These two passages speak eloquently for themselves 
and require no further comment in the light of what 1 
have already said.
nant does indeed see the need to make room for 
faith, and himself feels that there are grounds for 
naving faith in the Ideas of neason, stronger grounds 
than for not believing at all. From the standpoint of 
pure reason, they can be only useful notions, but 
practical reason may well supply what is missing in
60 B 654
61 B 3 W
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assurance•
Vaihinger0^ does admit that he only quotes from 
certain sections of JLant's KRV, and the passages he rejects 
are those of the pre-critical strand of the work.63 
However, one small thought which Vaihinger never mentions 
is Rant's constant thought that the very usefulness of 
the Ideas methodologically speaking suggests that they 
might well be worth investigating further, and that 
moral considerations may explain why they are so useful 
to science, and its account of the world of experience.
Vaihinger then takes a look at Kant's writings on 
ethics and religion, and ^akes a start with G. In 
Cnapter ill he sees the use of the 'as-if* method: "Low
I assert that every being who cannot act except under 
the Idea of freedom, is by this alone from a practical 
point of view, really free; that is to say, for him all 
the laws insep irabxy bound up with freedom are valid, 
just as much AS IF his will could be pronounced free in 
itself on grounds valid for theoretical philosophy' .64
Is Kant saying that freedom is a mere idea with no 
reality? VKiat is the force of the saying that freedom 
mUk.t be 'presupposed' (in the heading of the section)?
62 v p. 2bb-7
Vaihinger also quotes from tne prolegomena , but 1 
’ uo not feel that space is justified to answer the 
points made. The irole^omena is a summary of the 
iUvV, anu the one set of answers should be adequate.
64 G p. 115.
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Jurely Kant's closing words which follow as-if. suggest 
something more than a mere idea. The as-if is not so 
significant as the statement tnat freedom is as valid as 
though it had been proved theoretically for speculative 
reason.
We are then confronted by Vaihinger with the
following quotation: " ....  the Idea of a purely
intelligible world, as a whole of all intelligences 
to which we ourselves belong as rational beings (although 
from another point of view we are members of the sensible 
world aL well) remains alwayE a serviceable and permitted 
Idea for the purposes of a rational belief, though all 
knov/ledge ends at its boundary: it serves to produce in 
us a lively interest in the moral law by means of the 
splendid Ideal of a universal kingdom of ends In them­
selves (rational beings) to which we can only belong if 
we are scrupulous to live in accordance with the maxims 
of freedom A*.< IP they were laws of nature".0-
Added to this must be the supreme formulation of the 
principle of morality: "Act A^ IF the maxim of your
action were to become through your will a universal law 
of nature" . 00
Vaihinger claims that the hypothetical framework 
of morality, and the consequent 'fictional nature' of 
the Ideas is suggested in these ,-assages. But does the 
context support this? In the KRV the Ideas were 
introduced to give knowledge a systematic unity. In Gr, 
Kant is explaining 'how morality works' so to speak, and
65 G p. 1 3 c.
66 G p. 69.
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is merely illustrating this by means of the 'ae-if' 
device.
Another formulation of the supreme principle of 
morality reads: Act onxy on that maxim you can at the
same time will that it should .become a universal law*' .67
There is a difference between saying 'To have 
systematic knowledge, we must proceed in thought as 
though or as-if, there were a God', and sayin^ 'Acts
Ab-Ir  or 'Act on what you can will as law
'A--if' has two distinct forces: It can have the force
of something presupposed for the sake of argument or 
meaning, and the force of something predicated as a 
possibility in terms of consequences. Vaihinger does 
not *ake this distinction of sense, and therefore does
not read Kant correctly in this context.
Vaihinger then quotes the passage "......... And
precisely here we encounter the paradox that without 
an*y further end or advantage to be attained the mere 
dignity of humanity, that is, of rational nature in 
man - and consequently that reverence for a mere Idea - 
shoalti function as an inflexible precept for the will; 
and that it is just this freedom from dependence on 
interested motives which constitutes the sublimity of a 
maxim and the worthiness of every rational subject to be 
a law-making member in the kin dom of ends: for otherwise 
he would have to be regarded as subject only to the law 
of nature - the law of his own needs”.°
he regards this passage aE most important, and has
67 G p. b8 .
6fa G p. 106.
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this comment to make upon it: ”ln this passage, Kant
reached the high-water mark of his critical philosophy: 
the 'dignity of man', the 'realm of purposes' - this 
Kant acknowledges and teaches - are “mere ideas”, concepts, 
that is without any reality, orug 'heuristic fictions', 
only modes of approach, only a standpoint; we can, should 
and must look upon the things as if it were so. But in 
spite of tiiis realisation of the fictive nature of this 
mode of representation, man as a 'rational being1, 
orders his conduct in accordance with these fictions, 
here we reach the highest pix-nacle attained by Kantian 
bought, or indeed, by any human thought. Only a few, 
an elite, can continue to breathe at all at this 
altitude: the vast majority n^ed a different, a lesE 
rarified atmosphere”.°-
Apart from tne mountaineering meta nor which exalts 
mant, there is the questionable assertion that tnis is 
the hi ;hest pinnacle of any human thought. Could not 
the commandment 'uove your enemies', taken not merely 
as a commanau,ent of t'esus, but as a command which strikes 
our consciences with a moral authority 01 itc own, be 
regarded as having come 'from the e w e  altitude'?
However, Vaihir er's fascination with the notion 
that a mere Idea serves as m  inflexible rule for the 
will is what leads him astray. Perhaps tne Idea of the 
kingdom of Ends is important, but surely the free dor..
from dependence on interested motives is very real,
freedom here is no mere idea. It is something which we
experience when we act independently of eeuf-interest•
Kant's statement indeed does depict human nature
V p. 293.
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in elevated terms, but far from reducing morality to 
a dignified response to a set of Ideas, morality and the 
worthwhileness of life are closely tied together, and 
this implies that } ant was concerned with the experience 
of living, and not merely with expressing a ]ragmatic 
theory of human conduct.
The KPV contains little which interests Vaihinger. 
\  iAe takes the general view that the KPV contains many 
elements of the pie-critical dogmatism from which Kant 
sought to extricate himself. However, he admits that 
the radical elements do not totally vanis^, and quotes 
from Section 1 , par. 7 , where the idea of holiness is 
described as a practica- Idea, lie points o^ .t that the 
meaning of the expression 'objective reality' shifts 
its meaning in the x^ T'f 9 and that when it is not being 
used in the old dogmatic sense, he can see indications 
o a inorG pragmatic meaning.
’’Tills holiness of will is, howevei, a ractical 
iueal which must necessarily serve as a model which all 
finite rational beings must strive towerd even tnough 
they cannot reach it. The pure moral law, which is 
itself for this reason called holy, constantly and 
rightly bolus it before their eyes”.^ -
Yaininger's general view of the relation between 
the h a and the klV is that the if lapses xnto i-hc 
pre-critical rationalism from which I ant had tried to 
emerge. xhis ]roblem is of course a major question of 
Kanti n exegesis, but 1 would su<_ est that it is rather 
a superficial view in light of the importance whicn 
iant laid upon the limitations he had discovertd in
p. 33
- 47 -
speculative reason. In light of this, a detailed 
answer to Vaihinger's rather sketciiy comments is 
hardly requi ed.
It xs in K tnat Vaihin er next claims to find many 
important passages, and he goes through the book citing 
uvery instance 01 the u~e of 'as-if, and explaining 
these as fictional constructs. Lov/ever, in looking at
io neli ion carefully, it could be irgued that the 
'as-if' statements could be grouped into at least three 
main classes, and that this classification, if acceptable, 
weakens Vaihinger's case before it Cu.j h . cee.
imnt speaks of a schematism oi unalo, 71 by which 
he means, to render a concept intel„ic,ible by the help 
Oa. an analogy to .onething sensible. He says "It is on 
no account permitted to iicfer (and thus to extend our 
concept) by this analogy, that what holds of the former, 
must all 0 be attributed to the latter, such n inference 
is i .possible for the simple reason that it would run 
directly counter to ail analogy to conclude that because 
we absolutely need a schema to render a concept 
inteiligiole to ourselves (to support it with an example/
it therefore follows that this senega must necessarily
belong to the object itself as its predicate"
This echoes what the KKV said in essence about the 
Ideas viev/ed from the point of viev; of theoretical 
reason.
There are those passages which relate to the as-if 
as used in the ractical sphere of mora judgement.
71 R . 5 9 - footnote.
72 p # - footnote.
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Kant says that we s^e an evil act from the standpoint 
of its maxis, (principle of volition, and we tend to see 
the action in terms of its ground and consequents, as if 
it .ere a rule 01 action. 73
"....  secause these actions ar,. of such a nature
tir.x we nay infer from the presence in him of evil 
maxims . (op- cit. p* 16)
".svery evil act if we look for the rational origin 
Ox it must be treated ^  If the individual has passed 
straight to it from a condition of i n n o c e n c e ".74
This use of as-if is methodolc icul and is ualified 
by statements about maxims and (from G, statements about 
what the action implies as ground and consequent.
*/. wo third group of passages in wixiCxi 'fictional 
constructs' appear in 'die Religion' bring in something 
altogether new. Vaihinger now gets close to undermining 
.ant's concept of faith in this context, e. . The devil
i.ell ar« introduced as examples of fictional constructs , 
like the Virgin Birth and the 'Son of God'.
"It is indeed a limitation of human reason that we 
can conceive of no considerable mor 1 wor* h in the actions 
of a personal being without representing that person or 
iiis manifestation in a human g u i s e ....
The scriptures often accommodate themselves to this 
mode of representation when, in order to make us 
comprehend the degree of God's love for the i.uman racu, 
they ascribe to him the very highest sacrifice which a
73 R p. 16.
74 r  p . 3o.
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luving being can make, a sacrifice _erfonned in order 
that even those who are unworthy should be made happy • • • • 
... (John 5:16)" 75
uant appears to be saying that the concept of the 
*^on of God* is a morally useful myth. This would 
appear to be a fictional construct of a sort, and the 
Virgin rirth is dealt with similarly76 bj Kant. However, 
two points must be made:
first, .^ant says: (of the *Lon of God* concept)
"from the practical point of view this idea is 
completely real in its own right, for it resides in 
oui morally xe iislative reason”. 11
This is a clear statement oi Kant1c view of the 
status of the idea.
However, nant does make a distinction between 
elauberssachen, matters of faith .... Gou, freedom and 
im ortality, and Glaubensartikel, articles of faith, 
as contained in credal statements such as 11 believe in 
the Virgin Birth* (for example from the apostles* Creed).
Kant sees these as distinct in status, and there 
may well be a case for argument that he viewed them 
mainly as morally useful myths. This point will be 
discussed later. Meantime, it rs sufficient to observe 
that, while some statements may be dealt with as *as-if* 
statements, Kant ?_s clear about the differ nee in status 
and the *uon of Gou' statement, further, he nowhere
75 it p. [jb - footnote.
76 R p. 75
77 r P . 5 5 .
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impugns the status of what composed Glaubenssache-..
Vaihinger turns to the ab, but in fact offers no 
analysis of it at ail. He rests his case with a 
reference to an unpublished e s s a y ,78 written by kant 
for a prize offered by Herlin University in 1791« ihe 
fact that ilant diu not publish it sug eststwo 
possibilities, either he did not regard it as a valuable 
contribution to his thought, or that he regarded it as 
iixconc i„ tent with his general Critical position.
Vaihinger regards it as the supreme statement of .ant's 
methodological pragmatism, mrich A d i c k e s , 79 ±n an 
analysis of the essay, makes an excellent reply to 
Vaihinger: In reality, Kant is here, (i.^. in the
Preisschrift ) as everywhere, the strongest opponent of 
pragmatism, what is the basis of Vaihin er's misunder­
standing is the fact that kant, in the 'Fortsohritte'
( ages 139 - 197 j repeatedly reiterates that G-od, freedom 
ana immortality are self-made Concepts or Ideas".79 
Adickes then makes the point wixich I have constantly 
euph L.sised in Liy discussion of Vaihinger: "Fron the
teachr.^ of KV and from the general critical standpoint 
he nay cay nothing else, although he may otherwise be 
convinced of the real existence of those objects which 
are beyond sense experience".'
Adickes develops this point with reference to Kant's 
essay itself, and establishes that Kant recognised moral 
considerations as the source from which conviction could 
arise about Ideas of Reason.^
fxeissohriit uber uie jj ortscixritte der i-ietaphysik
( - , 'o.icemn i r5e FuTui [ r sics.,)
7 iD] . . aant u.-d die Als-ob uiloGQ. ie (Frommans
~tuttgart 1 ^ 2 7 p7 '2 ^b -"537';
Adickes ol. cit o 2 3 7  - 24.2.
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In completing my own formal reply to Vaihinger,
I would, quote Professor A.C. Jiving: "Kant refuses to
class the beliefs in God, freedom and inn ortality as 
justified opinions or hypotheses, partly because he 
thinks these words too weak to express the certainty 
of the beliefs in question, but partly because he 
thinks th ,t such words should only be used where we 
have a definite concept of the nature of what we are
postulating......... Kant in fact limits opinion to the
sphere of causal reasoning among phenomena, and insists 
that in meta. hysics or critical philoso ry, as in math­
ematics, our arguments being apriori either prove their 
conclusions with certainty or have no value at all.
^ince propositions about God and immortality were 
according to him neither cases of opinion or knowledge, 
he had to find a new niche for them, and did it by 
introducing a third class of cognitive attitudes, which 
he called belief or p r a c t i c a l  knowledge ,c-
11 The question may reasonably be asked how it is that 
havint denied the possibility of attaining any sort of 
knowledge or even justified opinion about reality 
through theoretical reason, Kant could consistently 
claim to do so by means of practical reason. Ke would 
answer by pointing out the total difference (on his 
viewj between ethical and theoretical k n o w l e d g e ” ^
These quotations sum up the nature of my reply to 
Vaihinger. Kant speaks of the Ideas of Reason quite 
differently from those concepts classified as justified 
opinions or hypotheses. The difference between
kl u. ^wing shorter Commentary on Critique 
of -ure . eason hethuen 1 9 3 9 p. 2 4 8 .
awinG op. cit. p. 2 5 0 .
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theoretical and practical reason enableE him to study 
them again in the light of morality.
To try to reduce Kant1s faith to mere pragmatism 
does violence to the text, and to the views he expresses, 
while pragmatism is a useful method, and while the idea 
of God may be viewed in this way, there is another 
approach to God, freedom and immortality.
In a letter dated 26th April, 177o» j^ant says;
”1 distinguish the teachings of Christ from the report 
we have of those teachings. In order that the former 
may be seen in their purity, 1 seek above all to separate 
out the moral teachings from all the dogmas of the New 
Testament. These moral teachings are certainly the 
fundamental doctrine of the Gospels, and the remainder
can only serve as an auxiliary to them ................
I respect the reports of the evangelists and apostles, 
and 1 put my humble trust in that means of reconciliation 
with God of which they have given us historical tidings - 
or in an, other means that God, in his secret counsels, 
may have concealed. For I do not become in the least a 
better man if I know this, since it concerns only what 
God does; and I dare not be so presumptuous as to 
declare before God that this is the real means, the only
means whereby I can attain my salvation ................
1 am not close enough to their times to be able to make 
such dangerous and audacious decisions”.^3
in answer to the question "Was Kant an agnostic or 
an atneist? the point seems clear, .^ant believed in
63 Letter of J. C. Lavater B A  Vol X p. 176 - 179 
tr. p. 60 - 81.
i
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tAs existence of God, and while he sympathised with and 
recognised the value of the insights of the Go pel, he 
would not venture to assert its uni [U cl im to truth.
He felt th t it was not morally relevant o. helpful, since (
it concerned God's action rather th .n that &n, Whether
or not he had time for the Church or organised reli ion 
is another matter. But he did have i attitude to life 
which made references to God. His faith embodied principles 
by which he lived, and which were rooted in moral 
consi ierations.
k . korner quotes this letter, and makes this comment: 
"The OtV has made roou for faith by demenstrating that the 
concept ci a most perfect being, thooz* theoretically 
empty, it yet not lly absurd r .. f-c mtradictory.
l. b KP. has conferred some practical content on this 
concept by showing how through the conception of the 
h i ^hest ood it is linked to the notions of duty and the 
mor 1 law. In this way, the two Cri13vut have prepared 
th ground for an act of faith, which is in harmony with 
the findings of the critical philosophy, it c n, in this 
sense, be e lied rational fait.. Ace rding to hant, it
is rational also in the sense thet it satisfied 'an interest 
in p re reason' namely of the connection between the 
realm of nature and moral freedom, ho ever difficult it
may be to understand Kant's notion of rational faith, he
le ves us in no doubt tnat it is different from the 
apprehension either of the moral law or of the world of 
empiric .1 f ct. It belongs to the sphere of religion"
This connection between the two Critiques and the
^4 corner - riant relican Books 1955. p. 169.
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work on religion is perhaps an oversimplification of 
what actually happened in their creation. However, there 
can be no doubt that .^ant was convinced that this was what 
he was achieving in his attempt to make room for faith.
The V leaves the question of the Ideas of Keason open, 
and the I PV takes it up from the pr ctic ,1 point of 
view. R develops a style of faith based upon the 
conclusions and insights of both the :.RY and the KPV.
It is an important part of the argument of this work 
to est blish that there is a vital connection between 
the thought of all ..ant's critical works, which leads 
up to i and points back therefore to the initial state­
ment at B xxx.
however, for the present, tne srgument is confined 
to showing that Kant interpretation which loans in the 
direction of Vaihinger and his pragmatism il unable to 
present either a balanced or complete ^x^o.ition of the 
text of ^ant. While it may have merits in respect of 
particular points of exposition, it i^ unable to provide 
a basis for an overall assessment of Kant's position.
It is therefore unaccepotable, and another line of 




The starting point for this study of the meaning 
of faith in want's thought was the conclusion which 
followed from his analysis of human understanding. He 
felt it necessary to place limitations upon human 
knowledge which enabled him to assert that he haa left 
room for faith, m  answer to the question 1 what kind of 
faith:' Vaihinger's line of interpretation wa£ examined. 
By refuting Vaihinger1s point of view so for as nis 
understanding oi the nature of Kant’s "Faith" is 
concerned, it was proved that Kant's claim about faith 
is to ue understood seriously. xiant di not hold the 
view that the concept of faith was merely a convenient 
or useful fiction. we may now proceed to ask again 1 ..hat 
did i.ant mean by 'faitn1. and examine the other extreme 
line of interpretation.
The statement by Kant in the nRV about denying 
knowledge to make room for faith, if set against the 
intellectual background of the times, could be made to 
carry the implication tnat tant was ul i ,ning himself 
with the contemporary plea for the recognition oi faith, 
aid in thinkers like namann and Sohletermacher. If this 
can be substantiated, it suggests that i\ant wa3 adopting 
a Romanticist interpretation of the term faith. This his 
inueed b^en argued, and ivant has been reau in this way. 
want's earliest reception in ^ngland was the rece tion 
of an intellectual protagonist oi nomantieism.
"Coleridge used nant, after periods of complete 
inactivity ultimately as a aefensor fidei; Hamilton saw 
in ivant the graveaig^er of rationalist metaphysics, who 
justified learned ignorance; Carlyle found in nant tne 
supreme foe of the nnii^utenment who maue possible the
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return to Divine F a i t h ............MJ-
xrofessor x.onald Gregor Lmitn, in work on J. G. 
Hermann makes this comment: "It is possible to argue
that x^ant was much more on the side of the Romantics 
than ^amann ever recognised 1
I would regard the view~ expressed ix* both these 
quotations as dangerously misleading for two reasons, 
first, Aant was, on his own admission, afraid of any 
nomaritic view of religious laith, and would have xejected 
any question of a connection between nis views and those 
of namann. secondly, the contemporary romantics of 
Pant’s day would have likewise rejected any attempt to 
relate their views to those of Aant. Admittedly, as 
Trofecsor Gregor smith s.ys, they may not have fully 
recognised the significance of Kant’s position. However, 
by makin0 cie^r the nature of both sets of views, I would 
hope that their mutual exclusiveness will become clear.
I referred to two names as being leading exponents 
of the Romantic view of religious faith, who were 
contemporaneous with Aant. Johann Georg iiamann (175u - 
1 7 6 6 ),the 'visard of the Morth’ as he was called, was 
the founder of the "laith fhilosophy" movement. He 
lived in Aantfs city of i.bnigsberg, and was a man of 
prodigious intellect who lived out his interesting and 
unusual life propagating his new ideas. Friedrich 
•^chleiermacher (I7 b6 - 1 6 3 4 ;, a man of passionate
1 i.ant in . n land R . . ellek (Princeton U. . 1951)
. Stl.
2 J. G. Kamann R. Gregor smith (Collins I960) p. 65•
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religious faith and unbending intellectual rigour, was 
the theologic.il exponent of omanticism. while in 
Berlin, as preacher at the Charity hospital, ichleiermacher 
published his "Addresses on iteli ;ion", in which his views 
were expounded. net me comment on dchletermacher first.
" ..........  Berlin had been the headquarters of
the enlightenment, whose ideas now tended to wear fairly 
thin; and the more sensitive minus were by this time 
listening eagerly to the tender and exquisite tones of 
Romanticism..........
..........  of this mo ement, witn the vague
splendours ana pursuit of the indeterminate which were 
its life-blood, ^cnieiermacher - with reservations - made 
. imself the champion in the religious field".4
k.o wrote L.ii. mackintosh on L chleiermacher. audolf 
utto, in an introduction to John Oman’s English trans­
lation of the "Addresses", makes this assessment of him:
" ..........  SchlSiermacher set himself in sharp
opposition to the intellectualism and moralism of the ge 
oi neason. He accused it of debasing and misunderstanding 
reliv ion, oi confusing it with and transforming it into 
metapuysics and morality. Thereby the enlightenment had 
obscured the completely unique independent essence of 
religion, uiscreditin it and brin^-in it to the very 
vanishing point. This explains his tirelessly repeated
J Types of Modern Theology Ii.R. i'iackintosh (l isbet
U Co. TS7T) p• *
Jd-'hi footnote to p. 5 3 -
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demands that a sharp distinction must ever be between 
religion and all metaphysics and moralities.
doulfi/ermacher attacked a host of enemies:"the 
dogmatic school system of traditional theology, including 
the treatment of religion 011 the part of the new secular 
‘science of religion; Leism and ‘natural . uligion* ; the 
theology of rationalism, including Jr.ant1 s Religion 
within the ^i^its of neason Alone that had a peared six 
years before ..........."5
Two quotations from schl&ermacher, which are charac­
teristic of his outlook and wnich outline his standpoint, 
should expand the meaning of these comments: It is
true that religion is essentially contem]lative. You 
would never call anyone pious who went about in impervious 
stupidity whose sense is not open for the life of the 
worlu. hut this contemplation is not turned as your 
knowledge of nature is, to the existence of a finite thing, 
combined with and opposed to another finite thing ........
“The contemplation of tne pious is the im ieaiate 
consciousness of the universal existence of .ill finite 
things, in and through the Infinite * .nd of all temporal 
things, in and through the nternal. iteli ion is to 
seek this, and find it in all tnat lives and moves, in 
all growth and change in all doing and suffering. It 
is to have life and to know life in immediate feeling, 
only as such an existence in the Infinite and Eternal.
Where this is founu, religion is satisfied, where it 
hides itself there is for her unrest and anguish,
5 \ch.resses tr. Oman harper Torchbooks 1^56 
p. xvii ^introd. by OttoJ
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extremity and death* wherefore it is a life in the 
infinite, nature of the whole, in One and in the All, 
in God, naving and possessing all things in God, and 
God in all. Yet religion is not knowledge and science 
either of the world or of God. without being knowledge, 
it recognises knowledge and science. In itself it is 
an affection, a revelation of the Infinite in the finite, 
God beinc seen in it and it in GodM.°
’’True science is complete vision, true practice 
is culture and art self-produced; true religion is sense 
and taste for the Infinite”.l
i
chlaiermacher1s position could be defined b„ saying 
that he regarded religion as a matter of feeling,as an 
experience to be lived and enjoyed, and which yielded a 
certain type of knowledge, one whicn science and other 
forms of knowledge could not yield, viz, a sense of the 
Infinite. He also speaks about having a sense of 
dependence upon tl is sense of the Infinite, upon the 
reality of God thus experienced. This immediately 
brings to mind Wordsworth's lines:
....................  and 1 have felt
a pres en^e that disturbs me with the .joy 
of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime 
Of something far more deeply interfused. * 
whose avelling is the light of setting suns 
And the round ocean and the living air, 
and the blut? sky, and in the mind of man:
A motion and a spirit that impels
All thinking objects, all objects of all thought
And rolls through all things .................... " °
%° Addresses Lchleiermacher tr. Oman p. ^6 .
7 op. cit. p. 3 9 .
^ "xiineo composed near fintern Abbey” Wordsworth 
l-n^iish farnassus OIL 1934; p. ^91.
/The direction of ScLIaierm&cher1 s thought puts hiia 
clearly into the . .omantic camp so to speak, with regard 
to his views on the nature of religious faith.
Before examining Hamann's more general version of 
the specifically tneological position expressed in 
scaleiermacher, let us pause to ask: Is there any
^rounu for arguing that .ant could nave held Romanticist 
views? 1 'Does he anywhere speak in a manner which is atiall reminiscent of Dchleiermacher or, for example, 
wordsworth, in the Anglo-Daxon tradition of Romanticism?'
There are three Kant passa es, all of which are
referred to bj worm uilber in an essay on hunt's religious
views,-' and to which he gives the name 'Kant's 
\
l/evotionais ’ .
Rirst there is Kant's famous hymn to duty: "Duty!
Thou sublime and mighty name that doet embrace nothing 
charmin, or insinuating but requirest submission and 
j’et seekest not to move tne will by threatening aught 
Ihcit would arouse natural aversion or terror, but only 
boldest forth a law which of itself finds entrance into 
the iind and yet gains reluctant reverence (though not 
always obedience) - a law before which all inclinations 
are dumb even though they secretly work ag inst it: 
what origin is there worthy of thee, and wheie is to be 
found the root of thy noble uesc.nt whicn proudly rejects 
II kinship with the inclinations and from nhicn to be 
descended is the indispensaule condition of the only 
worth which men can give thems elves?
9 "nthioal Significance of Kant's Religion" ^ilber 
K p. lxxix - lxxx.
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further to tuis, there is the more famous passage 
at the enu of the . ethodolog; of Pure Practical Reason, 
which is suggestively Romantic: "Two things fill the
mind with ever rev/ and increasing admiration and awe, 
the oftener and more steadily we reflect on them: the 
starry heavens above me and the moral law within me. ‘
1 do noc merely conjecture them and seek them as though 
obscured in darkness or in tne transcendent region 
beyond my horizon: 1 see tnem before me, and I associate 
them directly wit.i the consciousness oi ,y own existence. 
The former begins at the place I occupy in the external 
world oi sense, anu it broadens the con section in w^ich 
1 stand into an unbounded magnitude Ox worlds beyond 
worlds and systems of systems and into the limitless 
times of their periodic motion, their beginning and 
their continuance. The latter begins at my invisible 
self, my' personality, and exhibits me in a world which 
ha., true infinity but which is com rehensible only to the 
understanding - a world with which I recognize myself as 
existing in a universal and necessary (and not only, as 
in the first case, contingent; connection, ana thereby 
also in connection with all thos- visible .orlds. -he 
former view of a counties- multitude of worlds 
annihilatesi as it were, my importance as an .nimal 
creature, which must give back to the planet  ^ a mere 
syeck in the universe) the matter from which it came, 
the matter which is for a little time roviaed with 
vital orce, we know not aow. The latter, on the 
. . contrary, infinitely raises my worth as that of an
intelligence by my personality, in whicu the moral law 
reveals a life independent of all animality ana even of
, the whole world of sense - at le. st so far as it ira?
| .
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inferred from the purposive destination assigned to my 
existence by this law, a destination which is not 
restricted to the conditions and limits of this life 
bui reaches into the infinite.' H
The third passage comes from R: "0 sincerity!
Thou Asttaea that hast fled from earth to heaven, how 
must thou (the basis of conscience, and hence of all 
inner religion) be drawn thence to us again? I can 
admit, though it is much to be deplored that candor 
(in speaking the whole truth which one knows) is not 
to be found in human nature. Jut we must be able to 
demand sincerity (that all tiiat one says be said with 
truthfulness) ana indeed if there were in our nature no 
predisposition to sincerity, whose cultivation merely 
is neglected, the human race must needs be in its own 
eyes, an object of the deepest contempt. .et this 
sought for quality of mind is such that it is exposed 
to many temptations and entailmanj a sacrifice and 
hence calls for moral strength or virtue (which must be 
won); and moreover it must be guarded and cultivated 
earlier than any other, because the opposed propensity 
is who L .rdest to extirpate if it has been allowed 
firmly to root itself'.
This passage like the others is lengthy, but the 
tone of the final section is worthy of special mention: 
"And if we now compare with the kind of construction 
here recommended our usual mode of upbringing, especially 
in the matter of religion, or better in doctrines of 
faith, wnere fidelity of memory in answerin questions 
relating to those doctrines without regara to the
uPV p. lob.
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fidelity of the confession itself (which is never put to 
the test) is accepted as sufficient to make a believer 
who does not un^erst nd what he declares to be holy no 
longer shall we wonder at the lack of sincerity which 
produced nothing but inward hypocrites" *^2
These three passages are Kant’s only excursions 
into the Romantic use of language. The question to be 
asked is "Could hant be accused of expressing himself 
in terras of an experience or awareness: that could be 
defined as an a ^st,.etic ii.tuitio* . such as the Romantics 
held to be the basic source of their knowledge?" Kant’s 
awe at the starry heavens above, however, is equalled 
only by his awe at the fact of the moral law within.
».hile it is apparently easy to achieve a Romantic 
interpretation of Kant on these texts, in fact it is 
impossible to prove or justify beyond them. Kant’s 
s 15 fundamentally moral, and refer3to the 
human sense cx duty. The similarity between Kant and 
the Romantic enthusiasm for language ends at the point 
of a similarity between their literary styles and Kant’s 
literary sttle in these passages. Aesthetic experience 
for ^ant could never replace or even be made equal in 
status to the act of being sincere, performing one’s 
duty, anu behaving accoruing to the moral law. This 
would certainly distinguish Kant irom all Romanticism.
Uo far then as ^chliermacher and Kant are concerned, no 
point of meeting between the thought of each exists, 
in the expression of what each meant by religion, without 
be0ging the fi al question, Kant nas nothing to say that 
resembles ^chleermacher in appearance, at least at a
R p. 176 (footnote;
first glance.
Row let us probe deeper, ana c ncider . amann.
Ilamann was the leader of the faith lhilosophers, and 
while i^ant perhaps did not express himself in the 
extreme terms of ochliermaeher in theology, it is still 
possible that the.e is an affinity between Kant’s 
"Glauben Plats" and Ilamann* s conception of faith.
some quotations from Iiamann shoumd be sufficient 
to outline his position which can then be stated more 
compactly as a view of the relationship between faith 
and reason.
"east as all kinas of unreason presuppose the
existence of reason and its misuse, so must all religions
bear a relation to the faith in a single, independent,
and living truth, which like our existence, must be older
than our reason, and hence cannot be known from the )genesis of reason, but by a direct revelation of the 
truth, ^ince our reason dr ws the material of its 
concepts merely from the external relations of visible, 
sensuous charging things, in order itself to shape them 
in accordance with the form of their inward nature, and 
to make use of them for its pleasure or service, so the 
ground of religion lies in our whole existence, and 
outside the sphere of our powers of cognition, which 
taken altogether constitute the most casual and abstract 
mode of our existence .
'noil. . faith and reason are sneer relationships 
which uo not let themselves be treated as absolutes; 
they are not things, but pure concepts of the schools, 
signs for the understanding not for admiration, means
Zweifel and ^infalle Nadkr edn. Viterfe (Vienna) Vol?fL9'lff 
ir. .. 3"."""T>m3rtn ""Iiamann p. £-3 6 .
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of help to awaken and fix our attention, just as nature 
is i revelation not of itself, but of a higher object, 
not of its vanity but of His glor^ " •-L‘t
" .......... why should only uncertain knowledge
be called faith? what are not grounds of reason? Is 
knowledge without grounds of reason possible, any more
than sensus without intellectus? ...........  sense
experience in human nature can be as little separated
from reason, as reason can from the senses ..........
sense experience must be qualified by grounds of reason. 
Knowledge from faith is basically iaent .oul with the ^±± 
i_ i .tellectu.........     " 15
* ..........  And whoever is moved by Faith to assent
to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own 
person, which subverts all the principles of his under­
standing, and gives him a determination to believe what 
is most contrary to custom and experience.
"dell your friend that it becomes him least of all 
to laugh at the spectacles of my aestnetic imagination, 
because I use them to arm the weak eyes of my reason11.1 °
"The philosopher is just as much subject to the law 
of imitation as the poet. For the poet, his muse and 
its heirogiyphic-shadow-play is as true as reason and 
its structures for the philosopher. 11 ^.ate sets the
,.ter 3j ..pril 17^7 tr. L.G. mit- NfrmAnn . 257 
15 Letter ^7 April 17H7 tr. u.(r. limit o . cit .
1° Letter 27 culy 173^ tr. K. G . Smith o; . cit. i). 241-2.
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greatest sage and the poet in circumstances where they 
really feel fox themselves, the one denies his reason 
and discloses that he does not believe in the best of 
all possible worlds, however well he can prove it, while 
the other sees himself deprived of his muse and guardian 
angel when his *.eta dies' . *
From these and other writings of Hainann, it can be 
argued that iiamann regarded faith and reason as in 
opposition, even in radical opposition, because of 
this, each requires the other to sup^lement it, but 
in particular, reason needs faith. The aesthetic 
imav ination, which is the instru ient of faith as an 
experience is needed to strengthen the weak eyes of 
re son. This latter point was made in a letter to 
i^ant. nike hant, he saw that knowledge had limits, 
nut in answer to the question *what should supplement 
knowledge*, the distinction between the two is to be 
and. For Kant, ration .1 faith supplements knowledge.
For uamann, faith formed through the aesthetic 
imagination supplements not only knowledge, but reason.
It would not be a misrepresentation of .jamann to 
say that he regarded reason as only an illusory guide 
to knowledge, and that for him- reality is grasped 
properly only by faith, by reason, lamann was referring 
to the rationalist school of philoso; in which /'Ant 
had been nurtured, and which could be traced through 
Wolff, rant’s teacher, to Leibniz and nescartes. reality, 
tney argued, was amenable zo reason and could be 
analysed anu expressed in much the same way as 
mathematical formulae and calculations could be worked
17 ^ocratic memorabilia 1 7 5  ^ tr. li.G, bmith
o . cit. . lbb.
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out. This was indeed their model. According to Hamann, 
faith is needed to supplement the shortsightedness and 
limitations of tnis approach to reality.
Developing the Romantic side of Hamann1s thought 
further, with reference to the second last of these 
quotations, Hamann brings alongside each other, the 
standpoint of the philosopher and that of the artist or 
poet. He says that they have much in common, and by 
implication suggests that the feelings of the artist can 
better express reality than the philosopher. Hamann was 
making a contrast between reason understood as the tool 
of philosophical sclentiiic knowledge and faith as the 
product or experience of aesthetic intuition. This 
certainly is Romanticism.
Professor Gregor Smith, the most recent commentator 
on Hamann, had doubtb about placing Hamann in the ranks
of the Romantics: ” ••••• it is doubtful to me
whether a full study of Hamann can substantiate either 
the simple disjunction, and opposition between faith and 
reason, on the one hand, or the restriction on the other 
hand, of the activity of faith to the Intuition of the 
artist. Reason is not the enemy of faith, nor is faith 
to be understood as an immediate, as opposed to discursive 
view of reality"
While perhaps Professor Gregor Smith is correct in 
pointing out that it is always dangerous to classify a 
thinker with a label which represents a point of view 
to which he seems close, ther is no doubt that Hamann 
subordinated reason to faith in a manner different from
18 Professor R. Gregor Lmith J .G . Hnsnann
p. 45.
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Kant, what he meant by faith Mae something intuitive 
ana aesthetic*
In a letter to Hamann, which recognises the grett 
difference between their points of viow, 1 ant invited 
Hamann to express himself in any future correspondence 
".•*•• if possible in the language of men. For I, poor 
earthling that I am, have not been properly trained to 
understand the Divine language of an Intuitive reason”. ^  
This clearly indicates how Kant regarded Hamarji insofar 
as his view of reason was concerned.
To develop this a little further, 1 would draw 
attention to ant's correspondence with J .C . Lavater 
(1741 - 1601), a Lwlee poet, mystic and 'rnronologist', 
who was steeped in romanticism, strongly influenced by 
Goethe and was close to hamann* Kant gives a clearer 
indication of hlo practloal objections to the religious 
views of men like Hamann and bav'vter* navater had asked 
Kant for some comments on a work published in 1774, 
and these are the terms of Kant's replys "As for your 
request th it 1 give my opinions of the ideas of faith 
and prayer in your Vermischte . o^riften. the essential 
and most excellent part of tne teaching of Christ is 
this: that righteousness is the sum of all religion, 
and that we ought to seek it with ail our might, having 
faith (that is, an unconditional trust) that God will 
supplement our efforts and supply the good that 1c not 
in our rower. This doctrine of faith forbids ill our 
presumptuous cur£08lt> about the manner in which God 
will do this, forbids the arrogance of supposing that 
one can know what Leans would be most in conformity
6 A p r i l  1774 jJ.A. V o l. 10 p. 14b.
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with His wisdom;it forbids all wooing of favour by the 
performance of Rituals that someone has introduced. It 
allows no part of that endless religious madness to which 
people in all ages are inclined save only the general 
and undefined trust that we shall all partake of the good 
in some unknown way, if only we do not make ourselves 
unworthy of our share of it by our conduct” . 20
It seems then that x^ant's objection to Lavater '6 
ideas (which are not defined or discussed in the letter) 
is that they give rise to needless speculation and 
religious madness. The fact that Kant referred to Lavater 
on one occasion as a Bchw&rmer, albeit perhaps affection­
ately, gives the key to why Kant precluded religious 
experience as a source or support of faith. Kant rejected 
the view that any weight or value for knowledge should ue 
attached to religious experience. He was afraid of 
Schw&rmerei^ - "irrational fanaticism proceeding from 
unreflective emotional feelings"• Kant does not question
20 b .A. Vol. 10 p. 179 - 80 tr. Z p. 83.
21 Kant recognised a moro general eenoe of the term 
Lchw&rmerei, of which the religious sense is a specific 
manifestation. L.B. Borowski in hie biography of *ant, 
records his having asked K-nt for comments on his book on 
Cagiiostro, and on the Enthusiastic mischief of the age 
in general, want's reply was the short paper entitled 
"On Bchwdrmerei, and the Means against it" (1790), in 
which he spoke against the superficial scholarship and 
learning of the day. Lchw&rnierei, he said, seemed to 
spread like influenza. ”1 see no other remedy against 
this evil than to replace the superficial learning of all 
sorts of things in the schools by a thorough learning of 
fewer things, and to direct the thirst for reading in such 
a way that a well-taught pupil only enjoys reading what 
deepens his insight and is disgusted with everything 
else". GR p. 232.
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religious exp rienoe as a psychological fact, but as a 
means of knowledge of God, he completely rejects it. 
Consider these quotations from R, in which he speaks of 
Schw&rmerei. In speaking of encouraging men to act 
morally, he says: "Moreover, it does not even seem
advisable to encourage such a state of confidence 
(engendered by feelings), rather it is advantageous (to 
morality) to 'work out our own salvation, with fear and 
trembling1 (a hard saying which, if misunderstood, is 
capable of driving a man to the blackest fanaticism) 
(fanaticism - Schw&rmerei)• Moral success through feelings 
of piousness is bad, ana if misunderstood, this text 
could lead to such fanaticism.
At the end of book Two, Kant says: "Finally,
lest perchance, for want of this assurance (about the 
original predisposition to good and of how it may be 
restored) we compensate superstitiously, through 
expiations which presuppose no change of heart, or 
fanatically (schw&rmerischj through (and merely passive) 
inner illumination, and so forever be kept distance from 
the good that is grounded inactivity of the self, we 
should acknowledge as a mark of th© presence of goodness 
in us naught but a well ordered conduct of life".2^ 
Fanaticism which entails specious assurances is really 
pretended passive inner illumination. This seems a 
rejection of religious awareness for practical purposes.
In direct and explicit rejection of feeling (Gefttnl) 
as an arbiter in the sphere of Scriptural interpretation, 
Kant speaks of the dangers of incipient fanaticism
^  R edn. quoted p. 62.
1 3  f 7©
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through such a source: "There Is a third claimant 
contesting the office of interpreter, the man who needs 
neither reason nor scholarship, but merely an inner 
feeling to recognise the true meaning of Scripture as
well as its divine o r i g i n ........... A knowledge of laws
and of their morality can scarcely be derived from any 
sort of feeling; still less can there be inferred or 
discovered from a feeling, certain evidence of a direct 
divine influence; for the same effect can have more than 
one cause. In this case, however, the bare morality of 
the law (and the doctrine) known through reason, is the 
source (of the law's validity) and even if this origin 
were no more than barely possible, duty demands thit it 
be thus construed, unless we wish to open wide the gates 
to every kind of fanaticism (Schw&rmerei) and even cause 
the unequivocal moral feeling to lose its dignity through 
affiliation with fantasy of every sort".
He continues: "Feeling (Gefiihl) is private to every
individual, and cannot be demanded of others when the 
law, from which and according to which this feeling 
arises, is icnown in advance; therefore one cannot urge 
it as a touchstone for the genuineness of a revelation, 
for it teaches absolutely nothing, but is merely the way 
in which the subject is affected as regards pleasure or 
displeasure - and on this basis can be established no
2 Aknowledge whatsoever"•
This latter sentence gives Kant's reason for 
rejection of GefGhl as a source of knowledge, and 
explains why Jjchw£rmerei can result from giving Geftthl 
epistemologlcal status.
24 a p. 104-105.
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Continuing with the evidence from R, Kant warns 
about the physical dangers which can arise from
fanaticism: " ..... history tells how the mystical
fanaticism (mystische SchwKrmereien) in the lives of 
hermits and monks, and the glorification of the holiness 
of celibacy, rendered great masses of people useless to 
the world; how alleged miracles accompanying all this 
weighed down the people with heavy chains under a blind 
superstition; how with a hierarchy forcing itself upon 
free men, the dreadful voice of orthodoxy was raised, out 
of the mouths of presumptuous exclusively 'called1 
expositors, and divided the Christian world into embittered 
parties over credal opinions on matters of faith (upon 
which absolutely no general agreement can be reached 
without appeal to reason as the expositor •••••••••."24
Kant's illustration of the fanatically inspired mon­
astic movement, and the consequent uselessness of its 
members, and of the presumptuousness of the Reformation 
preachers who claimed Biblical authority, is clear in 
its meaning. Reason can reconcile the opposites because 
of its status, but those who base their beliefs upon 
feelings can only end up divided and at variance, because 
communication iB impossible between them.
In speaking about the principle of morality as the 
proper source of religious understanding, Kant says: "The 
persuasion that we can distinguish the effects of grace 
from those of nature (virtue) or can actually produce the 
former within ourselves, is fanaticism: (bchw&rmerei) for 
we cannot by any token recognise a supersensible object 
in experience, still less can we exert an influence upon
*
2 * R  p. 1 21.
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it to draw it down to us ........."
rurxutr on, ^ant defines superstition and funaticism: 
"The illusion of being able to accomplish anything in the 
way of justifying ourselves before Lou through religious 
acts of worship is religious suLorstition, wust as the 
illusion of wishing to accomplish this by striving for 
what is supposeu to oe communion with Gou is religious
f. .naticisia (ochw&rmer8i>  ......... an illusion called
fanatical when the ver} means it contemplates.as super­
sensible^ pro not within man's power, leaving out of 
account the inaccessibility of the supersensible end 
aimed at by those moans; for this f eling of the immediate 
presence of the Supreme deing and the distinguishing of 
this from every other, even from the moral feeling, would
constitute a receptivity for an intuition for which there
2 bis no sensory provision in man’s nature1*.
Kant makes his position beyond all reasonable shadow 
of doubt in clear distinction from the Romantic stand­
point. fanaticism is any claim to experience God 
directly. Man has no faculty for apprehending uod, and 
therefore the concept of communion with God is an illusion. 
To speak of God in the manner and sty.ce of Jchliermacher, 
Kant dismisses as intellectually absurd and physically 
impossible.
He goes even further and says: "The fanatical
religious ixiusion Iscnw&rmerische Ueligionswahn) ....
is the moral, death of reason; for without reason after 
all, no religion is possible, since like morality in
27general, it must be established upon basic principles".
2 5 R p. 162.
2b R p. 162-163.
27 R p. 172.
When Kant says that Schw&rmerei is the moral death 
of reason, he Is being unequivocal. The previous 
quotation read in the light of this requires no further 
comment. In a footnote,27 Kant speaks slightingly of 
the "fanatical (Schw&rmerisclien) illusion of imagined 
Bupersensible heavenly feelings" leaving no doubt about 
his contempt for the "Geiahlsphilosophie" (philosophy 
of feeling) of which the "Glaubensphilosophie" was a 
particular species.
The points made in hunt's letter to Lavater which 
1 quoted are expanded in R, and in particular in four 
sections which come as 'observations' to the four 
divisions of the work. They deal with works of grace, 
miracles, mysteries and means of grace. Kant maintains 
that he cannot speak of these as part of religious faith 
viewed within the limits of the critical philosophy.
However, they are part of the trappings of institutional 
religion, and some comment upon them is therefore necessary. 
"They do not belong to it, (religion within the limits of 
pure reason), but they border on i t " K a n t  calls them 
the parerga of religion, additional embroideries upon the 
b a d e  pattern of faith. In seeing how Kant treats them 
ve can see more clearly the tendencies which he feared, 
end the interpretations of faith which he himself rejected. 
We see in fact, his treatment of those aspects of religion 
which themselves either encourage, or are encouraged by 
Romanticism.
The General Observation entitled "Concerning the 
Restoration to its power of the Original Predisposition 
to Good9' is the first of the discussions and it deals
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with the concept of grace - the idea of supernatural aid 
in the moral struggle.
Kant's final attitude is summed up in the last 
sentence of the Observation: "Hence we can admit a work 
of grace as something incomprehensible, but we cannot 
adopt it into our maxims either for theoretical or 
practical use"
Kant is saying that from the standpoint of Reason 
(practical or theoretical) nothing may be said about 
grace, other than that it may exist. We can say in a 
more general way that grace might be real, and that 
works of grace may exist, but we must add that they are 
outwith the possibility of knowledge as defined in the 
KRV. How does Kant reach this position?
He commences by insisting that man must act rightly 
by himself, and that he is vested with full moral 
responsibility. He saysi "i'ian himself must make, or 
have made himself into whatever in a moral sense, whether 
good or lev’ll, he is to become. Hither condition must 
be an effect of his free choice".30 Otherwise it is 
pointed out, man could not be held responsible for any 
action, and therefore could not be morally good or bad.
To affirm that man is created good, Kant takes to mean 
that he is created for good, and not that he is good 
in actuality. He has a predisposition for good. Bearing 
in mind what he has already said about good and evil in 
man, Kant is faced with the question: "how can a man 
become good?" Here he declares: "Granted that some
29 R p. 49.
3° R p. 40.
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supernatural co-operation may be necessary to his 
becoming good, or tothis becoming better, whether hie 
co-operation consists merely in the abatement of hind­
rances or indeed in positive assistance, man must first 
make himself worthy to receive it, and must lay hold of 
this aid (which is no smell matter; - that is, he must 
adopt this positive increase of power into his maxim, for 
only thus can good be imputed to him and he be known as 
a good man.
"The restoration (of the original predisposition 
to good) is but the establishment of the purity of this 
law as the supreme ground of all our maxims, whereby it 
is not merely associated with other incentives, and 
certainly is not subordinated to any such (to inclinations) 
as its conditions, but instead must be adopted in its 
entire purity, as an incentive, adequate in itself for 
the determination of the will".31
In pointing out that original goodness is the 
holiness of maxims in doing one's duty, namely doing 
one's duty for duty's sake, Kant recognises that there 
are two senses in which a man c n perform the right 
action. He may resolve to conform to the law and do 
his duty out of self interest and not out of a sense of 
duty. "Honesty is the best policy" is not a moral 
slogan. "Honesty for honesty's sake" is a moral slogan.
Kant say8: "•.......... if a man is to become not merely
legally, but morally a good man (pleasing to God) that 
is, a man endowed with virtue in its intelligible 
character (virtue noumenon; ana one who, knowing something
31 R. p. 42
77 -
to be hie duty, requires no other incentive than th is  
representation of duty i t s e l f ,  th is  cannot be brought 
about through gradual reformation, so long as the basis 
of the maxims remains impure, but must be effected  
through a revolution  in  the man's d isp o sitio n  (a going 
over to the maxim of holiness of the d is p o s it io n .) He 
can become a new man only by a kind of re b irth , as i t  
were a new creation".32
Before proceeding fu rther, a question emerges which 
i s  very obvious. "Is Kant e n tit le d , on h is  own basis, 
and w ithin the framework of h is o vera ll argument, to 
postulate the p o s s ib ility  of supernatural assistance, 
and in  the way in  which he speaks of i t ,  namely as an 
adopted increase of power into the maxim of action?"
He c le a rly  runs the r is k  of being accused of stepping 
beyond the c r i t ic a l  lim its  he has set fo r  him self.
Those who fin d  a contradiction between the KRV and the 
KPV w il l  natu ra lly  fin d  him g u ilty  of trespassing h is  
own prescribed lim its .
Kant him self, however, anticipates th is  question 
when he says: "Reason, conscious of her in a b il ity  to
sa tis fy  her moral need extends to h e rse lf high-flown 
ideas capable of supplying th is  lack without, however, 
appropriating these ideas as an extension of her domain. 
Reason does not dispute the p o s s ib ility  or the re a lity  
of the objects of theBe ideas; she simply cannot adopt 
them into  the maxims of thought and action . She even 
holds that, i f  in  the inscrutable realm of the super­
natural there is  something more than she can explain to 
h e rse lf, which may yet be necessary as a complement to 
her moral in su ffic ie n cy , th is  w il l  be, even though
32 e .  p. 4 2 - 3
- 73
unknown, ava ilab le  to her good w il l .  Reason believes 
tn is  with a fa ith  which (with respect to the p o s s ib ility  
of th is  supernatural complement) might be ca lled  
re f le c t iv e ; fo r  dogmatic fa ith , which proclaims i t s e l f  
as a form of knowledge appears to her dishonest and 
presumptuous **33
Kant does not deny that Reason is  often tempted to 
go beyond her recognised lim its . This he c a lls  the 
natural d ia le c t ic  of reason.34 j f  works of grace, which 
are the hypostasised ideas of supernatural help are taken 
as dogmatic, then of course reason has been transcended. 
Kant says however, that we have no more than an idea, 
and answers the question I raised by saying tnat when we 
speak th is  way, we are not asserting in  the existence of 
these things a new knowledge to which we have reasoned.
I t  i s ,  in  fa c t , a re f le c t iv e  fa ith  derived through past 
experience that suggests speaking thus at a l l .  No 
knowledge is  involved. Fa ith , in  th is  sense, is  defined 
as the conviction that, when a man consistently  t r ie s  to 
act from the motive of duty, what is  inadequate about 
h is  moral reason which makes i t  d i f f ic u l t  fo r  him to act 
from the r ig h t maxims, w il l  be supplied by a supernatural 
complement.
There i s ,  however, s t i l l  an unsatisfactory  feature 
in  th is  rep ly . Kant says that works of grace may be
postulated or admitted as ex istin g , but he does also say
that they are inscrutab le . Reason cannot venture to say
33 fi. p. 47.
34 c l  KRV B 356 on the theme of 'Pure Reason aB the
Seat of transcendental I llu s io n ' wiiere Kant admits that 
reason t r ie s  continually  to go beyond the c r i t i c a l  l im its .
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anything about the supernatural at a l l .  In the realm of 
the supernatural, " a l l  use of reason ceases".35 But 
Kant im plies that the Divine co-operation is  necessary 
because man does not have the wherewithal to p u ll him­
s e lf  up to h is  f u l l  moral stature without such assistance. 
He has to believe that he w ill  receive what he needs to 
make h is  moral undertakings possib le.
Is there not a contradiction here, or at least the 
p o s s ib ility  that Kant is  s p t\king from some other, but 
unstated point of view? This p o s s ib ility  appears to 
depend upon an extended use of reason which enables Kant 
to speak about things from th is  point of view that cannot 
be mentioned within the s t r ic t ly  c r i t i c a l  understanding 
of reason.
The only way in  which th is  d if f ic u lt y  of exegesis 
may be overcome so that Kant speaks consistently  is  to 
re fe r  to G,3*> and there to the d is t in c tio n  between the 
standpoint of the moral agent who makes the decision in  
the fa ith  that he w il l  receive help, and the observer 
who from outside the s itu atio n  can only observe a man 
acting in  a causal process, and therefore cannot speak 
about anything supernatural. I t  would seem that Kant is  
leaning on th is  d is t in c t io n  without making the fact  
e x p lic it ,  and th is  suggests that the d is t in c t io n  is  a 
basic one in  h is  thought. Tills is  one answer to a Kant 
c r i t i c  on th is  point. Whether or not i t  is  acceptable 
must be a personal judgement. I accept i t  because th is  
d is t in c t io n  with which Kant operates runs through every 
le v e l of h is  thought and is  derived u ltim ately  from the
35 R, p. 48. 
56 0. p. 124
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problematic concept of the "Ding-an-Sich". This issue  
l ie s  in  a realm of Kant in terp retation  beyond the scope 
of the immediate argument. However, i t  is  important to 
point out two consequences, f i r s t ,  there is  an answer 
which ju s t if ie s  Kant speaking at a l l  about the super­
natura l, and secondly, the re lation sh ip  Kant sees between 
man and grace is  ono of fa ith .
Central a lso fo r  the proper understanding of why 
Kant viewed works of grace as superfluous to man as a 
moral agent is  the conception he uses of the revolution  
necessary in  the d isp o sitio n  before a man can become 
m orally as against le g a lly  a good man. He says in
expanding th is  theme: M . . . ............... duty bids us do th is ,
and duty demands nothing of us except by saying that a 
man is  under the necessity of, and is  therefore capable 
of a revolution  in  h is  sensuous nature (which places 
obstacles in  the way of the former)."37
luint could be sayln^ one of several things in  th is  
passage: F ir s t ,  s ta rtin g  with the view that we have a
duty to act always from the motive of duty, i t  could be 
argued that, amongst a l l  the decisions we have to make 
about duty, there must at some point be one major 
decision , a meta-decision so to speak, which could be 
expressed in  th is  way "From now on, I w i l l  always do 
my duty fo r  duty's sake, and with no regard fo r  s e lf  
in te re st" . .ihen we make th is  decision , then we have 
undergone the recast of mind necessary to become morally 
good as w ell as le g a lly  good.
Another in terp retation  of Kant would be reached
by arguing that we should continually  purify  our
57 R. p. 42-3.
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maxims, and doing so, we w il l  gradually undergo (with 
the aid of grace) a recast of our mind by the purify ing  
of our maxims. "He must be able to hope through h is  own 
e ffo rts  to reach the road which leads th ith e r, and which 
is  pointed out to him by a fundamentally improved dispo­
s it io n , because he ought to become a good man and is  to 
be adjudged morally good only by v irtu e  of that which can 
be imputed to him as performed by himself' .36
These two lin e s  of in terp retation  su ffer from the 
fa u lt  of o vers im p lifica tion . We do not take a revolut­
ionary leap from impurity to p u rity , nor do we gradually  
progress, what is  indeed required fo r  such a change,
Kant states thus: 1 •••••••• the conversion of the
d isp o s itio n  of a bad man into  that of a good one is  tc  
be found in  the change of the highest inward ground of 
the adoption of a l l  h is  maxims conformable to the moral 
law, so fa r  as t, is  new ground (the new heart) is  now 
I t s e lf  unchangeable".31*
This seems to ind icate  a leaning towards the f i r s t  
in terp re tatio n . Howevei, Kant continues in  a manner 
which ra ises  doubts about both: "Nan cannot a tta in
NATURALLY to assurance concerning such a revolution , 
however, e ith er by immediate consciousness or through 
the evidence furnished by the l i f e  which he has h itherto  
led; fo r  the deeps of the heart (the subjective f i r s t  
ground of h is  maxims) are inscrutable to him".40 Kant 
says ho can only hope.
Therefore, what Kant is  saying is  that whether or
38 R. P» 46
39 R. P- 46
40 R. P* 46
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not we make a meta-decision, or progressively purify  
our maxims, we can nover assess our own moral progress.
We can only keep try in g , hoping that what we lack w il l  
be supplied. C le a rly , fa ith  is  involved, the same fa ith  
that makes us believe that doing our duty is  contributing  
to a better world.
The main point of Kant's views on works of grace 
should be c le a r. There i s  no need to speak about grace.
We have the concrete situ ation s in  l i f e  where we are 
faced by duty. Our course of action is Ja id  down fo r  us. 
This we must fo llow . Wo can wonder about the meaning 
of i t  a l l ,  and how we succeed and we oan speak of grace 
and fa ith , but th is  in  no way contributes to the 
performance of duty.
"It  is  not essen tia l and henoe not necessary fo r  
everyone to know what God does or has done fo r  h is  
sa lv a tio n " , but i t  is  essen tia l to know what man him self 
must do in  order to become worthy of th is  assistance" 
Again, the emphasis is  upon the action of the moral agent. 
It  is  therefore impossible to read any kind of Romantic 
in terp re tation  of grace in to  Kant’ s comments upon works 
of grace. He even points quite e x p lic it ly  to the super­
f lu i t y  of those re lig io u s  e ffo rts  to win favour with God. 
This type of re lig io u s  e ffo rt  f la t te rs  i t s e l f  that God 
can make someone etern a lly  happy without him becoming a 
better person, or that God can do th is  merely on request. 
Th is, no doubt, Kant would argue, opens the door to 
Schw&rmerei, bearing in  mind what he said to Lavater in  
h is  le t te r .
The only quasi-homantic manner of speaking adopted
41 R. p. 47
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by Kant in  th is  section occurs where he eulogises the 
moral d isp o s itio n , the predisposition  to good, in  these 
words: "The force of th is  question (about our cense of
r ig h t and wrong) every man, even one of the meanest 
capacity, must fe e l most deeply -  every man, 15 wfia
previously has been taught the holiness which inheres in  
the idea of duty, but who has not yet advanced to an 
inqu iry  in to  the concept of freedom, which f i r s t  and fore­
most emerges from th is  law; and the very incomprehensibility 
of th is  p red isposition  which announces a d ivine o rig in , 
acts perforce upon the s p ir it  even to the point of 
exaltation , and strengthens i t  fo r  whatever s a c r if ic e  a 
man's respect fo r h is  duty may demand of him. More 
frequently to excite in  man th is  fe e lin g  of the sublim ity  
of hi6 moral destiny is  esp ecia lly  commendable as a method 
of awakening moral sentimenta",42
The expression moral destiny is  h igh ly  suggestive, 
but again, when read ca re fu lly  in  the context of i t s  use, 
Kant is  merely re fe rrin g  to man's pred isposition  to good, 
and how th is  can encourage the moral sense and strengthen 
man's reso lu tion  to be d u t ifu l. There is  nothing 
Romanticist about thiB idea.
ivant's next Observation is  on the subject of 
MRACijhS, sind he opens h is  discussion in  the follow ing  
way: "I f a moral re lig io n  (which must consist not in
dogmas and r it e s ,  but in  the h eart's  d isp o s itio n  to 
f u l f i l  a l l  human duties as Divine commands) is  to be 
established, a l l  m iracles which h istory  connects with 
i t s  inauguration must themselves in  the end render 
superfluous the b e lie f  in  m iracles in  general: fo r  i t  
bespeaks a culpable degree of moral unbelie f not to
42 R. Ti - A A nnH AR _
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acknowledge as completely authoritative  the commands 
of duty 43
.tant c le a r ly  regarded b e lie f  in  m iracles i f  looked 
upon as a prop to moral endeavour as merely pandering to 
moral unbelie f, which itse i.f  cannot be excused.
44­In a footnote, Kant refers  to navater'B defence of
Wunderglaubene, and i t  is  not unexpected that Kant is
opposed to any defence of the idea of supernatural
influences upon human l i f e  or in  the world. Kant points
out that in  p r in c ip le , Lavater'e champion, *fenninger,4b
can be assailed  him solf by the same arguments he applies
to those who permit B ib l ic a l  m iracles, but no others.
Kant c le a r ly  saw a danger of Schw&rmerei in  admitting
even l i t t l e  m iracles or specia l Providences.
However, i t  is  s ig n ifica n t that he does not take 
to tack the New Testament m iracles. He accepts that they
ushered in  a new era, and that i t  is  therefore pointless
to debate "narratives or in te rp re ta tio n s".47
Kant says: "*•••••••*• when a re lig io n  of mere
43 R. p. 79
44 r. p. 80
43 ia  periods of o istory where the Romantic influence  
nas been strong, fo lk lo re  abounds in  ta le s  of the super­
natura l. B e lie f  in  m iracles seems to be part of the 
Romantic temperament when i t  reaches popular le v e ls . A
healing shrine such as at Lourdes is  surely the mere
product of a Romantic imagination? Levater, natu ra lly
enough, as a Romantic, defended frunderglaubens.
4^  Johann Konrad Pfenninger (1747 -  92) Reformed 
M in ister at Ztlrich.
47 R. p. 79
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r ite s  and observations has run i t s  course, and when one 
based on the s p ir it  and the truth (on the moral d isposi­
tion) is  to be established in  it s  stead, i t  is  wholly 
conformable to man’ s ordinary ways of thought, though 
not B tr ic t ly  necessary, fo r  the h is to r ic a l introduction  
of the la t te r  to be accompanied and, as i t  were, adorned 
by m iracles in  order to announce the termination of the 
e a r lie r  re lig io n , which, without m iracles, would never 
have had any authority".4®
Having made h is point in  th is  general way, Kant then 
develops i t  with p a rticu la r reference to Gospel m iracles: 
•’The person of the teacher of the one and only re lig io n , 
v a lid  fo r  a l l  worlds, may indeed be a mystery. His 
appearance on earth, h is  translation  thence, and h is  
eventful l i f e  and suffering  may a l l  be nothing but
m iracles ...................   We need not c a l l  in  question any of
theBe m iracles and indeed may honour the trappings which 
have served to bring into  public currency a doctrine 49 
whose authenticity  rests upon a record in d e lib ly  registered  
on every soul and which stands in  need of no m ira c le ".50
The l i f e  of Jesus may be shrouded in  miraculous 
happenings, but th is  should not confuse our re a lisa tio n  
that His message is  already written in  the moral law and 
engraved upon our hearts.
48 r  p. 79.
49 inere is  a s tr ik in g  p a ra lle l to Kant's insistence  
that the Gospel narrative is  secondary in  Importance to the 
message i t  proclaims. This is  a basic premise of the form 
c r i t i c a l  school of ft.T. scholars, although no doubt,
Rodoli Hulmann would d if fe r  witii Kant strongly on what
was the content of the Gospel.
50 R P» 79/
to
When Kant aBks directly "tohat is a miracle?", he 
declares that the only possible answer ic in terms of 
what they are for us (as something we can incorporate into 
the maxims of our practical reason.) He defines them ad 
"events in the world the operating laws of whose causes 
are and must remain absolutely unknown to us".51 He then 
classifies them, and briefly explains why none of these 
categories of miracles can be of any' practical use to us.
He speaks of th e is t ic  m iracles, in  which we can have 
the idea that i t  is  possible fo r  God, the Creator to 
occasionally  suspend the causal nexus in  order to bring  
about a m iracle. However, tne means by which He does th is , 
and the law in  accordance with which i t  is  achieved, we 
can never Know. However, i t  is  certa in  that what is  done 
w ill  be morally good, and that th is  i t s e l f  provides a 
means of testing  a so-called  th e is t ic  m iracle, and also  
a reason fo r regarding them as 'd i f f ic u l t  to accept'.
I f  a th e is t ic  miracle conflicted  with the moral law, then 
i t  would be fa ls e . This is  a negative te s t. I f  however, 
the e v i l  s p ir i t  made him self an angel of l ig h t ,  which 
would be a demonic (d ev ilish) act, we could not apply 
a p ositive  te s t.
The other c la s s if ic a t io n  he mentions is  that of 
demonic (angelic in  the sense of good s p ir it ;  m iracles.
The same problem applies: how do we id e n tify  one beyond 
a l l  doubt?
He continues b., saying that in  any event, ve cannot 
make use of these ideas in  the a f fa ir s  of l i f e .  A man 
cannot face a court of law and say "I have been tempted 
by the d e v il" . This cannot be a defence against possible
51 R p. 83.
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conviction. Kant then concludes: "since he (man) can
make no possible use of them (miracles) he sanctions ( i .e .  
does not incorporate b e lie f  in  miraclo3 in to  h is maxims 
of e ith er th e o retica l or p ra c tica l reason, though indeed 
he does not impugn th e ir  p o s s ib ility  or r e a lity  -  footnote) 
no m iracles in  th is  case, but instead should he attend to 
the commands of reason, he conducts him self as though a l l  
h is  change of heart and a l l  improvement depended so le ly  
upon h is  own exertions directed thereto. But to think  
that through tho g if t  of a re a lly  firm  th e o retica l fa ith  
in  m iracles, man could him self perform them and so storm
So
heaven -  th is  is  to ventureAfa r  beyond the lim its  of 
reason that we are not Ju stifie d  in  tarry in g  long over 
such sen8eleso conceit".51
Iven the idea that m iracles can occur occasionally  
makes l i t t l e  d ifference to Kant’ s unquestionable refu­
ta tio n  of the need fo r  a b e lie f  in  the miraculous.
Works of grace are inaccessib le  to th eo retica l reason, 
and m iracles are of no value to p ra c t ic a l reason. Relig ious  
thought therefore can take neither of these things 
se rio u s ly . The th ird  observation deals with m ysteries.
He commences by defin ing the concept of OTSTHRYi 
"Investigation into  the inner nature of a l l  kinds of 
fa ith  which concern re lig io n  in variab ly  encounters a 
mystery -  i . e .  something which may indeed by known by 
each sing le  in d iv id u a l but cannot be made known p u b lic ly , 
that is ,  shared u n iv e isa lly . Being holy, i t  must be 
moral, and so an object of reason, and i t  must be 
capable of being known from w ithin adequately fo r
51 R p. 83 .
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p ra c tic a l use, and yet as something mysterious, not fo r  
th e o retica l use ................... " 52
Rant's recognition of the mysterious element is  
conditioned by h is  insistence upon the importance of 
giv ing  moral s ig n ifican ce  to the concept before i t  is  
capable of being discussed.
When he speaks of them being private , and not 
pub lic , he is  perhaps thinking of the experience usually  
termed m ystica l, when someone claims to have apprehended 
or experienced re a lity  d ire c tly  through an intuition.-'^  
buch an experience of course precludes the use of reason, 
and on th is  ground alone, Rant would have objected.
however, he continues: "B e lie f in  what we are yet 
to regard as a holy mystery can be looked upon as 
d iv ine ly  prompted or as pure ra tio n a l fa ith . Unless we 
are impelled by the greatest need to adopt the f i r s t  of 
these views, we s h a ll make i t  our maxim to abide by the 
second". Then with great s ig n ifica n ce , he says: "Feelings 
are not knowledge ana so do not ind icate  a m y s t e r y . . . . . . ."
Therefore, he concludes: "It is  im *jesible to se ttle  
a p r io r i  and ob jective ly , whether there are mysteries or 
n o t" .54 >
Rant is  therefore refusing to discuss any concept 
of MYSTRRY which is  based upon fee lin gs which are subjec­
t iv e . He turns to the inner subjective moraa predispo­
s it io n  (which is  objective in  the sense that a^ J. men are
52 r p. 129.
52 It should be remembered that L&vater was also a 
mystic.
54 r p. 129.
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endowed with it )  to enquire i f  any such thing as a 
mystery is  to be found there. The Ground of m orality, 
he declares, is  not a mystery: "1st wo s h a ll not be 
e n title d  to number among the holy mysteries the ground, 
o ’ m orality which is  inscrutable to us; fo r  we can thus 
c la s s ify  only that which wo can know but which is  incapable 
of being communicated p u b lic ly , whereas though m orality  
can be communicated p u b lic ly , i t s  cause remains unknown 
to us” . 55
Neither is freedom a mystery, for the came reasons. 
Our knowledge of freedom can be shared, but the ground 
of freedom is not gi\en as an object of knowledge. But
" ........  i t  is  th is  very freedom which, when applied to
the f in a l  object of p ra ctica l reason (the re a lisa tio n  of 
the moral end) alone leads us in ev ita b ly  to holy
mysteries”.56
Man, Kant argues, has a duty to work towards the 
end of the idea of the highest good, and in  th is  1 he 
finds him self impelled to believe in  the co-operation  
or management of a Moral Ruler of the world by means of 
which alone th is  goal can be reached” . 57 ir a c t ic a l  reason 
requires a b e lie f  in  God, concerned ”not so much to know 
wh t God is  in  Himself (His Nature) as what He is  fo r  us 
as moral beings".58 God is  spoken of ao the Creator -  
the morally holy le g is la to r , Preserver -  Ruler and moral 
Guardian and as Aum inistrator -  and Judge. This merely
55 r p .
56 R p. 12&.
57 R p. 130.
5® R p. 130.
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expresses God's moral re la tio n  to the human r ic e .
Without entering in to  a d igression to discuss Kant's
understanding of the doctrine of the Holy T r in ity , i t
is  relevant at th is  point to note h is  reference to such
an idea. Clement J . Webb explains Kant's thought in
these words: "This doctrine of the T r in ity  does not
extend our knowledge of God's nature in  i t s e l f ,  and i f
presented as i f  i t  d id , would be a morally useless
mystery of the kind which a ra tio n a l re lig io n  cannot
admit; but understood of God's moral re la t io n  to us, i t
i s ,  in  another and better sense of the word, a 'mystery'
or rather three mysteries revealed to us through our own
reason, and so p ra c t ic a lly  c lear to us, although presenting
59problems which are th e o re tica lly  in so lu b le "• *
The three mysteries mentioned which correspond to 
the aspects of the T r in ity  as defined by Kant are the 
ideas of a DIVINE C/un., ATONEMENT and ELECTION.
A f u l le r  d iscussion of Kant'B treatment of the 
doctrine of the T r in ity  and of the doctrines of Atonement 
and E le ctio n  belong to a study of how he treats the 
doctrines of the C h ristian  fa ith  and the teaching and 
b e lie fs  of the C h ristia n  Church. The immediate task to 
hand in  th is  section of the argument is  to seek out 
Traces of Romanticism in  h is  d iscussion of those aspects 
of re lig io n  which lend themselves to that way of thinking. 
One f in a l  quotation from th is  section should d isp e l any 
suoh ideas: "Although that great mystery, comprising in  
one formula a l l  that we have mentioned, can be made 
comprehensible to each man through h is  reason as a 
p ra c t ic a l and necessary re lig io u s  idea, we can say that,
59 Clement J • Webb Kant's Philosophy of Relig ion  
p. 134.
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in  order to beconj the moral basic of re lig io n  and 
p a rt ic u la r ly  of a public re lig io n , i t  was, at that 
time, f i r s t  revealed when i t  was p u b lic ly  taught and 
made the symbol of a wholly new re lig io u s  epoch . . . . . . .
hut the highest goal of moral perfection  of f in it e  
creatures -  a goal to which man can never completely 
a tta in  -  is  love of the lawM.^0
Moral worth is  the primary value of re lig io n  to man, 
and the supernatural element cannot have moral s ig n ifican ce . 
Tnerefore i t  cannot re a lly  be incorporated in to  the 
b e lie fs  of a moral fa ith .
Tne tra d it io n a l concept of the MnANL 0E GRACE is  
discussed in  the fourth general observation, Bince n&nt 
hab already rejected the idea of grace as being of no 
moral value, the means of grace would be rejected on the 
same grounds, however, hie d iscussion doea ra ise  some 
points which are worth noting. He begins by saying: 
"Whatever good man is  able to do through h is  own e ffo rts  
under laws of freedom, in  contrast to what he can do only 
with supernatural assistance, con be caj-led N A T U R E  b lb  
distinguished from GiUi.CE" .61 However, we do not know 
what grace can do fo r  us, "and reason is  le f t ,  on th is  
score as with the supernatural in  general, (to which 
m orality, i f  regarded as holiness belongs; without any 
knowledge of the laws acoor  ^ ing to which i t  might occur".^
The means of grace are natu ra lly  central to the 
s p ir itu a l and devotional l i f e  of a b e lieve r. In C h ristian  
thought, they are channels of God's grace to man, through 
wnich he receives Divine help, and therefore are b a iic  to
60 R p. 130.
b l R p. 179.
- 92 -
any conception of a personal subjective re lig io u s  fa ith .
nant, however, m  these opening words already 
demolisnes the p o s s ib ility  of means of grace as part of 
a moral fa itu . we cannot know how they work, on the basis 
of h is  d is t in c t io n  between nature and grace. I f  nature 
_lb opposed to grace at the le v e l of what we can do that 
is  good by ourselves, as against what we can do with 
su em atnra l assistance, then grace must be immediately 
and by d e fin it io n  precluded from any ra tio n a l discussion  
of re lig io n .
kant says in  further c la r if ic a t io n :  "The concept
of a supernatural accession to our moral, though 
d e fic ie n t capacity and even to our not wholly p u rified  
and ce rta in ly  weak d isp o s itio n  to perform our entire  duty, 
i s  a TKARbCEND&NT CONCEPT and is  a bare idea of whose 
re a lity  no experience can assure us". Kant finds i t  hard 
to reconcile  such an idea as grace with reason, but admits 
that i t  cannot be proved to be an im p o ss ib ility  because 
"freedom i t s e l f ,  though containing nothing supernatural 
in  i t s  conception remains, as regards i t s  p o s s ib ility ,  
ju st as incomprehensible to us as is  the supernatural 
fa cto r which we would lik e  to regard as a supplement to 
the spontaneous but d e fic ie n t determination of freedom" . ^2 
Howevey, beyond the bare idea that i t  is  not im possible, 
we can know nothing of i t s  operation, i f  i t  does e x is t.
It is  a transcendent idea, and in  that sense a mystery.
Gf the transcendent, we can have no knowledge at a l l .
Of the means of grace, Kant says; "Now means are 
a l l  the intermediate causes which man has in  h is  power 
whereby a certa in  purpose may be achieved. There is  no
62 r  p, 179.
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other means (and there can be no other, of becoming 
worthy of heavenly assistance than the earnest endeavour 
to better in  every possible way our moral nature and thus 
render ourselves susceptible of having the fitn e ss  of 
th is  nature perfected fo r  Divine approval, sc fa r  as th is  
perfecting  is  not in  our power; fo r  that Divine a id }which 
we awaii>i t s e l f  re a lly  aims at nothing but our m ora lity".^3
he continues: "The concept c f a so-ca lled  means of
grace ..............  serves here nonetheless as a means of s e lf ­
deception which 1b as common &b i t  is  detrim ental to 
true r e lig io n " •
Kant is  saying then that as the operation of grace 
is  outwith the idea of moral re lig io n , so the idea of a 
means of grace which bringsgrace to work is  a form of 
self-deception  i f  i t  is  regarded as an object of knowledge* 
The centra l theme of R is  that true re lig io n  and true 
service of God consists in  the "d isp osition  of obedience 
to a l l  true duties as Divine commands, not in  actions 
directed exclusive ly  to God".63 The only true means of 
grace fo r  £ant is  the earnest moral endeavour of man.
The moans of grace spoken oi by the Church are il lu s o ry  
i f  they claim to give knowledge of supernatural a id .
**rom the examination of these themes in  R ( i .e .  
works of grace, m iracles, mysteries and means of gracej 
i t  shouad be c lea r that Kant has no desire  to allow into  
h is  consideration of re lig io n  any element of fe e lin g  or 
even any considerations based upon anything but moral 
experience. K e lig ion  fo r Kant i f  i t  is  to be discussed 
must be ra tio n a l, and by that he means amenable to 
understanding in  tenns of the laws of m orality, i a^nt
65 R p. 180.
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rejected the idea of a personal subjective re lig io u s  
fa ith , because he regarded i t  as a p oten tia l source of 
Schw£rmerei.
iAirlug th is  stage of h is  career, there oan ug u.i'ctle 
doubt that i a^nt neid the viuw that personal subjective  
re lig io u s  experience was not an expression of any kind 
of knowledge oi God. Pure ra tio n a l moral fa ith  was, fo r  
nim, the only true possible and vaJLid re lig io n . However, 
i t  has been argued from Kant's OPUS POSTUMUM that la te r  
in  b is l i f e ,  he did adopt such a personal r e l i  ious fa ith  
fo r h im self, d rich  Adickes made th is  claim many years 
a g o . His arguments rest on three grounds: F ir s t ,  in  
the Opus Pofctumum, Kant does not restate h is  moral argu­
ment, as advanced in  the KPV. Secondly, Kant declares 
that no ’ p ro o f is  possible in  any case, and f in a l ly ,  
Adickes claims that Kant affirm s that God is  d ire c t ly  
and immediately revealed in  the Categorical Imperative.
AdiCKes' points must be given serious consideration .65 
xhe f i r s t  two can be answered f a ir ly  sim ply. F ir s t ,  as 
to the claim that Kant does not restate the moral argu­
ment, i t  could be said that th is  is  merely negative
64 Krich Adickes "Die bevegenden Krdfte in  Kants p h il-  
osphischer Ifintwicklund und die beiden Pole seines 
uystems 11"
t antstudien Vol. 1 1897 p. 402 f f  "Kants Opus PostuLium, 
dargetekkt und beurheit" 
nantstuciien Vo l. 5o p. 720 f f .
* A point by point consideration of Adickes* views is 
contained in  an a r t ic le  by George ochrader in  Philosopny 
1951 (p. 226): "Kant’ s presumed repudiation of the Moral
Argument in  the Opus Postumum -  Adickes Interpretation"
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evidence, and tho point that lie ueclorss that no proof 
i s  possible can surelp be cleared up by remembering that 
the moral argument is  not a th eoretica l proof in  any 
case. The KKV destroyed the p o s s ib ility  of speculative  
theology. However, as to the th ira  point, that Kant 
claims that God is  d ire c t ly  and immediately revealed in  
the Categorical Imperative, le t  me o ffe r  three quotations 
from Kant's Opus Postumum which appear to contradict any 
possible defence of the view that Kant reverted in  la te r  
\ears to a personal subjective re lig io u s  fa ith  based on 
th is  idea.
The f i r s t  re ite ra te s  the thought of E Book IV. "The 
r e a lity  of the concept of freedom cannot be presented or 
proved d ire c t ly  (immediately) but only through a mediating 
p rin c ip le ; and s im ila r ly  the proposition " there is  a God", 
namely in  the human, m oral/practical reason, a determina­
tio n  of His a c t iv ity  in  the knowledge of a l l  human 
obligations as Divine commands" .66
This surely also answers the point that Kant never 
offered a fu rther 'p roof' of God's existence.
The second passage I would cite takes up the point 
made by Adickes that we apprehend God directly in the 
Categorical Imperative. We do not apprehend the Nature 
of God in this Imperative, but only the command of God, 
which is God speaking to us as moral beings. It is what 
God is for us. morally, tnat we know in the Categorical 
Imperative.
The third quotation which 1 append to the second 
merely underlines Kant's view that a direct and
66 Kant Schrlfteni BA Vol 21 p. 30
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unmediated experience of God is not possible.
’’That no positive or negative command from a holy 
and powerful Being to man could actually be issued, tnat 
even if it occurred, the man to whom it happened could 
not have recognised it and been persuaded of its 
authenticity, is beyond doubt. we are left with nothing 
more than the knowledge of our duty as commanded of God, 
which suffers not the slightest loss of authority because 
of the inevitable lack of knowledge of this proclamation. 
The moral imperative can thus be regarded as the voice of 
God" . ° 7
"It is fanatical to claim or even to hope for an 
exp>e*ienee or perception of the Being of God or for an 
efxect-which could proceed only from Him" . 6 8
These quotations from the 0, us Postumum should 
ciai’ify any doubts about Kant having changed his views 
at that time.
Kant’s intellectual integrity which stood firmly 
by the principle of objectivity in knowledge obviously 
did not allow him to either countenance in others or
embrace to himself the view that belief in God is a matter
of pure personal conviction. It is surprising that 
xidickes should have tried to make the claim that /Cant 
altered uis grounds of belief. However, while admitting 
that it is difficult to present any kind of argument from 
suc.i a mass as the Opus iostumum, at least it has been
67 -^ant ~chriften: Berlin Academy ~.di ion Vol. p. o4.
60 xca.nt ^chriften: Berlin Academy edition Vol. 21 p. 74.
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demonstrated that while A.ickes represents Kant as 
having abandoned his rational faith for the personal and 
subjective faith, the kind of religious view that he 
feared all his ’critical1 life, the^e are passages which 
indicate that he held to his position as enunciated in R.
To prove the case finally would require an analysis beyond 
the scope of this argument; 1 am content therefore to 
suggest that such an analysis would prove that allowing 
for ’experiments* with ideas and language, ivant never 
ab ndoned the rational faith of pure reason.
Therefore neither in his published worksnor in the 
Opus Iostumum is there any evidence of K nt ever having 
embraced a view of religion that had mything in common 
with the views of *>chliermacher the theologian or hamann 
the Glaubensphilosoph. Indeed, it has been one consistent 
criticism of Kant, that he failed to identify any personal 
and subjective elements in religious faith, or as some 
would have insisted more extremely, he lailed to see 
that religious faith was personal and subjective. This 
latter criticism is implied by the extreme Romantics, 
such as ^chliermacher. The former criticism merely 
points out that want’s religion is pernaps rather cold 
and devoid of the warmth of a personal element. The 
following is an example of this line of criticism:
’'Perhaps the main weakness of Kant’s j hilosophp of
religion is that it is ..........  a moral philosophy.
It never seems to occur to him that there is a specifically 
religious experience, a part of which is what Otto called 
"Thu numinous". He develops only the moral side of man 
in harmony with God. The temple of ^arnak, the Parthenon, 
the catheural at Chartres, religious painting, sculpture,
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poetry, music and charity - Kantian religion is not 
sufficiently fertile and generous to welcome these. It 
waters down saints and prophets into ethical culture 
leaders. Its emphasis on reason and morality as the 
essence of advanced religion, or of religion for the 
philosopher*, unconsciously tenas to engulf religion as 
a whole, making it i-ard on the hypothesis to understand 
how - ii. ediate experience of the Divine being ig ored - 
religion can flourish where abstract thought and moral 
inspiration are weak, and how it often falters where 
discursive reason and politeness reign".u-
i'his quotation sneaks for those who think that * ant's 
views lack an element of feeling, and are therefore one­
sided.?'' Dakin refers to iiudolph Otto and his expression 
"the numinous" - Otto formally raised the question of 
the relation between the rational and the non-rational 
elements in religion, and developed a line of thought in 
answer to this problem witnin a ^antian framework. Any­
one acquainted with sas he ill e ?1 may perhaps question 
the worthwhileness of discussing it at all since it is so 
far from the position that Aant held, at least as 1 have
69 A. hazard Dakan: "Aant and neligion" Essay XVII of 
Heritage of Kant edit. ..hitney and Bowers (Princeton 
U.i. 1939) p. 416-9*
7u cf. garon friedrxch von Htlgel ( nssays & Addresses - 
Dent uc ~ons ntd. Lonuon reprint 1963; criticises Pant 
in this vein, ^ee 1st. Series of assays & Addresses 
pp. Is—1^, 17-16, 131, 16u-7> m  particular.
71 .oidolph Etto Das Heilige (1917/ tr. J*W. ^aivey 
lhe Idea oi the ilo-Ly’ Pelican Books 1939*
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represented it negatively in his fe; r of Ochw&naeroi. 
However* since Ctto does refer to nut for certain of 
his basic ideas* he con ot be totally disregarded. In 
fact* there are one or two positive reasons, for 
examining ’’ies lieilige".
Eirst, Otto attempts to go beyond Cchliermacher.
Ue criticises ^chlieiTOaoher on two :aaln counts, while 
lespecting that sc^iern*acher has isolated "a very 
important element" iii religious experience* the •feeling 
of dependence* 73 he claims that hie di^ cov*. is open 
to criticism.
xirst, . ecause ^chliermachoi fails to distinguish 
successfully between the religious sense 01 dependence* 
and the ordin&x'y human sense of dependence. * chliermacher 
appears to see the difference us a mat er of degree* 
between conditional do endence* which is human* and 
absolute dependence, whic is religious dependence, 
utto wishes to m tate the . ecificully r 1 1 ^ious form of 
dependence more positively as •creature f e e l i n g * .74
Secondly, Ctto criticises Schliercachor because he 
speaks as though this religious feolii.ip of dependence 
wore priioarily a phase of eelf-conscloiisr.esc. however * 
v tto believes tnat the feeling has reference beyond the 
self to what he calls a nuae.n irae^t.a. ^  It is this 
numinous that he wishes to study. Otto's at empt to
^  op_. cit. p.
7> o . cit. p.
74 otto o .ci<*. p. ^0-^4. vLto refare to Gen. It :27 
waere Abraham opeake of himself ac *duct and ashes*.
75 pp. ci;. p. 2$
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rationalise Lchliermachei ' s discovery is one reason 
for taking a closer look at his views.
secondly, rrofeseor C.A. Campbell feels that the 
use Otto makes of want's term ' bCiieinatism' is not to be 
totally ignored: "Oince Otto's use o.’ the antian term
'schematism* has been somewhat blown upon by the critics, 
it is vjorth while pointing out that there does seem to 
be a suiiicient resemblance between the process otto has 
in mind, and Kant’s schematism of the categories - or, 
mere accurately, Kant's schematism of the ure concepts 
of the understanding - for the term 'schematism' to have 
re 1 indicative value'.76
Professor oampbell feels that while Otto ..ay ernapc 
not be a strict Kantian, his use of 'schematism' is
not entirely worthless or meaningless.
The purpose of Otto's use of the term 'schematism' 
is of course to attempt to rationalise the r.u..nious 
feeling which he derives from his criticism of 
3uhliermacher.
Finally, it should be remembered that what is 
being asked is quite simply 'Can Kant be read in this 
way?1 »ve have found no trace of Romanticism in his 
writings, and since there is no doubt that Ctto's views 
belon^ to the Romantic camp of thinkers, and since he 
does draw in a meaningful way upon nant, the question 
must be faced 'Are the seeds of a Romantic position in 
KantV' 'Jo his terms lend themselves to such a use?'
76 C.A. Campbell selfhood and (lodhood {George Allen 
& Unwin 1*57) p. 337.
i
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For the purposes of strict relevance, 1 shall state 
the general question of Otto and Kant 77 in a very 
specific form: 'What is the nature of the 'indicative 
value' of Otto's use of the term 'schematism', and is 
there anythin^ in his final position that is genuine 
reflection of i*ant;'
First, then,some quotations from Otto which lead
directly into his treatment of 'Schematism': "........
in our idea of God, is the non-rational overborne even
perhaps wholly excluded by the r ational........ ?" 78
From this question, he makes a criticism o_ orthodox 
Christianity for failing to recognise the value of 
religious experience, and for therefore giving to the 
iaea of God a one-sided intellectualist and rationalist 
inter retation. ueligion cannot be fully contained in 
a series of rational assertions. It is Otto's belief 
that the non-ratioual element of relation lias been 
mistakenly devalued.
iO give his discussion precision, he takes for 
analysis the concept of "has Heilige , and this leads 
us to his use of Schematism: "We generally take 'holy'
as meaning 'completely good'; it is the absolute moral 
attribute, denoting the consummation of moral goodness.
In this sense, Kant cu-KLs the will w* ich remains 
unwaveringly obedient to the moral law from the motive 
of dut^ , a 'holy' will; here clearly we have simply the
77 Retailed material on Otto s background, and
relation to Kant's ideas may be found in Robert F. Davidson
Kuuolph utto's Interpretation of Religion ( rinceton U.i. 
1*47j Chapter V in particular.
78 ihe xdea of the Holy p. lb.
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perfectly moral will. In the same way, we may speak of 
the holiness or sanctity of duty or law, meaning merely 
that they are imperative upon conduct and universally 
obligatory” •
Then he continues: "but this common usage of the 
term is inaccurate. It is true that all thiL moral 
significance is contained in the word 'holy', but it 
includes in addition - as even we cannot but feel - 
a clear ov^rilus of meaning, and this it is now our task
to isolate"*79
Having isolated the overplus of meaning contained 
in the word 'holy', Otto asks how the rational and non- 
rational (the holy) are related. To answer this question, 
he introduces the term 'schematism'.
In expounding 'schematism', Otto says: "   an
exam le indeed of an inner a priori prixiciple is 
(following the theory of Kant) the connection of the 
category of causality with its temporal 'schema', the 
temporal sequence of two successive events which by 
being brought into connection with the category of 
causality is known and recognised as a causal relation 
of the two. In this case, analogy between the two - the 
category and the schema - has also a place, but it is 
not chance external resemblance but essential correspon­
dence and the fact that the two belong together is here 
a necessity of our reason. On this basis of such a neces­
sity, the temporal sequence 'schematises' the category".80
79 The Idea of the Iloly. p. 1*. 
v The Idea of the Holy, p. 60.
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Applied to his concept of the holy, Otto claims 
that: "the relation of the rational to the non-rational 
element in the idea of the holy or sacred is just such 
a one of schematication, and the non-rational numinous 
fact, schematised by the rational concepts we have 
suggested above, yields us the complex category of the 
'holy' itself, richly charged and complete and in its
_  8_lfullest meaning".
tie claims "that the schematisation is a genuine one, 
and not a mere combination of analogies may be distinctly 
seen from the fact that it does not fall to pieces, and 
cannot be cut out as the development of the consciousness 
of religious truth proceeds onwards and upwards, but is 
only recognised with greater definiteness and certainty".
This must now be compared with Kant's chapter on
62'Schematism' in the KRV. The following passages from 
Kant outline his doctrine: "tiow then is the subsumption 
of intuitions under pure concepts, the application of a 
category to appearances possible?"
tie answers his own question thus: "ObviouBly there 
must be some third tiling, which is homogeneous on the one 
hand witn the category, and on the otner hand with the 
appearance, and which thus makes the application of the 
former to the latter possible. Thi6 mediating represen­
tation must be pure, that is, void of all empirical 
content, and yet at the same time, while it must in one 
respect be intellectual, it must in another be sensible. 
Such a representation is the TKAhSCtiDDtiNTAL SCHEMA".**^
81 Idea of the Holy p. 61.
62 B p. 177.
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nant says that the schemata are found by interpreting 
a pure category in terras of time.
"Thus an application of the category to appearances 
becomes possible by means of a transcendental determination 
of time, which as the sc ema of the concepts of under­
standing mediates the subsumption of the appearances under 
tne category".0-^
The scnema of a concept is defined as "...........
representation of a universal procedure of imagination 
in providing an image for a concept ........ "84
He gives an example: "'ihe concept fdogf signifies
a rule according to which my imagination can delineate 
the figure of a four-footed animal in a general manner, 
without limitation to any single determinate figure such 
as experience, or any possible image that 1 can represent 
in concreto actually exists1•
how is this possible, and how do we 'schematize?1 
Aant says: "This schematism of our understanding, in its
application to appearances and their mere form Ah ART 
CORCRALAD IN THE DEPTHS OF THE HUMAN OOUL, whose real 
modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow 
us to discover and to have open to our gaze".85
"The schema of a re lity, as the quantity of some­
thing in so f r as it fills time, is just this continuous 
and uniform production of that reality in time as we
<-3 ii p. i76.
64 B p. 180.
*-3 B p. 181.
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successively descend from a sensation which has a 
certain degree to its vanishing point, or progressively 
ascend from its negation to some magnitude of it".86
"The categories therefore, without schemata, are 
merely functions of the understanding for concepts; and 
represent no object".87
Luch in brief is Aant's doctrine of 'uchematism'.
In using this doctine, Otto argues that the category 
of the Holy (which he claims is an apriori category) is 
schematised by the rational (moral) concept of the holy.
lie argues: "The idea of the numinous and the feelings
that correspond to them are, quite as much the rational 
ideas anu feelings absolutely 'pure* and the criteria 
which Kant suggests for the 'pure1 conce t and the 'pure' 
feeling of respect are most precisely applicable to them".88
"The proof that in the numinous we have to deal with 
purely a priori cognitive elements is to be reached by 
introspection and a critical examination of reason such 
as Kant instituted".89
He refers to Kant's distinction of empirical knowledge 
into what we receive from intuition and what comes from 
unaerstanding, when intuitions give occasion for them, 
and sees the numinous arising from the understanding:
"The facts of the numinous consciousness point therefore - 
as likewise do also the 'pure concepts of the under­
standing' of Kant and the ideas and value judgements of 
ethics and aesthetics - to a hidaen substantive source,
88 B i. 163.
67 B p. 167.
88 Idea of the Hol.v p. 129.
69 Idea of the Hoi., p. 130.
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from which the religious ideas and feelings are formed, 
which lies in the mind independently of sense experience; 
a pure reason in the profoundest sense, which, because 
of the surpassingness of its content, must be distinguished 
from both the pure theoretical and the ure practical 
reason oi Knnt, as something yet higher and deeper than 
they".90
These passages indicate Otto's position. It is true 
to say that Kant's enigmatic description of Schematism 
as 'an ait concealed in tne depths of the human soul* 
has a Romantic so^nd. It lacks the recicion and clarity 
of moLt Kantian definitions. However, nant intended that 
it should be a negative limit to improper speculation 
aDOut the ground uf knowledge and reason itself. Otto 
seeuiS to have developed the idea in a positive way. 
however.* this is perhaps too general a criticism to have 
any weight.
Therefore, we mu^t examine the justiiic tion Otto 
of1 e s for nis claim to have used .ant's tern schematism 
to ration Llise the non-rational element in religion.
one searing criticism comes from rofessor dohn Oman, 
the Orkney-born theologian. He says: "rofessor Otto,
more erhaps than any .other writer has jut the emphasis 
on the a.esome holy as the essenti 1 religious character­
istic, and ne divides it entirely from the ethical, which 
he regards as a quite separate development alongside it. 
ict so unueniable i 1 t e close and a parentIj necessary 
connection that after distinguishing tnem sharply in the 
interests of his theory, he maintains in the interests 
01 experience and common sense, that they are related
luea of tne Holy p. lyl.
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a priori.
"~uch a position hardly needs refuting ••••....
"This scheme really assumes two bupernaturals. One 
we realise by awe and value by the shuddering of the 
creature, and one only by moral reverence and moral value
in the liberty of God's children .........  Again in respect
of the rational, are there two supernaturals - one a 
numinous might, before which the creature has no claims 
and no rights, and one a moral order which speaks to 
us as children?"
If Professor Oman is correct in his criticism,92 
then Otto must lace the dilemma of being accused of 
v-uistorting Lant, so that the fundamental Kantian position 
of the concept of religion as seeing all duties as commands 
from God is destroyed, or of having discovered in Kant's 
epistemolo^y a weakness that makes his views on ethics 
and theology totally inconsistent.
However, there may be a measure of truth in Uuan’s 
criticism. One point he does make (and ovurstresses 
perhaps; is given a finer eage by Prolessor Campbell who 
points out the consequences for theology of Otto's use 
of jiant's schematism.
He says: "The implication of Otto's central thesis
seems to me to be incontestably, that the only kind of 
theology' possible is a symbolic theology".93
He takes the question first "Is there an inward
91 Tne Natural and the Supernatural John Oman 
(Cambridge U.r. 1*31) the two questions will be found 
on paL,es 63 and 64 respectively.
92 C.ii. Campbell Selfhood and Goanood an answer to 
Oman's 'attack* on 6tto is given pp j4^-343.
93 op. cit. p. 341
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necessity of the mind which compels us to think of the 
numinous object in terms of rational concepts in their 
literal meaning?” He answers that when the numinous 
consciousness is active, tnere is n inward necessity to 
refrain from 1 rationalising1. However, this level of 
experience does nob sustain itself lOi-g, and when it is 
passed, the desire to rationalise ;rows. There comes the 
acLire to tuiim tne numinous object in terms of a specific 
set of characters. However, we can assign to these 
c aracters no more than a symbolic validity, because they 
re applied to the mysterium tremenaum as analogues only 
and not in any literal manner.
i'he refusal to rationalise initially is nece~sar„ , in 
order to prevent the numinous nature of the experience, 
from ceasing to exist. when any attempt is tade to 
rationalise for the purpose of expressing the expedience 
theologically, any definition can be merely annalogioal, 
and therefore symbolic. Hence onij a symbolic theology 
is ossible on Otto's basis.
rhis refine Oman's point about separating tne 
ethical and religious, in that as irofessor uampbell 
points out, the ethical characters c in be applied to the 
religious experience only as analogues, and not literally.
The technical abuses of which ^tto may be accused,
irofessor ti.J. Paton discusses in one oi his books.94
"Otto lumps together Ideas and categories - he uses
the words interchangeably - and assumes (by twisting the
meaning of both) that the category or Idea of the 'holy* 
can give us knowledge of an object which transcends
94 The Modern Predicament (George Allen & Unwin 1*67)
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ordinary experience altogether*' • 5
He points out that Kant's doctrine is complicated, 
but that this fundamental distortion by otto denudes his 
"osition of the right to be uesignated Kantian in any form.
"Otto reverses the meaning Ox the terms he has 
borrowed. The pure rational conce ts belonging to the 
category of the holy are described as the schemata of 
the n^n-rational insteau of vice v. rsa. i?urtnennore, as 
these rational concepts, although called categories are 
really Ideas and so by definition can have no objects in 
experience, they are all of all things least suited for 
the iunction 01 schemata - namely, the lunction of enabling 
us to ply a apriori concepts to an object." ^b
In summing u Otto's general positron, ~aton says:
"It seems pretty clear tnat he bases reli ,ious belief, at 
least primarily, on divination and not on reason".97
finally he comments: "For K.nt, such a doctiine would 
be mere mysticism oi Lchw&rmerei".9fc
irofessor xaton does admit that Otto's suggestion 
is a most pxausible adaption of Kant's philosophy to the 
needs of reli ious consciousness.
with regard to it being a legitimate use of Aant, 
he feels however that Otto is mer ly trying to make Kant's
95 The Modern xredicament P« 136.
9b The Modern redicament P- 138-139.
97 The i'ioaern predicament P* 140.
9b The Modern Predicament P* 141.
- 110 -
philosophy into a r tional framework for sticism. 
irofessor laton concludes that Ctto distorts Kant for 
tnis purpose.
The most recent attempt to revive in interpretation 
oi -ant in which the role oi experience is stressed in 
ui .tt^rs of religion is in Mgerstrbm' s thesis about what
~ GOho calls 'metaphysical religiosity' in iCant ianism.* The 
uet ils oi hi^ doctrine are not relevant lore, out his 
imurpi station of Kant’s view of morality i. open to 
muostion. He argue® th t ".. •. for _ti:t, mor lit., in 
itself has no value wnatsoever. it is merely a symptom 
of the soul's absorption in its essence, In _erfect 
happiness. «*hy not of the soul's absorption in God? It 
is customarily said that in hant, reli^ioii loses all 
independence and is only an appendix to morality, khy? 
Uccau e what .ant calls religion, vij. i ith in God as 
the giver of happiness in the measure oi duty, is nothing 
but the imperceptible form of religiosity , ouch as we have 
in an extreme fori, in the Arabian o o . aradise.
But if Kant s so-called morality were hot just religion, 
neither u l ; it be religiosity, but or Xity wnen uesus 
sav,c *Hy peace I give to you; not as the world gives do 
1 give'. Kant says 'Be determined by reason'. Paul says 
"Abide in Christ". The background of fecli and thought 
are stil- fundamentally the same - the feeling of blessed­
ness in connection with absorption in the pure 'I', and 
the thought thereof
i i re} ply: to Hiigcrctrdm' © sweeping iacu oalications,
I would first, that it takes no account at all of 
what .ant said about ^cnw&rmerei. This makes his view
”  h AGu a STRSm  ihilosophy and aeli^ion ^George Allen 
oc Unwin 1^64 j p- 2UT-2U2T7
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open to question. However, k i w i n  the passage quoted 
the definition of religion he offers, namely, faith in 
God as the giver of happiness in the measure of duty is 
quite wrong, while Kant allowed hii; self in k to take up 
the question which Mgerctrbm earlier r  ises, ' v.hy is the 
duteous will bent on fulfilling iis duty?' 1^0 the 
roblem is still discussed witnin the critical limits, 
and the transcendent use of the term God which i&gerstrbm 
employs in .^xis version of want's views, to Kant would be 
an illegitimate use of an luea of Keason. Only by virtue 
of this improper use of God, can H&gerstrttm's thesis be 
either advanced or defended. Kant's own definition of 
religion as the recognition of all duties as Divine 
commands would not permit the development of such a 
doctrine.
It may be auaed that while Kant might accept the 
reduction of Oesus' words, and St. Paul's words to the 
simple imperative 're Determined by practical reason' he 
would most certainly not have accepted an equation of 
that imperative with any formulation which carried 
mystical overtones. T.K. Greene, in clarifying Kant's 
position, speaks in a way which finally refutes 
Hagerstrbm's idea wnen he speaks of "Kant's inability 
to recognise a distinctive religious experience, which 
is akin to tnat moral experience which he nimseli describes 
in such detail yet is not identical with it. This 
religious experience implies a knowledge of God as real 
as isnnt's own apprehension of the moral law. A&nt himself, 
as we have seen, tended during his last years to interpret 
the moral experience as a direct revelation of God to
100 H&gerstrBm ox. cit. p. kOO.
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man.- ^ let hie characteristic belief is that God is 
not directly knowable".102 These words are adequate 
comment•
Kant may have denied knowledge, but he did not 
repudiate reason. Any non-rational element in religion 
was uebarred from rational discussion. Kant claimed that 
we cannot discuss things which belong to a realm whose 
laws we do not know. Therefore, any attempt to place 
r^ant in the ranks of the Romantics must be doomed to 
failure. while there may be traces of a romantic 
imagination within his writings, close scrutiny of the 
text and the context yields little support for any 
generalisation. Kant was interested in come of the 
phenomena 01 Romanticism.103 That is a n  that may be 
said. -he 'laitn Philosophy1, he rejected, not because 
it pressed the claims of faith or denied knowledge, but 
because it repudiated reason. Therefore he took issue 
witn Laiuann. Limilarly, either an attempt to erect a 
theology of the non-rational in religion on Kantian lines, 
ac in the case oi wtto, or a simple e ,u txon of a neo- 
myctical position with x^ant' s vie* oi faith in mind, as 
in che case of Mgerstrbm, ar- alike doomed to failure.
So far, it has been established that ..ant took a 
serious stand on the need for religious faith, and that 
he believed that he rad made room for faith through the 
conclusions of the KRV. whatever he meant by the term
lyl As earlier indicated, 1 do not subscribe to these 
views. Greene's admission that .ant's characteristic 
belief is tnat God is not directly kncwable is important.
1 ^ T.M. Greene "The Historical Context and Religious 
Significance of Kant's religion" R p. xxvi.
103 See Appendix 1.
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'faith', he did not mean a personal subjective religious 
attitude derived through religious experience. This view 
he rejected as being open to Sehw&rmerei. He objected 
stiongly to Romanticism either in matters philosophical,104 
or theological. As a possible basis for a standpoint in 
either philosophy or religion he rejected it completely.
In conclusion, at tnis stage, both extreme forms 
of x ant interpretation, namely that represented by 
Vaihinger on the one hana, which denies a significant 
place for religious faith in Kantian thou< ht, and the 
other extreme which attempts to relate x.ant's use of 
the torai 'faith' to the faith philosophy of x, mann, for 
example, must on good grounds be equally rejected. The 
enquiry mu^t now return to Kant's starting point, and 
rocead to follow the route of his thought to the point 
at which he justifies his claim to have made room for 
faith.
t
1J4 in a short work entitled "On a newly emerged noble 
Tone in Philosophy (1790,, Kant states his objections to 
the idea of philosophy as the utterance of eccentric 
omanticL. "Obscure expectation which cannot be satisfied 
by Reason must find a surrogate in mystical illumination 
which perverts the brain towards Schw&rmerei and isthe 
death of true philosophy".
GR p. s83»
CHAPTriR THRKR
PROM RATIONALIST THiSOLOOY TO 
RATIONAL PAITH - I
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In order to understand the nature of tne faith for 
which * ant believed his KRV had made room, it is necessary 
to xocuc. upon the means by which he denied Knowledge.-1*
.e must asK '^at are the steps, in ant's argument, which 
lead to this conclusion?' Ihis is necessary in and by 
itself for an adequate study oi Kant'j conception of faith. 
It become^ imperative, however, in the light of rant's 
assessment of tne use of speculative reason in contemporary 
theology: "how 1 maintain that all attempts to employ 
reason in theology in any merely speculative m inner are 
altogether fruitless and Oj their very nature, null and 
void,. a&d that the principles of it. ioyment in the
study of nature uo not lead to an; theology whatsoever".^
Thifc statement implies & i ejection by ant of certain 
views on theology. However, taken with his initial 
position, we face the ecemiiig paradox of ant rejecting
theology but defending faith, stated in sucn an oversim­
plified form, ..art's position is open to both misinter­
pretation and abuse, fcith this in b in.., the general 
question of how he maxes room for fait, say b( IttbdiviM 
into three distinct ?roblems:
i. *hat aid Kant mean by a 'theology* which used reason 
in a speculative manner: *h t sort of theology was
ne rejecting?
. now does hu justify the possibility oi another type 
ol theology ?
3. by what means does he introduce tne discussion cf
the type of theology which he regards as legitimate, 
the kinu of theoio&j which exiounda and contains
^ b xxx 
2 B bo'j.
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the faith for which he has made room?
A proper ana satisfactoij answer to these questions 
requires an interpretation of the intentions ana structure 
of the ritical ::hilosophy as it developed out of the KRV. 
Therefore, the movement of want's thought in the argument 
of that work, and in other related an relevant writings 
must be followed.
*he basic problem with which xant started the KRV is 
set out in more th n one way. for example, he asks quite 
airectiy: "what and how much can the understanding and 
reason know apart from nil experience?" >
The rationalist tradition of philoso.hj, in which 
hVint uad b^en formally tr inea rejected the senses as a 
source 01 knowledge. ant clearly facer the issue which 
i~ raised by that position, eo he iormulatec hie question 
accordingly.
. wver, Kant was aleo aware of the difficulty raised 
for science and philosophy by David . u .e's famous argument 
on causality.4 Hume argued that while eneik of 'cause' 
and 'effect', we in fact apprehend neither. 'Cause' and 
'effect' often occur simultaneously, and cannot be 
distinguished. «Lere this is not the case, we merely cee, 
foi example, 13 succeeding A and not B as .uicebsrsril.v and 
ci.1* s successive upon A. The latter ideas we infer from 
a number of xupcated instances of A followed by u . kow 
ti.e ci.ai ctcristios of universniitu and . it., belonj 
to many basic statements of mathematics, science and
^ A xvii
4 David hume: * Treatise oi human Nature book 1 iart 111
SnquTry concerning the human Understanding
le c tio n  VII.
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Mictphyslc** (each as - 'every event has a cause*. 4 Such 
et fcttjnente ^ n t  culled w-jnthctic ^ . ri ri. is problem 
then became* 'How are synthetic a priori judgements 
possible?" ~
Chif question broken into its coition on I parts became
the three problems oi* the KJiV - viis.
\1 / low is pure at^cmatic^ possible?
^  , *.o* Is pure k cien.ce possible?
v, o* i. -eta* hycico, . natur 1 i oil ion, i03Sible?b
u's own iit-Lu lor hii enquiry i- *.tA c... ...
it is concerned with 'nut so much the objects as with the
1 . . 1 . this r...O'*-
* a, c i. edible riori'.
The structure of the kHV is highly complex, and it 
u set out in soic. th a one way* A1 thou i ant ..i self 
subdi nicies it into two j.l» sectione, it .aw. ■;iso be 
regarded as bein0 i*. three sections e c.* ■. linu with one
ci the turee specific formulations o the .section about 
. v ntactic _ iori pi o; sitio.- . .
lii the TRAhi3C-i.M)n^TAL . , ant analyses the
mode oi our n o i l  experience and in loin,: so deale with
rob . _ of wjynthetic •: : i „: i . i. try.J
-dmiiar to sense exr eri ei.co Jeo&etry requires the const­
ruction oi .. -pace is shown by ant to be a necessary
3 p. 11.
» 13 > . 1 W 4 *
h . 1".
*ra.xcer dental occtrine of i.le .ents ~ Tr. i) ctrine of
i.ethod.
9 ^uclidean Geometry is what n&nt is discussing. The
si ;niiicance of tne Aesthetic lox non-nuclidean Geometry 
is a separate problem, b .41*
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MODB { ..AY, oi receivi i .c is Ox thx . in our ruindfi •
without the idea of space ^  and the idea 02 t i n e , t h e  
worlu of our ^ensu perception cui not be or nised. ihue
pui. .uathematical c .lculations would be inioscible.
Space and time have no reality of themeel.ec- uowever, 
t hey have • ■ I - - ' - 1 i 1 ll f “ in that they are
the necessary condition of ordered experience.
xHo  ^ .. . d_ ....1 . AhAbYTIC deals with the problem
of syntactic a priori judgements in the body of physical 
science.^ To justify the use of statements such as 
’-very event has a cause' , KLant expounds his TEANSCbKD&HTAL 
h, v>r * CAfhGGhl&h, ^ He ar use thr t for there
to be any experience at all there m^et u  what he calls
-v ... i APpHRv.. 11 . '. ‘5
He means that the mind uses cute $orleo through whioh
it Lj nth-ticaiij unites and organi$e*a tae materiax oi 
sense experience, will oh we already luive by virtue of the 
farms of ecusi iiitj.1° ihe caue^ories ol the understunaing 
belong to tne Blindf and apply only to appearance*. ihey
I B p. 4«-. :,dpace is nothing but the form of all
SLi ;arance. uf o^ter seiwe. d  it tn.. subjective
uiitlon of Sci-tibixity, under which alone outer 
intuition is possible 1 or u.^".
II B p. '‘Time la nothing but the form of inner
........... Xiao is tne tl a i ricri condition
oi *11 aipearanea*.
1^ B . *>1.
l-> Newtonian hyLico.
H  u . U S  ff.
^  B .131.
do B p. - space and ti.ae.
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do not apply to objects ^  themselves which give rise 
to our experiences. *<e only know oi' thing* as they appear 
to us in our thus ordered experience.
while these sketchy remarks do not Login to analyse 
the complex themus of tne :uiY, the., sot into erspective 
want's y.prroach to the problem. Th«y render clearer the 
background against which the TltAHbChhi ^  r I)lAl*bCTIC 
deals wit.* tne problem W  0f synthetic a-iiori judgements 
in the discipline of meta;hyeics.
aving shown tliat we cannot k ow object:., and that 
our knowledge is limited tc appearance*, ant argues that 
when metaphysics uses reason to try to reach objects, 
PARALOGISMS ^ 0 (formally fallacious syllogisms) arise.
Thrat type* of syllogism *'.re specified by . ant, an- these 
eharacteria* tne three subdivisions of . et physics. They 
art. r kpectiveiy:
( i / Li*l vikxwUcul' i c 2 uuw^hi i, use ^ujnon^l
l cxiOlot>r; to prove the existence oi the soul.^
I U  ; the 1*1 Gi.--.XS. * * iiOQIi; , uc^d Dw. i * ioiiai
Cw^-uo1 o»lv to k i GVu the reality oi lretdom.*1-
h p. 3 2 'time cannot be lie< objects
in themselves"
. 'um c i.tegorie*., afl yitidi nowledge of
thin s, liave no Kind of application, m  ve only in 
re ird to things which may be objects of possible experience.
lb b . 350 ff.
2 u b . 3 9 9 .
21 B p. 37b "*e have therefore to se lor m  unconditioned
first of the categoricux synthesis in a .* abject; secondly,
of the hypothetical synthesis of tne members of a scries; 
thirdly of the disjunctive synthesis o. tue parts in a 
system”. B 397.
22 b p. 4 3 3 "Tne second type of dialectical argument 
follows tne analogy of tho hypothetical syllogism".
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liii/ the DISJUNCT! Y . . Yj.LCGUM us ad in the statements 
made by HAT i UGY to prove the existence
of Gou.
ihwoe disciplines sout.ht the uucpnditionag oDjecte 
buhinu the appearances 01 our u.\j uence • . atioi*al psy-
ehology .. ju nt the subject in turrai_ a., tie 3::... oziality of 
the soul. ..ant took all categorical x >powitione to be 
reuaceabl tw subject/ redicate for:. , the* <*o .nectixi0 them 
with the eats ory of substance. .e irs.uet that tne 
syllogisms of rational cychclogy use ’thought* and 
’subject* in two distinct senses in two different premises,24 
c i . a* therefore not satisfiwd th i the 111 ortulity of 
the suuii could be , ioved in t.ii m »i ! ex*.
.afioni i- coo. ology ai*d its defence o: freedom ^ant
cimi-.n^Lj rcjucifcu.-^ Hypothetical syllogisms exiresc a
relation between ground and consu ,uont, . u if, as would
b„ necuubary to assert the reality o* freedom, things 
*that a* iub^l arc awC*ibt,u reality, contradictious a.uut
JL • C • 1 a.jC u u 11 u Uci i. J * L - » X . i .i wi« t
i3 p. oul-3- •
^4 ^ p. 4IC— 4-12. "in the major premise ..e speak, of a
that cun bt thougi.itin 1, 1. cion, mid
thei U o  IB it civ . . 1 litian. nut in tne
minor premica we bi e. k of xt only 1.. so far as it regards 
i tLcli ii.. ^uoject, cibplj ii - fcjL. x j.. to tnq-i .-it <iiid ui»e 
unity of oontoiQus&es&t and not a li aviso i. relation to
\,r»„ intuition through which it is iv i t: object to
the: ;ht" .
.a c.uiu, to >.4 : Hoses I onueltsohr: \ 1/. , a iriend of
.ant, argued that the soul was a sul t c l , not composeu 
of parte. (Ucsammcite hohriften lc4,, ii . ffy Kant
refutes it bj saying tuat if the soul wan a simple subst­
ance, it ..uuld r.avc to disappear at ones oi not at all, 
since it had not parts, because of it. intensive quality,
the soul evjuid ai^inisn gradually* bee B p. 414-3*
b  . 47t Xx. c*. b t . -   . .7 -fcb.
-  . 1 2 0  -
utuphysicfi 1 r a science, ant claims ic impossible. 
that it )fi:;t a ntur i* oiti 3n . 2 6
1 e afiirma that rational cosmology cannot prove the reality
cw freedom, bui Ly l initm the caus x i\.h tion to
r at the condition oi the 1 to.iii j ble order
- - o r nett , freedom . ~ i ou .. 1 . i ility
r*6iL . 1 i.l • *Kil ossi wi 1 1 i «v> ,iluuk» t. i .c i c iuiij in the
1 . IV .
tin -lj , rational theology is dintnisaad. iheololtical 
.i cnar*ct ri * tl c lij i : . xie junotive
. .2 ( I o x. . _________ . ■ - i nun,
ai the sum cl' ill attributes, then thia notion re;.upposes 
v disjunctive ro aritio 5 giving 1 1 'Ot iole
1 t 3 nay :*ave«
r^t’c rejection of theology i. co.*t i. . m  his V
ideclaration that the tnroe traditional :oof, afforded 
~y theolo y ire impoecibi*.
Tne ontoiogic l ar o. i.t is bed ox i'ix'ct.29
luia *r u -r.t in its oi x«*ct xnu ftc t. «a:a -rase, form
w. ince v i t. . ■.= ■ 1 . . .  tt-jbute*,
ana eiiice existence is ■» positive at rioute, therefore
• ation: . t *' in.. 1q
a ;oiiiive attribute *3^ and argute that existence in not
2 b b . 4 3 C ff.
2 / • u«. 4—5 •
- . 1 1  ff. . ter . ( n. ±1 / the dialectic
c :h : . ..i r.tu ; . ..... t * . 1  roof
o . bfc > L k. *1 c c . 1 . > u i i ome e i i. • •
23 section IV - entitled The impossibility, of an
tOdLC icai xoof Ox tna .j.-iwUi.Cw ox j oI «
^ jj u<>u 1 Being/ is ouviousi^ not a real predicate"
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a predicate.
c I* o ui.: cusses the concept oi* a n#c«»aarj being,
&nd concludes that the concept of someone . ho Lie existence 
e ..not s/v ,uiJ.ea wi Ua uut contradiction arises through 
oufunion with M c t m r y  judgements. .... redicate which 
iv aeccssarv is conditional upon the subject to be
defined, tut tuis doe*- not mean that s-._. subject itself
and its conditions arc necessary, nant i_lu£trates this 
in tne cac^ of v triangle.
. e Cosmological roof 3^ Kant reject*, because it 
cove* tly implies the ontological argument, and the failure 
of tne former is dotwrsiinect by the failure of the latter.
proof he st .tec tfcuc: "if anything .exi3tat ... 
ab. oiutoi^ rii-cess .ry eing must also exist. r,ow I, at 
least, exist, therefore an absolutely necessary being 
exists .^3
v n il this argument were able to stand by itself,
it ouid not be ntliful in that it yields othin^ of the
. t . : the buirig hose existenc it r^ve ihe
argument as a whole requires supplement!: by the onto-
repical argument which lant hac ..iscredited.
3bine argument from design rests Upon the coeu*olofc icai 
argument, since from tne cone t oi in absolutely necessary 
being, v* infer the existence of k ierfect -r*d wmnipotent 
,.ne. The cosmological argument ie refuted because it 
cores .is the ontological argument, an.. li* ewise this 
ar a cnt collapses for the same reason.
B P . v< 4mm .
•^ d  pi cyl. 
f>3 b < • o3^.
34 b p. u4«^
3^ b p. 64c.
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"Thus the ph^cico-theological roof of the existence 
of an original or sup>rene being ret te u on th cosmolo­
gical proof, and the cosmological u un the. ontological”*36
ant therefore rejects this * ament, although he 
doe~ exhibit ~ome sympathy for it,>^ i. .pite of hie iinai 
rejection*
«hile nsmt uisvoces oi the arguments in uutnil in 
m e  ”?r&ufio*ftdeataX Dialectic , hie attitude to tnese 
roofk. has aJr*-&dj be^n determined i. the iraneeendental
, ( ! iiiCi ill t*J r I'e..kjCt ■ - ^ • - >-/f the
eate yriu- , ac i rolessor jjttiriou . a^ ^ »1* *» . minted
ywtu. U n  the iiLjluu  ^ Qa . uic eaBQi.t thu doctrine oi 
the transcendental ideality of space and -ime noivos the 
ohtOtneoxogical f rofc.u., as well* ..race and time do not 
bexoxt things in thomcelvec but a foi .. oi ..., pe ranee 
fiiiLv it loiiowtO im. eolately iron inis tnat vney cm. t 
bel to vine being. ..ant repeatedly points out
m a t  w m ,ll the doctrine of the transcendent 1 ideality of 
space a m  time h«s haw also s lv id tne onto tne oroh'ioai 
robleE ."w
Irofessor Martin of lore a state ent from ..ant wnich 
is wQi tn :uotlng at jueiigthi In natux rl , in
thinkin0 an object ^aOvi; who not ei.-*,. on* c an
object oi intuition to cn , bu« c nn t‘ b^ a . reject *-*r 
sensible in tuition even to hi: £«~i^, .«e rc c nt^ui to 
remove the conditions of t m e  and s pace Iron ..is
)o B p  6 5 h  .
3/ see* B .. 664-0. ihis question is interesting, and 
worth no w i m  in tec as&lng.
. artin '..nci.estl-r v r Vf; r ■ . 1^61 p. 162.
iT • Cj . • 0 * rUCtiO •
- 123 -
intuition - for all his knowledge must be intuition, and 
not t ought, which always invoi . limitatinu.. But ,ith 
w..at ri:j;t can we ao thic ix we have made time and space 
previously forme of things in themselvee, and as such, 
wout in at apxiori coalition- of the existence of
t.ii l, even though tne thir e i.-* the&seiv e were removed? 
i conditions oi xll e.istence i.. eneral, they must also
c * *i. l,Oi>L Jx l»iiu b U  . ..c c Ji. u Wvjt # ^
.ant is saying that Lime and g pace cannot be 
attributes of the being of God. fhis akei j.ny rational 
ruof of dod1^  existence Leyona possibility.
savin* cXxtiutu now tus. tuwoio icai i aments which
: ant icject. , h  c iru to enquire , ith whom in particular
i . . . i L i ied. . identifi-. c
i vi c rtt. 4 with the ontolo ic 1 I ument, nd .^eibn^z^l
with cosmological urgument. .L.cax‘tt-. v naed th*
»■ . -. u <xw ■t.j i a j L lit on ti**» bati> ox h 1 l> c .c^i* m u  ii» uinCj*^
m ^ xiu j[ l> autiji them ao - w. - - ^ .i« x. a* ..is
^  13 . 71.
A * } " ihe attempt to establish the e 4. ter;e f a Supreme 
beir.^ bw. means of the f m o m  ontoicj icax ar. ament of 
* occurtee is tne re lore it.crtJij ; o much xauuur inn effort I^sl .......* £> • o^w. .
41 "ibis i oof, termed by .. the * f contingent-ia au. a, . . .... jw proce I t  ex . and examine* B 632.
‘f m  . c a r .oaitatioi-.. . the ii . t. .allotOjhj
xidn. v. fc n, 1 1 . xr; uoan Vei\c:.. ,.unt" u o n  fix n.. tnere is nothing that Iv . mt is* . ce ol TTT3 n  uth, except the 
cue r . aistinct perception oi wh t I afiir®"* p. (jb•of. -.x-i.ui ,.ee oi .iJLlo..orhy rt i « . It*, on .(hat
cu-.w tr t- teL cieai She xisti set tret: ii . ? ej.it at ion V 
' .... c nnot conceive Go j .c ^  as existing, it follows
La. t existence i. ins arable iho.. i , aid that therefore
n e  r e a l l y  e x i t t s  . i f 3 M & s o o n  a t  I  d i s c o v e r  t f x a t  
e x i s t e n c e  i s  a  p e r f e c t i o n ,  t o  c x u s o  m e  t o  i n f e r  t h e  
e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h i r  f i r s t  a n d  c o v e ,  i l g n  b e i n g " • p .  1 2 3 •
- If 4 -
- . . . - ometry. las attitude to
philosophy modelled on mathematics and tne ty of 
»rt lnty that m a  atical deduction affords.4j
ioihni* wan even more oiti.iGtic than Descartes, in 
ui^ .it j.e coiiiplctely tia, yr .ted tne* i o- bibiiities oi 
: . . . . xe V:i v . t h v h his
optimism, he i~ reputed to have bell vcu t) at the vexed 
roblem of the division of the Christian hu ches was
. oha I . lieve * that
: .   o theodicy. . -i articular
. t that the. e ,
. uiemleoed all mtte&piij at f h e o d i ^ u i b n i z  believed
ii. solution was so simple that he undertook to produce a 
ooutx^r version oi it. ..e thought that he had solved the 
question oi the relation ox tue i t iiljible world to the 
worli oi appearances by means oi hi© concept oi the cre-
. . ical argument,
L^t hie eculi^r u. on hi*, vei^ion of the
l c - -uf.uiit. _ossesseu a ’blind faith’ in
the powers ox reason, reflected ii. the optimistic manner 
in which he sets forth his phIIc~ophicai viuws,^5 
particularly with it a r . to xa^ attitude to t^e proofs 
of God’s existence. it clearly believe i fixat final roofs
□ Ions say be offered 1 - .
Descartes (lt'9&-l65 > Leibniz (It o-17io; were
42 ,euc rtes o, . cit . i -^ .e.
..ant 1.n the ; allure of .,11 philosophical attempts
to m r il.  ^i.oouxCj 17 jl
4 5 L t &ndix 11.
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- * .. tlXX t * &L< O ivIX• ..QwiCV^X'j . *.1 (X  / 2 ■‘-t “ l h 0 4  J
'■ »». •» libXCwii X itix t Ux C U  X ■ t «C .' i. ].  ^1:,» ..i ^  t
"oif.i.ii t x on. .1-• i.i i*i.o j i t “ C i i l i c  i c r i o d  u u  ..ij. e s ^ / m c e  
i t .  ii lc^u i d a n c e  *it.i n t i o n r  i. .. . . i::rout>h
- h r i :  ti . ok'f ( i b . 7 v - 1 7 ^ 4 ;  uxvi t.» ,u h  ui-.; a r t e n 4 7s .
b e r h a r a , ^  ^ w o m s  a n  .ti; _. i n  h i e
- e c t u r e e .  .unt, Loi'orc h e  w r o t #  t C r i t i i j u a a *  wa n  s o  
i ; r s u u  i a  a t l o n a l i & t  t a o u  t t n a t  .ri .r- .-.ac a b l e
t o  s i t e  iroux i . a n t ^  a  r  t i o a  l i s t  p r o o i  o t h e  e x i s t e n c e
) f  oo.;. • ‘
. o  . :tract b i t v t i n  a n t 1 s  a p p r o a c f  to*.t h e o l o g y
. if , - c r i t i c  i w r i t i n g s *  a n d  ;ii v i e  .. _ r c L i c .  i n
t h e  n v  x a n  1 c a t e s  h o w  h e  n o  c n a n g e t  i.i o c i t i o n ,  h o w
X» 0 • X <• j C C  i c d  . .kiivJw .iXikl t h  C 0 1 0 ^ » ii « C S C  l b i c
wTi c r t . ; r'-hi^>y a n d  .iOw n e  ha, *. neor. tii w x . r  < Lx ialtxi
 Vu j t i f i c * i t i o n ,  . to c-ooie t  x oe
S lilt 00.1‘C^ -.
4o x - . -I - o ; x x : 0  i • v : I
1 . . r te n : _____________  i o t i . i . Leu in
1 i k ▼ . . . - j -aum^aiten i uiI i ‘iri t  <-
liffii t 0 . i i » .x > - iX  d l ■ ♦ xvt tu C C 1 3 i- . th e . 9
*ii_i.e e O  . x. i n c <  . I t ;  . h i . i i j i l j e  i ; c X -
t  u.. ;CC . t i  i-; ; 1 l » i  n c  i /i  o  u t  . ^ X ., A ■’ 1/
J ' : e  J i .j .1.* r h o i  Ov-. il  u o V ’d ii » ■ ■ - i i  v • i
t • s.. ; . v ik . t . . .  t h : . » t *5 *4 » jL 1  h Oi » 1 X * W « irHie c . oe nce t ia^  n . ■ ■ ■ e ..
ti >■1 e U u t i l  o  ^ iL^ m j. i X w j  O i  O i i t i i l : ■ i
J o  1 t iC i t* • 1 ‘w 1^  .  ^ O -i k # x t i ^ X fc- . • X h../
re. that 
'■____-> • e 1.. «
t itbe a no t> trie error
* - j o., e.novvn, iv OTii.rarie
.-w 'o* x i-i v>*e x
i . i,: 1 i on tii-41
I Ut-S i. ti vCll .x 1L' tii.1 O  I lx CJ U  ul > ii \j O 1 #
it
<-' ■_ .   - » - 1..1 1 C-  ^ . 1 ‘ I L ,
’x^t -. :..... :. . ., — e.ip t ....;-- ” - era i ; ar-jued:
.*. • x x Oi. j Vw»j iv^  ii u i u uu ex it 1 e u_. he
ioducud* an .. • . , rot erty ox jo ; c • ds txit La. is
oi u sw* tiue ox x. tui 'il toe ole . jaxuhx tea ti.i; iroia
O X -4. . | k U  j c*. . «1 t - . . j <X ‘ kk,* L O »I _. 1 -.. i. t •
43 hb^rhard1 a illustration la draw ho. xre-critical
itin oi ..ant, entitled M,ihe oni„ oeeibli ... . f p
O  . ■’ W O  O  A * kl C A V-4 i X Ua * O  i. i» A i - . . X  X  kf L vilC W O’ 1- ■ V-/ 1 — / O  .
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.want's rejection of Natural .heoiogy tee 
nationalist tr dition was not his rejection of God, but 
merely of the possibility of proving God's existence by 
epe Uxative means.
"Its objective reality (that of tne tu reme being; 
cannot indeed be proved, but aim 0 n oi be disproved* by’ 
merely *f eculative r e a s o n " . 5  ^ jm t 's  attac : on theology 
is too often onl  ^ half read. The full significance of 
his att xc is tnat it leaves oj en the possibility of 
.uCd v hiUolii.ii theology on new lines.
unt axeo in t e KhM indie the dinner in which
theology may be reoonatruoted; *........... the only tneology
of Tv eon which is poct.ible is th t w: ich is based upon 
moral laws, or see :o uidance from them"*^
in . ection of the Janon of z re eat or, he rays 
quite specifically that; "Une other line o.‘ enquiry s t ill  
rem ire open to us: namely, whether pure reason may not 
also be m t with in the practical sphere, tad whether it 
iu y not there conuueto us ideas which reach to those
highest ends of pure reason........................ nd whether*
therefore, reason may not be ible tu supply to us from 
the standpoint of its practical interest wh t it altogether 
. * < ;\i. tiTe interest".
He go*s on to xormuiate the three great questions of 
philosophy; "All the interests of my reason, speculative 
as well as racticai, combine in tne three following
50 b . 0 6 9
h p. ob^ r.
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questions:
1. «hat c m  1 /mow?
2. *hat ought i to do?
>. &hit may 1 hope?
Ihe first question is ~erelj speculative .........
The second question is purely practical ....... .
fhe third question - if 1 vie wh t I ought to do, 
wh t I then hope? - is t once I'actic .1 and theore­
tical, in uuch fashion tnat the pructic ;i serves only as 
clae tnat leads us to the answer to the theoretical 
question, and whan this ie followed out to the speculative 
quc. tionr.W
nt relites the practical question to the problem 
oi the Highest Goo , implying that wo should tnink in 
practical terms of things which theoryticully are unknow- 
aule to ue. In other words, he ie suggesting th-tt he has 
found the possibility of speaking ^about <ou within a re­
constructed theology, a theology which emergen from a 
studj of the nature of practical reason, or i uiu reason 
in it. ractic .1 employment.
Two question! of Kant exegesis im. «diatelw arise. 
First, can ..ant, on his own basic, permit any reference 
to God at all? 1c thi^ consistent with ui^ oeition in 
tne . raru.ee lido nt ,1 Analytic?
Secondly* what argument does Kant aaploy to make 
further discussion about God possible wneu he has rejected 
tne trauxtionai proofs?
The xirst question urn; be statcu in ti.ic words of
-/t- 13 p. 0— k. .
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Professor «.u. *»alsh53* 11 Yet how could he (Kant) have
any kind of rational theology, given the correctness of 
the results of the Critique of xurc auakon. According 
to the argument of that work, any attempt to prove God's 
existence as a mattei of nowiodge or justified belief 
of the eve yday kind c m  be shown to involve either an 
illegitimate extension of the categories beyond the limits 
of possible experience, or the patently false asi umption 
that, in this one case, we oan argue from essence to
tencej if not both. :roof of the existence of , 
as soEietning which demands or at least n. tome claim on 
our theoretical assent, is accordingly ruled out".
irofessor fcalsh the21 continues with his -ore specific 
cziticism: nut there is worse to com, for the doctrines
01 the Analytic uo not u.orci; amo *-t tc a theory ox tne 
limit® of tha proper employment oi the understanding;! 
tne., -Iso constitute a theory of meaning . And if Kant 
ic to stick to his theory of meaning, as he in fact
•sees to uo throughout hie natux ri * it looks
as if he is committed to the view, not just that statements 
about 0 0 1 are incapable of roof or dis roc., but that 
t ey are strictly, not even inteliigible".
ix Oxessor i.alsh further quotet ant hi xelf in 
su port 01 this view: "For we have seen that concepts 
alto ther impossible, and car. have no * .ning, if 
no object is given for them, or at least xor the elements 
cl which they are composeJ".54
11 tn..o criticisms arc v lid, then Kant's under- 
tating to vindicate faith is doomed to failure by hie
53 Irofessor W.H* nalsh "Kant's Moral Thaology* 
ruceedis s of tne British kc&gr.Uj , lyb; p. ^6 4 .
54 B p. 176.
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own admission. Or ii* Kant believcut he was ’making room 
for faith'p he was going back on his own critical 
insights. This probl«a* is indeed serious. However, 1 
not t- ink it is unanswerable.
First of all, it seems that tne real sting of 
iTc ) Isn't criticism lies in I ausage he cites 
from -ant. ..ant does indeed say that concepts without 
objects given for them ..re impossible (ufmbgli&h), but 
Ire api e rs himself to see the dan er of this rather 
tr .. statt - t, a r^icssc1 c..; ~mitn, i: foot­
note to the relevant page of 2*is translation mentions 
that fact tnat ant amended the wording ofthis sentence 
to read: For we have seen that couce ts are tor us
m i s  brings his statement more c^e uly into line 
witn wnat I in ve earlier explained as being want's 
position as I understand it.
To say th it concepts. applied be. ,nd a earances can 
have no meaning for us is different from saying that they 
are impossible. .e know that the cate ori^c c .nnot be 
extended in use beyond appearances, and that when they 
are, we fall into fallacies, or in otner words, whut we
try to l j becomes meaningless.
*
sowever, it also seems doubtful whetntr or not -ant 
would, on his own basiB, have the right to say that 
concepts, without oojests in experience (a. pe^ranoes) are 
meaningless. This would be to assume that, for example, 
uumo's ' ticicm' wa~ justified, and that whot cannot 
be . iiiufactured from the raw materials o. experience iB 
meaningless if defined, unless it correspouuo to some 
intuition. ihis -ould be no acre than a dogmatic
- 130 -
rationalism. Kant'- concern was not to come down on the 
side of either scepticism or inde d the olar oipocite of 
the rationalism from which Hume '.wakened hiiw. As I i^ave 
eu^ ested, he appears to res ect t,*c inti hts and the 
quc.t-onc which uotii positions raisf,and therefore tries 
to hold a balance between them.
The answer to the second question is found in want's 
concept of the ' bing-an-..ich' . It remains possible to 
speaK a-uut Gou, freedom and immortality because tne 
categories of huaan knowledge relate to ap? e runcec, and 
not tj tx*e ultimate objects of knowledge, tne 1things-in-
themoeives1 whloh . ive rise to our intuit _. Therefore,
the w . is open to reconsider tne problem. e have certain 
tual iMi -l. p i,. ... r~ t■_ v- f reax >x .. ri^arily Jod,
freedom ana immj*. talit„ , ana because we .1 takenly thinn 
v/e have a priori understanding of them, wu cou.»it the 
fallacies which yield the invalid proo; i’f t .
ii there were only ihiunoiaen^, tnen our iuu would be
beyon ( ilfillaent nderetanding, , ’ sits
the reality of * Th i nge ~ i n- theme elvesr, vert* behind
phenomena, noumena, a« he calls them, . in this w Jf tne 
discussion remair.e open* In this wato , at attempted to 
hold a balance between dogmatic ratio linn na dogmatic
»w'C tidB.i. •
Clearly, Kant's exposition anu defence of this 
concept must be reviewed,5b with specific regard to the
It cannot be within the goo  - e o i  this ess y to review 
tne Vvrj uifiicult problem of Kant e egexia contained in 
the hapter Oil '} henomena a Soumena' « ...uronae wixl be 
• D certain writers on this subject,, but a complete 
imvxuw o. xl the literature relevant to the problem is 
not ossible. .eiow are appended come of the"main 
contributions t tne debate: (written recently) 
ri an . - .1: ant u.. cas . i •-. .
i rtin ^oj. cit*7 pr 1 J . 
oohn Kaohurray ^elf as ... eat chapter III
-V i 3chaper "Tne anti an rhing-in-iteelf as a hilosoihical 
fiction".
George -chraaer "The Thing-irv-lteelf in . uitian Philosophy®
I - v- •- • - - la - .. 1 m . . rch 1*43 - . --
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question 'Joes this justify the *oesibiiity of another 
way of speaking about God?'.
last ChL.iter of the Analytic oi Principles is 
entitled "The uioaii and istinction of al-u objects in 
gener. vl into _ enomena and IfouiLena". 56
want's opening statement indicates tnat he intends 
to review the li-rts of Knowledge in the ii ht of the 
naLure nna function oi the categories. This would imply 
an in; j.-.itioii oi th ; provi .ct c: l'-iith* in >oetic v e i n , 57 
he describes the territory of pure under; t vriding a: an 
'island, enclosed by nature itself within un.ltera le 
lixui s. it is the land of truth - enchanting name! - 
surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the rrtive home
of illusion  ..... " He then fferc a distinction (which
does not appear elsewhere in the KRV) between the IRANI- 
Cih*DHNTAL and the xsKPIRICAL ULn of a conc« t. -iinpirical 
•uployaaent of concepts is their use In ordering the 
material of experience. Transcendent*1 employment of 
concepts takes place when we attempt to apply them to the 
objects oi knowledge themselves as .gainst our intuitions 
of tnem. i\ant limits categories to appearances, and there- 
xore to empirical employment.
In ’.very concept we nave two t i*iLs, ceording to 
rail: first its logical form (what it is in thought to
The chapter fails into four main arts: 
t i ) Introduction ( . -o,
( ii ) .eview of argument of tne " tnaljtic (to 30b > 
(iii, Thesis of jthenou.enr I l oumena (^-0-2) 
v iv ; further elaboration (3 310 to end>.
u . - .,-u•
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US/ and secondly, the possibility of specifying an 
object to which it may be applied. Now an object cannot 
be given a concept other than in intuition, hence all 
concepts and principles relate to empirical intuition, 
the data of possible experience. Apart from this 
relation, th- y have neither meaningror validity. «e 
cannot deiine the categories substantially. we must, 
for example, in speaking about a ca~se, refer to the 
conditions of sensibility and to the forms of appearances, 
if in explaining tne concept of cause, reference is omitted, 
to something which goes before, and something which 
follows, there can be nothing left to talk about. Cause 
and effect cannot be distinguished, because tneir 
possibility of being (in intuition; has been removed.
"So long as the definition of possibility, existence 
and necessity is sought solely in pure understanding, 
they cannot be explained save through an oovious tautology, 
for to suostitute the logical v osslollltv of the concept 
(namely that the concept does not contradict itself; for 
the transcendental possibility of things (namely that an 
object corresponds to the concept; can deceive and leave 
satisfied only the simple minded.
from all thiB it undeniably follows tnat the pure 
concepts of underttanding can never admit of transcenaental, 
but always only of empirical employment ........ M 56
.ant then summarises the conclusion of the " analytic" -
"..... the moBt the understanding can achieve a priori is
to anticipate the form of a possible experience in 
general".59
58 B p. 302-303.
59 B p. 303.
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The limitation of the categories ie clear. They
AOcontain the logical faculty of uniting a priori into 
one consciousness tne manifold givenin intuition, 
separate from the intuition possible to us. Apart from 
this, they cannot mean anything, without intuitions, 
they have nothing to unite.
&&nt makes the further point, that we should not 
confuse the origin of the categories with the forms of 
intuition, (i.e. space and time; which are grounded in 
sensibility. The categories are merely forms of thought.
Kant then draws the distinction Detween ShNblbLK 
hNTlTIhb and INTjiIa/IGIBLb KNTlTIh! • "we distinguish the 
mode in which we intuit them (phenomena; from the nature 
that belongs to them in themselves".ol The mode of 
perceiving is by means of appearances l iiSNGfLaNA) • The 
Inings in themselves are NuUMlNA, the intelligible 
entitles. The concepts of tne understanding cannot 
apply to NuUMohA. NuUMiiitA is an indeterminate concept 
"of a sometnint in general outside our sensibility".**2 
Kant indicates two senses of NOUMRNA.
There is the positive sense as an object of non- 
sensible intuition, a special intellectual faculty being 
employed in order to apprehend them, ouch a faculty we 
do not possess. The negative use of the term means quite 
simply, something which is NOT an object of sensible 
intuition. The categories only have meaning in relation
60 B p. 305-306.
bl B p. 306.
62 B p. 307.
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to the unity of intuition in space and time. Therefore, 
Kant's emphasis is naturally upon the negative use of
the term".^5
„ant further styles NOUMRNGN a PROBLJSttATIC CONCEPT - 
a concept whose "objective reality cannot in any way be 
known, while yet the concept contains no contradiction 
also at the same time i- connected with other modes of 
knowledge tnat involve given concepts which it serves 
to j-li41T.......... " 64
"The concept of NOUttnhCi* is thus merely a limiting 
concept, the function of which is to euro the pretensions 
of sensibility; and it is therefore onxy of negative 
employment. At the same time, it is no arbitrary invention; 
it is bound up with the limitation of sensibility, though 
it cannot affirm anything positive beyond the field of 
sensibility".^5
The chapter is concluded with these words: "Tnus
the concept of pure and merely intelligible objects is 
completely lacking in all principles that might make 
possible its application, ror we cannot ihink of any 
way in which such intelli ible objects might be given.
Tne problematic thought which leaves open a place for 
them serv a only, like an empty space, for tne limitation 
of empirical principles, without itself containing or 
revealing any other object of knowledge beyond the sphere 
of tnose principles"
63 b p. 307.
64 b p. 310.
65 b p. 31^-311.
06 B p. 315.
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Why did Kant regard the "Ding-an-Lich" as a vital
and necessary part of his philosophy', i^acmurray claims
that it was only introduced to solve the antinomy of
freedom, iichte regarded it is the Achilles heel of
6hthe Kantian philosophy, lartin snuimarises well the 
great range of different attitudes tow rds this 
concept.
Certain reasons urje immediately apparent, lirst,
K n t realised that some explanation necessary of how 
our sense experience was oaueecl. The forms of sensibility 
and the categories are transcendental in that they are 
concerned with tne mode of our knowledge. They are not 
re 1. ..here then is reality located? . ant answers that 
the source anu the cause oi experience is the NGUMKiiA.
Kant, also regards the KQJXfchA as necessary in order 
to sex limits upon the possible exploits 02 metaphysics, 
wnicn is constantly tempted to use tne categories to 
extend .uiowled^e beyona appearances, ho^mena by definition 
prevent the illegitimate extension of the categories• 
binleotieal illusion, the impulse tc apply the categories 
to reality originates when pure reason forgets its 
limitations, houmena are firmly bound up with the 
conclusion of tne Critical Philosophy and toe limitations 
Ox knowxeage.
1 * .
It is at least clear that mant, on tne basis of 
his own position would have been wror^ not to speak of 
hCtlWhKii, out this leaves open the question of whether or
0 ' i*aemurray o p .  cit. p. bp-
luartin op. cit. h 21 p. 154 ff.
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not he justifies what he says.
from the standpoint of developing his Idea of faith, 
the noumena were necessary. The 'empty space'7u he speaks 
of is higuxy suggestive as Aartin had noted,71 anti Kant's 
limitation of knowledge was the limitation of the app­
lication of empirical principles. The possibility of 
further discussion of God remains open.
The distinction between PhdNGMnNA and NOUftuiNA was 
necessary for Kant to maintain a balance betwe n scepticism 
and dogmatism. Had he limited all knowledge to the 
categories, and thus adopted the position that speaking 
about God was meaningless, then he would have been a 
sceptic. iad he however allowed reason to speak of the 
nature of reality, then he would have been condoning the 
rationalist view of reason. Neither extreme seemed 
jalatable, and therefore within his philosophy, there is 
a point at which the two impinge in opposition to one 
another. It is in the distinction between PHENOMENA and 
NOUMANA. This further explains why botn Vaihinger's 
interpretation of Kant lacks balance, and also those who 
have tried to suggest that Kant considered that some 
form of direct intuition of reality was possible.
There are numerous questions which could be discussed 
with re ;ard to the status of the "Ding-an-bich"• It could
"It is clear from tnese considerations that it would 
have been wrong on want's principles to deny thinge-in- 
themselves, but wao he justified in asserting them?"
4 .0 . Bwing shorter uoiamentary on nant's C ritique of 
rare neason fcetfeuen 1950 p. 192.
70 & p # 3 1 5 .
71 Martin 01. cit. "  ...... at the same time, the
objective reality oi being in itself •••••••• ib always
envisaged as a possibility", p. 146.
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simply be asked: 'Is it not an impossible concept?' 
Professor Cuird^&ccueed rvant of creating a metaphysical 
dualism between the reality of noumenal and phenomenal.
This dualism could only be overcome by either an infinite 
progression or by the Deus ex Xachina. He claims that 
Kant used both of these devices. This criticism ove - 
simplifies the issues involved, and disregards the 
subtlety of Kant's argument. Professor D.h. t.cKinnon 
recognises that the question of how r^ant left open the 
possibility of discussing faith may not be so perempto­
rily dealt with.
"It used to be said of /.ant that the evident dis­
proportion observed between his theoretical and practical 
philosophy was the expression of a change of mind . 
experienced between the writing of the first two Critiques, 
and variously attributed to his distress at finding the 
religious faith of his servant impugned by his argument3, 
or to his fear of tne Prussian ~tate Police".73 However, 
he himself recognises that "The subtle agnosticism to 
which /.ant argues in hit* first Critique provides the 
context in which the peculiar quality of moral experience 
can be determined".^
Therefore while admitting that the "Ding-an-~ich" 
is not a concept which may be either easily accepted or 
defended, it mutt in fairness bo said that it is part 
of a subtle train ol thought which should be reviewed 
entize before any juugement is made. To allow tnis is
72 wiward Caird The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel 
Kant” Vol II p. 269 ff.
73 D.Jt. ftci.innon bthical Theory (Adam <5k Charles Black, 
^ondon 1956) p. 6o.
74 D .A . Ac^innon op. cit. p. 64.
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to recognise something basic about the nature of Kant's 
thought which Professor McKinnon identifies when he stys
that "....  in Kant there is something at once of the
xainstaking minuteness and the sneer virtuosity charac­
teristic of the philosopher of genius, who makes it 
possible to see a whole group of seemingly disconnected 
problems together in a new light".75
Having now discussed tne nature of the theology 
which Kant rejected, and naving attempted to give an 
exposition of the manner in which Kant justified the 
possibility of an alternative approach to the problem 
of religious faith, it remains to deal with the third 
question. This concerns the means by which he introduced 
a new basis for discussing those things about which 
speculative reason must be silent.
in the Preface to the KPV, Kant summarises his 
position, and gives an explanation of what he understood 
he was doing. In the KhV, he had spoken of practical 
reason, and ol the possibility of raising again questions 
which cannot be answered by speculative reason.76 it is 
this possibility that is discussed in the KPV. Basic to 
want's exposition of the position, he is now delining, 
is the establishment of freedom. He says: "With the
pure practical 1acuity of reason, the reality of trans­
cendental freedom is also confirmed. Indeed, it is 
substantiated in the absolute sense needed by speculative 
reason in its use of the concept of causality, for this 
freedom is required if reason is to rescue itself from 
the antinomy In which it is inevitably entangled when 
attempting to think the unconditioned in a causal series.
73 P.M. kcklnnon op. cit. p. o4-o5.
? 6 B p. Ci05 ff.
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For speculative reason, the concept of freedom was 
problematic but not possible.......... " 77
"The concept of freedom, in so far as its reality 
is proved b y  an apodlctic law of practical reason, is 
the keystone of the whole architecture of the system of 
pure reason and even of speculative reason. All other 
concepts (those of God and immortality; which, as mere 
ideas, are unsupported by anything in speculative reason 
now attach themselves to the concept of freedom, and 
gain, with it and through it, stability and objective 
reality. That is, their possibility is proved by the 
fact that there really is freedom, for this idea is 
revealed by the moral law".78
"freedom, however, among all the ideas of speculative 
reason is the only one whose possibility we know a priori, 
is do not understand it, but we know it as the condition 
of the moral law which we do know".79
"here we have a ground of assent wnich in comparison 
to the speculative reason, is only practical, but which 
is just as valid objectively to a practical but equally 
pure reason".8a
These passages are quoted in full because they give 
rise to the genenl protest that what i^ant has forbidden 
reason to attempt in the KKV, he permits in the iPV.
1 radical reason is permitted to conduct speculative 
journeys into the noumenax.
77 Ki-V p. 3.
76 a FV p. 4.
79 U>V p. 4.
60 KPV p. 4.
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Kant c le a r lw saw that th is  charge would be la id ,  
and he re p lie s  in  an tic ip ation : "reason is  not hereby 
extended, however, in  i t s  theoretica l knowledge; the 
only thing which is  d iffe re n t is  that the p o s s ib ility ,  
which was heretofore a problem, now becomes an assertion , 
and the p ra c tica l use of reason is  thus connected with 
the elements of theoretic 1 reason".81
fu rther to th is , he elaborates h is  explanation in  
these terms: "Now is  explained the enigma of the c r i t i c a l
philosophy', which ll^ c in  tho fact that we must renounce 
the objective re a lity  of the supersensible use of the 
categories in  speculation and yet can a ttrib u te  th is  
re a lity  to them in  respect of the objects of pure rea&on. 
This must have seemed an inconsistency so long as the 
ra c t ic a l use of reason was k-own only by name. However, 
a tnorou^h analysis of the p ra ctica l use of reason makes 
i t  c lea r that the re a lity  thought of here im plies no 
th e o retica l determination of the categories and no 
extension of our knowledge to the supersensible, 'no 
then perceives tnat a l l  that is  meant in  a ttrib u tin g  
re a lity  to those concepts is  tnat an obyect is  a ttr ib u t­
able to them in  so fa r  as they are contained in  the 
necessary determination of the w ill  a p r io r i or because 
they are in d isso lub ly  connected with the object of th is  
determination. The Inconsistency vanishes because the 
use which is  now maue of these concepts is  d iffe re n t  
from that required by speculative r e a s o n " .
having defended h is  position , hant continues: "So 
fa r  from bein^ incoherent, the highly consistent structure  
oiT the c r it iq u e  of rure Reason is  very sa tis fy in g iy
b l KBV p. 4.
64 kpv p. 4-5.
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revealed here, For in  that work the objects of experience 
as such, including even our own subject, were explained as 
only appearances, though based upon things-in-them sleves; 
consequently, even in  thut C ritique i t  wa. emphasised that 
the supersensible was not mere fancy and that i t s  concepts 
were not empty. Now p ra ctica l reason i t s e l f ,  without any 
co llu s io n  with the speculative, provides re a lity  to a 
supersensible object of the category of causality  -  i . e .  
to freedom ".^
Of s ig n ifica n t note at th is  point is  want's assertion  
that in  the C ritique  of Pure heauon i t  was emphaLiced 
that the supersensible was not mere fancy, and that i t s  
concepts were not devoid of meaning. He also in s is ts  that 
the argument he is  defending is  not inserted merely to 
f i l l  up a l l  the blank spaces of knowledge le f t  by the 
lim ited  nature of speculative reason: "One must not,
therefore, thim: that such considerations including those 
devoted to the concept of freedom in  the p ra ctica l use 
of pure reason, are only in terpolations which serve to 
f i l l  out gaps in  the c r i t i c a l  Bjste^ of speculative  
reason, fo r th is  Is complete in  i t s  design. They are not 
l ik e  the props and buttresses which usually have to be 
put behind a h astily  erected bu ild ing , but they are rather 
true members making the structure of the system plain  and 
le tt in g  the concepts, which were previously thought of 
only in  a problematic way, be c le a rly  seen as re a l.
This reminder pre-eminently concerns the concept
83 iLpv p. Thiu is  a f in a l reply to Vaihinger1 s 
view s;to iro fesso r a&lsh's point about ra n t's  theory of 
meaning denuding the idea of God of any possible meaning.
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• ..64of f r e e d o m .........   • ’
Tne vital point which emerges from tuese quotations
from the jmiV in that the concept oi i ..... is the &ey
to clarifying the nature of practical reason and its 
assertions. Two smaliei f but equa±-L,y im ortant points 
e*iierue aico. ine first is that, a~ nas already been 
s.-.id, r.nt’s ii-trouuction of practical re son is not 
merelj a device to fill any gaps left by his earlier 
work. The second point is that ne oec not re tract any 
of his earlier views, because when Gou is discussed, 
tnere is no attempt being made to ac aeve 'objective 
rexlitj1 for the concept, in the sense in wuic i speculative 
reason understand# the expression ’objective realitj*.
The reality achieved is valid for momlity only, and not 
for speculative reason.
ii ^reat deux of clarification and definition is 
required here in order to understand ooth the argument 
beiin advanced, and tne refined disti^ct-io. s being drawn 
b,,- iiant. Two obvious questions oi uie esis must be 
answered, rirst, now is freedom est. biished? secondly, 
from tnere, how does i.ant go on to spo- oi ^ou, 
immortality t.na f -itni These questions will be dealt 
vitn Ixi the next section.
in sunnar,, at this stage, the cruci 1 concept in 
rant’s move from rationalist theolo to his own under­
standing of the nature of faith, is t e concept of 
freedom.
°4 J£PV p. 7
CHAPTER FOUR
FROM RATIONALIST THLOLOGY TO 
RATIONAL FAITH - II
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The ce n tra lity  of the concept of freedom in  the 
o v e ra ll argument which leade up to an t's  statement of 
his view of the nature of fa lt li  has been established.
In th is  connection, two exegeticul questions suggest 
themselves, f i r s t  'low does .ant estab lish  and define 
h is  concept of freedom?' second, 'from the establishment 
oi freeuom, how precise ly  docs he proceed to speak of 
God, immortality ana fa ith ? ' ihe f i r s t  question may be 
answerea from G, in  vnich Kant expounds h is  doctrine of 
freedom. ihe seconu question nay be answered from the 
"D ia le ctic  of lure P ra ctica l ueason" in  the KPV, wheie 
Kant establishes the postulates of Pure ir a c t ic a l mason.
As a prefatory note, 1 would lik e  to sa„ that 1 see 
the p rin c ip a l ta~k in  the discussion of these questions 
as an exegetical one. ihe c r i t i c a l  tasx here is  secondary. 
This 1 take to be the case lo r  three reasons, f i r s t ,  the 
main objective is  to c la r ify  tne ro le  of freedom In it s  
re la tio n  to la ith , and to see how .ant completes h is  move 
from ra t io n a lis t  theology to the need fo r ra tio n a l fa ith .  
•.econdjLj, s p e c if ic  c r i t ic is m  of a n t's  defence of freedom, 
while of great pnilosopnloax in te re st, belong to a separate 
discussion. ,.ny c r it ic is m  offered of .want's view of free­
dom w ill  depend on i  re la tio n  to h is  v&uw of fa ith . 
T h ird ly , the c la r if ic a t io n  of want's doctrine of freedom 
i s ,  fo r  the purpose in  nand, only a ste , a lb e it  a c iu c ia l  
one, in  the argument which h d it s  f in a l outcome in  tne 
w riting of ft. Taring ivant's defence of freedom f ir B t ,  i t  
is  not unexpected that h is argument leans heavily upon 
the d is t in c t io n  between henomina and noumena. Th is, i t  
has been argued, is  the central d is t in c t io n  of the KRV, 
which makes possible Kant's departure from ra t io n a lis t
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theology without involving him in  the to ta l re jectio n  of 
a re lig io u s  standpoint. Through th is  d is t in c t io n , Kant 
established that the mind can think of noumena outwith 
th© phenomena of the causal process of nature. This 
d is t in c t io n  is  applied to the problem of causa lity  as i t  
if fe e t8 human freedom. Having Bhown in  the KRV that the 
category of causality  is  necessary fo r  an ordered under­
standing of sense experience, ^ant faces in  G the 
im p lication  of th is  fo r  human freedom, han, considered 
as phenomena, is  part of the causal order of navure, 
under tne c^tegoi'y oi cau^ alitj. Therefore, viewed in  
th is  way, man is  not xree. iiowevei , the fact that the 
p o s s ib il it ie s  of knowledge are not exhausted by phenomena, 
leaves open the question of whether or not, from another 
standpoint, man may be considered as a free agent.
Irofessor Lteph&n Kttrner summarises th is  point in
these words: N  i t  has been shown that the two
propositions 'Kan as houmen is  free* and * nan as pheno­
menon is  part of the cnusal order oi nature' areOrq uecl
compatible. Indeed, ant has^tnat the Third Antinomy of - 
lu re  reason can only be resolved by admitting tne jo in t
p o s s ib ility  of both these propositions  ..............  freedom
means not ing beyond independence of the causal order of 
nature. if we keep this in mind we can regard it as a 
kind of causality and contrast it, as moral or noumenal, 
with the positive notion of natural or phenomenal causality, 
which is a scne~atiz©d Category of tneoretical thinking.
”«e have established, n o w t h e  internal consistency
of the notion of freedom or moral causality  ..............  I f
we wish to prove that man exists as a free being we need 
to know somethin^ more; and the nature of the additional
145 -
evidence we require w ill  determine in  what sense we can 
attrib u te  to man existence as a free being.
"This add itional evidence comes froai moral experience".1
Professor Jt ttrner sympathetically detects two stages 
in  i an t's  argument. The f i r s t  stage is  the defence in  
p rin c ip le  of the p o s s ib ility  of a moral causa lity  wnich 
could be termed freedom. The second stage is  the proof 
that man does ex ist as a free being, the evidence lo r  
which comes from moral experience. In appealing to moral 
experience, kant is  developing the p o s s ib ility  fo r further  
uiscussion of re lig io n  which he had established in  the KKV 
by means 01 the d is t in c tio n  between phenomena and noumena.
Q gives Aant'3 account of moral experience, and of 
how experience of the moral law can be evidence of freedom, 
he argues that freedom of the w ill is  autonomy, the 
prope ty of the w ill  to make laws fo r i i s e l f  which conform 
to the moral law. "Thus a free w ill  and a w ill  under 
moral laws are one and the some th in g " .2
However, nant recognises the c ir c u la r ity  of th is  
position  when ne admits that in  "the order of e f f ic ie n t  
causes we taxe ourselves to be free so tnat we may 
conceive ourselves to be under moral laws in  the order 
of ends; ana we then proceed to ti.ink of ourselves as 
subject to moral laws on the ground tnat we have described 
the w il l  as fre e , freedom and the w i l l 's  enactment of 
i t s  own laws are indeed both autonomy -  ana therefore are 
rec ip ro ca l concepts -  but precisely fo r th is  reason one 
of them cannot be used to explain the other or to furn ish
1 wtephan KBrner -ant ( ie lica n  Books 1^60, p. 152-3•
2  0  p. * x 4 .
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i t s  ground".
It is  here that he draws upon the d is t in c t io n  
between phenomena and noumena. "One s h ift  however, 
s t i l l  remains open to us. can enquire whether we do
not take one standpoint whereby we conceive ourselves 
as causes acting a p r io r i ,  and another standpoint when 
we contemplate ourselves with reference to our actions 
as e ffe cts  which we see before our eyes". 3
Developing the p o s s ib ility  of two standpoints from 
which the same action may be viewed, kant argues that man 
may be considered as belonging to two orders. As a
member of the sensible order, the realm of phenomena, he
contemplates him self with reference to h is  actions as he 
sees them before h is  eyes - namely as e ffe c ts . Therefore, 
he is  part of a causal order of nature. When, however, 
he contemplates him self as a member of the in t e l l ig ib le  
order, he conceives of him self as a cause, acting a
p r io r i under freedom. Therefore, man as phenomenon is
part of the causal process. Man as noumenon is  a causal 
agent -  a ra tio n a l being under freedom.
This d is t in c t io n  is  one of Kant's most valuable 
contributions to e th ics , and certa in ly  is  a most useful 
argument in  the tra d it io n a l philosopnical problem about 
human freedom and cau sa lity .
n when we think of ourselves as fre e , we transfer  
ourselves into  the in t e l l ig ib le  world as members and 
recognise the autonomy of the w ill  together with i t s  
consequence -  a m orality".4
Kant of course never undertakes to explain how
3 0 p. 118.
4 G p. 121.
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freedom is  possib le. His argument is  bent on proving 
simply that freedom is  possib le, and further that moral 
experience demonstrates i t s  a c tu a lity . This in  p rin c ip le  
answers the f i r s t  question which concerned the manner in  
which Kant defined and delended freedom.
The second question must now be taken up, to see how 
Kant uses the concept of freedom to speak of God, immor­
t a l i t y  and fa ith . The 'D ia le c t ic  of Pure P ractica l
Reason' in  the KPV is  the text to be examined. The
relevant argument starts  from the reso lu tion  of the 
Antinomy of lure P ra ctica l Reason, which Kant states 
thus: "In the highest good which is  p ra c tic a l fo r us,
i . e .  one which is  to be made rea l by our w il l ,  v irtue
and happiness are thought of as necessarily  combined, so 
that the one cannot be assumed by a p ra c tica l reason with­
out the other belonging to i t .  Row th is  combination is ,  
l ik e  every other, e ither ana lytic  or synthetic. Since 
i t  cannot be a n a ly tic , as has been shown, i t  must be 
thought syn th e tica lly  and, more p a rt ic u la r ly , as the 
connection of cause and e ffe c t, fo r  i t  concerns a p ra ctica l 
good, i . e .  one that is  possible through action . Therefore, 
the desire fo r  happiness must be the motive to maxims of 
v irtu e , or the maxim of v irtue  must be the e f f ic ie n t  cause
of happiness. The f i r s t  is  absolutely impossible ........
maxims which jjut the determining ground of the w ill  in
the desire fo r  one's happiness are not moral at a l l  ........
The second is ,  however, also im possible, since every 
p ra c t ic a l connection of causes anu e ffects  in  the world, 
as a resuxt of the determination of the K i l l ,  is  
dependent not on the moral intentions of the w ill but on 
knowledge of natural laws ..................  consequently, no
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necessary connection, su ffic ie n t to the highest good 
between happiness and v irtue  in  the world can be 
expected from tne most meticulous observance of the 
moral law". 5
Kant, however, notes that: "In the antinomy of
pure speculative reason there is  a s im ila r c o n flic t  
between natural necessity and freedom in  the causation 
of events in  the world. It was resolved by showing that 
there is  no true c o n flic t  i f  the events and even the 
world in  which they occur are regarded only as appear­
ances................. " w
Applying th is  insight to h is problem, he says: "It  
is  just the same with the present antinomy of pure 
p ra ctica l reason. The f i r s t  of the two propositions, 
v iz . that s tr iv in g  fo r  happiness produces a ground fo r  
a virtuous d isp o sitio n , is  absolutely fa lse ; the second, 
v iz .  that a virtuous d isp osition  necessarily  produces 
happiness, is  not however, absolutely fa lse  but fa lse  
only in sofar as th is  d isp osition  is  regarded as the form 
of causa lity  in  the world of sense. Consequently, i t  is  
fa lse  onxy i f  1 assume existence in  th is  world to be the 
only mode of existence of a ra tio n a l being, ana there­
fore , i t  is  only cond ition ally  fa lse " . 7
Kant then brings in  a reference to phenomena and 
noumena as used in  h is  defence of freedom: "But not
only since 1 am ju s t if ie d  in  thinking of my existence
5 KPV p. 117-116. 
b KPV p. 116.
7 KPV p. 119.
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as that of a noumenon in  an in t e l l ig ib le  world, but 
also since I have in  the moral law a pure in te lle c tu a l 
determining ground of my causality (in  the sensuous 
world/, i t  is  not impossible that the m orality of 
in tention  should have a necessary re la tio n  as cause to 
happiness as an e ffect in  the sensuous world: but th is  
re la tio n  is  in d ire c t, mediated by an in t e l l ig ib le  author 
of nature. This combination, however, can occur only 
co n tin g e n tly  in  a system of nature which is  merely the 
object of the senses and as such is  not su ff ic ie n t  to 
the highest good".7
He concludes: " . the highest good is  the
necessary highest end of a morally determined w ill  and
a true object t h e r e o f .................. " 7
The next stfep is  the establishment of the PRIMACY
of Pure P ra ctica l Reason in  it s  Union with the speculative  
R e a s o n . 8 This is  the most important conception in  the
entire  K P V . 9 By primacy here, Kant means: " .........  the
prerogative of one by v irtue  of which i t  is  the prime 
ground of determination of the combination with the 
others".10 The in terest of speculative reason "consists  
in  the knowledge of objects up to the highest a p r io r i  
p rin c ip le s ; that of i t s  p ra ctica l employment l ie s  in  the 
determination of the w ill  with resj^ect to the f in a l ana 
perfect endM. H
Kant defines the re lation sh ip  of theoretica l ana
7 KPV p. 119.
8 KPV p. 124.
9 Wnite I ;ck A Commentary on Kant1 e Critique of
P ra c tica l Reason p. 47 -  section 4«
10 kpT p. 124.
11 KPV p. 32 4.* I
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p ra ctica l reason in  th is  way: "Thus in  the combination
of pure speculative reason with pure p ra c tica l reason 
in  one cognition, the la t te r  has the primacy, provided 
that th is  combination is  not contingent and a rb itra ry , 
but a p r io r i, based on reason i t s e l f  and thus necessary. 
Without th is  subordination, a c o n flic t  of reason with
i t s e l f  would arise  ..................  flor could we reverse the
order and expect p ra ctica l reason to submit to specul­
ative reason, because every in terest is  u ltim ately  
p ra c t ic a l, even that of speculative reason being only 
conditional and reaching perfection only in  p ra ctica l 
use"
what is  Kant saying here? He is  saying f i r s t  of a l l  
that we have re a l c o n flic ts  between reason and in c lin a tio n . 
Reason in  i t s  p ra c tica l employment is  reason that with­
stands in c lin a t io n 's  pressures by le g is la t in g  morally so 
that we may act fre e ly . The primacy of p ra c tica l reason 
means that reason combined v/ithoour moral experience is  
empowered to speak in  a way in  which reason from a pure 
speculative standpoint may not.
The postulates of pure p ra ctica l reason are ju s t if ie d  
through the establishment of freedom as a postulate 
Of the IMM0RTA1.ITY OF THu &0U.D, Kant says "The achievement 
of the highest good in  the world is  the necessary object 
of a w il l  determinable by the moral law. In such a w il l ,  
however, the complete fitn e ss  of intentions to the moral 
law is  the supreme condition of the highest good. This 
f itn e s s , tnerefore, must be just as possible as i t s  
object, because i t  is  contained in  the command that 
requires us to promote the la t te r . But complete fitn e ss
12 KPV p. 126.
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of the w ill  to the moral law is  holiness which is  a 
perfection  of which no ra tio n a l being in  the world of 
sense is  at any time capable. But since i t  is  required 
as p ra c t ic a lly  necessary i t  can be found only in  an 
endless progress to that complete f itn e ss ; on p rin c ip le s  
of pure p ra ctica l I'eason, i t  is  necessary to assume such 
a p ra c tica l progress as the rea l object of our w i l l .
This in f in ite  progress is  possib le, however, only 
under the presupposition of an in f in it e ly  enduring 
existence ana personality of the same ra tio n a l being; 
th is  is  ca lled  the immortality of the soul. Thus the 
highest good is  p ra c tica lly  possible only on the 
supposition of the immortality of the soul, and the 
la t te r  as inseparably bound to the mo:al law. By a 
postulate of pure p ra ctica l reason, 1 understand a 
th e o retica l proposition which is  not as such demonstrable, 
but which is  an inseparable co ro lla ry  of an a p r io r i  
unconditionally v a lid  p ra ctica l law." 13
The hxvl^ TBHCi^  of GOD is  dealt with in  the succeeding
section . Kant says: " ........  the same law must also lead
us to affirm  the p o s s ib ility  of the second element of the 
highest good, i . e .  happiness proportioned to that 
m orality; i t  must do sc just as d is in tereste d ly  as here­
to fore , by a purely im partia l reason. This i t  can do on 
the supposition of the existence of a cause adequate to 
th is  e ffe c t, i . e .  i t  must postulate the existence of God 
as necessarily  belonging to the p o s s ib ility  of the highest 
good ................... " 14
Aant says of the three postulates: "The Postulates
of pure p ra c tica l reason a l l  proceed from the p rin c ip le
13 KPV p. 126-127.
14 KPV p. 129.
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of m ora lity   These postulates are not th eoretica l
dogmas, but presuppositions of necessarily p ra ctica l 
import; thus, while they do not extend speculative know­
ledge, they give objective re a lity  to the ideas of 
speculative reason in  general (by means of th e ir  re la tio n  
of the p ra c tica l sphere) and they ju s t ify  i t  in  holding 
to concepts even the p o s s ib ility  of which i t  could not 
otherwise venture to a fiirm ,f.15
kant anticipates the possible c r it ic is m  that he is  
extending th eoretica l knowledge by h is  argument under
the guise of p ra c tica l reason: ” ........  Therefore, through
tne p ra ctica l law, which requires the existence of the 
highest good in  tho world, there is  postulated the 
p o s s ib ility  of those objects of pure speculative reason 
whose objective re a lity  could not be assured by speculative  
reason, by th is  then, the theoretica l knowledge or pure 
reason does not obtain an accession, but i t  consists only 
in  th is  -  that those concepts whicn fo r  i t  are otherwise 
problem atical (merely thinkable/ are now described 
a sse rto r ie a lly  as actu a lly  having objects, because 
p ra ctica l reason inexorably requires the existence of 
these objects fo r  the p o s s ib ility  of i t s  p ra c t ic a lly  
and absolutely necessary object, the highest good. 
Theoretical reason is  there!ore ju s t if ie d  in  assuming them.
The extension of the theoretica l reason, however, 
is  not an extension of speculation. That is ,  a positive  
use cannot be made of those objects fo r  theoretica l
purposes .......... no synthetic proposition is  made possible
by conceding th e ir  r e a lit y 1 ,
15 kpv p. 137.
16 KPV p. 139-140.
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This does not mean that nothin meaningful is 
comiunicated to us, hov*over, since "Leverthelesc, 
knowledge not of these objects, but of reason in general 
was extended so far that, by tne practical postulates, 
objects were given to those ideas, and a merely problem­
atical thought thereby obtained objective reality. It 
was therefore no extension of knowledge of given super- 
sensuous objects, but still an extension of theoretical 
reason and of its knowledge with respect to the super- 
sensuous in general, inasmuch as knowledge is compelled 
to concede that there are such objects witnout more 
exactly defining t h e m ..........." ^
^mmt's own words are his best explanation and 
defence. As to whether or not he justifies his position, 
each must judge for himself. For Kant, however, this 
train of thought leads up to FAITH, as the following 
quotations explain: "It is well to notice that this
moral necessity (i.e. of God's existence) is subjective 
i.e. a need, and not objective i.e. a duty itself. For 
there cannot be the duty to assume the existence of a 
tiling, because such a supposition concerns only the
theoretical use of reason ..........  Considered only in
refer nee to the latter (speculative reason) it is a 
hypothesis i.e. a ground of explanation. But in reference 
to the comprehensibility of an object (the highest good; 
placed before us by the moral law, and thus as a practical 
need, it can be called FAITH and even PUnn RATIONAL FAITH, 
because pure reason alone (by its theoretic .1 as well as 
practical employment; is the source from which it springs".18
Again, he says that "though the concept of the highest
17 KPV p. 140.
16 KPV p. 130-131.
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good as the object and final eno of pure practical
reason the moral law leads to religion. teligion is tne
reco riition of all duties as divine commands, not as
„ 19sanet. one .......... "
section eight, of the "hi slectic (Chapter 11) is 
entitled: "on Assent (or relief,^ arising from a need 
of J ure ueason". . ant argues that theie is "An absolutely
necessary need (tne objects of morality represented by 
tne postulates/" which "justifies its presupposition not 
merely as an allowable hypothesis but as a practical 
postulate. Granted that the pure moral law inexorably 
binds every man as com and (not as a rule of prudence) 
tne righteous man may say: 1 will that there be a aod, 
tnat my existence in this world be also an existence in 
a pure world Of tne understanuing outside the system of 
natural connections, and finally tnat my duration be 
endless. 1 stand by this, and will not ive up this 
belief, for this iu the only ease wnere my inter st 
i ievit Dl\j determines my judgement bee -use 1 will not 
yield to anything oi this inteiest; 1 uo so without any 
attention to sophistries, however little  ^ may be able 
to answer them or oppose them with others more plausible"***■
The argument is tnat there is a justified need for 
faith In order to explain the full meaning of the facts 
of moral experience, and the binding nature of the moral 
demand. *e are not merely believing out of interest, or 
be-loving because we want to have something in .hich to
1"j KPV p. 134.
v ii.. . Abuot of. .ant's , ritlque of i r idle .1 -.eason 
v 'On^man'B repr. L'^j? p. c4J/
21 KPV p. 146-149.
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believe. we have a need to believe which stems from the 
very nature of our moral experience. ihis is not a 
commanded faith, but a practically necessary faith, a 
faith we find ourselves requiring to hold in order to 
complete our underst aiding of the exp riencc of the 
categorical Imperative, to which we feci com >elled to 
submit as rational beings.
The status of the Ideas of .eason then is not tiiat 
of empiric illy justified hypotheses, nor of theoretically 
proved concepts, but of PRACTICAL beliefs, the objects of 
a moral faith.
These selected passages from Kant's G and KPV, with 
connecting comments, state in outline his defence of 
freedom, ana the estrblisnment through frecuom of the 
lostuiates of *ure ructical neason. The ostulates of 
God, Freedom and immortality give rise to the need for a 
moral faith, of which they are the objects. The 
distinction between phenomena and noumena is the keystone 
in the argument which justifies the concept of freedom. 
Therefore, there is a connection in argument between ..ant's 
distinction between phenomena and noumena and the defence 
of the concept of the "ling-an-lich" and Kant's justifi­
cation of the need for faith.
having reviewed the argument tx> this stage, it is 
now appropriate to make reference to one or two w~o have 
noted the connection and who have commented upon it.
Caird, who was mentioned earlier, says of the 
aigument of tho Dialectic, and Kant's statement of tne 
postulates: " .ant's distinction between 'Noumena* and 
1rhenomena' left him with a metaphysical dualism, and so 
he Utoes the two traditional methods of overcoming dualism,
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viz. the infinite progress (which leads him to postulate 
immortality/ and the Deus ex Kachina, which of course 
leads him to introuuce the idea of Goc• Although ethics 
is introduced to explain the origin of the two ideas, 
basically this ic what he is about, and the guise of 
ethics should not be allowed to conceal his real 
activity".22
These criticisms imply that Kant's aictinction 
between (xhenomena1 and '-.oumena' is not valid, and that 
he wat being forced to go back on it. They stand only 
if the distinction between practical and speculative 
reason is not considered, and the role of faith is 
ignored, nant witholds a certain status from his 
postulates which Caird would like him to nave afforded 
them, and it should be remembered that Caird, like Kegel 
who had influenced him, rejected tne concept of the 
'iiin^-an-dioh' •
Criticising the place of the postulates within the 
system is irrelevant, ^uch criticism fnils to see how 
PAIl'H belongs as an integral part of the system, as the 
epistemic mode of nodding what iractlcal Reason snows 
that it is necessary to believe. George Lchrader in his 
article on The Thing in itself in 1antian philosophy"23 
tries to take a broad view of the problem oi interpreting 
the relation between the "Thing in itself", the nature of 
wnat information it ofiers us, and no* it is related to 
faitii and moral knowledge.
His general criticism of Kant is that of inconsis­
tency. "nnnt's position wan anbivalent. He insisted
22 _dward Caird o,. cit same ref. as Chapter 111.
^3 \ant - modern studies in philosophy ed. A.I. wolff,
, acmiTIan"19bL. ^chrader p. 17c-lcb.
upon the autonomy of the practical reason, declaring 
that the postulates of morality have no theoretical 
validity whatever. At the sane time, ho provided a 
theoretical foundation for the metaphysics postulated 
by the practical .tacon, maintaining that the realm of 
the practical reason is the 'intelligible1 or 'nounenal' 
world. This is a fundamental inconsistency in hie 
position. The implicit ration.liem of hie philosophy 
is only partially concealed by nic insistence that the 
metaphysics of morality ie based upon faith rather than 
knowledge. vd xxx, B
hchraaer continues then to attack r.ant's use of 
the term faith: "The term faith is not used in an^
conventional sense and serves to confuse the function 
of the critical method as apilied to moral experience. 
Kant was attempting to make a theoretical claim for 
metaphysical concepts without being willing to accept 
all of the implications involved".24
Further on, and more specifically about Faith, 
dclirader corrimente: "As i ant uses the term faith in
referring to the concepts of moral experience, it has 
little of the traditional meaning and certainly none of 
the religious meaning which is usually associated with 
the concept. It is not an irrational fait *, a faith 
that is blind or mystic 1 to which j ant refers• he is 
at great pains to point out tnat the faith reaupposed 
bj morality is a rational faitn (Vernunftglaube)# For 
Kant as a pexson, 1 eutpect that more tian a rational 
faitn wan invoiveu. Thus the term faith has a double 
meaning for him. it refers to the critical or transcen­
dent. il meaning for him anu to rant's private meaning
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which was not at all dependent upon his critical analysis* 
he ieaixy tried to say two things which are incompatible! 
(1/ tnat things in themselves are ^iven in the case of 
practical reason (*/ that the concepts of the practical 
reason have no theoretical validity when extended beyond 
the mor.il realm*
"There can be little douut that Kant actually 
believed that the practical reason gets at the heart of 
xeality, that in a literal sense it presents us with 
things as the* really are. It is the latter aspect of 
the practical reason, the latter type of faith which has 
been most influential in modern theology". 25
Lchrader is simultaneously fair anu unfair to :aint. 
ne is fair in recognising that ..ant uses tne term faith 
in an unorthodox sense, he is unfair in attributing to 
Aant personal views which ne claims are not consistent 
with his vernuiftglaube. In any event, the meaning of 
this personal faith of Aant is not defined, and in view 
of tne lacI that ichrader rejects nrich Adickes* view that 
Kant later in life abandoned the 'moral argument* in 
favour of a personal subjective view, hie meaning is even 
more difficult to aecertain. It is hard to know if 
^chrader is arguing for an inconsistency in Kant's 
osition about the *thinw in itself' from an inconsistency 
in hie view of faith, or the other way round. . ^  radcr's 
main weakness is that he fails to distinguish clearly 
between the functions of tneoretical and practical reason, 
however, he deserves credit for the fact that he treats 
the A&ntian position as a whole, and recognises that Kant 
was trying to say something new. Although, in . chrader's
25 £c~rauer oi. cit. p. It4*
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opinion, he was able to do so only at the price of self­
contradiction.
Lewis *hibe beck in a sympathetic treatment of the 
same general problem, answers one of Schrader's points, 
when he notes: 'The epistemic mole in which a postulate
is held is a "f^ith of pure reason", 'moral belief" or 
rational belief". Through this epistemic mode, ;.ant 
encompassed within philosophy what had previously been 
an epistemic resource outside of, or hostile to philosophy. 
The faith-reason contrast before Kant was parallel to 
that between revealed theology and philosophy".26 He 
then distinguishes between several ways in which Kant 
speaks of faith.
The faith referred to in connection wit.a the 
postulates he characterises thus: "The faith of pure
reason is needed to 'orient ourselves' in the 'empty 
space' of ti .ought oe*ond experience, in that 'wide and 
stormy ocean, the native home of iliu.ion, where many a 
fogbank and many a swiftly movinc iceberg ive the 
dec* ptive appearances of farther chores. It must be faith 
in objects of practical reason, since theoretical reason, 
in default of intuition, gives no point of orientation".27
The second of the two expressions in inverted commas 
in Inis quotation belongs to the KRV. The first refers
to -.ant's own work: "ahat does it mean: to orientate
oneself in thinking?" (17b6>
"..... xhe faith required bj reason is a postulate.
ko eck A Commentar.y on ant'., critique of
iractical reason" (U. of Chicago Press 1^66; pT”255*
27 newi3 *hite Leek op. cit. p. *56.
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A e regnrdc the degree of certainty, it is not inferior 
to any knowledge, while an opinion, say concerning some 
historical fact, may change if new material turns up. I 
an absolutely certain that no one can over refute my 
proposition that 'there is a God', for whence could he 
gain such insight?" 2b
Lewif hit« neck's exposition of Kant recognises 
tnat the epistemic mode of holding the postulates is that 
of faith, and this means that therefore the epistemic 
status of the postulates is that of 'moral beliefs', 
uchrader ignores the significance of moral experience 
which has to be taken alonc with the* 'Jing-an-Lich' in 
oruer to reach the need for faith. An merely regards 
moral consideration:: as included in his reference to 
practical reason, which 1 have sug ested ic inadequate.
-hose critics, (J lid, Schrader and Beck and their 
respective attitudes to ant illustrate the thesis tnat 
it is necessary to sec the entire Kantian frsu.eworK 
before making any judgement upon Kant with anything 
resemblin an air of finalit. • Beck's more sympathetic 
Interpretation stems from tne fact that he accepts that 
-.ant*L views on faitn and religion are an integral part 
oi his systuia. he discus.es vant's views on faith 
seriously and as part of ^is thought which requires 
consideration alongside his other ideas, he doee not 
xook upon Kant's views on religion an an 'optional extra' 
which goes along with .he Kantian outfit.
ihe conclusion from this discussion is that it is 
necessary to consider n in order to see the outcome of 
i.ant's critical tnecis a. ne unuorotood it. we turn to
2b f^ant GR p. ioc-lo^.
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R not merely to find hie views on religion, but to 
observe the climax of a long argument ;.hich starts in 
the KRV, moves to the £, thence to the KPV, and finally 
to n. Lome of the critics I have discussed see the need 
to relate the various strands of want's thougnt and tne 
arguments which lead through his writings if his idea of 
faith is to be discussed at all. To ascertain Kant's 
final position, a study of R is required. R is not a 
Kantian aft rthought on the subject of reli ion, but 
essential to complete tne work on the critical rogromae, 
and esscnti 1 as an object of study to see wnere the long 
argument of the critical philosophj comes to rest.
One of tne most competent surveys of the history 
of antian thought, which pays due attention to the 
historical circumst nces which gave rise to . also is 
quick to recognise that it is not in any way inconsistent 
with the .-\antian programme.
"His (Kant's) book iAeligion within the Limits of 
i.eaoon Alone was a public confession of Deism, which the 
authorities interpreted at is face value, nameij ae a 
challenge to the reactionary forces in the government ....
xhis work on religion after all owes its origin and 
lie strange composition simply to tne political circum­
stance of the period, however, uant had a much too 
systematic temperament nut to seek to integrate it at 
once with the Critical synthesis in the strict sense" . ^
Thus de Vleeschauaer'sasse.~eo R and its place in 
-.ant'c tnought.
uolm R. tdlber is another critic who sees a place
xhe development of Kantian thou^nt tr. A.a.O. Duncan 
(Kelson 1^62) p. 177-178.
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for R alongside other I antian writings. In an essay 
entitled "The ethical Significance of r.ant' s 'Religion'" ,5^ 
he has this to say: ".ant's Reli ;ion we may say without 
ex iggeration compares in importance for the understanding 
of hi* ethics, vitn . is 'Groundwork of the 1 et&phycics of 
Morals' and the second 'Critique', want's ethical STATlCh, 
to borrow a term from physics, may be found in varjing 
degrees of systsmatiaation in most of his \ ost-crjtical 
worxc. only in 'Religion' do we find what .ight be called 
his ethical DYNAMICS, tant has discussed the nature of 
the gooa, the character of the Imperative, and the method­
ology of moral enquiry in hia earlier works; in the 
Religion he addresses himself to the problem of evil - 
its nature, its origin and the possibility of its 
eradication, in the process he raises questions which 
necc sitate an undeistanding of the will in its full 
complexity ana dynamic unity. we therefore iinu in the 
Religion, in his struggle with the problem of evil, want's 
most explicit and systematic account of the will and of 
human freedom - an account which in turn clarifies his 
system of ethics .5^
These remarks by Lilbar are highly suggestive. He 
sketches in a few words, tne idea of & new relationship 
tetwe n the G and K, based on the fact that tne one 
com: ences with the concept of the Good Jill, and the 
other starts b^ accepting tne fact of radical evil.
However, h&nt't own ren&rks in tne KPV about faith also 
lead naturally to a, and » ilber is in fact indicating one
5 Published as pait of the i: tr duction to the Harper 
Torehbook (ndn. of 'Religion', pp. lxxix - cxxxiv.;
~iiuer o,. c-t. j• lxxx
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way of describing the already implicit relationship 
between these documents.
*nat in effect 1 have been doing here is to argue 
the justification ox a significant place for ti within
i
the framework ox the Critical .hilosophy. Ac 1 have also 
eug eated, not every r.ant scnoiar wouxd accord u sucn a 
place, if or example, Caxrd wrote that in R: u ant sets 
himself to consider how fax*, from his own point of view 
he ca.i appropriate these fundamental conceptions of the 
Christian religion, or at least, . ive them an interpre­
tation in harmony witn his own ideas; and also, though 
in a less direct and conscious way., how far he can 
stretch or modify his own iueas, so as to admit new
elements from Christianity".52
coming from a scholar of Caird*s standing, thic is 
not oniy cruel and unfair, but involves a complete 
disfiguration of «\ant's argument. This view implies 
that the three critiques or perhaps on.y one Critique 
completes the work of the Critical ±hilosophy, and that 
all else is superfluous afterthought. It certainly 
refuses to regard R as the summary of Kant'm answer to 
the claim of . RV xxx;.
^want's arguments in the ref aces to h will add 
weight to what 1 have been saying* and will offer 
clarification of his views on how morality leads to 
religion.
The irst Preface to R deals with the relation 
between ethics and religion. It is in fact a particular 
argument for the general relationship whicn ie implicit 
in the KPV. It clarifies the linal st je of ant's
52 Caird; o ■ cit. Vol. 11 p. 5ob.
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passage from rationalist theology to the need for 
rational faith, because R itself is an attempt at an 
exposition of that rationalist faith*
However, before commencing to look in detail at the 
first Preface, one preliminary observation must be made.
It is addressed to those who are critical of the 
idea that significant place should be given to R amongst 
Kant's critical writings* They often refer to the 
external circumstances through which the various essays 
passed before they finally became R* However, facts 
about the composition of the work should be set in 
perspective. Does, for example, the 'patchwork' theory 
of the Transcendental Deduction affect the significance 
of what Kant is trying to say? To answer in the 
affirmative would be suggesting that an artist's 
painting must be de-valued if he painted it from a 
number of earlier sketches. The work must surely be 
judged by what it says, not by how it came to its 
extant form?
To proceed with the argument, Kant understood moral 
experience as the starting point for his re-appraisal of 
the possibilities of theology. Rationalist theology, 
which he rejected was speculative in its character, and 
was based upon the illusion that transcendent knowledge 
was possible for man. Kant believed that reason in its 
practical employment created both the possibility and the 
necessity to speak about God, freedom and immortality 
(the postulates of pure practical reason). Discussing 
them from the standpoint of practical reason ascribes no 
objective reality to them. Their defence, Kant argued, 
is, however, of equal validity in the courts of reason
with speculative proofs, although of a different order.
The moral proof is based upon the inner necessities for 
understanding which arise out of moral experience rather 
than upon external reasoning based upon logic.
This is most clearly demonstrated by the manner in
which Kant argues that morality leads ineluctably to
religion. Prima facie, this appears to contradict the 
principle of the autonomy of morality, bux carefully 
considered, it is merely an extension of his view that 
moral experience requires that we should postulate the 
existence of God, the reality of freedom and the possibi­
lity of immortality. It is at this point that the argu­
ment in the first Preface to R becomes relevant.
He begins by stating the doctrine of the autonomy
of morality quite categorically and unequivocally and 
thus reiterating the concxusions established in G. "Ho 
far as morality is based upon the conception of man as 
a free agent who, just because he is free, binds himself 
through his reason to unconditioned laws, it stands in 
need neither of the idea of another Being over him, for 
him to apprehend his duty, nor of an incentive other than
the law itself, for him to do his duty  ....... morality
requiies absolutely no material determining ground of 
free choice, that is, no end in order either to know 
, hat duty is, or to impel the performance of duty".53
He illustrates this by arguing that we should require 
no incentive to make us give a true testimony in court, 
other than referring ourselves to the fact that it is 
our duty. This is the familiar argument in G.
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This position has been regarded by some critics 
as suggesting that Kant had no place for religion in 
his scheme. The KPV answers that view, but does not 
resolve the final tension between the autonomy of the 
categorical imperative, and the conception of religion 
as either 'beyond' morality, or 'proceeding from' 
morality.
However, Kant does bridge the gap between morality 
and religion quite specifically in the ensuing argument:
"..........  It is true that morality requires no end for
right conduct; the law which contains the formal
conditions of the use of freedom in general suffices.
Yet an end does arise from morality; for how the question 
'what is to result from this right conduct of ours?' is 
to be answered, and towards what as an end - even granted 
it may not be wholly subject to our control - we might 
direct our actions and abstentions, so at least as to be 
in harmony with that end; these cannot possibly be matters 
of indifference to reason".54
He then concludes that "Morality thus liiiiADH 
INELUCTABLY TO RELIGION, through wnich it extends itself
to the idea of a powerful, moral . awgiver, outside of
manlind, for Whose will that is the final end (of 
creation) which at the same time can and ougnt to be 
man's final e n d " . 55
Kant maintains that morality is independent of 
religion, but later says that morality leads ineluctably 
to religion. Is this blatant self-contradiction, or can 
the apparent discrepancy be reconciled?
54 r p. 4
55 R p. 5
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It is worthy of note that the argument which leads 
to the Divine .Lawgiver is not quite the same argument as 
the argument which leads to God as the distributor of 
the summum bonum. The Divine Lawgiver's function seems 
more significant than the mere computing of virtue and 
happiness in the ethereal spheres of immortality. However, 
1 would like to discuss three possible lines of comment 
on Kant's seeming inconsistency:-
(a) The first is that Kant undermines his own concept of 
duty by asserting the possibility of a move from morality 
to religion. The argument would run thus: "Kant argues
that practical reason offers and indeed requires a way 
of speaking about religion. However, Kant's conception 
of dutj is such that he can insist upon the independence 
of morality from religion. The basis of his starting 
point concerning practical reason is moral experience of 
the categorical imperative itself. Therefore, while it 
expresses the moral demand fully, it also creates the 
need to go beyond itself, while saying that nis concept 
of duty is adequate from one point of view, he is 
admitting that it is inadequate from another, because it 
leads on to something else. Therefore, having argued 
thus, can Kant maxe so much out of duty after all, and 
can his concept of duty be held to be independent of 
reli^)n from tne beginning of the argument, so that we 
can see tne need for a reference to religion later on? 
nant wouxd appear to be undermining the concept of duty 
when ne claims that morality leads ineluctably to religion 
such that it cannot have any longer the autonomy of 
morality as its complement which is so essential in G. 
Kant's argument is thus circular".
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lb) The second line of comment has been raised already 
by Kant when he anticipates the argument which would be 
advanced against him - viz. that what the KRV forbade, 
the KPV permitted. This line of argument would claim 
that the Postulates of Pure Pr ctical Reason are the 
result of speculative reason being employed under another 
name. Kant's own defence has been outlined and this, it 
has been suggested, must be judged as a separate issue 
by each individual for himself.
lc) The third line of comment is recommendation that 
final judgement should be suspended until rent's total 
position on religion has been develoAed. The significance 
of what he is saying and the detail of the argument should 
be considered side by side. On occasions, the value of 
the former might outweigh any devaluation caused by slight 
discrepancies in the latter, we have seen that the 
programme which develops from tne second Critique should 
not be prematurely juaged until Kant has fully worked 
out his position, loitewise, his step from morality to 
religion should not be crushed until it has been fully 
determined whether or not what he means by religion 
realty affects his position on morals.
Returning to the test of R, the key move Aant makes 
comes in these words: "Take a man who, honouring the
moral laws, allows the thought to occur to him (he can 
scarcely avoid doing so) of what sort of world he would 
create under the guidance oi practical reason, were such 
a thixig in his power, a world moreover into which he 
would place himself as a m e m b e r .......... "
"It cannot be a matter of unconcern to morality as 
to whether or not it forms for itself the concept of a
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final end of all things (harmony with which, while not 
multiplying men's duties, yet provides them with a 
special focus for the unification of all ends); for only 
thereby can objective practical reality be given to the 
union of the purposiveness arising from freedom with the 
purposiveness of nature, a union with which we cannot
possibly dispense".5^
rant is arguing that while we cannot question the 
authority of duty, we may still wonder at the over­
all significance of a life lived in accordance with duty, 
and of the collective life of humanity, lived in 
accordance with duty. There are thus two senses of the 
question "Why should 1 do my duty?" which must be 
distinguished. This distinction answers the criticism 
of comment (a). The first sense of the question is 
illegitimate - it is the sense discussed in G. when 
someone reflects "X is my duty, but why should 1 do it?" 
the only reply to be given is simply the general state­
ment "A duty is something to undertake without question". 
The second sense, howevei, is legitimate, because the 
force of the question is this: "what will result from a 
liie of duty?" or "what is the meaning of duty for the 
good of the world?" The important difference is that 
both questions view duty difierently, but neither require 
a reference to consequences in order to support the 
authority of duty. The need to perform a duty is not 
being justified. The second sense of the question is 
an attempt to seek deeper understanding of the 
significance of duty. The interest in the consequences 
of morality which it expresses is not a moral interest,
56 fi p. 5
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but the interest of the enquiring mind.57
for Kant, the autonomy of morality is never 
questionable. when faced with a duty, we may never say 
"why should I do t.-is?" if by that we are seeking a
justification for doing our duty. *e may only say "1
cannot know the consequences of doing my duty, but 1 
believe it is right that it should be undertaken".
However, the idea that we may be interested in what
morality will produce by way of its effects is important.
It enables us to raise the question of the ends of 
morality, but not as something that precedes the 
determination of the will. Morality is what each 
individual engages in in the performance of duties. It 
is not a totality of affairs at which we may aim our 
actions. The idea of the end arises out of morality.
It does not precede it in any way. The heart of Kant's 
claim that morality leads to religion becomes exposed, 
ana may be more easily grasped. Prom consideration of
57 Kant indulges in an expression which is most dangerous, 
when he suggests in a secondary way that we enquire about 
this end of morality so that "We might direct our actions 
and abstentions so as at least to be in harmony with that
end". (R p.4.) This form of expression would have
devastating consequences for his views on morality if he 
had given this idea a more prominent place in his views.
It would imply that once we have apprehended the end of 
morality, we could 'short cut' duty by laying our plans 
to fit the end. The problem of enu and means for Kant 
would then remain unsolved. 1 do not regard his remark 
in this vein as an essential part of the argument.
Therefore there is little purpose in dealing with it in
detail. It does not add anything to his argument and for 
present purposes is disregarded. Why Kant should have 
said this, admittedly remains a problem.
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the question of the end to which morality leads, Kant 
finds himself driven to speak of religion. Han needs 
to be able to envisage some final end or ultimate set 
of consequences which arise from doin^ nis duty through­
out life, and this leads us to religion. The end is no 
more than "the idea of an object which takes the formal 
condition of all such ends as we ought to have ^dutyj 
and combines it with whatever is conditioned and in 
harmony with dut , in all the ends we do have vhappiness
proportion d to obedience to duty) ..........." 58 Only
a higher moral and omnipotent Being can unite the two 
elements here presented. So it would seem that while 
morality can be Known and understood in and by itself 
qua moral experience, it cannot be known and understood 
in its fullest significance as a way of life without 
refeio-nce to God, at least as a Being who can combine 
the prescriptive end of morality with the concept of a 
highest Good for all moral agents.
This argument bears strong resemblance to the 'morsil 
argument' as found in the KPV, although both arguments 
have slightly different emphases.
The KPV view is basically that of God as a Moral 
Being who balances duty and nappinesa. This argument 
makes God into une who relates duty to the pursuit of 
happiness. This is present in the R argument to the 
extent that God is called a Divine ,.awgiver, who indeed 
gives tne law, but who also effects a balance between 
happiness in the world and the worthiness of those who 
deserve to be happy (i.e. those who do their duty) since 
man himself does not have the power to achieve this.
3b R p. 4
- 172 -
The main emphasis, hov/ever, of R could be stated 
as follows: "If morality has an overall end, then
someone must be organising it, and have so made man, 
or arranged that within him, the sense of duty is his 
guide as to how to achieve that end, (whether he knows 
of its existence or not). We do have the idea of an 
ideal world even after a very little reflection about 
morality, but the pursuit of our duty makes us a 
participant in the production of that ideal w orld. God 
has ioade us so •
The justification for this interpretation should 
become clearer in the course of the argument, and I 
think proves to be the dominant insight and emphasis of 
R. Kant speaks about having faith in the outcome of 
moral living, and when he speaks in that way, he is 
relying upon tne second rather than the first emphasis.
A. D. nindsay in his monograph on Kant expounds 
this emphasis in the following terms: "We are to do
our part (by doing our duty/ trusting that others will 
do the same. We must do this,for we are, if acting 
morally, willing that the ma^im of our action should 
be a univeisal law. This implies that we must for 
right action have faith in something that is not within 
our power, and yet that we must not demand that this 
faith should become k n o w l e d g e " .59
He continues by contrasting Kant's position with 
that of Hobbes: "The nerve of this position may be
seen most clearly if we are to compare it with that of 
Hobbes. (Leviathan c. xv) 'He that would be modest 
and tractable, and perform all the promises in such time
59 a .D. nindsay Kant p. 250 ff.
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and place as no other man should do so, should but 
procure his own ruin, which is against all the laws of 
nature, hut he tnat having surety that other men shall 
regard the laws of nature, doth not do so himself, 
endeavoureth not peace but war'. If you are guaranteed 
the kingdom of heaven as a result of your actions, you 
are called on to act as a member of it; if not, not.
Prom wnich follows Hobbes position that the setting up 
of a guarantor in the person of the sovereign must precede 
all morality. This is to make the result willed in action 
the determining ground. Kant is right in thinking such 
a position immoral. 'For if ye love them which love you, 
what reward have ye? Do not even the publicans the same?' 
And yet at the same time, such a 'bestowing virtue' as 
Neitzsclie called it, implies necessarily trust and faith 
in the consequences of our actions. That faith is the 
outcome of the action, not its determining ground; but 
it is not an accidental outcome. The action implies 
faith".40
Lindsay then points out the relation between faith 
and reason entailed in this position: "Notice what a
revolutionary conception of the relation between faith 
and reason this position involves. Instead of the two 
being separate as though we were first rational and then 
faith gave us something more, faith is for Aant, part 
and parcel of rational willing. True faith is, therefore, 
for Kant, always rational faith. It is the faith implied 
in the rational will".40
aindsay is taking Kant to mean that we believe our 
actions will have consequences which we cannot know. This
4^ ii.D. Lindsay op. cit. p. 250.
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is implied in the notion of willing that they become 
universal laws. And further we believe that often moral 
agents will do the same. To this extent Lindsay is 
correct in his interpretation of Kant.
However, he draws another and I think mistaken 
conclusion, that if we thought that our actions were not 
to bear fruit because the world was totally alien to our 
moral actions, then we should think that moral action 
was futiJLe. He says: "In a world in which our moral 
purposes were known to be incapable of fulfilment, it 
would not be enough for us to say: 'let us at least do 
our duty*  it cannot be our duty to will what has
no consequences".41
This implies that if we know consequences only, we 
can will and act. This interpretation does not do proper 
justice to the significance of Kant's view of duty for 
duty's sake, lie accepts that duty has unquestionable 
authority, and that faith is involved in rational willing, 
but then concedes tnat this is conditional upon us knowing 
that the consequences of our actions are attainable.
The heart of Kant's position is that there can never
be an excuse for the moral agent's failure to undertake 
what he sees as his duty in any given situation, were 
Lindsay's view valid, and were Kant saying this, we would 
be excused from the effort of trying to attain any 
morally good end, or from doing a duty which would help 
bring this about, unless there were a sufiicient number 
of others willing to do the same. This would reduce 
morality to nought, and make as the maxim of our life 
"If no one else cares, 1 will not". This maxim xs most
41 Lindsay op. cit. p. 208.
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immoral•42 it reduces the Categorical Imperative of 
moral obligation to the hypothetical imperative of the 
selfish child or the apathetic adult.
Lindsay misinterprets Aant on this vital point.
Kant maintains the independence of duty's demand from 
any consideration of possible consequences of doing our 
auxy or possibility of attainment of any end. Our Faith 
in the possible consequences of doing our duty may lie 
in deciding to adopt tlie proper maxim, but whether or 
not that faith is justified, is of no .^oral interest, 
we do our duty because it is our duty. Thought about 
consequences are not relevant considerations at the 
time, but merely confirmatory after thoughts.
Kant is suggesting in a general way that without a 
definite goal, the will can achieve no satisfaction. This 
may be true. Bui, he constantly maintains that morality 
requires no end for right conduct, and this position he 
holds as unconditionally true. The man who may feel the 
duty to face even failure in order to act rightly under 
whatever circumstances may face him, may indeed perform 
actions that might bear fruit. Then again, he may be no 
more than a failure altogether. Nothing however, can
42 Surely the duty to rouse public interest in a subject 
about which there appears to be little social concern may 
fall into this category? It *ouj»u be totally immoral to 
say 'No one else cares, why should I?' or '1 snail 
probably fail, so I will not attempt anytning'. Is not 
the entire conception of a rrotest movement based upon 
the repudiation of this immoral slogan, which lacks 
conscience, and sees nothing as its duty except circumstances 
be favourable? The failure of Jesus in Bis crucifixion,
Bis faith in the principle of nove, the 'Here 1 stand' 
attitude of Luther, the passive suffering of Ghandi and 
LutHuli would seem to illustrate the duty to 'die a 
failure' if necessary.
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divest him of his duty at that time, and no amount of 
consideration of consequences or contemplation of ends 
envisaged will weigh either for or against. This is 
for Kant the essence of the moral attitude to life.
Can Kant, from his own words, be understood to mean 
anything else?
To this general comment may be added the conclusion 
already outlined that Kant, while insisting upon the 
autonomy of morality, sees that the end of the totality 
of moral action is of interest to us, and that from this 
consideration the need to speak about religion arises.
A modern echo of Kant's view on the relation of 
morality and religion may be heard in these words of 
irofessor Mckagan; on the theme of the moral utility of
religion: "I therefore heartily agree that ....  a man
who sets nimself to get on without religion may be like 
a man who persists in hopping on one leg along a road 
on which ne might more comfortably and quickly proceed 
by walking on two. Nonetheless a roan who is under the 
honest impression that ue has only the one leg not only 
must, but can, however painfully and slowly, travel that
way".45
In tne Preface to the 1794 edition of R, Aant takes 
up a point w.-ich helps to set into better perspective 
his progress from rationalist, tneology to rational faith.
He distinguishes between Biblical theology and Ihilosophical 
theology as separate and independent disciplines: "Among 
the sciences, however, there is, over and against Biblical 
theology, a philosophical theology which is an estate 
entrusted to another faculty. So long as this philoso-
45 Mc.uagan Theological Frontier of Athics (George,
Allen oz Unwin 1^,61; p. lb5«
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phical theology remains within the limits of reason 
alone, and for the confirmation and exposition of its 
propositions makes use of history, saying books of all 
peoples, even the Bible, but only for itself, without 
wishing to carry thesepropositions into Biblical theology 
or to change the latter's public doctrines - a privilege 
of divines - it must have complete freedom to expand as 
far as its science reaches”.44
This passage clearly demarcates the province within 
which Kant is operating. He is attempting to think 
theologically, but clearly is making use of philosophical 
criteria for assessing and deciding what may or may not 
be said, and any religious material (even the Bible) for 
illustration, xvant is not merely writing a philosophy 
of leigion, but is conducting an exercise in 'philosophical 
theology' within the limits of reason alone, within the 
framework of the critical philosophy.
The difference of emphasis between a philosophy 
of religion and philosophical theology' may indeed be 
rather subtle, but x^ant implies that his awarenesses 
are theological, and this is justifiable, since God, 
freedom and immortality are established in the nPV.
However, he still permits no reliance upon revelation, 
tradition or holy books.
Kant classifies as within theology "a knowledge 
of God and His existence",45 and his contrast between 
an ethical theology and a theological ethics, may be 
useful in this context. He argues that an ethical 
theology is quite possible, since "morality without
44 R p. b.
45 KU p. 165.
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theology may carry on with its own rule". But then 
he adds that "it cannot do so with the final purpose which 
this very rule enjoins, unless it throws reason to the 
winds as regards this purpose". However, "a theological 
ethics * on the part of pure reason - is impossible, 
seeing tnat laws which are not originally given by 
reason itself, and the observance of which it does not
A1bring about as a practical capacity, cannot be moral".
The import of his insights in this regard is first 
that his awarenesses are primarily theological in that he 
was trying to discover a pathway from experience to belief 
in God and His existence. His insights are also ethical, 
since that aspect of experience from which the pathway 
commences, is moral experience. Hence his notion of a 
philosophical theology which arises out of ethics. This 
could be called an expansion in methodological terms of 
his claim that morality leads ineluctably to religion.
The difficulty which has faced R is tnat it has been 
regarded by philosophers as intended for theologians, 
since it occasionally makes reference to Biblical concepts. 
On the other hand, some theologians have viewed it as an 
attempt by Kant to explain something he does not fully 
appreciate, in a language alien to themselves. This 
conflict of attitudes may account for the lack of atten­
tion paid to R by either discipline. Kant, however, was 
trying to communicate with both disciplines, by catting 
out a pathway from one to the other. I would suggest 
that he was attempting to set Christianity within a 
philosophical perspective, to see which elements of the 
traditional faith could be reached by other than
4 6 KU p. 163.
4 7 KU p. 163.
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revelation.
Through moral experience he believed he had 
discovered that alternative approach to God, freedom 
and immortality. The faith which arose out of these 
considerations, was derived from reason in its practical 
employment. This faith he calls both rational faith 
and moral faith. This concludes the study of the 
movement in want's thought from rationalist theology 
to the rational faiti of an ethical tneolo^y. The 
nature of this faith, however, c ills for further 
clariiication.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE PURE MORAL FAITH OF REABOH.
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The enquiry so far has centred upon the analysis 
and criticism of certain misrepresentations and misinter­
pretations of the \antian view of the nature of uaith. 
rrom these corrections was developed an outline of both 
the ideas *nnt rejected and how he made provision for 
trie possibility of faith witnxii the self-imposed 
limitations of his criticxl programme. The conclusions 
which wer reached may be summarised as follows:
1. .want's conception of faith is not, as Vaihinger 
suggested, a mere pra^mrtic device, introduced to justify 
the use of otherwise urbjlievable ideas, as working 
hypotheses. He argued that Kant's view of faith was a 
matter of acting 'as-if* x or y were true. rfith regard 
to the status of the oojects of tnis pragmatic faith, 
Vaihinger claimed that Kant held the views of an agnostic, 
if not indeed tnose of an atheist.
This, however, was shown to be a misrepresentation 
of j\ant. when kant declared that he had made room for 
faith, he was speaking not of a mere pragmatic faith or 
a hypothetical faith which witheld any positive assertions, 
xiis faith did not remain silent about such ideas as the 
existence of Goa. .aant rather claimed that his faith 
would supplement knowledge. It would be an injustice to 
the psychology of rvant to disbelieve his stated intention 
in B xxx. In addition, the test of the KRV will not stand 
such a one-sided reading.
on the other win^ of misunderstanding, there is the 
position represented bj tnose who claim that ..ant was 
tinged with some form of Romanticism. Otto's attempt 
to construct a phenomenology of religious experience, 
using nant's schematism, is an example of such a position.
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while in isolated passages, Kant does appear to speak 
in a romantic vein, and while his enthusiasm for the 
teleological structure of nature, and the argument (for 
God's existence/ from design is undeniable, these factors 
must be viewed cautiously. Careful scrutiny of the text, 
and careful observation of his most emphatic pronouncements 
on tne £ abject confirm the view th.t x^ant permitted no 
element of 'experience' to enter into the determination 
oi the nature of religious faith. He regarded 'religious 
experience' as a dangerous concept, and one waich was the 
source of "Schw&rmerei" - fanaticism.
His understanding of faith had no element of so 
called ’’religious experience” in it, and made no provision 
for an account of such religious experience. He claimed 
that he was not discussing transcendent entities which 
could be reached onlj bj mystical meditation, or by 
experiencing feelings of the numinous, if such experiences 
were at 11 valid. Therefore, while he was interested 
intellectually in the phenomena of Romanticism, his 
thinking was quite uninfluenced by this.
3 . With the extremes eliminated, the next stage was to 
consider the compatibility of want's assertion that faith 
was necessary wTith his outright rejection of the 
traditional arguments for God's existence. In fact, he 
rejected all speculative theology. The thinkers whose 
views he was rejecting were Descartes, Leibniz, wolff, 
and indeed the entire panorama of rationalist philosophers 
and theologians. Kant concluded that the purely 
theoretical employment of reason could not sustain any 
discussion of God. How then did he proceed to make 
room for faith?
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The key to the mystery was found to lie in the 
concept of the 11 ing-an-Sich". Kant defended this 
concept and the distinction between the phenomenal and 
the noumenal with dialectical ferocity, because upon 
its validity depended the very possibility of the 
eiii jloyment of reason in another manner. The other 
manner, Kant calls 'Practical Reason', as against 
'Theoretical employment of aeason'. 1 suggested that
this part of the Kantian argument is at least underrated 
in its importance and value, aant saw this as not only 
an integral part of his system, but as necessarily 
completing it. while the KRV opens the possibility to 
our view, the oJ?V develops the theme after a preliminary 
investigation in G. It is through the need for an under­
standing of the meaning of the Moral demand that Kant 
sees a way of expressing the place of faith. It is out 
of moral experience that the need for faith arises.
In this way, he moves from his rejection of 
rationalist theology to his conception of rational faith - 
namely, faith based upon reason in its practical employ­
ment. In the jjlPV, he establishes moral justification for 
speaxing about God, freedom and immortality. In the 
first preface to R, he justifies the passage from morality 
to religion, and this leads into the work itself which 
affords elucidation and clarification of his conception 
of the nature of faith.
The close relationship between G and the KPV and R 
was argued for on the grounds that first G analyses the 
concept of good, and from the KPV, aant proceeds in R 
to face the problem of evil, becondlj, in so far as the 
idea of faith is developed iurther in R, not only is it
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necessary to give it full consideration, but it may also 
be looked upon as the final clarification of the state­
ment made in the KRV at B xxx.
Certain questions now arise. Having established 
that Kant had a religious faitn, tne nature of that faith 
has to be determined. Once this has been achieved, there 
is the further problem of how this faith of want's 
matches up to any of the trauitional views of Christian 
faith. Is Kant merely an ethical theist? Or with regard 
to Christian revelation, is he an ethical relativist? ur 
was he j erhaps trying to say something moi’e significant, 
ana therefore, correspondingly more difficult to express? 
These questions must be faced. But before offering a 
preliminary solution to them, a brief outline of the 
argument of R would serve us useful background to the 
detailed arguments to follow.
R consists of iOur parts with a General Observation 
appended to each section. The first part appeared 
separately and the three successive sections were added 
together in the following year (1 7 9 3 ) to complete the
work m  its present form.
The first section is the crucial one. In it, aant 
developed his contribution to the problem oi evil. G 
begun with an analysis of the good will whereas part 1 
of R opens with the statement: "That 'the world lieth
in evil' is a plaint as old as history ..... " ^
uvil is defined, as is goodness, in terms of the
maxims according to which a man acts, ana from this
starting point, Kant proceeds to analyse the original 
predisposition to good in Human Mature, and its propensity
1 R p. 15
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to evil, having done this, he arrives at the conclusion 
that man is evil by nature. This is so because evil acts 
may be predicated of mankind as a species, and because 
man has a tendency to act from morally mixed motives. 
Therefore evil originates within man himself.
This part of the work is most important, because it 
contains. implications for Kant's doctrine of freedom, 
aant critics have not been slow to argue that Kant departs 
from his earlier doctrine of freedom, an. finally ends up 
in self-contradiction, with two inconsistent accounts of 
freedom. This challenge will be answered in due course.2
B o o k II of R introduces the concept of der ] nr.^f.3 
the struggle for supremacy of the good principle and the 
evil principle. This of course is a moral struggle and 
takes place within men as individuals. The ideal of 
moral periection is adequately presented to men in the 
form of a son of *-ian - a person morally pleasing to God - 
the archetype present in man's morally legislative reason, 
with this example before them, men should be able to 
adopt only proper maxims of conduct, and so be, so to 
speak, morally converted, by making a 'meta-decision' 
to act only on moral maxims. There are clearly 
implications in what m t  sa^s about the uon of Kan ideal 
for Christology.
Among the difficulties . ant sees in this idea is 
that it is unable to solve the problem of atonement for
^ "Kant's alleged Romanticism". The General observation 
at the close of this section as with the three at the 
close of the other sections have already been discussed.
3 R p. 50-53
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past guilt and wrong actions. They still remain, although 
the moral agent decides in luture to act only on moral 
maxims. In the eyes of upreme Justice, no one who is 
blameworthy can ever be guiltless, and therein lies the 
problem of reparation. This leads to the antinomy of 
saving faith, and its solution has implications both 
for Kant’s conception of faith, and for the relation of 
his views on faith to Christian doctrine.
The second section of Book II deals with the 
scriptural 'mythology1 (history recited in order to 
convey some vital truth) in which der Kampf is exi)Ounded. 
It concerns an evil power establisnlng a kii^giom on earth, 
and the conflict of this power with the power of good 
lor supremacy over man. Through history man was prepared 
for the a;peurance of one who was not implicated in the 
original errors of tne human race, and who therefore was 
independent of the Kingdom of nvil, but who was persecuted 
by that evil power. The physical victory of the evil 
power, when that .erson was killed, became the moral 
victory of the good power.
x^ant closes this discussion bw. explicitly suggesting 
that the account thus given in Scripture, being stated so 
vividly, was meant for popular consumption. The real 
significance of the story lies in the universally valid 
truths it conveys.
The third Book introduces the iaea of the Church, 
as a moral commonwealth, designed to help men to 
collectively resist the assaults of the evil principle.
Man lives in an ethical Btate of nature, in which he 
stands judged by his own actions in light of the moral 
law. however, because h® Is a solitary individual, he
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is weak and prone to assault and defeat by the evil 
principle. Therefore, Kant argues, he should leave the 
ethical state of nature to become part of an ethical 
commonwealth, acting under universally recognised moral 
laws. These moral laws are not made by the community 
itself, but are recognised as prior to the community 
and therefore they emanate from God. This ethical 
commonweaitn oi people obeying tne moral law of uoa 
can only be achieved oy human organisation, through the 
form of a Church. The different foxms of Church are 
described by i ant. At this stage, he distinguishes 
between pure religious faith, which is tne heart of the 
moral ideal, and the different Historical faith,which, 
using various Holy Scriptures, h ve been organised to 
uand men into different unions (an approximate to the 
ideal;, and aant speaks interestingly, but enigmatically 
of the day when men will be able to dispense with 
Churchly faiths in favour of the xjure religion of reason.4
In the second section of Book 111, aant treats the 
Victory of the Good over the uvil Principle, historically, 
and in the coux'se of his exposition, makes many 
interesting comments and evaluations upon specific 
periods in the history of Christianity which are of note 
in and by themselves• his rather critical conclusions 
on the morally dubious history of Christendom are 
summ rised by himself in the words of the Roman poet 
Lucretius: "Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum" 5
The fourth and final section of R concerns Service 
and Pseudo-Service of God under the sovexeighty of tne
4 R  p. 1JU-112.
^ R p. 122 Lucretius "Le reruia natura" I, 101 
'Such greatly evil deeds as religion can prompt1
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Good Principle. It is subtitled - Religion and 
Clericalism. The argument opens by claiming that the 
founding of a Kingdom of God is something which can be 
done only by God Himself. For the practical purposes 
of public organisation, there must be clergy and laity, 
but the pure rational religion of the 'church invisible' 
knows nothing of tnese artificially created distinctions. 
The concept of the service of God is discussed, and Kant, 
working from his definition of r e l i g i o n , c o n s i d e r e i 
subjectively as regarding all duties as Divine commands, 
argues that God wishes the recognition of duty as true 
and proper worship. Anything else that men com and on 
behalf of God, other than tne moral conduct of life, is 
so much superstition and falsity. Religious illusion 
has given rise to much fanaticism anu cruelty during the 
course of history.
Kant distinguishes between Christianity as a 
Natural Religion, and Christianity as Learned Religion.
As a Natural Religion, it consists in the first place 
of morality along with the necessary beliefs in God 
and Immortality. He includes in this section an 
exposition of some of Jesus' words as implying that lie 
taught not statutory religious duties, but, in fact, 
pure morality.
As a learned religion, Christianity should be taught 
as a iides elicita. This means a faith which st nds and 
maintains itself on rational grounds, and not as a fides 
imrerata (a commandal faith). In speaking of this, he 
makes indirect reference to ti*e edict of Frederick 
William II, which has caused him so much trouble; "It
0 R p. 142
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(Christianity) must therefore always be taught as at 
least a fides hlstorice elicita: that is, learning should
certainly constitute in it ....  not the rear guard but
the vanguard, and then the small body of textual scholars 
(the clerics), who, incidentally, co Id not dispense with 
secular le: rning, would drag along behinu itself the long 
train of the unlearned tthe laity; who, of themselves, 
are ignorant of Scripture (and to whose number belong 
even the rulers of world states ; . 11 7
want's clarification of the distinction between hie 
idea of moral faith, (religion conceived in ethical 
termsy, and pseudo-service of God makes use of the 
antithesis he draws between the obligation upon man to 
live a good course of life and the illusion that something 
more than this is required to please God. In the light 
of this, he evaluate* ,ublic worsnip and the Lacraments 
of the Church as merely encouragements to moral sentiments. 
He ultimately reaches tne point where in the last chapter,® 
he claims that conscience is the guide man must accept in 
matters of faith. It should be clear from this survey of 
the argument of n, that the entire work arises out of 
the position established in Book 1, which deals with the 
problem of evil.
At the close of the preceding part of this work, it 
waL establisheu. that j\ant regarded his faith as both 
rational and moral. The full significance of this iias 
yet to be developed. However, it would aA ^ ear that some 
account must now be taken of the argument of R Book 1 , 
for at least two reasons.
First, from the standpoint reached in the iirst
7 R p. 152. 
6 R p. 175 f
-  189 -
irel'ace of R and in the &1V, it is ossiblc to review 
i.unt'o argument in such a Wcij tn t it is c^e r tL*xt hie 
dootiinc oi freedom in G, is the basic a o, which the 
uiscucsiou oi faith is possible. Ac lifts been already 
shown, the defence oi freedom rests o\o. the crucial 
argument in the *J£V lor the distinction ue tween phenomena 
and noumena. Ihe basic position in G, ib tnat the only 
free acts are acts performed in obe ienee to the moral 
law. Ihereiorc, freedom in o h; s nothing to saj about 
ti e robieaa of evil. . Book I o* ens by r, lining this 
roblem. Therefore the question utor atic^x-Lj arises:
1 fchafc is the rel-ationshix’ in h between evil and human 
freedom? 1
Secondly, ana arising out o_ the ..in w point, is 
the ruLxeiu oi the relationsni: of faith to Ine act of 
iuOxm! wiriii^g. Tne moral faith of reason rises out of 
the exurc-i.se ol freedom, and is in cae V the epistemic 
uuue i.. which tne postulates of pure practical reason are 
held- iii- fact that R intro luces the .robrem oi evil 
®ust i urs/ly affect the coace tion o . faith aa defined 
eariiei i.. tne JLPV. subtle aiiftr^ac o_ emphasis has 
bee. '..Irfeady underlined between the co. ce lion of God in 
, i overnor o: ... . . rse in the
j ref to tne first edition of
• Therefore, uotn kant's view oj fxeedOL., and possibly 
also iiie view oi faith wouiu s^em to ue necessarily 
axiecteu oj tne introduction to his et i c -± discussion 
of the proolea of evil. The nature u cTibad to each will 
uepend upon tne position he adopts with re iru to the 
defini lion o± the nature of evil.
xentatively, I would suggest that ant extended the
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meaning of the concept of freedom in R, m u  from there 
amplified and expanded his conception of pure moral 
faith accordingly. This leaves two problems to be 
discussed, first, 'Is tnis enlarged conception of 
freedom still consistent with the conditions of knowledge 
set out in the KPV? 1 And second ' what is the relation 
between Kant1s 'faith' and any traditional views of 
Christian faith?' i\ant claimed initially to have 
silenced all objections to both morality and religion, 
and this claim, as 1 nave argued, must be seriously 
regarded, for hi. ther is only one true religion, 
because there is orny one morality valid for all men.^ 
Again, i would suggest tentatively, and to offer 
justification for the manner in which my own argument 
will develop, that in trying to maxe a place for faith 
out of the nature of moral experience, Kant was trying 
to define a universally acceptable and recognisable 
foundation for the insights both of Christianity and 
indeed of all 'moral' religion. In morality, he 
believed, I think, that he had discovered a pathway from 
human experience direct to God, which could universally 
express the natural im ulse for religious faith, so 
adequately expressed in Christianity. Therefore, what 
my argument will try to detect is evidence that from 
his ethical theism, nant was seeking to develop a 
Cnristian universalism.
^ P footnote to p. 31* "Difference of religion - 
singular expression. It is as if one s oke of different 
moralities. There may very well be different kinds of 
historical faiths attached to different means employed in 
tne promotion of religion, and tney belong merely in the 
field of learned investigation. Similarly, there may be
different religious texts ....  but such differences do
not exist in religion, there being only one religion valid 
for all men and in all ages".
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we may now proceed to examine in detail the argument 
of Book I about freedom and the nature of the faith 
implied in the act of moral willing, what sort of faith 
is involved in the exercise of freedom as freedom is 
defined in R? This will lead to full definition and 
expansion of the terms vant uses to descrioe his concept 
of faith - rational and moral.
Kant opens the argument of Book 1 by refuting from 
experience, the false optimism of the Aufkl&rung that 
the world was becoming better and better, by emphasising 
that human history will not bear this view out. However, 
he refuses to accept tne extreme alternative, that tne 
world was collapsing into chaos. Peeing the weakness 
of both, he asks if there is not some other way of 
understanding the situation. This desire to seek a 
road which combines the autnentic insights of both 
extremes of interpretations illustrates the whole 
objective of his theory - to combine two apparently 
contradictory sets of insights, so that res -ect may be 
paid to the truth which lies in botn. Therefore he
acks:   since it may well be that both sides have
erred in their reading of experience, the question arises 
whether a middle ground may not at least be possible, 
namely, that as a species man is neither good nor bad, 
or at all events, that he is as much the one as the 
other, partly good, partly bad” . 1 0
He then refers to tne concept ox ixaxirn, first 
introauced in G: "we call a man evil, however, not
because he periorms actions that ai-e evil ^contrary to 
the xawy but because these actions are of such a nature
ji p# Xu.
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that we may infer from them the presence in him of 
evil maxims" . ^1
want's maxims are j'rinciples of volition.'±Cm They are 
sources of willing, and they have implications for more 
than just our projected action at the giv^n moment when 
we employ one. He argues for the importance of the maxim 
in relation to the problem of the origin of evil in these
words: ".....  the source of evil c mnot lie in an object
determining th will through inclination, nor yet in a 
natural impulse: it can lie only in a rule made by the 
will for the u^e of its freedom, that is, a maxim".!-'
Only free actions may be imputed to the agent in 
terms of guilt or innocence. Actions caused by impulse 
or any other external determining factor do not belong 
in the category of free actions. Thus to say that a man 
is good or evil by nature is to say that "there is in 
him an ultimate ground (inscrutable to us) of the adoption 
of good maxims or of evil maxims (those contrary to law), 
and tnis he has, being man; and hence he thereby 
expresses the character of his species".14
Kant's view clearly is that actions caused by 
anything other than the adoption of maxims are not 
performed as the proper exercise of freedom. Ho actions 
wixicxi are the result of tue proper exercise of freedom 
are morally indifferent, ana this is so oecause they 
involve an attitude towards the law. This is a definite
11 R p. 16.
12 See Appendix 111
13 R p. 17.
14 R p. 17.
- 193 -
advance on the position in Gr.
"If now, this law does not determine a persona's 
will in the case of an action which has reference to the 
raw, an incentive contrary to it must influence his 
choice; and since by hypothesis this can only happen 
when a man adopts this incentive ^and thereby the 
deviation from the mor .1 law; into his maxim ^in wnich 
case he is an evil man; it follows th t his disposition 
in respect to the moral law is never indifferent, neither 
good nor evil’1.
The next stage of the Kantian argument centres on 
tne concept of GBSlNHUHOr. He defines disposition in
these terms:   the ultimate subjectiv. ground of
the adoption of maxims", which, he continues, can be 
one only and ap:lies universally to the whole use of 
freedom. Yet this disposition itself mu^t nave been 
adopted by free choice, for otherwise it could not oe 
imputed".15
Kant argues that man has an innate disposition to 
neither good nor evil, in the sense of something he did 
not choose in time. He is not teaching the total 
depravity of man, but is quite emphatic th t tnere is a
15 Hoxe: ii p. 17 footnote: ’That the ultimate
subjective ground of the adoption of moral maxims is 
inscrutable is indeed already evident from this that since 
this adoption is free, its ground (why lor example I have 
chosen an evil and not a good maximj must not be sought 
in any natural impulse, but always in a maxim. How since 
this maxim also must he ve its ground, and since apart from 
maxims no aetermining ground of free choice can or ought 
to be adduced, we are referred bacx endlessly in the series 
of suQjective determining grounds, without even being 
able to reach the ultimate ground".
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susceptibility to good in man. Such is human nature.16
Kant appears to see man, not as a being progressing 
from a condition in which he is evil to one in which he 
is goou, but rather as one w o acts from mixed motives, 
and who must learn and re-leirn his priorities, and who 
can within time choose to honour duty as he ought.
This is clearly a different position from the basic view 
in G, that only mo al actions were free actions.
xvant introduces the idea of an original predisposition 
to Oood in human nature, 1® but speaks of a propensity to 
evil 19 in human nature. That he introduces both is 
important for his new understanding of fieedom, but before 
dealing with this, it is best to be clear as to exactly 
what he says about both these notions, and the precise 
conclusions he draws from them. This of course means a 
precise definition of his doctrine of radical evil.
The original predisposition to good is part of the
16 "....  by 'nature of man' we here intend only the
subjective round of the exercise funder objective moral 
laws; of man's freedom in general; this ground - whatever 
its character - is the necessary antecedent of every act 
apparent to the senses • R p. lo.
^  Clement o . ».ebb want's >hiIosouhy oi Religion (OUP 
1 9 ^6 ; " 1 have already called attention in a different
connection to this feature of Kant's ethical doctrine; for 
it is this sharp op osition of ood and evil, this division 
of the field between them that indisposes him to conceive 
of moral improvement as a gradual passage from worse to 
better, and makes him see a truer conce tiori of it in such 
a notion of coi.version as must have been familiar to him 
from hie pietistic training, than the establishment of a 
harmonious mean, as suggested in Aristotle's ethics”• p. 95.
lb der ursprtlnglichen Anlage zum uuten in der menscnlichen 
hatur.
19 der Range B£3a in der menschlichen Katar.
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'decided character1 or determined destiny of m a n / ' He 
detects three elements of lesinnumc. first, there is 
animality , 2 1 whicn regards man purely as a living being 
with social impulses and instincts to procreate and 
preserve himself. These impulses can give rise to awful 
vices like gluttony, lawlessness and lasciviousness.
secondly, there is the predisposition to humanity . 2 2  
In this context man is viewed as a rational being, who 
may juage himself to be haj;py or unhappy when he compares 
himself with others. The desire to be equal with others 
c n give rise, when 'emitted to go to excess, to 
jealously and rivalry ana the vices of culture.
The third element of predisposition is to 
ereonamity,-' which hant says is "the capacity for 
respect for the moral law as in itself a sufficient 
incentive of the will. This capacity xor simple respect 
for the moral law within us would tnus be moral feeling 
which in and through itself does not constitute an end 
of the natural predisposition except in so far as it is 
the motivating force of the will. Jince this is possible 
only when the free will incorporates such moral feeling 
into its maxims, the property of such a will is good 
character".^4
Considered in terms of their possibility, the first 
oi these dispositions requires no rationality, the 
second is based upon practical reason, but subservient 
to other incentives while "the third alone is rooted in 
reason which is practical of itself, that is reason




24 R p. 2 3 .
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which dictates laws unconditionally .......  25 He also
adds, concerning the dispositions, that "they are original, 
for they are bound up with the possibility of human 
nature11.25
saving ceiined nan&e ( ropensio;, mnt speaks of 
the propensity to evil in human nature in this way: "Here 
however, we are speaking only of the propensity to genuine, 
that is, moral evil; for such evil is possible only as a 
determination of the free will, and since the will can be 
appraised as gooa or evil, only by means of its maxims, 
this propensity to evii must consist in the subjective 
Oroixnd of the possibility of the deviation of the maxima 
lrorn the moral law*.2 /
He outlines three distinct degrees in the cajjacity 
for evil. He speaks first of a "weakness ol the human 
heart in the general observance of adopted maxims, or in 
otner words ti.e Jrailty of human nature". He explains
f r .iliti j 2 b j_n this way: "....  1 ado; t the good (the
law; into the maxim of my will, but this good, which 
objectively, in its ideal conception (in thesis; is an 
irresistible incentive, is subjectively (in hypothesi) 
when the maxim is to be followed, the weaker (in comparison
with the inclination)".29
25 h p. 23.
R p. ^3-^4 . "... the subjective Oround of the
possioility of n inclination (habitual craving, 
concupiscentia) so far as mankind in general is liable to 
it. ii propensity is distinguished from a redisposition 
by the fact that although it can indeed be innate, it ought 
not to be represented merely thus: for it can also be 
regarued as having been acquired (if it is good) or brought 
upon himself (if it is evii)".
i-7 A p. 2 4 .
2 b Gebrechen lichkeit
R p. 24-25.
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secondly, nant speaks of impurity , 2 0 and i m p u r i t a s  
is defined as "the propensity for mixing unmoral with 
moral motivating causes (when it is with good intent and 
under maxims of good) " . 5 1  The will which i s  motivated 
by impurity stands in need of incentives other than duty, 
in order to perform what duty demands. "fictions called 
for by duty are done not purely for duty's sake"52 
of course, tne moral assessment of an action depends not 
upon whether tne agent did his duty, but whether he did 
so for any other motivating cause t .an merely obedience 
to the imperative of duty.
The third degree Kant speaxs of i s  that of wickedness,5 3  
and this is defined as ''the propensity to adopt evil 
maxims1’. Kant elaborates this definition in the following 
teims: "the propensity of the will to maxims which
neglect the incentives springing from the .oral law in
favour of others which are not moral ....  it reverses
the ethical order (or priority; among the incentives of 
a free will; and although conduct which is lawfully good 
(i.e. legal) may be found with it, yet the cast of mind 
is thereoy corrupted at its root ( o  far as the moral 
disposition is concerned) and the man is hence designated 
as evil".-4
As t o  t h e  o r i g i n  of t h i s  p r o p e n s i t y  t o  evil, K a n t
says that ....  a propensity to evil can only inhere in
tne moral capacity of the will, nut nothing i s  morally 
evil ( i . e .  capable of being imputed*) but that which i s  our
3u Unlauterkeit
21 d p. 25.
22 f i  p . 25 .
23 Btteartigkeit.
34 u p. 25.
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own act".-^ 5 However, "by the concept of propensity, he 
states "we understand a subjective determining ground of 
the will which precedes all acts ana which therefore is 
itself not an act".26
xiie apparent difficulty Kant faces here is resolved 
when he distinguishes between two senses of the term "act". 
The distinction is defended by refe ence to the distinction 
between fhenomena and Houmena. This distinction is 
important for his final statement of the doctrine of 
radical innate evil.
The tejm act can mean the exercise of freedom in 
general by which the supreme maxim (in harmony with tne 
law or contrary to it)57 is adopted by the will. "This 
is an intelligiole action, cognizable by means of pure 
reason alone, apait from every sensible condition1'. 58 qn 
t.is sense oi the term act, the propensity to evil is an 
act, out also tne "ground of ^11 unlawful conduct in the 
second sense".29 That is to say that "act" in the second 
sense of "the exercise of freedom whereby the actions 
themselves (considered mateiially i.e. with reference to 
the objects of volition/ are performed in accordance 
with that maxim. This is a violation of the law, and is 
really a vice (peccatum derivatum) and is i sensible 
action, empirical, given in time -  a "factum p h a e n o m e n o n " .40
25 & p. pb.
3b R p. *b.
57 Hote here a^ain that ^ant departs from the position 
in G that only the adoption of maxims in conformity to the 
law can be regarded as the exercise of freedom.
38 n p . *b-27.
39 n p. *6.
40 R p. 27.
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i ivin: drawn this distinction betwee . ci i;'i the 
sense of adopting a supreme maxi i, which is n intelligible 
act, 1 *nd act ir* the sense of do. tin^ , ua ims of action 
in th prod.ess of living, which is th other sense, 
i ely sensible as disti: ct froi. intelligible, Kant is 
able to reach the following import ait cone usion: "In 
view of what has been saij above, the T reposition, Man 
is evil, can mean only, he ia corcci *us oi the moral law,
Lut has nevertheless dopted into his aa. i. s the 
Voccasional/ deviation. He it evil by lature me. nc this, 
that ev_i can be predicated ol man s a s eeies; not thu.t 
iucl a lity can be inferred iijrn t e concept of his 
siecies (that is, oi man in general; for then it wo^ld 
be necessary; but rather t. t fro what we know of man 
through experience we cannoi judge otherwise of him, or 
ti t we may preruprose evil to be subjectively necessary 
to ever. t*'n, even the b ct. How this ro ensit must 
itself be considered as morally evil, yet not is a
tur i predisposition but rather as somet inj th t can 
Le imnuted to man, and consequentl it niu.t consist in 
maxims of the will which are contrary to the law".
.ant's own words ire tne best ecu.maiy oi his 
position: "further, for th* cake ci freedom, these
...a *i.:s must in themselves be considered contingent, a 
circumstance which on the other h no will rot tally with 
the universality of this evil unless the ultimate subjective 
ground of all maximc somehow or other is entwined witn
41 *he ument here should be compared in detail with 
the argument in ur based on the same distinction.
R p. 27.
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and as it were, rooted in humanity itself. Hence we 
call this a natui il ropensity to evil, anf as we must, 
after all, ever hold man himself responsible for it, we 
can further call it a radical innate evil in human nature, 
(yet none the less brought U]on us by o u r s e l v e s ) 43 The 
ground of this evil in man, ..ant conduces, lies in
reversing the moral oruer of the incentives when he
adoits them into his m a x i m s . 44
i ant reaches this conclusion by arguing that the 
ground of this evil cannot be located in nan's sensuous 
nature, since he is not responsible for this. Nor can 
it ue located in a corruption of the moral legislative 
reason, ior reason cannot destroj tne authority of the 
law which it makes.45 These two points merit further 
consideration, man's sensuous nature ca not be the 
ground oi radical innate evil, since man would then not 
be responsible for the ground of nis actions or adoption 
of maxims. Heith.r however can man be exempt in any way
from the law, since to conceive of oneself as a freely
acting being and yet exempt from the law which is 
appropriate to such a being (the moral law; would be 
tantamount to conceiving a cause operating witnout any 
laws whatsoever (for determination according to natural 
laws is excluded irom the fact ol freedom/ this is a 
self contradiction1’.4b a  reason exempt from the moral
43 R p. 27.
44 R p. 31.
"when the incentives which can sprin irom freedom are 
taken away, man is reduced to a merely animal being".
R  p . 5 .
46 R p. 30.
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law is not possible, because man cannot repudiate the 
law* The subject would become devilish being were this 
possible, and this is, he claims, not a proper description 
of man.
ne then sa^s that: "even if the existence of this 
ropensity to evii in human nata e can be demonstrated 
by experiential proofs of the real opposition, in time, 
m *3 will to the law, suci proofs do not teach us 
the essential character of that propensity or the ground 
of this o osition. Rather because this character concerns 
a relation of his will, which is free (and the concert of 
w m c h  is therefore not empirical) to the moral law as an 
incentive (the concept of which likewise is purely 
intellectual; it must be apprehended a priori through tne 
conoti, t of evil, so far as evil is possible under the laws 
of freedom (of obligation and accountability ..... " 47
i*»an does not repudiate the law, because the moral 
law forces itself upon him by virtue of the moral predis­
position in all men. were tnere no other incentives 
working against the law, he would adoot it as his maxim 
to determine the will, simply because men cannot repudiate 
it.48 However, the incentives of the sensuous nature 
play a part also in determining his will. Normally and 
n turally, man adopts both into his maxims, either 
would be adequate on its own, an ii he acted on either 
alone, he would be either morally good simpliciter or
47 R p. 30.
48 Aant is emphatic that man caunot repudiate the law.
Ly this he means that it is impossible for the human will 
l o  be used diabolically. This is a questionable assertion.
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morally evil, e^mpliciter. But he does ado*t both, and 
therefore the difference between the maxims amounts to 
the incentives in them (their content;. Therefore the 
difference between the moral and the non-moral lies in 
the subordination of the one to the other. In other 
words, a non-moral maxim is one in which the moral order 
of the incentives has been reversed, and this Lant claims,
men do habitually. "Now if a propensity to this ......
does lii in human nature, there is in m m  a natural 
propensity to evil; and since this very propensity must 
in the end be sought in a will which is free, and can 
therefore be imputed, it is morally evil. This evil is 
radical, because it corrupts the ground of all maxims; 
it is moreover, as a natural propensity, inextirpabie 
bj human owers, since extirpation could only occur 
through good maxims, and cannot take place when the 
ultimate subjective ground of all maxims is postulated 
as corru t; yet at the same time it must be yossible to 
overcome it, since it is found in man, a being whose 
actions re free”.49
In these terms, imnt defines the conee t^ of the
radical innate evil of human nature. ,e considers also
the question of the origin as distinct from the ground
of this evil, and answers with the one word Inscrutables
"The r taonal origin of this perversion of our will,
supremewhereby it makes lower incentivesA among its uiaxims, that 
is, of the propensity to evil, remains inscrutable to 
u s  " 50
, This inscrutability is not a convenient escape route,
but like ill oi Kant’s statements, reached by reasoning
49 £ p. 32.
£ p. 3o.
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that "because this propensity itself must be set dov/n to 
our account, and because as a result, that ultimate ground 
of all maxims would involve the adoption of an evil maxim 
(as its basis;, nvil could have sprung only from the 
moral-evil (not from mere limitations of our nature); 
and yet the original predisposition (which no one other 
than man himself could have corrupted, if he is to be held 
responsible for tnic corruption) is a predisposition to 
good; then there is no conceivable grounu from which the 
moral evil in us could have originally come".^
Therefore he concludes that "in the search for the 
rational origin ^  of evil actions, every such action 
muet be regarded as though the individual had fallen 
into it directly from a state of innocence".^3
by saying that each action of evil must be regarded 
as a direct fall from innocence, Kant is s , ing that man
51 K p. 3b.
Tne concept of origin is defined thue: 'the derivation 
of an effect from its first cause, that is from the cause 
which is not in t^rn the efiect of another cause of the 
same kind . Ii p. 35- Therefore, since no evil action can 
be considered a3 in any way determined b^ its antecedents 
without prejudicing its character as a free act, the idea 
of seeking an origin in time for evil acts is impossible. 
Kant therefore rejects the idea of inherited evil in man’s
character; because "It is a contradiction to seek the
temporal origin of man’s character, so far as it is con­
sidered as contingent, since this character signifies the 
ground of the exercise of freedom; this ground (lixe the 
determining ground of the free will generally, must be 
sought in purely rational representations” R p. 39. Kant 
claims also that even the Genesis narrative of the origin 
o_ evil places it not in man himself, but in a "spirit of
an originally loftier destiny" h .39.
^2 ix p. 3o.
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is not basically corrupt, and that each time an evil 
action is performed, he has a duty not to do so again,
:nd to commence the process of moral improvement. While 
the origin of our moral perversity to reverse the order 
of the incentives in our maxims is i, ccrutable, we have 
the duty to undergo a moral conversion which will lead 
us to adopt the i*axim of the law as the supreme determining 
ground of adoption of all other maxims v.hich influence 
our willing.
There are man^ specific oirits which . u.d merit 
sep rate and careful treatment: for example, .ant's 
notion of 'inscrutability1, his refusal to seek a temporal 
origin for evil acts, the ^uestion of whether or not 
reversal of tne order of incentives affects the quality 
Of the act in te ms of its effect, and the notion of the 
'meta-decision1 required to complete our moral conversion, 
nowever, the purpose of this discussion of I ant's notion 
of radical evil is to discover its implication for his 
doctrine of freedom, nmil L. T'ackenheim is the first 
critic to wnom 1 would refer in this connection.
In an essay commemorating the 130th annivers ;ry of 
tn*..- death of Kant, he fastens on to the f ct tnat Kant 
cnanged. his viewn in order to improve upon his doctrine 
of freedom. He says: "want's shift to radical evil is 
made for a strictly phiioso K i i o a l  reason; and this 
reason is, strangely enough, the neeu to ive a full and 
adequate justification of moral lreedoin" .54 in 
elucidating the nature of this need he sa^s: "isant 
became gradually convinced that moral freedom can have
Universit of Toronto duarterl., Vol. 23 (1934) 
p . „ 39-553 ■ . ant and Radical nvil1* p. 340.
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no other meaning than the freedom to choose between good 
and evil and he finds it necessary to introduce the 
doctrine of radical evil so as to make freedom, in this 
sense intelligible".55
iacivenheim makes tne criticism that there is in 
Kant a iunuamental ambivalence in his exposition of 
numan freedom, an ambiguity which really amounts to two 
toutlines of freedom. he cnaracterises them In this 
waj : "According to tne one, man is free in the degree to 
which he is determined by the mor 1 principle; according 
to the otner, he is free to choose good or e v i l " . 5° 
rackenheim takes the view that the first idea takes 
redominance in Kant's earlier ethical writings, and 
that the second is explicitly embraced in the essay on 
radical evil. A s  suggested earlier, the.e is an advance 
in h upon the doctrine of freedom as ex ounded in G 
which contains the view tnat the will which acts in 
accordance with the moral law is the only will which acts 
under freedom. In his earlier writings, ant makes the
explicit assimilation that ’....  a free will and a will
subject to mor .1 laws are one and tne came thing".57
if this earlier position is carried to its logical 
^onc-i.usions, it implies that the will c m  be self­
determining in one way only, namely in obedience to the 
moral law. aj y otner form of determination is not self-
55 university of Toronto Quarterly V o l . <_3 (1554; p. 335- 
353~ " a n t  and Radical 3viTw I 340.
Fackenheim op. cit. p. 343*
57 Ab "fundamental Principles of the i-iet physic of 
Korals" . 66
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determination, but determination by some object of 
inclination, and tnerefore not a free act. 'ackenheim 
claims that aant saw the impossible difficulty w.ich this 
raised and that he wrote the eQsay on radical evil in an 
attempt to solve it. He goes as far as to say that Kant 
abandoned the doctrine of freedom as he stated it in G.
He argues that "....  this account of moral freedom is
open to so grave an objection that nant in the essay on 
radical evil, abandons it. For the account is compelled 
to deny that there can oe such a thing as an evil will. 
AlonB witn the evil will, it must deny evil itself. And 
in denying both, it cannot justify moral responsibilities 
for mor .1 evil**.58
The criticism of the earlier doctrine of freedom 
is both valid and understandable. A person of weak will 
who yields to inclination ratner th n obeys the moral 
law is yielding ana not willing, and therefore since it 
is not a free action, he is technically not responsible.
^n order to be free and responsible, man ust have the 
right to choose not merely between either willing the 
good, which in G is the only expression of freedom, or 
not willing at all, but between 6ood and evil alternatives. 
**e must be able to choose freely against thu moral law, 
ind be responsible for doing so in order to make his 
cnoice for the law equally responsible.
neaving for the moment Fackenneim*s criticism of 
nant at this level, useful reference may be made to a 
similar criticism made by John R. ^ilber (in an intro­
ductory assay to the Hudson and ureene ndition of R)59.
Fackenheim o . cit. p. 345.
John K. ^ilber: R p. ixxix - cxxxxiv "The Ethical
significance of nant's Religion".
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In that essay, Silber discusses basically the same 
problem in different terms, and by a different route of 
analysis, subtly reaches the same point* Silber discusses 
the question which Kant had to face, of whether or not 
human beings can misuse their freedom* He argues that 
Kant reached his new position in this way: "Dissatisfied 
with Plato's cavalier rejection of man's experience of ,
0 n r 4  tvM h  i \ l (  exw^rMpK lo  m o r vs| old,rys\~ ,or\moral obligation/to a hypothetical imperative subservient 
to a Divine decree, Kant tried to explain categorical 
moral obligation in such a way as to make it consistent 
with the Christian insight into the dark and irrational 
depths of human nature, and, simultaneously with Platonic 
confidence that freedom and obligation are ultimately 
grounded in freedom".^0
He continues: "Kant was aware that his earlier
attempt in the Groundwork to explain how the categorical 
imperative is possible was a failure because his compre­
hension of freedom and the will was too fragmentary" • ^
While there are differences in their individual views 
on the nature of the doctrine of freedom in Kant's earlier 
writings, they are in agreement over the fact that in 
his earlier work, Kant does not solve the problem of the 
man who chooses against the moral law being able to claim 
that he is acting neither responsibly nor freely*
60 Silber R p. lxxxi
Silber distinguishes between phases of the doctrine 
in earlier writings whereas Fackenheim assumes a uniform 
view of freedom in the earlier writings* This is a 
separate problem of Aantexegesis, but the contrast 
between G and R upon which they are ostensibly agreed 
is the only matter of concern here*
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Lilber poses the problem by attacking ] ant's 
distinction between autonomy and heteronomy, and argues 
that ioant's distinction in G between the autonomous will 
and the heteronomous will will not solve the problem, 
kant, he claims, has to face the fact that heteronomy
a mode of freedom also. This is the corollary to the 
. oint which Fackenheim n.ade when he said th .1 a will which 
was free only when it obeyed the moral law could never 
be responsible.
"On the oasis of his insight that heteronomy is a 
mode of freedom and that the will is both practical reason 
and the faculty of desire, kant could account for the 
will's being torn between the moral 1 iw and its natural 
ueslres' .
~iiber summarises his conclusions in these terms:
" ant's theoretical advance beyond lato i.h the under­
standing of freedom is now apparent, like X Jit, xlato 
identified freedom with rationality. Unlike Kant, however, 
^lato understood reason only m  »its honorific meaning. 
Anything that was not in accord with the fulfillment of 
reason as a canon, as the static form o the good, was 
non-rational, determined either by non-rational desires 
or no:i-rational spirit or blind necessity but not by the
hilber R p. lxxxv The next stage for silber is a 
discussion of the problem from the vi^w that the moral 
law is part of the structure of human peisonulity. He 
argues irom the keta. h.\sics of morals U ,B . 275) tnat 
kant identifies personality and responsibility when he 
say a tn t "a person is the subject whcse actions are 
capable of imputation". Therefore, by obedience to the 
moral law, man affirms his real self, and this is rational 
action. Heteronomous action, on the otner hand, is the 
negation of freedom, and therefore the denial of self.
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misuse <x reason i t s e l f ...........” ^3 Bz t recognised
this li jitation of the Platonic view and so he defined 
freedom and reason as spontaneity and pointed to 
rationality and autonomy as fulfilled and to irrationality 
nd hiteronomy as deficient modes of i ws ex ression. It 
was because the irrationality of rejection was itself an 
expression of some aspect of the rational that Kant 
developed tne idea, (accordin to kfiber, that the moral 
law is part of the structure of human ersonality.
Allowing for the different manner of approach to the 
problem in each case, both rackenheim and silber argue 
together that rant’s doctrine of freedom in R marks an 
advance on his earlier position in G, and that this 
advance took place to give an account of freedom which 
makes freedom a genuine choice between joou and evil.
1 suggested earlier tnat by introducing the problem 
01 evil, kant broadened his conception of freedom, and 
from there necessarily expanded the view of faith 
implicit in the KPV. Both Fackenheim and -fiber offer 
proof of the first part of that argument. However, 
before the matter may be left, cert in questions must 
be faced before the implications which this new view of 
freedom has for faith, may be examined, noes kant have 
two distinct doctrines of freedom, supported on separate 
gxounds, anu quite inconsistently irreconcilable? Did 
he see tne iapossibility of his position in G and merely 
reject it in favour of the doctrine contained in R?
This problem is important for two reisons. It C j I I s  
in question the earlier relationshi I sketched between 
G and R as part of the Critical piogramue. Secondly, if
Lflber n p. xcii-xciii
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Kant maintains freedom on grounds distinct, in principle, 
from those earlier expressed, then perhaps the faith of 
H is irrelevant for the assessment of the position of 
faith within the Critic.. 1 framework. In other words, is 
tho n^w doctrine of ireedom consistent or inconsistent 
with the canons of the critical philosophy‘i
Consider first the antinomy of freedom and necessity 
as stated in C. Kant argues that the concept of freedom 
is not a concept of ex erience, since it still holds - 
although experience appears to prove the opposite, But 
in txic interests of empirical science, it is necessary 
that everything which oceans should be determined in 
accordance with the laws of nature. This is a dialectic 
of reason, since for the purpose of speculative reason, 
causal necessity must be affirmed, while for the purposes 
of action, freedom is necessary. Therefore since reason 
cannot afford to surrender either, it must be proved 
that freedom and necessity in the senses defined are not 
onl^ compatible but necessarily concomitant in experience.
This Kant achieves by introducing tne distinction of 
sensible and intelligible, the distinction between the 
realms of jftoamena and Phenomena. Considered as a member 
of the intelligible order (the noumenal; man is a free 
rational being. Considered as a member of the sensible 
i,intelligible order; man’s actions may be seen as part 
of a causal nexus. Therefore as a member of the 
intelligible world, man acts under laws of nature 
^heteronomously), while as a member of the intelligible 
order he acts under the laws of freedom, vi-e. the laws 
oi reason (autonomously;.
The whole argument here depends, as does the entire
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success of the critical programme on the distinction 
between -heiiomena and noumena. In this way, Kant 
establishes freedom in G.
in contrast to tais position, xl tries to express
as free acts, those which before were accepted as part
of a causal process. I thin* it is lair to say with
ihesilber that ant saw tne weakness of^position in G, and 
therefore attempted to face the problem of evil. I am 
not persuaded, however, with Fackenheim that we have two 
entirely separate accounts of freedom. Prima facie, we 
may have, but closer inspection shows that they may be 
reconciled and that the latter is merely an expansion 
of the insights of the former, because ultimately they 
rest on the same grounds.
:want's analysis in G stands unaffected, because it 
concerns the analysis of the good will, the ideally 
perfect will, whicn does not exist, except ideally. He 
is discussing tne ideal, and not a concrete instance of 
human willing. This might be justified by saying that 
in j perfect world, if everyone obeyed the moral law, 
and someone deviated, they would have acted non freely 
but under some external incentive. However, iuint did 
recognise that people choose against the moral law, and 
are able freely to choose so. Therefore, these must be 
free acts, and must be explained.
Kant’s explanation depends again upon the distinction 
between phenomena and noumena. First he introduces the 
concej t of ^osinnung. the ultimate subjective ground for 
tne adoption of maxims. Ran nas such a G^cinnmu; for 
goou. ne also has a possibility in him of deviating from 
the maxims of the moral law, and the suojective ground of
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this is a propensity to evil. *hile men have a 
disposition for good, they also have a propensity to 
evil. If-iL means that considered as members of an 
intelligible order, they nave made as a Oround of their 
will, the ‘ossibilily of reversinw the moral order of 
the incentives which are adopted into their maxims. This 
means tnat man is capaDie of acting with mora^ incentives 
comin^ first in his maxims, or of acting with moral in­
centives being suoordinated to considerations of self- 
inter st. Therefore what before was heteronomous action 
m.j now be considered as free act on; considered as 
noumenal action. uint is recognising the oint, and by 
this Le ms, enshrining within sis system the simple fact 
that people can ariu do often act from a vaiiety of 
motives. They may do what is right, but in different 
circumstances do so foi other than purely ethical reasons. 
Therefore freedom to choose good or evil is open to men 
bj virtue of the fact that they h ve a pro ensity to do 
so, one w.*iCx* belongs to them, considered is intelligible 
agents. Unlawful conduct is of course, causally determined 
within the processes of the sensible world.
This can be reconciled with the kiV view, and so far 
as G is concerned, ±t is merely an expansion of tne
D oi freedom the actioi of man considered as part 
of n intelligible order. Man’s radical evil lies in 
the fact that since his underlying maxim .Hows for 
deviation from the law by reversing the ordei of incentives, 
then it is technically, an evil prcpensit. . ..ant has 
thus proved that evil is innate and radical. - the property 
of ^11 men, and yet they aru still totally responsible 
lor it each time an evil act is co*. itted. The main
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difference this theory makes in contrast to the former 
is that Kant makes the exercise of freedom, the freedom 
to order motives in our maxim of action. This leaves 
freedom defined as being in the noumenal order.
One problem which Kanx does have to faoe in this 
context is that of how the individual succeeds in 
reforming himself morally. How can an empirical act, 
an act in the phenomenal realm restore goodness in a 
corrupted condition which exists in the intelligible 
oider? If tne ground of evil actions is located in the 
intelligible realm, how can this be reversed? Kant 
however says that "•••.. if" a man reverses by a single 
unchangeable decision^that highest ground of his maxims 
whereby he was an evil man, (and thus puts on the new 
many, he is, so far as his principle and cast of mind are 
concerned, a subject susceptible to goodness, but only 
l?i continuous labour and growth is he a good man” .
He argues that we have a duty to change our evil 
cast of mind and therefore, we axe able to do so, since 
'ought implies can'• This idea of an inexplicable 
decision to become moral which Kant claims that men must 
make, is perhaps the least convincing part of his argument. 
Certainly it is neither easy to understand not to accept. 
The problem of how an empirical decision, a decision 
taken in tne phenomenal realm can afioct the ground of 
maxims in the noumenal realm seems intractable . *ant 
would have been better to have stopped short, and been 
optimistic about moral improvement at the level of 
isolated actions, perhaps because of a decision by the 
moral agent to try to be moral. But the propensity
64 H p. 43.
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ca. not be wiped out. If however it is self-determined, 
then the individual can choose not to act on his 
propensity. j.o say more than this is to weaken the 
osition gained.
therefore I would suggest that ..ant’.. doctrine of 
freeuom in R is not fundamentally in contradiction with 
the tioctrine of freedom in u. Ihe former may be 
integrated into the insights of the latter. The doctrine 
of freedom in R, while certain questions emerge from it, 
may be permitted to stand as on the grounds of the basic 
critical philosophy con ept of the "Ding-an-Sich"•
Therefore it is related to the original cliim by Kant to 
have made room for faith. Now we must examine the form 
of faith implied in this moral freedom.
In what way does this enlarged doctrine of freedom 
affect ant's conception of the nature of the faith for 
wnich he had made roomV In the PV, faith is the way 
In which we have knowledge of, and an anuerstanding of, 
the iostulatee 01 rure Practical reason. laith is 
synonymous with pract cal knowledge. It is epistemic.
In k, if first the conce tion of xelation between morality 
and religion from the Preface to the 1973 edition of R is 
taken along with the ianlieation of tn^ , view that man may 
freely choose good or evil, then ciearlj, faith becomes 
. ore than just the epistemic one of holding certain 
postulates, faith becomes relate^, if it is implied in 
moral willing to possible consequences of action, and 
therefore to tne problems surrounding human conduct.
1 snail now attempt to summarise the lull significance 
oi xant's use of the terms rational and moral as applied
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to his concept of faith, indicating the advance made 
by on his earlier position in each case.
iaking the turm rational first, t ant cl ims that 
wnile faith cioes not yield knowledge of the supersensible, 
it is rational. In a letter to uavater, he claimed:
"anyone can be convinced of the correctness and necessity 
of mor^l f ith, once it is made clear to him”. inis 
muiot surely be the ultimate confident expression of the 
cljirn to rationality. In It, this rationality is extended 
to include also the insights of Christianity.
In distinguishing between natural and xevealed 
religion, he claims that natural religion is based upon 
itsel.. Revealed religion is subjective in that the 
revelation upon which it.is based has a subjective appeal. 
If the revelation is vilid, (i.e. it can be shown to be 
true for all men) then the revelation itself ceases to 
be cruci 1 in its significance, anu men can ^rasp by 
reason, the truth tney first experienced through
revelation: ".....  the occurrence of sucii a supernatural
revelation flight subsequently be entirely forgotten 
without the slightest loss to that religion either of its 
comprehensibility or oi certainty or of oower over human 
hearts1’.00
kant claimed th^t men ought to, ana therefore can, 
discover the truth for themselves, out that a historical 
revelation might be of assistance to them. Applied to 
Christianity, he argues that as a Is rned faith, it 
relies upon history, and is therefore not a free frith 
which may be deduced from adequate insight into tneoretical
u . fal.
Db it p. 144.
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proofs. Jut he claims also that Christimity may be 
taught and spoken of so that it appeals to man’s reason, 
this means that it can be built upon the concepts of
reason, but "....  from the point where the hristian
teaching is built not upon the bare concepts of reason, 
but upon facts, it is no longer merely the Cnristian 
ieli ion, but the Christian faith which has been made 
tne basis of a Church".
It should be rioted in passin, that ha. t tends to 
.speak of pure rational faith in his earlier references 
to faith, but the faith concerned is faith in a rational 
reli ion - the religion of reason. This religion of 
reason has certain historical approximations, called 
ohurcnly faiths, and therefore the two usages of faith 
should be careiully distinguished.
Lhristi nity may be taught as 11 . ulicita. a 
faith whose content ma^ be elicited from the concepts of 
reason as agrinst a fides historice elicita. a faith 
which may be elicited from a historic 1 revelation. These 
both st .nd in contrast to a fides i erata - a faith based 
upon some authority, external to reason.
” ....  recognition and respect must ue accorded in
Christ! n aogmatic to universal human reason as the 
supremely cOiiuiiandin^ principle in a natural religion, 
and the revealed doctrine, upon which a Church is founded 
and which stands in need of the learneu as interpreters 
and conservers must be cherished and cultivated as merely 
a eans, but a most precious means of making this doctrine 
comprehensible, even to the ignorant, as well as widely 
difiused and permanent11.
6 7 R p. 151. 
o;- R p. 152-153.
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At an earlier stage in hie argument, while describing 
the Church as universal,^9 Kant argued that there was a 
universal foundation which could rationally justify the 
need for religious faith - namely mcr lity.
The rationality of Kaat'a faith la,y i- this, th ■ he 
cl imeu that it could be derived ironi the concepts of 
ibaeou ^in its radical employmentj , and that men could 
discover it for themselves. Through moral exp.rience, 
he was attempting to close the gai between reason ^nd 
faith, while maintaining the gap between faith and 
knowledge. Towards the end of R, c oxfers a concise 
ana a masterly summary of the meaning of the essential 
rationality oi his religious f ith. This rationality 
i^ derived from the fact that the mor^l lav. is what gives 
rise to faith.
"There exists meanwhile a practic. i knowledge which 
while restin^ solely upon reason and re uiring no 
historical doctrine, lies ~s closely to every man, even 
the most simple, as though it were engraved upon his 
heart - Law wnioh we need but name to find ourselves 
at once in agreement with everyone else re^arai^ its 
authority and which carries with it in everyone’s 
consciousness unconditioned binding lorce, to wit, the 
law of morality, what is more, this knowledge either 
leads, alone and of itself to belief in G-Owt, or at least 
determines the concept of ixim as t: t Of a moral Legislator 
hence it uides us to a pure religious faith which not 
only can be comprehended by every man, but Iso is in the 
highest degr.e wortny of respect. Yea it le ds thither 
so naturally that if we care to t ry tne extvriment, we
H p .  9 3 .
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sh 11 find that it can be elieite, in its completeness 
from anyone without his over having been instructed in 
it J  -
This statement so suffused with ^ocratic confidence, 
emphasises two points. First, ft emphasises that it is 
fhe concept of morality Which ,».eads to the concept of the 
jral Legislator of the Universe. Arid because morality 
is universal, all men should be able lo see, by means of 
reason, the need to believe in dod as I.oral legislator 
of the Universe. In the light of this, men will be able 
to see fox' tnemselveo that obedience to the demands of 
duty is the ultimate form of respect for dod, the author 
of the moral law. Kant claims that it would be possible 
to elicit from anyone, the nature of pure religious 
laith, without ever having to give aiij instruction in 
its concept. This part of his argument rests firmly 
upon Cr, and from the position that fro*. th„ concept of 
a categorical imperative, its content may be inferred. 
uiven tnis, and the authority of the moral Law which 
belongs to it, then logically and inevitabl, , in the 
manner in which lant argues, morality leads to religion, 
in this consists the rationality of his religious f°ith.
Ihe second point which the statement underlines 
with regard to the r tionality of want’s faith is that 
it is practical reason which .f fords the ossibility of 
this species of proof of its postulates - i.e. reason 
in its practical employment. while tne roofs are not 
v aid for speculative reason, they re v^lid for the 
purposes of morality. This means again that want's faith 
is grounded in reason.
70 R p. 169.
Gr p. 8b line 4*0-411.
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The second adjective which Kant applied to his 
faith is the term moral. It is in the manner in which 
he uses this term that the advance in R upon his position 
may best be seen. There are thre, distinct ways in which 
want's faith may be characterised as moral faith. The 
first of these may be detected in the AxV. The other two 
are the proper consequences of his enlarged doctrine of 
freedom.
The first reason offered by i ant for describing hie 
laith as moral ha^ already been explained. It is that 
his faitn arises inevitably out of moral experience.
This is the term faith as meaning tne erist nnc mode in 
which the postulates of pure reason are held. Belief in 
these is rationally demanaed because it arises out of 
moral experience, and therefore his faith is simultaneously 
both rational and moral.
However, a second sense of the term moral which may 
be applied to Kant's faitn stems from tile f ct that human 
freedom means the freedom to choose between good and evil, 
which in turn becomes clear when once we as*. the question 
“what is the overall purpose of morality iiself in the 
designs of the moral Legislator?" The fact that man can 
choose between ood and evil means that he iw involved in 
a continual mor-1 struggle, and that he is aware of being 
involved in a conflict. lie ma./ perform his uuty to the 
detriment of his own personal interest, and therefore has 
some faith in the value of what he is uoing. In the KPV, 
this faith is stated in the form of a f itn in God as the 
moral uovernor who will after death, apportion the summum 
bonum to those who failed to receive it in t is life by 
virtue of theixlullallin^ the moral law to their own
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peisonal loss. This negative form of faith becomes 
transformed into a positive belief in the value of moral 
conduct as achieving what is befc ond our power and perhaps 
even beyond our imagination. The need for such a faith 
is wh t lies behind his question in the first preface 
to R: "shat is to result from this right conduct of
ours?” This question, as has been explained, asks
what is the overall end oi the tot ;lit, o^ moral actions
men are culled upon to perform?
In the same letter to navater uoted earlier, -.ant 
wrote: "by 'moral faith' 1 mean the unconditioned trust 
in Divine Aid, in achieving 11 the oo that, even with 
our most sincere efforts, lies beyond our power".72
by "Divine Aid to achieve the good w ich lies beyond
our power1*, he does not mean supernatur .1 assistance to
act morally. This would be a wrong interpretation for 
two reasons. First, from G "ought implies c n". secondly, 
from A, the idea of Means of Grace is rejected as 
^chwArmerei". Therefore, he means that in every act of 
moral willing, faith in the ultimate purpose and v.lue 
of moral action is implied, bac.- time a moral agent 
uoes what he conceives to be his aut^, he is expressing 
his faith in a moral Universe under a Koral Governor, and 
in his own duty as u means of achieving tne purpose of
72 a p. 4.
n p. cl. In the KU p. 14b, lines 4-t, the same 
point is made slightly differently: "Faith, in the plain
acceptation oi the term is a confidence of attaining a 
purpose the furtherance of which is a dutfc, , but whose 
achievement is a thing of which we jire un .bio to perceive 
tne possibility".
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that higher power. This makes faith optimistic as against 
bein^ merely epistemic, because faith is conceived of as 
possessing an element of hope. Its ho e is that it is 
assisting in an overall purpose by being part of victory 
in the struggle of good again t evil. The ultimate hope 
is in the victory of the good over the evil principle, 
nd the founding of a kingdom of God upon earth. The 
cleaning 01 this faith is developed in detail in Books 
111 and IV of R, and the analysis of the content belongs 
in connection with the question how ^ant1s faith b^ 
u e £ C - i b e a  as Christian?
The answer to the question 01 the nature of the 
l ith implied in willing is this - faith in the outcome 
of struggle between the good and the evil rinciple for 
su remacj over man, and faith that each moral act is 
helping the Moral governor of the Universe, to achieve 
his purposes in that struggle.
The t**ird sense in which Kant's faith is moral 
emerges from the second sense, and also from the 
rationality of his view of faith. It ia best expressed 
in xhe contrast between der reine eli ionsglaube (pure 
religious faith; and Churchly faiths.74 ^ure again, he 
makes reference to Christianity. He relates them in 
this way: "hure religious faith alone can found a
universal oh^rcn; for only sucu rational faith can be 
believed and shared b everyone; wnereas an historical 
faith, grounded solely on facts can extend its influence 
no further than tidings of it can reaah, subject to 
circumstances of time and place, and dependent upon such 
capacity to judge the credibility of such tidings. Yet
74 h  Book III.
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by reason of a peculiar weakness of human 12 tire pure 
faith can never be relied upon as much as it deserves, 
that is a Church cannot be established on it alone".75
The distinction is that pur. reli ;iou& faith is 
moral .nd is based upon reason. Therefore all men can 
1 ucognise it. Church faiths are b sea upon scriptures 
or traditions, and are expressed through visible 
int titutions.
ihe fact that visible institutions exist such as tne 
Churchly faiths of men is oecause men do not see that 
Religion is vsubjactively regarded; the recongition of 
ill duties as divine commands". They think that more 
is required. "It does not enter their heads that when 
they fulfil their duties to men (themselves and otners) 
they are, bu these vt.ry acts, performing eod's commands, 
ana that it is absolutely impossible to Lerve God more 
directly in any other way (since they can afiect anu 
nave influence upon earthly uei gs alone ana not upon
Goa  ......" 71 Because of such a la$k of discernment,
there arises "tne concept of a religion oi divine worship 
(Gotteadienstliche) instead of the coxicei t of a religion 
Iurelj moral".
uant is arguing that if the question 01 how God is 
to be honoured is to be answered in a way universally 
v -*±id for all men, then morality is the oni, 1m erative 
universally recoguisable. The rules and regulations of
75 R .94.
<° R p. 14c.
^7 . . 9 4 .
' . 9 4 .
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. particular church faiths may be acceptable to their 
adnerents or followers, as based upon some revelation or 
scriptural authority. However, they can never be regarded 
as authoritative or binding upon all men. The demands of 
duty in contrast, may be see., as universally authoritative. 
Therefore, rant proceeds to the logical limit of this 
line of thought and claims that 'whatever, over and above 
good life conduct, man fancies th t he c in do to become 
well pieasinw to God is mere religious illusion and 
pseudo-service of G o d " . '9 This is so because ■ . . . .  pure 
religious faith is concerned only with what constitutes 
the essence of reverence foi God, namely obedience, 
ensuing from the moral disposition to all auties as 
his comman is".c^
jure religious faith is moral then, in that its 
e pression is founi in li e lived in accordance with 
the moral demand. This happens because reli ion is 
u.n^erstood as duty seen as Divine command.
A strong argument in favour ol this view is th.t 
it is possible to criticise all historio traditions of 
I fro thi standpoint of a higher c. . of judgement, 
to which all may be equally subjected. This criterion 
c n claim the highest characteristic of universality, 
x. .nt states this by saying that all churchly faiths have 
as their 'iiig.est Interpret.r', ure religious faith.
He argues th. t all ecclesiastical structures have
79 R p .  1 5 & .  
h p. yt>.
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within them some form of religious dictatorship, and 
this gives t'.em their characteristic f U«*e a ohurchl^
U ...ths.
ohurch,. dominated by 'spiritual iat era* of aixy
loi'iii, whether one mi&ht suppose a pi el *te u hoiuin^ the
authority oA tradition, or a preacher affirming the
authority ox the written viora of k,cri >lure, is a Church
oi fetish-worshippers. "In this condition is Iways
ouna  instead of principles oi morality, statutory
? acommands, rules Oi faitn and observance". In such 
organisations, the rules of the orgunis tion are substi­
tuted for Ihe principles of morality. Therefore, the 
conduct of the organisation ma„, be ciiticised on moral 
grounds. This point.seems to be \ lid eua justifiable, 
it may be expressed in a number of maye. iu may be 
affirmed ^uite simply that conscience should be the only
C 7
0utide in matters of faith. Llternativelj , it may be 
.rgue. fro., history for example, th t while the torturers 
of the .punish Inquisition may have boe*i doing what they 
i ou ht v 0 right, ithia of course the limits of their 
- * or o . . , t e.y maj
oe jud : r It c . if they
cted from co science, or fro;., i complete lack of
e ( y the uthority
o w irr tun I fa tne r v, IfxTMd ) • us. ut.s censorious
_ e sell, o . bee use of the attendant corce; t of 
iritu 1 despotism* to be found i. orms of
ecciesiao uj.ci8 , nowever unpretentious- and o: uiar t ey 
may declare themselves to be". H p. 163.
~ - i • -Lu/—  l o t .
b? r  J.. 17:>.
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conscience? They ma have been acting on the instructions 
of their superiors, who in turn may h-ve been acting upon 
a claim of divine authority for their position. But would 
the moral law itself not condemn the acts perpetrated, 
and would not the moral law within Lcripture require to 
be i nored or subordinated in order to claim that these 
acts were right?
tr pe haps an instance may be quoted irom the Bible 
itself. Joes the incident of Abr ham and Isaac m o t  
si\^ est t^e question that although he felt commanded 
b,y dou to perform t h . sacrifice, m y he not also have 
felt t^ .t it was morally wrong? Is tuis not in fact a 
roper and legitimate explanation of the action of 
ibraham in not sacrificing his son? wiile scholars may 
arjue that the story was written to assist in the process 
of preventing the practice of infant sacrifice arising 
within the religion of Israel, surely it could be argued 
that it was on m o n l  grounds that tne prophets objected 
to the piactice? Therefore tne mor^l significance of 
the narrative becomes its most important feature.
nant suggests the followin test to 11 leaders of 
churciily faiths: “net the author of a creed or the teacher 
■ i o church, jea, let every man, jjo far as he is inwardly 
to acknowledge a conviction regarding dogmas as divine 
revelations asx himself: Do ou really trust yourself to 
assert tne truth of these dogmas in the si ht of iim who 
knows the heart und at the risk oi lo~in^ 11 that is 
v luable and hol^ to you?” ^5
.^ant'b contention is that the laws of morality of 
which all men are aware, may be their guide when forming
Genesis <2: 1-14.
O  R p. 177-178.
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attitudes to matters of belief, and conscience may be 
the judge of alleged revelation from God. ant thus 
not only emphasises the contrast between ure religious 
f ith nd all c.urcrly faiths, but based u on the fact 
that churchly faitas and their activities have been 
susceq; tible to criticism in the light of reason and 
morality, in the past, he is sajin^ that ^re religious 
faith is tne juage of all historic .1 churciily faiths.
Thera is however a need for these churchly faiths, 
a eed which lies within men the^eelves. ^owever, they 
have no claim to uitiiLaey or universality ; 11 .e have noted
that a church dispenses with tne most important mark of 
truth, mjnely a rigntf’ul cl^im to uni vers lity when it
bases itself upon a revealed faith ..........  yet because
of the natural need and desire oi nil men .lor something 
tenable, and for a confinflation of some sort from 
experience of the highest concepts and grounds of reason 
(a, need w^icii really must ce t ken into account when the 
universal dissemination of a faith is contemplated) some 
historic±1 ecclesiastical faith oi otner, usually to be 
found at hand, uiust be utilised”.
In other words, tne ,are religion of reason requires 
ind of vehicle upon whicu n  veyed to men.
.^wever, once tney rave received it and j .ropriated it, 
the faith c<a.n then maintain itself upon rational grounds 
.;lone, without sucn a venicle for its expression. The 
mor a. and rational grounds a re the m .r s of universality 
whicn belong to pure religious faitn. churchly
f iths do not nave these cuaracteristics. Therefore, 
while there is a need ior tnese churchly i ;iths to exist,
6b R . ICO.
- 227 -
the need is limited, and their function li.ited also.
The c urchly faiths themselves also stand under the 
judgement of pure religious faith.
.these considerations c±urll’j tne third sense in 
which Kant's faith is "moral faith'. This third sense 
uas two distinct aspects to it. The first i~ tnat morality 
is the critic of all religious institutions. The pure 
moral faith of reason c n stand in judgement of all 
historic i religious organisations, because it is the 
highest interpreter ox all religious faiths.
ihe secona aspect of this particular characterisation 
Oj. rant ’ s iaxtn as moral faith xies in tne implication 
which becomes gradually more a^d more explicit in the 
workin, out oi the content of th* faith in ii that pure 
reli i o u s  faith a o  tne highest interpreter of all churchly 
faitns, founded as it is upon moral experience, is the 
onlu univers 1 faith possible ior .11 m~n. The develop­
ment of this concept of the Universality of Kant's faith 
which takes place in it presents interesting possibilities 
which will be discussed, however, for the present, and 
in conclusion, to summarise nant's position - Kant's 
pure moral faith of reason io the essential rationality 
developed in the KPV and its moral aspects are developed 
in ii, particularly in li ;ht Oi the enlarged view of 
freedom a. a cnoice between , od and evil, Morality is 
rejaided as a form of rationality, and reason has an 
ethical aspect. This mode of rationality leads however 
to faitn rather than to knowledge.
ine different aspects of the moral si uiiicance of 
i^ ant't, faith have been developed. It now remains to 
determine the relation of this faith to Christian faith,
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and as been suggested, it is mj view that .-ant's claim 
that hie are moral faith of reason posse* sec the 
char cteristic of universal v.lidity for aim men may be 
interpreted as a claim for a Christian universalism 





Having iven more precise meanin i to .ant's concept 
of the pure moral faith of reason than the hare terrae 
imply, the way is paved for the final stage of the 
enquiry. However, this stage presents the most compli­
cations. The basic question being as ed is straight­
forward enough: "Can Kant's faith be described, in any
proper usage of the term, as 'Christian'?*
thiiie the question mi(jbt be simple enou a , the 
answer is not so easy. There are a number of ways in 
which tne problem might be posed. The term faith, in 
ecclesiastical circles and in theological circles is 
usually taken as meaning the traditionally handed on 
'faith of the Church'• It then refers to the doctrines 
and dogma3 which have been seen, through the centuries, 
to be the central doctrines of the Christian faith, 
xhe Apostle's Crejd-^ is a good example of a very ancient 
formulation of 'Church faith'.
"± believe in God the rather Almi hty, £4 ker of 
Leaven and Barth
And in Jesus Christ His only ^on our ^ord 
.»ho was conceived by the Holy dhost 
Dorn of the Virgin Mary 
buffered un^er Pontius Pilate 
.as crucified dead and buried 
The third day' He rose again from the dead; 
he ascended into heaven
Ana sitteth on the right hand of God the father Almighty 
From thence He shall come to judge the quick and the dead.
I believe in the holy Ghost, the Holy C itholic Church
*iie Communion ox saints, the forgiveness of sins
The resurrection of the body
And the nife everlasting".
The commentary on the Creed by the ponservitive theologian 
:.arl Barth is appropriately called * fho  ^ ith of the 
i c.T ( English translation - Fonta
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The Creed is a straightforward collection of 
articles of Christian belief, and its recitation is the 
Church expressing its faith. Often it is referred to as 
"der ii tube" - the belief, or the faith.
xn lig^t of this we wight ask. "hoe>- ant's concept 
Ox faith have any dogmatic content which resembles this 
arrij of Christian theological conce ts?" Or alternati­
vely: "Does riant's view of faith resemble the view of 
faith implied b ; or enshrined in a collection of state­
ments such as the Apostle's Creed?" Or agiin more simply 
and directly: "In any refer nces to any of the articles
of the Creed, does Kant indicate bis oelief or disbelief 
in any or all of them?"
These questions would be a direct assault on the 
roolem. This would be i simple enough line of action, 
but 1 tnink neither fair nor fruitful. It ..ould lead to 
a recitation of pieces of nant's writings, and quotations 
of extracts, and the dangers of this woulu , e that an 
overall perspective was lost in the roCv-ss. It was this 
kind 01 iecemeal inter retation which lead to the 
circumstances of the historic 1 controversy surrouiiding 
t-.e ublieation of It in 1793*
The Lutheran Church in Prussi in mart's own day 
found difficulty in affording any oiiicia3 recognition 
to his views. The second part Oi it was not satisfactory 
to the censorship board, and Kant was forbidden to 
publish it. ihe details of the incident are not 
irrelevant. The office of linieter of rublic orship 
and education was occupied by von ^edlitz, during the 
reign of Frederick the Great. He had |ursued a policy 
of free thought and *.ant would have had no conflict with
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him. Two years after the accession ol Frederick 
*illiam II ( in 1786 ), the office was taken over by 
dllner, a known bitter opponent of the Aufkliirung. He 
was an ex-priest who was associated v;ith tne pseudo- 
mystical and (both theologically and politically) 
conservative movement called 1Rosicrucianism*.
on t/t.f July, 1 7 ^0 , a royal edict was issued which 
declared that ,11 1unorthodox1 teachers oi subjects 
bearing on religion would be removed from either their 
academic chairs or their pulpit®. A^l books dealing 
wit such matters were henceforth to be submitted to a 
co i ission which was set up in 1791, consisting of 
three members with most extensive jowers of censorship. 
Ihey were to examine with authority the doctrines of 
school teachers, university lecturers and professors 
and pr rish priests of the Lutheran Churcu.
Kant submitted his essay on * radical avil* to the 
Berlin Commission, although the work had been published 
in ciena. This was passed as being philosophical, and 
mainly for scholars. It then appeared in the ’Berlinische 
ftonatsachrift * (A ril 1792)* However, when he submitted 
the second part of u, approval was not iven.
A member of the commission called fiilimer objected 
on the rounds that it ventured into ’biblical theology’. 
Lynnes, another member of the commission, supported 
iiillmer, and x^ant was refused permission to publish the 
es.a^ because, it was claimed, in it, he controverted 
the teaching of the Bible. Kant, however, completed 
Lis work, and askeu for the approval of the faculty of 
iheolo^j at Kdnigsberg to publish the book. This was 
dulj granted. In 1793, R was published in its first
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edition.
1 X tO b } I 'v - -I - G M ililXUI -
*itu formally 'depreciating Christianity1 , and in a letter
t him, Frederic! tfiliia ride this 3i I ....  r .11-
.x^xiusb xurson nas noticed lor sox. ti .ic with jreat 
ui^ _ xt iiUio now yon abuse your phiicsG far the 
axstoition and depreciation of ccit i unda&cntal 
aootriiieL 01 ao±%/ ~oripfure Christi nit, , especially 
in you boo*. 'xceli ion nc/ 1 but eiiuilafly in other short 
t t n e b .............
iO this kant snade a respectful ro. xw. , and as nis 
defence, offered the foliLGwing ax. — nt: al t..e said
booi. contains no appreciation o_ i iiotiax.it it couxd not 
Du guilty oi depreciation* ,.y quoting o_ xiblical
ubL: es to uoitfiiiu certain d^coiix.wK ol n tur 1 reli ion 
y L ve ivuii rise to this xaiui^tu. prc tat ion. I Lave 
ox. re. sea iuy great osteon xor the nibliCfai. uO trine of
i ait a a .a praised the nibxo as tne best v liable guide
uiic rexigxous teaching, i ^eo i. tht accord
• o ■ xi Oinx* tx.xiix(.ixn txxo uxQijt ratx ■ • i - th, its
-uost permanent eulogy; by this accord, and cot by
)x xCti — &c - ■ r8ln p, ciu otix Ox ten o - ei 11ed3uhrxstiamty always Lc regenerated .
ueaving Kant’s reply for the moment, the attitude 
oi tne Commission ana tne a tituae ux reatrick William 
are uocn oaseu upon hant's handling of certain siulical 
passages. 1‘hero is no aoubt that lie.- in.u point of view 
i t >dox theology, Kant's use of ctxtxin texts taken 
j i isolation 8Ugge#t it react dubiously Christian .otions,
ii not eX'Xicitly neretical o^iaxons.
xetter 1st uctober 17^4 IWuotea by nant in "her 
treit" tr. Oh. p. 3^ty
5 p.
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This fact has been fastened on to by a number of 
writers. For example, John Oman quite openly accuses 
Kant and all the rationalists of Pelagianism in respect 
of their doctrine of evil.4 He also quite explicitly 
contrasts the moral attitudes of Kant to the Augustinian 
doctrine of grace, and by implication, places Kant in 
the Pelagian camp.5
Friedrich Delektat, in a discussion of the Person 
and work of oesus Christ, in a book on nant, describes 
Kant.'s' basic position as Gnostic, and his treatment of 
the nistorical life of Jesus as Docetic.b
« While there nay be detailed justification for these 
charges, depending upon readings of individual texts, if 
all these charges were substantiated, Kant’s final 
attitude to religion ^i.e. Christianityy could be summed 
up as either simple depreciation or a coagulation of 
heresies. It could be said that either he had rejected 
Liblical belief, or that he was guilty of . elagianiem, 
Gnosticism, Docetism, and 1 rather sus-ect that a case
4 Oman Grace & Personality . ^9 (Fontana 1962)
5 Oman op. cit. j. 99.
0 friedrich Delektat Immanuel ant (quelle & Meyer, 
meidelberg 1963) p. 353.
l i e  h i s  ory o f  j o  y„a c 1 1 a  O o c e t i c  th e  i  i s  lo !o<  y 
of then c Gnostics wiio u.eiij tii t C h r i s t  t e r r o r  t i in l
body and by this 
y t h o l o  i c  ..1 p r i n c i p l e .  The f  a t  f  a t  n t h  d o c t r i n e  o f  
. Vii.v, man p o i n t s  i n  one oculc d i r e c t i o n  i  ^ c l e a r l y
the passage ’On the lot ‘ cl of the principle 
of evir for the power over Man and on the s ruggle between 
t l i-iCipa.es 1 . ihe u.iio ui u esus r.. tnis passage is 
r e ,  oribe i n  the form of a isyth".
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could bo made o t for him having Arian tendencies also!
Is it theologically possible for one man to be uilty of 
so many heresies at tlio one time and all within the one 
document? Given selective reading of the book, and taking 
the use of biblical quotations as expositions in context 
and not illustrations, this might be possible.
IIow then is it Xvoscible to discern whether or not 
Xant*s conception of Faith iiad anything in common with 
Oiiristian Faith? It would appear th t Kant is trapped 
every way into some form of, at least, a Christian 
position* First, if his references to the hible were 
altogether omitted, then his work would be one of ethical 
relativism, or ethical theism, with perhaps the theism 
lundarnentally superfluous. If his use of iblical texts 
is taken in the sense of the Commission or rederich 
William, ICant becomes either a heretic at least or an 
opponent of Christianity at worst. In fact, many of the 
sceptios of his day rejected hi , because of M 3 apparent 
;..xfiliation with Christianity. This affiliation, the 
officials of the Church would not recognise! Neither 
wished to recognise his thought as belong in^ to their 
’oar ’ , so to speak.
Thist of course, raises a question, namely ’Did Sant 
fall between two stools?’ or ’Did he run with the hares 
and hunt with the hounds? *, which would be a more cynical 
stating the problem. Again for an answer, we must 
turn to ~ant himself, iris defence to Frederick William 
was tliat he was examining certain religious concepts from 
within his philosophical terms 01 reference, but 
uluiiuatol^, he was concerned about o^ristianity, and in
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that reply, explained that he was offering a means of 
regenerating Christianity.
To cot -n n t 1s oun thought into perspective here, 
it is useful to connect two things. First, -hero is 
9 distinction already discussed between Sisubenssaclien 
and Glaabensartikol.7 second, there is his comment 
about the possible compatibility of the pure religion 
of reason and a historical revelation, iv^n certain 
conditions.
First, the distinction between Glaubonesachen and 
i...aubensartikel: "Being a matter of faith oes not make 
a thing an article of faith, if by articles of faith we 
mean such matters of faith as one can be bound to acknov- 
lcd inwardly or cutvrardly - a kind therefore that 
does not enter into natural theolov;y. -.or, being matters 
of faith, they cannot, like matter: of fact, depend upon 
theoretical proofs, and therefore the assurance is a 
free assurance, and it is only as such that it is 
compatible with the morality of the subject".
only the objects of pure reason, claims -.ant, may 
be matters of faith. God, freedom and in ortality are 
these. The nature of assurance about them is moral, not 
theoretical. Articles of faith, however, would belong 
to the rovince of Biblical theolo y, with which t 
declares that he is not dealing. Articles of faith are 
therefore not the subjects of natural theology.
However, Aant was also aware that «- ■ ■ eiissachen 
7 KU . 140.
° Prei'aee to ^nd .udition o- it 
xJJ lootnote p. 14->.
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and G1anb enr art ikci may not be entirely prised apart.
In the introductory xreiace to the Second edition 
Ox R he recouiiines the ’wider sphere” oi faith, Wi-icli 
includes the narrower sense ox faith as baseu upon pure 
reason: The broader sense is that of the ‘churchly faith*
based upon revelations: “From t is standpoint* 1 can
. .e a second experiment, namely, to start iron some 
alleged revelation or other and, leavin, o.*t of consider­
ation the pure religion of reason ^so far i s it constitutes 
— sufficient system; to examine in a fragmentary 
manner, this revelation, as an IJLctorical system, in the 
light of moral concepts; and then to see whether it does 
not lead back to the very same pure rational system of 
reli ion. The latter, though not from the theoretical 
oint of v i e w ..........  j , k, fi m  th orallybt? for^enume rejiQio^
practical standpoint, w.-ich indeed, as a rational concept
a priori (remaining after everything empirical has been
taken away) obtains only in this (morally practical)
relation”.% 4
Having su^ested that he should tare some revealed 
faith, and by this, it is safe to presume he was referring 
to Christianity, he then jroceeds to anticipate the 
following interesting result: ”If this experiment is
successful we shall be able to say that reason can be 
found to be not only compatible with Scripture, but also 
at one wit., it, so that he who follows one (under guidance 
of moral concepts; will not fail to conform to the other. 
Were this not so, we should have either two religions in 
one individual, which is absurd, or else one religion 
and one cult, in which case, since the second is not
10 R p. 11.
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(like religion) an end in itself but only possesses 
v lue as a means, they would often have to be shaken 
up together* that they might, for a short while, be 
united” . H
kant is claiming that his pure religion of reason, 
the pure rational morax faith, should not be inconsistent 
with faith based upon revelation. Therefore, while 
l.». be.a. sachen and dluhbensartikel lire qui te distinct 
expressions of faith, they should not stand in contra-, 
diction to one another. .
..hat does this imply? Taken at face v lue, it 
means that a rjhilosophical evaluation of biblical concepts 
(ix carried out in moral categories/ should not produce 
a refutation of such a faith. It should produce the view 
that pure moral faith is contained in Biblical thought.
The faith in the biblical revelation 01 Christ should not 
be inconsistent with «he pure moral faith o reason. This 
would imply that Biblical revelation! must eo-.tain some 
a proximation to pure rational faith, or even enshrine 
it at its heart. If so, and remembering that pure moral 
faith can oe rationally substantiated, then x.ant is 
implicitly saying that the basis of Christian revelation, 
understood, in moral categories, may be roved by reasonJ
While he was not evaluating tne concert, of Christian 
Faith, as delivered through Scripture, he was offering a 
rational justification for certain Christian doctrines, 
as understood with regard to their ethical significance. 
This would justify his claim to have Oi.i ered a way of 
x'egenerating Christianity, and his claim to have been 
trying to make Christianity more acceptable to the
11 R p. 11-14.
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intelligent and the uncommitted.
The pure moral i'aitn of reason it th* cnrce ox 
thio justixication, and it makes justification possible.• 
i^ Ocl this make faitli Dased upon revelation superfluous*
On this point, iuxnt is mute, nut certainly the pure 
mor. 1 faith ox reason c m  ue defended, jac t,J.s is the 
basis for the defence ox iblical conce ts.
It is now possible to make two apparently contra­
dictory statements about want's faith in relation to 
Christann revelation. First, having rejected as criteria 
ox xeveiation an,, objective proofs, he submitted pure 
moral faith as a possible candidate Tor the titxe 
‘defender of the faith*. That is to sa.; , he is offering 
what amounts to a subjective proof of what are claimed 
to jo objectively true concepts.
This statement is not so paradoxical when considered 
carefully. But it merely reflects the situation ..ant 
found himself in when he drew severe limits round 
knowledge, to make himself look almost like an agnostic. 
It was at this point, he introduced the concept of 
practical reason, in order to speak about ideas which 
otherwise would admit of no discussion. e ti us moved 
-rom rational speculative theolo^ to ration I faith.
This rational faith he now placed at the service of 
Christian theology.
xhe significance of i£antfs mo re from rationalist 
theology to rational faith in this situation may be 
usefully described by means of _ant‘, o n ..clf-styled 
* o ernican evolution*. This was the title he gave to 
the hilosophicil revolution which he cllimed to have
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instituted. Copernicuc substituted the heliocentric for 
the geocentric point of views "f iling of satisfactory 
rogress in ex laining the movements of the heavenly 
bo .ies on the supposition that they all i.volved round 
the s ectator, he tried whether or not he might have 
better success if he made the spectator to revolve and 
the stars to remain at rest".!*-
Thus i ant interpreted the work of Co ernicus. His 
own philosophical revolution, he claimed, followed the 
same principle: "Hitherto, it has been assumed that all 
our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts 
to extend our nowledge of objects by establishing 
something in regard to them a priori, by means of 
concept, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We 
must therefore make trial whether we m y not have more 
success in the tasxs of metaphysics, if we suppose that 
ob,ects must conform to our knowledge
"Copernicus ....  cf'red in a manner contradictory
of the senses and yet true, to seek the observed movements
not in the heavenly bodies, but in the spectator ..... ",14
and similarly, kant tried to find the explicit orderly 
structure of nature not in the external world itself, 
but within the spectator, in the structure of the 
apprehending mind.
In botn iant and Copernicus, we are being offered 
an explanation, in terms of the subject, of that which 
to the senses had appeared both objective and external.
1^ jvIIV B xvi.
13 KKV £> xvi.
14 B xxii (footnote;
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This hypothesis helps to clarify the standpoint which 
ant is adopting. Man becomes a spectator, within 
existence, and the world exists for him onlj as he is 
ablu to apprehend it. There is no objective knowledge, 
or objective world which he may discover. His knowledge 
is limited to himself, and everything he apprehends is 
ovcrnea by this fact.
The significance of the Kantian departure from the 
then traditional ways of thinking is described by Heidegger 
a. tne "structure of traditional metaphysics" under :oing 
its "first and most profound shock' The Aristotelian
view that insight into things was gained by focusing 
upon that which was to be known had been c lied into 
section. Asmt had reversed the common sense view oi the 
relationship between tne knowing subject and the object 
known, because he located the ground of axij knowledge 
..ithin the knowing subject. If the object is to be 
known, it must conform to the require exits the knower.
where then does faith come in? kant is acting on 
the ,riA*ciple that just as the ground 01 knowledge must 
lie within the knowing subject, the GrRGUlTD oF FAITH lies 
within the believer, dou, freedom and inmortality, the 
matters of Faith are introduced under the domain of 
r ctical reason. They arise necessarily out of the 
mature of moral experience.
By implication from the analogy of the oopernican 
..evolution, faitn must conform to moral e.x erience, 
which in fact is the implicit argument of the r^ PV. Kant 
introduces discussion of Hod, freedom and mor ilitj, 
because they are morally necessary concepts. It is not
Heidegger Kant and the xroblem of 1 eta^ ..ysics 
tr. Churchill ^Indiana Fress . lo.
i i
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surprising then to find that want’s evalu?tion of all 
biblical concepts is made on moral considerations, 
because of the moral necessity of objects of pure 
rational faith.
having said all this, in poosibxe answer to the 
original question as to the relation betwec ant's 
faith and Christian theology (putting the problem in 
its broades t possible terms j there are only tv/o 
alternatives. I have ruled out the point by point 
comparison of for example, the doctrines of the Apostle’s 
Creed with Kant's references to a n y  such doctrines in ft, 
because it could lead to xvant being accused of a multi- 
licity of heresies, through considering his words out 
Ox the context of his general purpose.
Therefore, taking his view as a whole, and taking 
note of his Copernican devolution, either Kant, through 
h s pure moral faith was attempting to reduce Christianity 
to simple ethical theism, or he was using ethical theism 
^if his pure moral faith of reason may be s o  succinctly 
characterised; as a basis for a Christi n cmversalism.
This latter alternative, however dinicult to defend 
ap ears to me to be most consistent wit i all that Kant 
says in his books in Lis letters, and with the whole 
spirit of 3U fchile his idea of a Christian universalism 
may not be the ideal of many, 1 holct the view that his 
was an attempt, similar to many made in the history of 
Christianity to interpret the Chri^ti n x*evclation in 
terms which transcend historical particularities, and 
which make Christian f^ith more plausible by setting it 
into a universal context. Throughout its long history,
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Christianity has been expressed in ^any Leininologies 
and has m e n  expounded through many different Ojstems of 
thought. Broadly speaking, these can be classified into
two imxin groups. There are those which are conservative
in that the., have tied themselves quite firmly and
rigidly to the thought forms of the hew Testament. They
admit little variance or reinterpretation for succeeding 
generations, of ideas which become inevitably dated, buch 
gruups feel basically that the battle for u^ristian 
'victory1 may be fought within the frontiers of traditional 
or 'orthodox' thought, and in the ten,:, which Christianity 
makes, nven in the 2uthC, representatives r.f this
remain a powerful wing Christian tradition*
Such thinuers are basic: lly exclusivist in their attitude 
of thought which they ciuim is alien to the Lew Testament 
understanding of Christianity . *-u
The other main element of thought in the Christian 
tradition may be uroaaly describee .s liberal and 
i^idus ivist. There is a _ reat range o.. ossibility in 
what may be calleu liberal or non-exciusivist thought. 
However* all the possibilities tem fro*.. the common 
principle th.,t Christian thought not only is capable of, 
but also requires expression in alien and n m-Christian 
terms, in order to continue to be meaningful.
The lormer position makes certain questionable 
tions. First it over readily assumes that there
Lb In the 20th0, the general contrast may be illustrated 
by comparing the Christoiogical exolusiv >e s of ..arl
Barth witu the willingness of -naolf Hultmi n to make
the analytic of Dasein in Heidegger the existential 
framework for his exposition of Christian faith.
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is sue.. a thing as ’orthodox belief1 openly and easily 
known, and that this nay be easily elicited fron 
scripture. Further it is assumed that scripture itself 
regents such a x^lain statement of the etsentials as nay 
be conveniently transmitted, without too much thought, 
t a believer. It is also taken . nted that cripture
is both consistent and uniform in its statement of such 
i eas. Therefore, since the heart o- the Christian Faith 
consists in timeless truths, plainly set forth, there 
is little need for either theoloLW or philosophy of 
religion.
This was basically the view of the legist group 
lid o osed Kant's publication of the second part of R.
biblical scholarship itself, without any theological 
considerations, has proved the utter naivete of that 
view. For example, the differences, between the terminology 
of rauline and Johannlne theology represent an important 
if...er nee in emphasis. ..hile Paul’s account of Christ 
centres u on the significance of his death, oohn
mce starting from the Incarnation. 
Interestingly enough, neither mention the Virgin Birth. 
These 1 ,ctB surely ose questions.
Further to that, two different traditions of 
Christianity emerged and developed, not perhaps from the 
specific difference between Paul and John, but from the 
dif.erent cultural background which their ‘articular 
differences represented.. The hastern Church's theology 
wa. dominated oy the concept of and of course this
’iacarnational* preoccupation lead to the reat 
Clsri^tological controversies which r& ed over many 
centudes. The Western Church, however, which developed
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an emphasis upon the mace and the sacrificial death of 
Christ was dominated more by the leg 1 demands of the 
Roman mind, and the necessary Jewish concept of the 
atonement to meet that demand, This distinction has 
been veil documented by both historians 17 and 
tleologians.l®
The fact that such a distinction exists must be 
attributed to the different cultural settings in which 
Christianity has found itself. Its desire to communicate 
has compelled it to loc c into tne riches of its Sacred 
literature to see ii a meaningful set ox ideas may be
-i to serve as a medium for communication in this 
situation or that. Often, some theological emphasis of 
the hew Testament has been used, however, this has not 
always b^en possible, nven the great Christological 
debates wore conducted, in the mai , by seans o. non- 
biblical language. This fact represents the basic 
problem: ’-low is the basic message of Christianity to 
be communicated where the presuppositions Ox biblical 
thought are either not known or not & ted'. 1 ’Low can 
tne Christian faith’s insights be transmitted in a 
situ tion where some of the philosophic: i notions 
. ind the expression of its doctrines rx not understood?’
It is in answer to this problem tin t most of the
17 . . Jrenstead Doctrine of the it ..xae.it Ch. IV
. bo and CL. V . 6;*
Iians scitsmann history oi thy. r f  - -ca 
Vol. Ill . 107 ff*
1® ..... .eairbairn Christ in i.oanx i,nolo ,.y (.odder
<s Stoughton 1693/ p. 74 ST7" " " t i n  father’s
(cf. . 7s - 110;.
k.yaney Cave Docix.i..e of the Person cf ^hrlst
(Duckworth 1962) Ch. IV . . . Jsk.
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’heresies’ within Christianity*s history have arisen - 
not \ erhaps all, ut certainly a great many. In the 
main they have been attempts to express the ignificance 
of Christ or Christian Faith in language which is based 
o . different philosophical structures from those in the 
new Testament. It could be argued, that why his doctrine 
may have given rise to disputes, is because John in
Xoyos
thought the alien tradition oi Greek philosophy, 
xhore ore, while it is neither competent or essentially 
relevant to argue the case here, it is of interest to 
note in the passing, that a case could be mode that the 
Testament itself, is an experiment i.. conceptual 
translation which has given rise to internal conflict.
1 woulu like to suggest that there is within the 
corpus Christianorum, and always has been, a dialectical 
tension between these two positions - on the one hand, 
those who have tried co take Christianity into the world 
by translating its insights into conctsfcually speaking, 
foreign languages. Their intent nue been to liberate 
Christian thought into a ’universal’ context. On the 
other, there have been those who have tried to restrain 
such liberation by either repressing such expressions or 
by extending the frontiers of Cnristian thought as tney 
S69 it so that it becomes the norm of all thought.
The Mediaeval Church is an example o j . Christian 
thought being the oasis of society. xhis explains the 
inevitable represi ion of science in the *.iddle Ages, 
and e\en the rejection of Copernicus theory, because it 
conflicted with one point in a closed system of thought.
19 John 1:1-14.
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The Reformation attempted to re-express Christianity 
in terms of the Renaissance learning, and it could 
acnieve this because the basic thought forme of the 
i-.ediaev tl Christian c lurch was a ^remise from which 
the reformers could commence with confidence.
Immanuel Kant lived at a later era o^  history, when 
the presuppositions of the Reformation thinkers could not 
be taken for granted. He lived in the age when learning 
was advancing rapidly, and when science in ;articular 
raising questions for Faith. The Church in Kant’s 
d y appeared to ue offering merely authoritative state­
ments of belief, and demanding of its members the 
surrender of intellectual integrity.
Kant saw two things. First he recognised the value 
of Christianity itself, and believed in certixn basic 
items of faith. However, he was also aw re of the utter 
absurdity of speaking to intelligent people in 
’mythological’ thought forms. Added to these two points 
was his doctrine of practical reason and the primacy of 
etuical experience. In this he saw a universal language 
for expressing Christian Faith to an are which did not 
share the ..e x t a n s c hauunr of the scriptures . naturally, 
he turned that Lcripture would not ultimately co.J?lict 
vitn the )ure moral faith of reason. To set his position 
in sharp relief, and to distin^ ish the subjectivity of 
moral ex erience as the ground of reli ioux faith from 
subjective ’religious’ experience, . e rejected all 
attempts to objectively (or in this latter sense, 
subjectively) prove Christianity. He uiscovered another 
ecies ox assurance i.; matters o- . ith - moral assurance, 
xni., is the key to ni*. Christian universalism - the facts
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of moral experience, and the necessary concepts which 
arise from it, in order to give it meaning. I would 
argue that the desire for a Christian universalism is in 
itself Jiiblical. The tension within Christianity I have 
described in fact originates within the :«ev/ estament 
itself because it grew up within the New xestament 
Church. It is this fact which makes it o^sible to 
argue th t ant was seeking to express a C.iristian 
universalism.
These words from St. Paul provide good illustration: 
wT'or we see divine retribution revealed from eaven and 
f lling u_ on the godless wickedness of men. In their 
.ickedness they are stifling the truth. or all that 
may be known of uou by men lies plain visi le before 
their eyes; indeed God has disclosed it to them. His 
invisible attributes, that is tc say His everlasting 
power and deity, have been visible, ever since the world 
oegan, to tne eye of reason, in the things he has made".20
This passage from it. Paul is ot to be taken in 
isolation, but along with, for examnle, part of his 
re sorted address to the people at nystra: 11 The good 
news rte bring you tells you to turn frOi_ t tee follies 
to tne living God, who made heaven and earth and sea and 
everything in them. In past ages he allowed all nations
to go their own way; and yet lie h. s not left you without
some clue to uis nature, in the kindness he shows: he 
sends you rain from heaven and crops in their seasons, 
and he gives you xood and good cheer in plenty”* ^
In these two passages, Paul is clearly appealing
2 Homans 1:1^-P0 (h.h.h.;
21 ^ets 14:16-17.
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to his hearers on grounds which arc distinct from those 
provided by revelation.^2 Paul is definitely approaching 
the proclamation, of the Gospel by first engaging in a 
h o t  of natural theology. Perhaps his meet outstanding 
effort in this direction was in his sermon to the phil- 
>phers on liars kill in Athens. Here he begins by 
referring to the ’lltir to tne unknown Got , and through 
latural .ogy offers conceptual co then positive
identification with the God who raises the dead.
However, the fact that Paul speaks this way 
illustrates the tension even within his own thought, and 
which certainly is alive in the entire Hew 1estament.
One ijractiCu.1 expression of it w,.s in tne ,uestion of 
It 1 entiles toi/ie early Church.24 This debate raged 
around the i-sue of whether Gentile: could be admitted
directly, without first becoming hi ewe. he, Paul had 
won that victory, in fact he had universalised the ethical 
insights of Judaism by interpreting the through the 
symbolic figure of Christ, whom He then interpreted in 
the context of an even greater universalism^: "He is 
tne image of thu invisible ,od; his is t. rimacy over 
all created Tilings . In Him everythi; ' i_. itaven and 
earth was created, not only things visible out alsothe 
invisible o n e r  of thrones, sovereignties, authorities,
22 Acte 17: 12-31.
23 C .11. Dodd. (Moffat Commentary on Acts 1:16; "There 
is no otner passage where iaul so explicitly recognises 
natur 1 i 1 n a fundamental tr human nature".
24 Acts 15 documents the debate in the Ch..rch after Iaul 
and narnabas returnee from their journey to nsia Minor*
..here they had been baptising non-Jews. u e  council 
decided in their favour.
25 Colossians 1:15-20
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and powers: the whole universe has been created through 
Him and for Him. And he exists before everything, and 
all things are held together in Him. He is moreover, 
the Head of the body, the Church. He is its origin, 
the first to return from the dead, to be in all things 
lone supreme. Foi m  Him, the complete being of God, 
by God's own choice came to dwell* Through Him* God 
chose to reconcile the whole universe to hi self, making 
peace through the shedding of his blood u, on the cross - 
to reconcile all things, whether on earth or in heaven 
through lim alone".
The breadth of thought within this passage speaks 
elo iuentl^ for itself of Paul's eo mio conce lion of 
Christ.
Ihe significance of St. Paul's situ .tion is well 
summarised by Paul Tillich when he says: " ul is in a 
situation which is typical of all later developments.
nas to fight two fronts - against the legalism of 
Ci.ristianised Jews and against the libertinism of 
Christianised pagans. He has to defend the new principle 
revealed in the appearance of Christ, -iut as always 
defence narrows down, ho his first conde. nations are 
uttered against Christian distorters of his message; 
anut nemas are always directed against Christians, not 
against other religions or their members. With respect 
to other religions* he makes the assertion unheard of 
for a Jew, that Jews and lagans are equally under the 
bondage of sin and equally in need of salvation - a 
salvation which comes not from a new religion, the 
Christian, but from an event in history which judges 
ail religions including Christianity1 ,2o
<-D Tillich Christianity and the amount...: ..f the + 
-.Unions. p. 33.
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ith the point established thot ther i. emanating 
from New Testament writings and New Testament times, a 
tension wit in Christianity atr~>ut how it should express 
itself to the world, between universaliats and coneerv tives 
(as these groups have been earlier characterised), it 
remains to see what grounds there are for affirming that 
Kant's conception of faith can be classified among that 
of the universalists,
..hen ..ant reiore to CL rictian dogmatic theological 
concepts, he introduces them either with reference to, oi' 
inter rets them in the light ol the very important 
consequences of hie enlarged docti'ine of freedom - namely, 
in tne context of the struggle between the uood and the 
mvil jrinciplee for supremacy over man. Consider the title 
of hook 11: 1 Von de:, K^amgf des guten rinsij>st mit dem 
b5sen um ie Herrschaft tiber den I oneci f ,c' - which 
hi lSoh and Green translate as "Concerni the Conflict 
of fch Good wit.i the Jvil Principle for sovereignty over 
man". The second section oi Boo... 11 der detail with
the concept of der ramrf. the moral struggle.
Using the Biblical account of the j? 11 : ant begins: 
tur v forth th is
(i.e. the struggle,/ intelligible moral relationship in 
the form of a narrative, in which two principles in man, 
as opposed to one another as is heaven to hell, are 
x*epresented as persons outside him; who ..ot only pit 
tneix’ strength against each other, out also seek (the 
one as man's accuser, the other as his advocate; to 
establish their claims legally as though buiore a supreme • 
judge".2U
c-'1 R . 5C.
xt. p. 7>*
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The way that Kant states this implies two things, 
first, that the conflict between thu t/jo principles is 
■ t ' y second,
t , ing of the struggle
in the form of a narrative are not expounding the moral 
conflict, but rather, the moral conflict affords us a 
means whereby we may expound Scripture. The narrative 
is coucheu in the language of a legal discourse over 
property involving God, nnn and the devil s parties to 
the action, lhan was "originally constituted proprietor 
of ail the , oods ox the earth' . This rj rietorship 
in effect a tenancy (dominium atile/ with Goa as 
fominus birectus. Tnen appears g o ...*, bean ,  originally 
,ogcl, out my steriously eorruptea, who i.. es to have 
dominion over spiritual nature upon e rtn. He has already 
u en ais ossessed of his heavenly est te. . he caused 
man’s first parents to be disloyal to their overlord and 
therefore de endent u o.. nimself. lie sets himself up as 
n n c e  of this world, and as proprietor of the goods of 
this eartn.
God could nave annihilated this bein, , but the 
ftu re. e isdom left man to exerci.. ~ the prinoiple of his 
freedom so that the good or evii that bef 11s aim is 
imputable to himself I "A. kingdom of evil e thus set up 
in defiance of the good principle, kingdom to which all 
men descended in natural wise from A 1 m bee me subject, 
nd thiJ too, witn their own consent, si c, the i\ Ise
 ^ R p. 73 Genesis 1 :mb "God blenced them and said to 
them ht* fruitful ana increase, fill the earth and subdue 
it, rule over the fish in tne sea, the birds cf heaven, 
every living thing that moves upon rth'."
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show of this world’s goods lured theii ;aze from the 
;byss of destruction for which they were reserved"
laove^ on turougn t**e ^ia itsl m^-nt arguing that 
t*±_, ,j o u rineipie maintained its li tin lo lordship 
through tne Jewish systcu. of theocratic government,
for the honour! g . tely,
howeverf the system was dominated uy the outlook of rewards 
and - unishment within this life. Therefore this world’s 
v lues dominated it and consequently, the s^eton. became 
characterised by shc.llov; external observance. Compulsion 
and external sanctions were required to obtain conformity.
The inner essence of the mor^l diSj osition, although kept 
alive by the prophets, was not taken seriously at all.
Then, at i suitable time, when the influence of Greek 
.ilo^ojh^ and its doctrine of freedo^ nad become fused 
with ^ebrew thought, there appeared in the world "a person 
whose wisdom was purer even than that of previous philoso- 
z ure though it had deec^ _ \ .
.his p e r s o n  proclaimed himself indeed as truly *umnn, with 
respect to liis teaching and example, yet also an envoy of 
heaven, who through an original innocence was not involved
in the bargain with the evil principle .... "31 The ievil
tried to bargain with him, but to no av ii, and so he set 
about persecuting this person. This too,, place as a 
physical occurrence in which this person was killed.
tfi^wed legally, in terms of the principles and their 
struggle, tne death of this ,erson w s am: nifestation of 
the good principle, of humanity in its mor-1 perfection 
,iving an temple for all to emulate.
A hint at Kant’s universality comes when he comments
5° R j. 73.
51 R p . 74-75.
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that tne oiio historical appearance of Chile t should 
not be read in any exclusivist manner: "Yet the good 
>rinei le ha£ descended in mysterious fashion into 
hum itv. not ax one particular time alone, out from the 
first beginnings of the human race (as anyone must 
( .. considers the holiness oi this .i ci le, and
the inco»,rehensibility of a union between it and man’s 
Sensible nature in tne moral predisposition) nd it
521 fully had in mankind its fir ellii ;>iace".
ere manx is implying that tne historical Christ
a- the maniies uaxion of the good ii*.cm xe - .o^ld not
reg rded as its only appetrance, cs en«T#r men
stood the u_ .Lms of t.ie oa ri eipie, then
uiwj lave Ul*u ^i\ tool what later a eared us a nxstciical
f * - | - - JL . - * |
i w  0 . O , ■ . JL . v •
j-.ant then . oints out tnat tn^ mor ^ outcome of 
a.. . txie x. zlc the dsfeat oi ti c evii ri ci le,
o j- - kirigctuil 3 t i n  qxxsis id coj~Xm ie, but
■ ■ , ' m
uu. x dominioix was t.xen o f xere to man ..v. n v .. j . 
f i  Oi-i t ie e v i i  oxu, ><hex*®i. t m w w> cde. l j  xo.u -  ^j  u^<
- - , -—X ut • - ■.. '-i c. . . i ■ >c bvix
, rlncx me xs •_ till in t*ie ^uixu. mid 3 iilx *> e .ri. cu 
o thin ifcrid, end tne t, thej . - ore , w . ..l. •.» who adhere 
vO the ,oou rincx iws should always be re o.red lor 
* w> C X j .,■ X/ <aX x e 1 x X jf,, L. cri f X  C Uki —. — ii J t  X • - BLfi
m  uy tne evil principle.
a .on comes one explicit statement oi rineipie which
K F « 77.
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erlies all Kant’s exposition: ”lnce this vivid mode
of representation which was in its time robably the 
only popular one, is divested of its mystical veil (die 
htllxej it is easy to see that, or is otic 1 urnocec 
itL s] irit rnad rational m aning have been v- lid and 
binding for the whole world and for .11 time, since to 
each man it lies so near at hand that he knows his duty 
towards it. Its meaning is this, that there exists 
absolutely no salvation for man apart fro... the sincerest 
: . > . i ?f , Ly liion *; ri. ipi ' - ; Jif.ro: ition;
that what works against this adoption is not so much the 
suous n ture, which so often receives th© blame, as it 
it a certain self incurred ervereity, or however else 
one nay care to designate this wickedness which the human 
race nas brought upon itself - falsity” .
io summarise x^ant’s position it could be said that 
he regarded her nampf as the context and lramework in 
which all human lives are lived. The btrug le between 
these two principles is the ke^ to understanding human 
behaviour and the necessity for a moral law.
* The struggle between tne principles is a mythological 
way ox setting forth the implication for all human beings, 
individually aim*, collectively of u.*e doctiine that their 
freedom is the freedom to choose between good and evil.
. fore,
in any considelation of rwiigious or thaolo ical concepts, 
if tixey axe oo ue valuable in this life/death struggle, 
priority must be ^iven to their jio.,1 helpfulness. That 
is to say, we should ask of them 'will this or that 
doctrine or idea be mor-11./ helpful in der. . japf?” what
S p. 76.
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is meant here by helpful? tfhat does i t, mean to be
morally helpful? >
1 w^ula surest that to be mor. dry he If iujl means
tnat tne concept concerned wouia nel tne ind to better 
understand the nature of the struggle and now vital it
i. . it might perh&pe also encourage M m  to uopt the 
i or 1 aie oaition ana choose against the evil princi;le. 
inis of cruise is the purpose of want's faith -to give 
men j. eason to choose ior ,ood.
One major problem i. ust be face before tue implications 
of tnis for Kant’s faith and its relation to Christian 
faith can be determined. Can Kant's concept of aer i^amaf 
be credited vith the description C..risti n, or perhaps, 
can ant be justly accused of Gnosticisml This m^st be 
settled before proceeding; any further, ince this concept 
appears ve y important.
This issue is important because the roblem of 
Gnosticism is one form of the general question - how far 
can Christianity be expressed in alien -terminologies 
without lorin g its identity? There are two casic views 
01 gnosticism. There is the view o^ ' . uj itt that 
Gnosticism rose within Chri tianity since the struggle 
between e krly c t olic Christi ns nd Gnostic Christians 
too place as debate within the Church, -at r Gnostics 
were, through the elaborate cosmolo ie. they introduced 
and in which they interpreted Christi n thought, nurkitt 
claims, apologists for Christianity. They were re-inter- 
retinj Christianity in terms of modern science, that is 
to say, modern for their day. On nurkitt's reading of 
u n o s t i c a a line of crixicism could be developed which 
would declare as forms of unocticism, all aixempt^ to
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re-interpret Christianity in contemporary terms. For 
example, in so far as iiudolph Bultmann tries to express 
the significance of the freedom which Christ brings to 
man through the interpretation of Casein found in the 
thought of eidegger, Bultmann could be labelled a 
modern Gnostic. In so far as Kant then tries to interpret 
Christianity in terms of a mor il struggle, he could be 
accused of a form of Gnosticism.
.rufessor Burkitt's view however, 1 not po’ular,
.nd a conservative historian and hew *estament scholar 
such as iroiessor F. - . ,*ruce tends to side on this issue 
with professor Bultmann. howevei, thiw. uoes not completely 
exonerate Kant from the Gnostic charge.
If consideration is £iven to the basic themes of the 
gnostic myth as they are set out by rofessor Jjultmann34 
himself, certain motifs in common may be observed.
According to Professor bultmann, basic Gnosticism 
was a cosmology based upon tne myth that ce tain aemonic 
,/Owers have succeeded in capturin a bein from the realm 
oi light, and from thus original cosmic f 11 resulted the 
imprisonment of this being in a structure which is the 
world as we know it. The world i.. tnen a lac- whore the 
heavenly being is imprisoned by the demonic. salvation 
cornea when another heavenly being in the image of the most 
Iligh comes down from the realms of light, ap caring on 
earth, disguised in human form to avoid reco nition. He 
imparts unosis to his followers so that thej can come 
\ a-ter nim in safety. By this he has out itted the demonic
powers and broken up their world. There is added to this 
the belief that the redeemer and the pneumatic souls
nuitmann Primitive Christianity (Fontana 19&0; 
p. 194-195 ffT
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constitute one bodj and hence whatever happens to lim 
happens to them.
r f ffitdo  ^ it i ■. l> 1 eai ca u j j ■»>, x\^mt £
ideas resemble th# unostic myth, but not of course 
completely. His conception of der ...mor. ,%*iiie based 
upon the Old xes fcauient myth, undoubtedly resembles the 
Btlc myth* ihe manner in which ..is view of the bon 
ol v>oa x-ese—bles the hoavenly being who deieated the 
demonic is clearly reminiscent oi Giiostioisaw ehen .ant 
declares that the descent oi the Oooi rinciple is not 
a conquering of tne evil principle, but a breaking of 
its ower to hold men against their will, -a.<j appears to 
se following the .noetic myth.
owever, other comments ccrulc oe made a jou! Kant’s 
concept oi der nampf. The way in which m t  speaks of
implies the use o f q 
metaphysioal uualis-., which is not a characteristically 
.iblieal viewpoint, k-uc. a dualism in Ci ture *miy be 
traced to the Zoroustrian period of i ifluence in the old 
Testament uurin^ tne litter perio ox the b Ionian 
hxile. The concept of nueiier falling from hoaven, and
*N
a sociated ideas are only a small part yi Biblical 
tradition. she concept oi the * Prince of this world’
. m t  uses, does not belong to the ew .estament. 
This j >. a Gnostic idea, noweve , at this point it should 
. remembered that those men of fait: in bylon.* were
ii one co^ld so style M e m  * Hebrew Gnostics’ who were 
tig in to »ot out the implications of their xaith in 
;ahweh through the media of Persian thought. The^ used 
a contemporary epic about a world flood and so on and 
irom this has arisen tne problem oi inter reting Genesis 
1-la.
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The fact that dif erent traditions even in scripture 
can be examined for their moral insight, nd 11 be seen 
to set out in their own terminology some concept of a 
moral struggl# within man, would surely confirm ant’s 
use of the concept of der Xam:f rather than require him 
co be tried for heresy. May not the validity of his 
methodology be substantiated on the grounds that he is 
giving Christianity’s moral insights expression in a 
universal language?
Furthermore, it could bo argued that ant's thought 
contains robably less Gnosticism and more ethical 
thinking than the hew Testament. ~t. Paul is not free 
irom what coord be called Gnostic forms of expression:
*1 speak God's hidden wisdom, his secret purpose framed 
from the very beginning to brin^; us to our full glory.
The powers that rule the world have neve. n wn it; if 
ti>ey had, they would not have crucified the ~or& of 
glory” .25
St. Paul is here expressing his thought in at least 
the terminology of the unostie myth. Perhaps further 
iUestions might be asked such as ’1l Kenotic theology 
Gnostic?’ 'Is the doctiine of the Boay of Christ
Gnostic.' 'Is i-ant's view oi the JhurcJ  a moral
commonwealth, which is close to the -Id Testam-tnt ideal 
for Israel, less under Gnostic influence than the hew 
Testament idea of the Church, as, for ex i.ple, the Body 
of uhrist?’ one might even go furtner ana a-k 'Is the 
i e.i lost ament idea of the Church not si raj L> a Gnostic 
creation, and in con.radiction to ocsus' iaoa of a Kingdom 
of God?' The implication of this, if answered in the
or. 2 :8  NuiB. Bultmann op. c i t . p. -5 5 .
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affirmative night be that Kant wa.- nearer to the intended 
teachings of Jesus than much of the <ew Testament!
■Li.e <J ohannine doctrine 01 the o, o . whicn xeatured 
eu at? m  ~j in early Onristian thought, was a doctrine 
b: u on one of the most universally reco^niseu concepts
v>a . or . o ohii 1:1-14 ce t inlt . t ins traces
± the Gnostic myth. Therefore, the ^ew Testament writers 
aid not shrink tu borrow froi.. \ variety j. contexts, 
thoughts in which they could express their insights.
nit purpose of this appa ent til. xession is not xo 
tm*ow dust in the air to blind tae observer, but to 
illustrate two points, first, that som early Onristian 
wri ex-s wrote in a ’universalist 1 franc o_ mind, making 
u.^ e of the concepts which had universal cur. ency in the 
period, secondly, Gnostic mythology and terminology as 
L.^ ea in the hew Testament writings should oe accepted 
in tne s uae way th x horoastrian influence and concepts 
were used to express the thought# of Old Testament 
writers, -ince j^ant in many respects appears to draw 
on botn, which may indicate little more xh n that he 
w m  aw-are oi the f rune work of uiscussxon i*. both 
testaments, his views should not ue regarded as suspect 
because prima facxe, he appears to tinged with 
■ ».cs uioil * .
It iw, only just to examine .ant’s tl u lit in its 
entirety. faking sections in isolation (sue.: as the 
concept ox ue. .cam,ib can lead to misunderstanding.
This, j have claimed, was the error in method auopted 
bj the. Commission which attacked Kant’s writings on 
rto^i Ion.
-  260 -
Therefore, .ant’s ethical principle 0 for inter- 
reting the Bible ond dogma cannot be ruled out as being 
a.iy way contrary to Christian f ith. In fact, certain 
aspects of Kant’s attitude - his strong emphasis upon 
the fact that religion is seeing duty as divine demand, 
ana hia insistence upon the need for obedience to the 
Loral -aw to please God - are similar to the message of, 
for example, the prophet Micah, when he says:
"tohat shall 1 bring when I approach the Lord? 
now shall x stoop before iod on high?
Am x to approach Him with whole off.rings or ye rling
calves?
.ill the nord accept thousands of r. ns 
Ur ten thousand rivers of oil?
...hull I ofier my eldest son for own wrongdoing?
Ly children for m, own sin?
God has told you what is good
anu what it is that the ~»ord asks of you?
Only to act justly, to love loyalty, 
to walk wxsely belore your God".37
Allowing for certain differences in eneral outlook 
and foi the fact that -uint would have maintained. .that 
acting justly and loving loyalty was doin^. one’s duty,
(which in K&ttt is walking with dod,) the Btern ethical
3^ R footnote to p. 101 K tnt says ”1 ixi^e the question 
as to whether morality should be e; ounded ccorvxing to 
the Lible or wnether the nible should not rather be 
expounded according to morality”. This he sui ests because 
... the final purpose even of reading these noiy scriptures
.......... is to make men better" Ii Timothy b:16 is adduced
because it adds that Scripture is ’profit ble for doctrine, 
reproofs* improvement  * kc.
37 Kicah o:6-fci KBB.
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demand in bot- Mieah and Kant are com arable demands*
Mieah rejected the ceremonial functions of religion in 
f . >ur of ethical conduct. Kant's attitude was identical 
i ..it rejection of fetish worship, in favour of good 
life conduct - the only true worship.
Allowing then a close similarity betw ;en the old 
xestament prophetic religion and the ethics of Kant, 
tne situation becomes interesting when his rinci le 
evaluation is applied to the teaching of Jesus, 
in c iuoe rt can claim tne sanction 01 old let lament 
tradition. This provides both n illustration of his 
principle in operation, and provides necessary background 
information to explain .is attitua^ to Christology at 
i .or ta_e.
To many Christians, the ethical teaching of Jesus 
is teaching which, for want of a better word, they might 
-end to describe as 'suier-ethical'. The idea is that
’ _ i categories,
nd is therefore a 'higher* ethic than any other. Is 
this so?
ke for example Jesus' pronouncement about killing: 
have learned that our forefathers were tord !<Do net 
conii.lt murder; anyone who co. ..its murder . ust be brought 
to judgement”, nut what 1 tell you is this: Anyone who 
nurses anger again: t his brother must be brought to
judgement Here it would b e  claimed oesus is
transcending the negative Decalogue with a positive 
ethic based on lo e. However, careful examination of 
this view should lead to its rejectio ra her than 
c on! i rm&'t i on.
36 Matthew 5 * 21-22 DiiB
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In the first ilnce, the idea that ^esae xs
rebounding his new ethic on his Ci.n authority requires
support from a quite specific reading of the text in the 
lijrt of certain presuppositions* The fact that he
ecxares "But 1 aay to you .... " does not imply that
l*. oral sanction which these new laws fav^ emanate
fi i fin as their souice. In fact, it could be equally
rguec , and in light uf the moral sanction «Lich the
er l e . if i ;ht be argued \ ith r -ter 
force, that the ethical norms propounded by desus are 
able to stand by themselves without the justification 
of His uthority. This is so, because the ethical demand 
ifc expressed in them in perhaps a highly idealised form.
/mother important point is that in the course of 
rejuvenating tne ethics of Judaism, t.wsus did not simply 
replace an ethic of duty with one o_ lov^. The Cld 
Test ment tradition of loving one’s friends, and hating 
one's enemies he declared should be replaced'by the maxim 
of loving one's enemies. Put another way, this could 
merely be regarded as the e . ion < the moral require­
ment io be dutiful towards one's n*-i_.iooui . is it 
soncuiv o_lu that men should have moral duty to hate 
anyone? An institution like primitive Judaism, to 
rosect t*xe purxt^ of the nation may have 1 id this upon 
a s ct - - it *
institutional demand, and not a moral one. Jesus is 
then introducing the moral demand i coxitr st to the 
morally uron institutional demand.
t x: nt' a view ox the priority of tne ethical may then
justified and applied with justification to the manner 
iii whicn oenus propounded his teachj.^ , and illustrated
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with instances from the 'Sermon on the Mount' (ae that 
collection of teachings is normally designated). Jesus 
from an ethical standpoint assails many o, the dubious 
icmands of institutional religion, and is in f ct, 
Criticising a churchly faith from the standpoint of the 
. ion wf i’o ..on. Thu ctnic is
something which is implicit within humanity itself - 
shrined in conscience. Jesus merely reminded the
of the duty all men have towards their neighbours, 
his universal appeal lies in the fact that he universally 
extended the class of persons who could be celled 
ei ghbours.
l , on t... ... ' ,
would be a •ossible line for exegetic&l work on the 
teaching of Jesus. The view is not without features to 
commend, it, because it appeals to consciex *e as the canon 
of judgement, and not to textual sc .olurs and archaeolo­
gists nor to Biblical historians. v lue of
Christ*B teachin^ becomes a free mo.al faith, dependent 
not upon the uncertainties of ib^ic 1 scholarshi nor 
upon uncertain historical considerations. This, of 
course, was r_ant's purpose, home might feel that it is 
an inadequate view, however, at least it c n be called 
onristian, which was what this section of the enquiry 
to discover.
ICant's approach to the taeolo* real roble*^ in 
general t -kes him within the area of thought that would
w ealxcu Christi n, in distinctio what would 




rejection of his work was the result o'.' premature 
U gem« it* and within the basic pri ci lo. oi' Kent’s 
osition, there are hints of a universalis^. The nature 




The purpose of this section of the ar ;ument is to 
analyse certain passages in Kant1.. writings with a view 
to uetectin^ the manner in which he applies his principle 
of ethical evaluation towards the exposition of a 
Christian universalism.
as has already been said, Christianity throughout 
its loiio history, and particularly in the era of the 
church fathers, had an ambiguous relation to non-Christian 
thought. It had a tension within itself between the view 
of those who wished Christian thought to subsist in an 
exclusivist manner, on an exclusivi^t (which usually 
meant niblicalj basis, and those who wished Christian 
thought to exist on an all-inclusive univers list basis.1
ihe universalist attitude is well summarised by 
-illich: "The church lathers emphasised the universal .
resence of the Logos, the *ord, the rinciple of divine
i Consider lor example the conflict between Paul of 
c.-mosata (Bishop of Antioch 20GAD, and Cri *en of Alexandria 
over certain formulations of the faith’. It is documented
ii. ijict^mann1 s A History of the ~.arl. Church (meridian 
Books lybl, p. 99 '*....C n's system of
thought appeared to oe repellent to him, and he felt it 
ou^ht to be attacked; In fact, he would have nothing at 
air to Jo with movements dominated by philosophy, ihe 
sibiicai account of Jesus occu led the centre of hie
thought ......... " The theologian Lucian, teacher of
iirius, who commenced a debate with Alexander the Bishop 
of Alexandra in 51C, Lad been a pupil of Paul of Camosata. 
ihe background to these disputes is the general conflict 
between the ntiochene and Alexandrian outlooks on every­
thing. As Leiizm&nn comment a : TfAl#xa j ia and Antioch 
had always been rival cities, hatiu r I envying one 
another, and matters had not changed in the Christian era. 
Hence we iinu them also as the rallying points of two 
antagonistic tw ee of theology........ " ( . 1 0 0 )
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self-manifestation in all religions and cultures. The 
-i.ogos is present everywhere like the seed on the land, 
and this presence is a preparation for the central 
appearance of the Logos in a historical .erson, the
Christ ..........  They tried to chov; the convergent
lines between the Christian mesea ,e an^ the intrinsic 
uestc of the pagan religions. In do so, they used 
not onl„ the large body of literature in which the pagans 
had criticised their o.a religions (for example, the 
ree philosophers) but also made ‘ree use of the positive 
creations from the soil of the pagan religions. On the 
level of theological thought, they took into Christianity 
some of the highest conceptualisations of the Hellenistic 
and more indirectly, of the classic 1 Green feeling towards 
life - terms like pfeysis (natura;, ostasis ^substance) 
ousia (power of being,; orosopon (persona, not person in 
our sense; and above all logos (word and rational 
structure in the later Ltoic sense;. They were not afraid 
to call the God to whom they prayed as the . ather of 
Jesus, the Christ, the unchangeable one' .
The obvious difference between these early univers- 
lists wad Kant must be this. They were reachers and 
declarers of the faith. They wished, i i the interests 
of communication and better understandin, , to speak in 
a universal way to make the faith mor. acceptable to a 
world steeped in Greek thought. .ant, however, was a 
philosopher of the ..qfklg.run:?. who hile being immersed 
in learning and in the disciplines of reason* saw 
Christianity as a reasonable mode of belief. He wished 
to remain a Christian, but on a universalist rather than
Tillich Christianity and the encounter of World 
xieUnions p. 34-55•
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an exclusivist oasis. It now remains to examine whether 
or not his writings will support this view. Since the 
early Christian controversies centred upon rival interpre­
tations of the person of Christ, the key to all univers­
alism, it is appropriate to begin with Kant's view on the 
Son of God as he states them in Book II of R.
Section one of Book II, which concerns the "Legal 
Claim on the Good Principle to sovereignty over man" 3 
opens with a discussion about the personification of the 
good principle: "Mankind (rational earthly existence in
general) in its complete moral perfection is that which 
alone can render a world the object of a Divine decree 
and the end of creation".4 The idea of moral perfection 
proceeds from God Kimself. It is not a created thing, 
but "the word through which all things are".5 it is 
our duty to elevate ourselves to this ideal, to the 
"archetype of the moral disposition in all its purity".^
Since mankind is not the author of this ideal, in 
that it presents itself to his mind as originating else­
where, then it could be argued that it lias "come down" 
to us. Man, by nature, having a radical innate evil 
cannot be spoken of as raising himself beyond what he 
is, without the help of such an ideal. Therefore the 
idea of the descent of the good principle into a human 
form in order to make visible the moral ideal may be 
regarded as a manner in which to speak of the significance
3 R p. 54.
4 R p. 54.
5 John 1:1-2.
6 R p. 54.
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of the Christian doctrine of the humiliation of the 
won of God. Kant is implicitly arguing that the view of 
Jesus as the Head of the Church, the Son of God, (or 
indeed any view which particularises Him as the possession 
of a group who have special knowledge by revelation/ 
should be replaced by this broader view - namely of Jesus 
as the personification of the moral ideal for all 
humanity•
The full implications of Kant's position become 
clearer when his discussion of the objective reality of 
the idea is considered along with the discussion of 
various difficulties which the idea encounters. He 
begins with a remark which sounds reminiscent of the 
KRV and the KPV: "xrom the practical point of view, this 
idea is completely real in its own right, for it resides 
in our morally-legislative reason. We ought to conform 
to it; consequently we must be able to do so".^ This 
view is in line with kant's justification of the Ideas 
of God and Immortality as 'objective for practical
reason' only. M  we need no empirical example to
make the idea of a person morally well-pleasing to God 
our archetype; this idea aa an archetype is already 
present in our reason".® "Moreover, if anyone, in order 
to acknowledge for his imitation a particular individual
as such an example of conformity to that idea ..........
. , . „ goes on to re nire, as credentials to belief, that 
this individual performed miracles or had them performed 
for him - he who would demand this thereby confesses his 
own moral unbelief, that is, his lack of faith in virtue".^
6 R p. 56
9 R p. 56
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Any historical proof of the reality of the human 
manifestation of the moral archetype is disc rded as D o t h  
unnecessary and irrelevant. It is unnecessary because 
the moral ideal already exists within our practical 
reason. It is irrelev nt because it lifts the mind from 
the moral ideal to historical considerations which are 
q-ite distinct irom the problem o: living ccording to 
the moral ideal.
The real pioblem is how we ap ro riate tne moral 
disposition exemplified by the moral rchety narlier
he says thal "inn may then hope to become cce^ . table to 
cod tand so be saved/ txj.rougn a jractic 1 faith in this 
►von of sod (so far as ne is represented as having taken 
u. on Himself man's nature/. In other words, he alone is 
entitled to look upon himself as n object not unworthy 
of Divine approval who is conscious oi euaii a moral 
disposition as enables himself to hav. a well grounded 
confidence in himself, and to believe that under like 
temptations and afflictions ^so far ls these are made the 
touchstone of that idea} he v.ould ue loy i unswervingly 
to the archetype of humanity and by f ithful imitation 
rum ,in orae to his example". ^
Tnis passage paves the way for the eneral problem 
of the nature oi saving faith in this i^e of pr-ctical 
re m on along with the relation of the moral agent to
thl  r 1 archetype in time. The . . ropriating
the mor .1 disposition Lant states in txic m Oi u of three 
*uestions*^: first, how is it possible in wime. for a
1 0 Ii p. 6 0 .
1 1 H p. 55.
1 2 R p. 60 ff.
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man to fulfil the requirements of a law when the gap 
separating "good which we ought to effect in ourselves 
from the evil whence we advance is infinite, and the act 
itself, of conforming our course of social life to the 
holiness of the law is impossible of execution in any 
given time?"^3
Secondly,*-4 he asks, given the possibility of a 
change of disposition, how can a man be assured of tne 
permanence of his changed disposition? The third problem 
is the most difficult of all to answer.^  riven if a man 
does change his moral disposition, and so to speak under­
goes a moral conversion, and thereafter does nothing 
wrong, how can such a man make satisfactory reparation 
for the evil he has done before his change of heart? 
kant etates the third question quite unequivocally, 
recognising it as a serious consideration which must be 
answered: "whatever a man may have done in the way of 
adopting a tood disposition, and indeed however stead­
fastly he may have persevered in conduct conferrriabU Ja 
such a disposition, he nevertheless started from evil, 
and this debt ne can by no possibility wipe out. For he 
cannot regard the fact that he incurs no new debts 
subsequent to his change of heart as equivalent to having 
discharged his old one".^°
Kant's solution to these problems depends largely 
upon that very important distinction between Ihenom^na 
and -iQumena. In fading the question of how a man in time, 
fulfils the requirements of a law, when in fact, the gap
-^3 r  p. 6c.
1 4  R  p .  61.
1 5 R p. 65.
R p. 6 6 .
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between himself and the law is one which cannot be 
closed in time, Kant argues that although actions must 
be viewed as part of a causal process (part of a cause 
effect sequence), God perceives the noumenal self as 
against the phenomenal self. He perceives that true 
moral conversion is something which does not rightly 
belong in time, in the phenomenal realm, but is something 
which belongs to the exercise of freedom when man is 
considered as a member of the noumenal order. Therefore, 
through an intellectual intuition of which He alone is 
capable, man's change of heart is known by God. God sees 
the new disposition, and therefore is pleased.
This use of the distinction between sensible and 
intelligible does appear to stretch the meaning of the 
distinction as originally drawn. However, if the 
distinction is viewed as Kant saying that there is 
another way of looking at human wills and intentions 
which numan beings are incapable of seeing objectively, 
then its significance and importance becomes clearer. 
Further, while the original distinction pointed to the 
reality of a noumenal order, of which we can know nothing, 
and this present use of the distinction implies some 
knowledge of that realm, it should be remembered only 
God is capable of an intelligible intuition. From the 
numan point of view, the unknowability of the noumenal 
is safeguarded.
The second question regarding the permanency of the 
moral disposition is answered by the suggestion that only 
a retrospective comparison between life before and life 
after conversion to the moral law can furnish material 
for a solution. "And so tnat good and pure disposition
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of which we are conscious (and of which we may speak as a 
good spirit presiding over us) creates in us, though only 
indirectly, a confidence in its own ermanence and stability, 
and is our Comforter (Paraclete;whenever oar lapses make 
us apprehensive of its constancy".17 Therefore, hope in 
our own growing moral strength is at most what we may rely 
upon.
however, most important, Dut most difficult, is the 
third question ivant poses about how man can make reparation 
for past evil. while Kant poses a solution to the problem
in the context of his discussion of the Con of God, he
takes up the problem in Book 111 of R, in the context of 
his discussion of the Church. Perhaps he felt a little
dissatisfied with his earlier solution, but comparison of
the two is important for its bearing upon his view of the 
Con of God.
In the solution in look II, he falls back on the 
distinction between henouiena and Noumena. The punishment 
takes place during the change of heart in this way that 
considered phenomenally, it is the same man who exists 
before and after moral conversion, but considered noumenally, 
it is a new man who has come alive after the moral 
conversion. Considered as a sensible entity, man persists 
before and after conversion, and as part of the causal 
process, retains his identity. Considered as an intelli­
gible entity, there is a new man.
R p. 65.
18 Kant brings certain passages from the New Testament into his account ox moral conversion, liis use of these texts would appear to be quite in order and exegetically correct: e.g. Colossians 3:9-10 "...now that you nave discarded the old nat-xre with its deeds and have put on the new nature..." nphesians 4 : 2 2  & <_4 "...you must lay aside that old human nature ... and put on the new nature of God's creating" 
Romans o: 2 & b "we died to sin: how can we live in it any longer? ... the man we once were lias been crucified with Christ ..." cf. Galatians 5:^4. ((Quotations from NKB)
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"And this moral disposition which in all its purity 
(like unto the purity of the Son of God; the man has made 
his own (or if we personify this idea; this 3on of God 
Himself bears as vicarious substitute the guilt of sin 
for him, and indeed for all who believe ^practically, in 
Iiim; as Laviour he lenders satisfaction to the supreme 
justice by Lis sufferings and death; and as advocate He 
makes it possible for men to hope to appear before their 
judge as justified. Only it must be remembered that (in 
this mode of representation; the suffering which the new 
man, in becoming dead to the old must accept throughout 
life, is pictured as a death endured once and for all by 
the representative of mankind".--
The concept of atonement iB introduced into this 
discussion, as having two morally relevant aspects. First, 
it is a symbol of the need for man to atone personally 
for his "pre-conversion sins", secondly, it serves as a 
reminder of the need lor man to suffer after his conversion 
as part ol his duty to obey the law. Kant asks, however, 
whether this "deduction of the idea of a justification of 
an individual who is indeed guilty, but who has changed 
his disposition into one well pleasing to God possesses 
any practical use whatever?"
he sees in it " •.. • a negative benefit to religion
and morality ...... For we learn from this deduction that
only the supposition of a complete change of heart allows 
us to think of the absolution, at the bar of heavenly 
justice of the man burdened with guilt".21 No penances
ly R p. 69.
2 0 R p. 70.
21 R p . 70-71.
- 274 -
or prayers can supply the change of heart. If it is 
absent, then nothing can appeal on mtn’e behalf at the 
bar of Divine justice. Kant places great emphasis upon 
the conscience of man as his own best judge, since "a 
man cannot bribe his own reason”.2* Therefore, bringing 
this discussion into focus, the practical faith in this 
bon of God, with which this section began, becomes 
ultimately faith in uncorrupted human reason, reason in 
its practical aspect.
In the context of Book III, in the course of 
discussing the relation between pure rational faith and 
the various ecclesiastical faiths which partially convey 
and express it, again takes up the theme of the
nature oi saving faith, and this time introduces the term 
atonement and in addition, the term redemption. Faith in 
atonement is faith of course in waat man himself cannot 
accomplish - namely, undoing lawfully before a Divine 
uudge, all evil actions performed in the past. Faith 
in redemption refers to what himself ought to, and there­
fore can do, namely, lead a life conformable to duty so 
that he may become well pleasing to God in the future. 
Both these elements are constituent parts of one faith. 
The onuy way, Kant argues in which the connection between 
them may be necessarily asserted is by affirming that one 
may be derived from the other. This would mean saying 
that either from absolution of evil results good life 
conduct, or that good life conduct results ii absolution. 
This is the antinomy of saving faith.
22 R p. 72
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23The antinomy is stated in this form:
Can it be believed by anyone conscious of sin in 
himself that mere belief in atonement will make him 
live a good life in the future?
or
How can sinful man with the nature he has, make 
himself well pleasing to God and indeed a new creature 
without believing that God's justice has been satisfied 
by an Atonement?
with regard to the first part, Kant says that "... it is 
quite impossible to see how a reasonable man can in all 
seriousness believe that he only needs to credit the 
news of an atonement rendered for him to accept this 
atonement utiliter (as the lawyers say) in order to 
regard his guilt as unnioilateu - indeed so completely 
annihilated ^to the very root) that good life-conduct, 
for which he has hitherto not taken the least pains, will 
in the future be the inevitable consequence of this faith 
and this acceptance of proffered favour. iSo thoughtful 
person can bring himself to uelieve thiB ..... " ^
On the second part of the antinomy, he says that
^  The term ANTINOMY originates in the KPV. Kant defines 
an antinomy in the following terms: "all transcendental
illusion of pure reason rests on dialectical inferences 
whose schema is supplied by logic in the three formal
species of syllogism ..... " B 432 The categorical
syllogism gives rise to the paralogism, and the hypothe­
tical syllogism gives rise to the antinomies. The antinomy 
<rrses in any situation when there is a search for an 
ultimate ground, since a hypothetical proposition alone can 
express the relation between ground and consequent. To 
draw conclusions from a schema provided by logic, therefore 
is illusion.
^4 R p. 107.
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"....  if he cannot regard justice which he has provoked
against himself as satisfied through atonement by another, 
and cannot regard nimself reborn, so to speak, through 
this faith and so for the first time be able to enter 
upon a new course oi life - and t.iis would follow from 
his union with the good principle - upon what is he to 
base his hope of becoming a man pleasing to God?"^
Facing these questions, Kant comes to the conclusion that
"....  faith in a merit not his own must precede every
eflort to good works”. J
Theoretically speaxing, these questions must transcend 
the capacity oi reason, and since tne ground of our 
freedom is inscrutable, we c oinot tackle the problem from 
that an^le. Considered, however, as a problem of 
practical reason, this question may be asked. "which 
comes first in tne exercise of freedom - faith in what 
God has done on Our behalf, or what we must do to become 
worthy of God's assistance?"
nant argues that from the standpoint of the pure 
religion of reason, it is what we must do to become 
worthy of God's assistance which comes first. However, 
from the point of view of the ecclesiastical, or churchly 
faiths, their historical character requires that they 
snould see the action of God on our behalf as coming 
first in the exercise of freedom. He says that 
"Ecclesiastical faith, being historical, rightly starts 
with the belief in the atonement, but since it merely 
constitutes the vehicle for pure religious faith (in 
which lies the real end; the maxim of action which in
2 5 R p. 108.
2 6 R p. 1C6.
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religious faith (being practical/ is the condition, 
must take the lead and the maxim of knowledge or theo­
retical faith, must merely bring about the strengthening 
and consummation of the maxim of action".^7
Churchly faiths naturally see belief in the atonement 
at a duty from which springs good life conduct. From the 
point of view of pure religious faith, good life conduct 
is tn. duty, and atonement becomes merely a hope. There­
fore, those who hold a churchly faith, could be accused 
of a superstitious belief in the need for some kind of 
divine worship in addition to good life conduct, and 
therefore of either indifference to the moral demand, 
or complete moral unbelief. Alternatively, those who 
respect the moral demand, and who believe that ^ood life 
course and obedience to duty is what God requires, could 
be accused of "naturalistic unbelief" and appropriately, 
of indifference to revelation.
How can this antinomy be resolved? It is in solving 
this that Kant clarifies his attitude towards the Bon of 
God, and brings the statement of his position to 
completion. He begins his answer by drawing a contrast 
in points of view with regard to belief in a ^on of God.
He says: "The living faith in the archetype of humanity
well pleasing to God (in the Bon of God; is bound up, in 
itself, with a moral idea of reason so far as this serves 
us not only as a guide line, but also as an incentive; 
hence it matters not whether I stait with it as a rational 
laith, or with tne principle of the good course of life.
In contrast, the faith in the selfsame archetype in its 
(phenomenal; appearance (faith in the God-^an) as an
R p. 109.
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empirical (historical; faith, is not interchangeable 
with the principle of the good course life (which must 
be wholly rationalj and it would be quite a different 
matter to wish to start with such faiths and to deduce
the good course of life from it .......... yet in the
appearance of the God-han it is not that in Ilim which 
strikes the senses and can be known through experience,
but rather the archetype lying in our reason ..........
Here then are not two principles which in themselves 
so differ that to begin with the one or the other would 
be to enter upon opposing paths, but only one and the same 
practical idea from which we take our start, this idea 
representing the archetype now as found in God and 
proceeding from H i m ....
The distinction between noumenal anu phenomenal 
again plays'a •rominent part, and of course lies at the 
foundation of the distinction which Kant is drawing. The 
vital step in Kant's argument, and it is this which lies 
at the heart of nis universalism, is in the affirmation, 
that in the appearance of the God-Man, what is striking 
about Him is not his empirical aspect, namely his existence 
and actions which may be known by the senses. Bather it 
is that in Him which strikes the archetype lying in human 
reason which recognises and identifies Him. This is what 
gives rise to redemption and atonement. This is what 
Kant means by saving faith - faith which reason recognises 
the embodiment of an archetype in human form.
Clement J. ..ebb succinctly summarises Kant's solution
of the antinomy in this ways "....  our difficulty will
vanish if for an historical belief in Christ and the
2fa R p. 109-110.
\atonement wrought by Ilim we substitute a rational belief 
in the Lon of God as the archetype of a humanity well 
pleasing to God, for this kind of belief in the Son of 
God is not distinguishable from a life directed to the 
attainment of that ideal" .^9
Kant's position is that practical faith in the Son 
of God is in fact, iaith in practical reason to direct 
us on a good course of life. However, having followed 
Kant in his two tortuous statements of the doctrine, 
the question must now be faced - does this square with 
any tradition of Christian thought?
There is in fact here not one, but a cluster of 
inter-related problems which require to be disentangled. 
First there is the question of Kant's doctrine of the 
Lon of Goa as a moral archetype, and the manner in which 
this can be the centre of a universalist position, 
secondly, theia is the discussion of both atonement and 
redemption, ^the antinomy of saving faith) and the related 
question of whether or not Kant's view of atonement could 
be callea Christian in .Jiy usage Oj. the term. Finally, 
there is the problem implicit in ail this of Kant's view 
of the historical Jesus, the value and significance of 
his earthly lire. He places such emphasis upon the idea 
of the moral archetype that the historical manifestation 
of that archetype ceases to be of importance, or so it 
would appear. views on the status to be afforded to
^  Kant sees the antinomy expressed historically in the 
struggles of cult followers, and believers in morality.
For example, in the struggle between the Old Testament 
prophetic religion and the priestl cult, he sees the 
antinomy. The historical resolution he sees as in the 
lut^re, when the pure reli0ion of reason will replace all 
churchly faiths.
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or witheld from the historical person are important.
raking these problems in order, there is first the 
need to give a general assessment to rant's position 
that the Lon of God is the embodiment of the idea of 
moral perfection which lies within all. This position 
has certain distinct advantages. In the first place, it 
shifts the nn aning of the term Lon of God into a termin­
ology and into a framework of thought which makes it 
capable of both universal understanding and acceptance. 
Secondly, kant argues that the notion of a moral arche­
type in our reason is what the concept of a Son of God 
appeals to, and by this he means that reason in its 
practical employment can recognise this on of God, and 
that faith in Him is therefore rational and justifiable, 
ihe third merit of Kant's line of interpretation is that 
it relates the significance of the Lon of God to the 
moral agent who perceives Him as such. The moral agent 
sees the concept of a Lon of Cod before him, and this 
awakens him to become conscious of the moral ideal within 
his own reason. The faith in the Lon of God becomes then 
the individual's faith in nimself to attain to the moral 
ideal which he knows he is capable of fulfilling. It is 
at this stage that the problem of atoning for the past 
emerges. However, lsavin^, this problem for the moment, 
and concentrating solely upon the significance Kant 
attaches to the Lon of God idea, the universalist 
pos, ibiiities o^ the idea are its most valuable feature. 
Christianity may then be stripped of its particularities, 
and expressed in terms which all men can both recognise 
and understand. Kant would maintain that the moral ideal 
is universal symbol. Since it concerns reason in its
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practical employment, this universal symbol appeals to 
human reason, and therefore to all men. This is how 
kant universalises the significance of the Bon of God.
The difficulty in this osition lies, I think, not
in this aspect of its exposition, but in that part which 
concerns atonement, and the problem of how the present
decision to live morally is related to the individual's
past.
Kant's account of the atonement as stated earlier, 
which attempts to see it in an ethical context may be 
contrasted to the early eastern rathers of the Church, 
whose account of the atonement attempted to lift it into 
the wider terms of Greek thought. While the theory of a 
transaction between God and the devil was the common 
form in which the idea was expounded, it would not be 
improper to saj that the thinkers of tne ^astern Church 
saw the weakness and the limitations of such an idea, and 
in their own theories expounded it according to different 
principles. For example, Irenaeus combined a moral and 
a mystical line of thought about tne atonement and 
redemption which if read carefully, is capable of a much 
broader interpretation than at first sight seems possible. 
For example: "Binee the lord thus has redeemed us through 
His own blood giving His soul for our souls, and Lis flesh 
for our flesh, and has also poured out the Spirit of the 
Father for the union and communion of God and man, 
imparting God to men by means of the spirit, and on the 
other hand, attaching man to God by His own incarnation, 
and bestowing upon us at his coming, immortality durably 
and truly, by means of communion with God".50
5U Irenaeus Adv. Kaer. v 1, i
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• In this passage, it is to be noted that the life of 
Christ is looked u on in its entirety, a m  the whole life 
i>. the means whereby believers are s ved. Therefore, no 
rticu.7 v aspect of the urn n existence o hrist is 
given special Significance. For tai rle, special 
i ortanco 11. not attached, to Lis death for the purposes 
tenement or faith. Therefore, the possibilities of 
r^lati antfs idea and that of Ircr.aeus are increased 
because both regard the Lon of G-od manifestation in its 
totality.
in addition, the myntic_i vein in Irenaeus which
u. ioec man with God and uod with * ux, while appearing to
conflict with ICant ’ s views on leli^iou.^ e^.eiience, may
will be interpreted in ethical terms. Cod ovcreoaes the
d vil, or in ^ant's terminology, the evil principle, and
man, in God defeats the evil principle also. Lan does
not stand outside God's action in Christ, but man is in
fact intimately and directly and specifically involved
in the action. Other of the earl^ fathers - bstantiate
31this type of view and interpretation of Christ.
W i d e  1
compatible wi«h .want's ethical all-inclusiveness, and 
this is ail that the argument can demonstrate. By the 
sane token as tne patristic tnealo, y c n be called 
Christian, in spite of counter clains, .ant's evaluation 
of the -on oi Goa rs entitled to recognised also as a 
atjle of Cixristian faith.
now .we may turn to nant's view*. on wre historio 
manifestation oi the Church's faith - i.e. tr..e historical 
-vente of tne liie and death oi eesus, ana the doctrines
^ee A^pcnaix a .;
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therewith connected. Iiis basic attitude may be
summarised in these words: "..... the presence of this
archetype in the human soul is in itself sufficiently 
incom nehensible without our adding to its supernatural 
origin the assumption that it is liypostasised in a 
particular person".3
Kant is saying that the moral archetype in human 
reason is really enough without hypostasising the ideal 
in the form of a historically existing person. However, 
he does discuss certain historical problems, such as the 
Virgin Birth. The idea of a virgin birth, the idea of 
someone born free from the in ,ete propensity to evil is 
"an idea of reason, accommodating itself to an instinct 
which is hard to explain yet which cannot be disowned, 
and is moral too. For we regard natural generation 
since it cannot occur without sensual pleasure on both 
sides and since it also seems to relate us to the common 
anim .1 species far too closely for the dignity of humanity, 
as something of which we should be ashamed (and it is 
certai.ily thas idea which gave rise to the notion that 
the monastic state is holy; and which therefore signifies 
for us something unmoral, irreconcilable with perfection 
in man, and yet ingrafted in man's nature and so innerited 
also by his descendants as an evil predisposition, well 
suited to this confused view (on the one side merely 
sensuous, yet upon the other moral, and therefore 
intellectual) is this idea of a birth, dependent upon 
no sexual intercourse (a virgin birth) of a child 
encumbered with no moral b l e m i s h ..........
52 k p. 5 7 .
55 xi p. 74-75.
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Kant objects to this doctrine because first of the 
dubious view of sex which it implies. He objects to it 
also because it is not morally helpful. Rather impatient
of all the argument which surrounds it, he asks: 11.....
of what use is all this theory pro and contra when it 
suffices for practical purposes to place before us as a 
pattern this idea taken as a symbol of mankind raising 
itself above temptation to evil (and withstanding it 
victoriously)?"34
The other comment which must be made on this doctrine 
is that Rant refers to it when he is in the course of 
discussing the narrative within which Scripture expounds 
der Xampf, and therefore, the moral struggle is used to 
evaluate the concept.
a s  with the Virgin Birth,3b so with some other of 
the nistorical events of Jesus' existence. On the subject 
of the Resurrection and Ascension, he says that while the 
,ublic recoru of the life of tiesus ende with his unmerited, 
and yet meritorious cieath, the "more secret records^ added 
as a sequel, of liis Kessuiection and Ascension, which 
took place before the eyes only of his intimates, cannot 
be used in the interest of religion within the limits of 
reason alone, without doin^ violence to their historical 
evaluation. (If one taxes these events merely as ideas 
oi reason, they would signify the commencement of 
another liie and entrance into the seat of salvation
34 r p . 7 5 .
35 want's evaluation of the Vir in Birth and the other 
events in Jesus' life should be taken together, tohile 
with regard to certain aspects of his discussion, he could 
be accused oi Bocetism the over-all perspective should 
not be forgotten - namely the moral struggle.
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i.e. into the society of the all good,. This is so 
not merely because this added sequel is an historical 
narrative (for the story which precedes it is that also) 
but because taken literally it involves a concept i.e. 
of the materiality of all worldly beings, which is indeed 
very well suited to man's rnoue oi sensuous representation 
but which is most burdensome to reason in its faith 
regarding the future".36
All the implications of this rather difficult 
passage may not be easy to list, but the general stand­
point seams clear. He asserts that the Gospel writers 
were claiming tnat the Resurrection and Ascension, (which 
ivant regards as private sequels to the public events of 
Jesus' liie; were events on a par with the other events 
recorded similarly. Then he goes on to say that if 
these matteis are taken literally, they become really, 
in effect, the accommodation of our views to a materialism 
which misses the point that rational beings are 
essentially spiritual. It could be argued that Kant, in 
his emphasis upon the moral evaluation of these doctrines 
was trying to see in them something deeper than the mere 
historical consideration of them can afford. The Virgin 
Birth is a shallow and a mythological expression of the 
significance of the Incarnation. The rejection of the 
materialist aspects of these doctrines which Kant claims 
clouds people's minds to the fact that rational beings 
are spiritual beings, is a rejection of the historical 
problems created by these ideas in favour of a moral 
interpretation of them which can enlighten man in his 
moral struggle.
R p. 119-120 footnote.
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Several contemporary theologians" and Biblical 
scholars have, like Kant, emphasised the significance 
of these events as against their actual historicity.
Kudclph Bultmann points out the significance of the 
Resurrection as something more important than the manner 
of its occurrence. However, it is doubtful if he would 
join Kant in going so far as to ask whether or not the 
historical manifestations were really necessary, since 
we* have the archetype In our minds.
Kant’s position is in this respect rather extreme, 
and it is not surprising that in this way, he did incur 
the wrath of the Berlin Commission and Frederick william 
himself. .owever, a distinction should be drawn between 
how he speaks in his philosophical account of the moral 
conflict, and how he speaks of the historical account. 
Lcripture speaks of a narrative, and Kant by philosophically 
evaluating that narrative is attempting to justify tne 
ideas which are expressed in that form. He offers a 
philosophical exposition of the Christian doctrine of 
the Son of Cod. Ivian recognises the Son of Cod because 
he has an archetype in his mind of such an ideal. He 
has this to aid him in the moral struggle, horal 
necessity is the key to i^ant’s defence and exposition 
of theological concepts. If no moral necessity exists,
37 hultmann History of the Uynoptic Tradition (Blackwell 
1 9 6 3 ; "laux knows nothing afcout the empty tomb, which 
does not imply that the story wa3 no longer current in 
his day, out most probably that it was a subordinate theme 
with no significance for the official Kerygma”. p. 290.
Clincher Bornkamm Jesus oi Nazareth (Hodder <& 
^toughuon 19oj>; "..... it follows that we are to under­
stand tne master stories too as testimonies of faith and 
not as records and chronicles, and that it is the message 
of easter we must seek in tne master stories", p. 1 8 3 .
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how can revelation justify what reason sees as needless?
However, ^ant sees justification for such concrete 
conjepts and hypostatisations, in the limitations of the 
human intellectual capacity: "It is indeed a limitation
of human reason, and one which is inseparable from it, 
that we can conceive of no considerable moral worth in 
the actions of a personal being without representing 
that person or hie manifestation in a human guise".3®
He illustrates this idea by reference to the famous
statement of divine Love contained in John 3 Jib. This
he calls a schematism of analogy, by means of which we
may ascend from the sensible to the supersensible, but
only for the purposes of making a concept intelligible
if we cannot otherwise think it. io transform this
schematism into a schematism of objective determination,
by means of whion we would infer that what we have
schematised possesses the properties of the analogy by
means of which we think it, and thus extend our knowledge,
is mere antx-io omorpnism, and nas "irom the moral point
39of view tin ielision; most disastrous consequences".''
As apiLLiea to the Christian doctrine of the 1'rinity, 
Kant makes the observation that 11. •.. if this very faith 
(in a divine tri-unity; were to be regarded not merely 
as a representation of a practical idea but as a faith 
which is to describe what God is in Himself, it would be 
a mystery transcending all human concepts and hence a 
mystery of revelation, unsuited to man’s powers of
comprehension..........  Faith in it, regarded as an
extension of tne theoretical knowledge of the divine 
nature would be merely the acknowledgement of a symbol
R p. 5 9 footnote.
39 R p.
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of ecclesiastical faith which is quite comprehensible 
to men, or which, if they think they can understand it, 
would be anthropomorphic ..... ' ^  Kant, however, is 
naturally willing to attempt to see some moral utility 
in the idea of a Trinity, and by careful consideration, 
he detects a trinity of experience v/ithin the moral life 
itself. Man is called through the moral law to life 
characterised by obedience to the law. The strength of 
the demand of the moral law in him gives dim hope that 
he can satisfy the will to goodness within him. All 
through his experience, reason continually judges him 
and urges him to fulfil what he knows is his obligation. 
Therefore, mor 1 experience gives him first a demand, 
then a hope, and finally a judgement. Kant speaks of 
this experience in other terms: ’The hi -hest goal of
moral perfection of moral creatures - a goal to which 
man can never completely attain - is love of the law.
The equivalent in eligion of this idea would be an
article of faith "God is love”: in Him we can revere the
loving God ( .hose love is that of moral approbation of
men so £i r as they neasure up to His Holy ^aw) - the 
41rather". Then ..ant adds that the archetype of humanity, 
his "all inclusive idea” ma^ be regarded as the Son, and 
finally "so far as He makes this approbation dependent 
upon men’s agreement with the condition of that approving
love and so reveals lcve as based upon wisdom, we can
4-2revere the Holy Ghost . 1
This thought is made into a systematic moral
4 0 R p. 133.
4 1 R p. 136.
4 2 R p. 136.
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evaluation in these terms: 11....  the universal true
religious belief conformable to tnis requirement of 
practical reason is bolief in God (1 / as the omnipotent 
Creator of Heaven and ^arth i.e. morally as holy 
legislator as reserver of the human race, its 
benevolent huler and morkkl Guardian (5) as Administrator4.3of His own holy laws i.e. as righteous Judge". This 
brings together the legislative, executive, and juridical 
functions of the moral Governor of the Universe, and of 
course, it is a Trinitarian scheme. This particular 
statement underlines want’s view that theological concepts 
require moral evaluation in order to set them in a 
meaningful and useful context. He offers an exposition 
of the Trinity which is given in ethical terms, and there­
fore capable of universal expression. This is the 
characteristic feature of his statement of the Trinity, 
and it is capable of universal understanding and acceptance.
To summarise, Kant offers in the course of his 
argument, a general framework, namely der i.ampf - man’s 
moral struggle, within which he finds the key to 
interpreting Christian theological concepts. The ^on 
of God iaea, with its historical problems, and the 
doctrine of the Holy Trinity, are expounded in this way.
This he does for two reasons. Kirst, to show that they 
are rational, grounded in .iractical reason itself.
Lecondl^, because oi this, to show they may be recognised 
universally by all men without any churchly faiths to 
embody them. while perhaps there may be some difficulties
43 R p. 239.
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. 44within Kant’s formulation of these ideat, and some
interesting side problems which would bear investigation,
it is my contention here that theee two points lie behind
his thought.
having examined nant’e account of the idea of a £>on 
0 1 God, and having argued th_.t it can have as much claim 
to the description Christian as the concept of ^on of 
God offered b„ some of the uastemJb'athers, Kant’s account 
of the Church may now be discussed.
This ideaKealfO expounded according to morality. The 
need for a church, or a kingdom of God is determined by 
the manner in which man has to struggle for freedom from 
the control of evil: ’’The combat which every morally well- 
disposed man must sustain in this life, under the
^  One of the most interesting im lications of Kant’s 
exposition of tne Trinity is that he speaks of the first 
person as the moral demana. It could be asked *ln Kant’s 
thought, is Cod equal to the moral demand? Are God and the 
categorical imperative one and the same thing?* Is the 
categorical imperative man’s only genuine experience and 
encounter with the God of religion? This problem has been 
interestingly developed by irofessor •G . nacla^ran Theo­
ry iu .i 1 1 u tier oi i/iiuct ' i cmillan i^ol; naving argued 
oral law is neither independent of God, nor yet 
dependent upon God, he says "what I do affirm is simply 
this, insofar as tne consciousness of the moral demand is 
*• asidered in and by itself, ’God* c n mean nothing 
uifferent from ’moral law’, and tuat the theological term 
renames without elucidation. «e understand that the new 
name means through understanding the meaning of the non- 
theological expression; that is to say, the moral earlier 
suggested an index to what we mean by ’God*. Inis I repeat 
is very different from saying that our thought about God 
turows light upon our moral experience . He qualifies this 
statement carefully: "My position heie is quite consistent
with holding that in another sense moral experience is 
illuminated by religion. If, as I believe, there is a 
legitimate overplus of meaning attaching to the term ’God* 
additional to what is signified by ’moral law* or ’moral
demand* ..... 1 (p 81-81; Professor .aclagan’s ’neo-
Kantianism’ here is helpful in clarifying the position of 
Kant himself, if only by contrast.
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leadership of the good principle, against the attacks of
the evil principle can procure him, no matter how much
he exerts himself no greater advantage than freedom from
45the sovereignty of evil”, Man may indeed be free from 
the control of the evil principle, but he is constantly 
in danger that evil will assault him and dominate him 
again. Therefore, he must ever remain "armed for the 
fray" . 4 6
nut where do these evil attacks ori^nate? ^ant's 
answer is simply that being among people is the point of 
attack. He argues that "hnvy, the lust for power, greed 
and the malignant inclinations bound up with these
beseige his (man’s/ nature contented within itself as
• .» 47soon as he is among m e n .
It is not that men are necessarily evil towards 
one another, but it "suffices that they are at hand, that
they surround him and that they are m e n .......This
is one of flit's shrewdest ooservations. ivian is attacked 
socially, and as an individual is not always strong 
enough to repel the assaults of evii. Therefore, his 
defence must also be social. ence he concludes that the 
need for 'hk union ox men under merely moral laws is self 
evident: The idea of such a state possesses a thoroughly
well grounded objective reality in human reason ^in man's 
duty to join such a state; even though, subjectively, 
we can never hope that man's good wil^. will lead mankind
4b R P* 65.
47 Ii P- 65 .
4b R P* 65 .
i
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to decide to work with humanity towards this goal'1. '
The importance of der Kampf in ant's mind must be 
unquestionably obvious, but there does appear to be a 
discrepancy between the ^on of God as the moral archetype 
and the need for a moral alliance among men. If the 
moral arc.iety^ e in the mind is sufficient as a guide, 
what further need can t**ere be of help for man to know 
what he ought to do, since ou^ht implies can? The need 
for an ethical commonwealth implies a greater respect 
for the powers of evil, and therefore it would appear 
that nant's discussion of the ^on of God was written 
with the G doctrine of ^reedoiu in mind rather than that 
of the essay on xiadical nvil. However, in so far as 
these accounts are not mutually exclusive, the need for 
a church or mi ethical union is t .e inevitable consequence 
of the recognition of man's freedom as a choice between 
good and evil, and of the recognition that man is attacked 
socially rather than as an individual.
In his i; hilosophicai account oi the conflict and 
victory of tne good over the evil principle in the founuing 
of a kingdom of God on earth, Kant argues from ethical 
first principles for the need for an ethical union, nan 
exists initially in the ethic 1  state of nature, in 
w^ich 'each individual prescribes the law for nimLelf, 
and there is not external law to which he, alon^ with
others, recognises himseli to be subject ....... each
individual is now his own judge, ond there exists no
4-9 R p. 8 b. In this passage, Clement J. Webb (op. cit.; 
p. 1 2 9 makes the point that there is a similarity between 
Kant's conception of an ethical commonwealth and the idea 
of a National Church as set forth by the Reformation 
fathers. Kant argues that it is man's duty to belong to 
such a commonwealth, and that the idea of a moral alliance 
among men is natural for practical reason.
49
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powerful public authority to det rmine with legal power,
according to laws, what is each man's dut} in every
50situation that a r i s e s  11J
ihe ethical state of nature exists within a political
commonwealth, whe.e the citizens cannot be forced to
become members of an ethical union. A man may remain in
a political commonwealth, but never be part of an ethical 
51commonwealth. however, Kant argues that the idea of an 
ethical commonwealth extends to the whole of mankind, and 
nere the implicit universalism of his position begins to 
show itself: "hence, even a large number of men united
in that purpose can be carled not the ethical common­
wealth itself, but only a particular society which strives
towards harmony with air men ...... in order to form an
absolute ethical whole of which every partial society is
50 r  p . 87.
Webb (o . cit. p. 131; interprets this paragraph as 
offering a clue to Kant's view of the relation he sees to 
exist between Chuich htate: "...it betrays the traditional 
Lutheran attitude in regard to the matter. It is distingui­
shed alike from that ox the uom^n Catholic Church and that 
of the Leformed or Calvinistic Churches in its tendency to 
leave to the ^tate all matters relating to the ordering of 
outward conduct and to consider the Church as concerned 
only with the individual conscience", earlier he wrote:
"Th# distinction of the ethical from the political common­
wealth of church irom -tate is characterised not only by 
this internal dependence of the former upon the latter, 
but what we may call ^though Kant does not use the word; 
the Catholieicit^ of the national Church, which never 
claims to be the ethical commonwealth, but only a branch 
thereof". Kant holds the view that for a political 
commonwealth to compel people to join an ethical alliance 
is to destroy the ethical goal. ihis would ap *ear to be 
a veileu warning to those who would make what is essentially 
the concern of personal morality, the subject of political 
legislation, luant’s separation oi * church* and '^tate* is 
quite complete in the above de ined sense.
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.. 52only a representation or schema 1.
Kant claims that men have a duty to leave the
ethical state of nature, and bind themselves into an
ethical alliance to counteract the tendency to corx*upt
one another. He says that "....  we have a duty which
is sui rteneris. not of man toward men, but of the human
race towards itself. For the species of rational beings
is objectively, in the idea of reason, destined for a
social goal, namely, the promotion of thu highest as a
social good. But because the highest moral good cannot
be achieveu merely by the exertions of the single
individual towards his own moral perfection, but requires
rather a union of such individuals into a whole towards
the same goal - into a system of well disposed men in
which and through whose unity alone the highest moral
53good can come to pass”. With this duty in mind, it may
be seen that the duty "will require the presupposition
of another idea, namely that of a higher moral Being
through whose universal dispensation the forces of
separate individuals, insufficient in themselves are
54united for a common end".
Having established the need for an ethical common­
wealth, x^ant argues that this need leads to the necessary 
postulation of God as the lawgiver. "If the commonwealth 
i^ to be ethical, the people as a people c nnot itself 
be regarded as the law-giver. For in such a commonwealth 
all the laws are expressly designed to promote the
morality of actions (which is somethin^, inner, and hence
55cannot be subject to public human laws; There
52 R p. 6b. 
r p. by.
54 R p. 90.
^5 r  p .  90.
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must inevitably be another course of law for this
community, a public law giver for the ethical commonwealth
with respect to whom all true duties hence also the
ethical, must be represented as at the same time his
56commands ......"
The manner in which i^ant now speaks in following
this line of argument is the same in which he spoke of
God as the moral Governor of the Universe. Therefore,
he concludes that to speak of an ethical commonwealth
is to speai£ of "a people of God under divine commands
i.e. as a people of God and indeed under the laws of
57virtue". As opposed to this idea, there is the Idea 
of a rabble of the evil principle bent on the propaga­
tion of evil. This extreme contract suggests rather a 
stronger concept of evil than Kant normally allows. 
However, the impression may depend merely upon the way 
in which he expresses the idea. In an^ event, this is 
not material to the present argument.
The final step in the argument is that the idea of
a people of God, may be realised, because of human
weaknesses, only in the form of a church - a human
organisation. "The sublime, yet never wholly attainable,
idea of an ethical commonwealth dwindles markedly under
men's hands. It becomes at best an institution which,
at best capable of representing only the pure form of
such a commonwealth, as by the conditions of the
sensuous human nature, greatly circumscribed in its means
58for establishing such a whole".'
56 R . 90-yl.
57 R P . 91.
5& R p. 91-92.
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The idea of founding a moral people comes from God 
but man must proceed with workin0 this out in his life, 
iiant uses the distinction between tne Church visible and 
invisible, known to all Lutherans, to express his idea.
The idea of the ethical commonwealth unuer divine moral 
legislation is the Church invisible. "The visible church"
on the same analogy is the actual union of men into a
whole which harmonises with that ideal.
The cnurches thus founded as parts oi the visible
church naturally have all the characteristics of humanly
conceived institutions.'* "The true (visible; Church is
that which exhibits the moral kingdom of God on earth so
6ufar as it can be brought to pass by men". The tokens 
of this church are defined in terms ox the four classes 
of categories in tne These characteristics are
worthy of note for this and two further reasons.
They are an exposition oi the principles wnich should 
underlie all religious institutions - i.e. moral principles. 
The iaea of a church is expounded according to the 
principles of morality, which is consistent with Kant's
59 On this particular point, and in the manner in which 
he expresses it, kant may be criticised. In speaking of 
these organisations - they are as a "group, united in a 
whole, a congregation under authorities, who, (called 
teachers or shepherd of souls) merely administer the 
affairs of the invisible am^reue head theraof" (R F* 92) 
The notion of the Church havixg an invisible head is a 
distinctively reformed doctrine, and would mean that ivant's 
idea of the Church would be li^i^ed in its application to 
Protestantism generally. This would not be characteristic 
of what he called churchly faiths generally, and certainly 
not oi characterisation of religious institutions, and 
this limits the area in which such a general definition 
might be seen to apply.
b0 K p. Sk.
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general position. Also, the universality of i^ant’s idea 
of a church comes out strongly in this exposition. The 
idea of a Church for Kant is a concept capable of 
universal application. The essence of the idea is that 
the notion of an ethical commonwealth is the basis of 
a universal understanding of the need for an organisation 
such as the Christian Church.
The characteristics of the Church may now be 
considered . 1 First, in quantity, this church is universal, 
in that while divided on perhaps unimportant issues, the 
church is one with regard to fundamental intention. In 
its quality, it is pure, since only moral factors may 
be motivating forces. It is purified of all super­
stition and fanaticism. In its relation, it is under 
the principle 01 freedom, in respect of b o ch the internal 
relation of members to each other and in the relation of 
the church to political power, finally, the modality of 
the church is its unchangeableness of constitution.
Details of *dministration may alter and vary, but the 
apriori principles never change.
"An ethical commonwealth then in the form of a 
church i.e. as a mere representative of a city of God 
has as regar^- its basic principles, nothing resembling
a political constitution.......... It could best be
likened to that of a household, under a common though 
invisible moral father, whose holy ^on knowing His will, 
yet standing in blood relation with all membeis of the 
household takes his place in making ..is will better 
known to them; these accordingly honour the father in 
him and enter with one another into a voluntary, universal
61 R p. S3 KRV B 106.
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and enduring union of hearts”.
In tnis closing passage to the section, Aant connects 
his idea ox tne church with his earlier discussion of the 
moral archetype as tne bon of vxod. The general importance 
oi the deduction of the justification of the need for a 
hurch is that it paves the way for the appositeintro­
duction of the concept of pure religious faith, or pure 
moral faith. Only this kind of faith can be the basis 
of the universal churc^ for which Kant in s been arguing.
In this way he connects the pure moral faith ofreason 
with his idea of a universalist view of the Christian 
church.
"lure religious faith alone can found a universal 
Cnurch; for only such rational faith can be believed in 
and shared by everyone, whereas an historical faith, 
grounded solely on facts, can extend its influence no
lurtner tnan tidings of it can react .......  This
passage has already been quoted in full in connection 
with the contract between churchly faiths and pure religious 
faith, the pure moral faith of reason. The argument has 
already been outlined for want’s view that churchly 
faiths have as their interpreter pure religious faith, 
which means t^at religious institutions may continually 
be judged in the li^ht of the moral law. "lure religious 
faith is concerned only with what constitutes the essence 
of reverence for God, namely obedience ensuing from the 
moral disposition to all duties as his commands. A 
Church on the other hand, as the union of many men with 
such dispositions into a moral commonwealth requires a 
public covenant, a certain ecclesiastical form dependent
62 a p. 95.
63 R p. 94.
62
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upon the conditions of experience” .^
i£c.nt is thus explaining ihe existence of churches
as visible institutions on two grounds. First, as human
attempts to realise the idea of a kingdom of d-od. And
secondly, as derived from the mistaken idea that uod
desires some kind oi statutorj recognition in a churcn
organisation. He puts these combined grounds this way:
"In men’s striving towards an ethical commonwealth,
ecclesiastical faith naturally recedes pure religious
faith; temples (Duildings conseciated to the public
worship of Qod> were before churches (meeting places for
the instruction and quickening of the moral disposition...
  ^ince then it remains true once and for all that
a statutory ecclesiastic 1 faith naturally precedes pure
religious faitn as its vehicle and as the means of the
public union of men for its romotion, one must grant
that the public preservation of pure religious faith
unchanged, its propagation in the same form everywhere,
and even a respect for the revelation assumed therein,
can hardly be proviied for adequately through tradition,
65but only through scripture ..........." -
Ihe objective of this discussion in nant is to make
clear the nature of nis universalism and this is clear
when he faces the question "How does Grod wish to be 
66honoured?" If this question "is to be answered in a 
64 R p. 9o.
69 H p. 97. kant here appears to be making a concession 
to the Lutheran Church’s view that faith based upon 
scripture is a better disseminator of the pure religious 
faith than a Church faith based upon arguments derived 




way universally valid for each man, regarded merely 
as man, there can be no doubt that the legislation of 
His will ought to be solely moral; for statutory legis­
lation ^whicn rcsupposes a revelation, can be regarded 
merelj as contingent and as something whicn has never 
applied or can apply to every man, nence as not binding 
upon all men universally". The various historic churchly 
faiths, such as "Jewish, hohammedan, Christian, Catholic, 
n u t h e r a n " 0 ^  are quite distinct from the one true religion, 
"toe can say further that even in the various churches, 
severed fi'9m one -nother by reason of the diversity of
their modes of belief, one and the same true religion
69can yet be found’ .
However, as has been said, m n t  leco^nises that
human reason requires a church in which to express this
pure religious faith. Nontheless, this is not to be
reg rded as a permanent state of affairs, and Kant looks
forward to a time when pure religious faith will be able
to dispense with all churchly faiths as vehicles of its
dissemination. The result will be a single faith of
which kant says: "amid all diversity of ecclesiastical
faiths (or creed3j it is discoverable in each of these
In which, moving towards the goal of pure religious
7 ufaith, it is practical". This, of course, is the 
pure religion of reason.
b7 il p. 95.
it p. 9b The Kantian distinction between Christian,
Catholic and nutheran is interesting if one considers 
what it implies I
ft p. >8 This contention is the most significant
single statement of mant's universalism.
70 R p. 106.
v
VThe passage in which riant describes his hope and 
expectation of the day when the pure reli ion of reason 
will take over as one single universal faith, from tne 
churchly faiths i~ the high water mark of his universalist 
optimism, ihe *assage is difficult to grasp at one 
reading, and it is the concluding >assage in his 
philosu Jaical account of the victory of the Good over 
the Rvil princi le. Because of its importance, it merits 
both quotation in full, and careful consideration.
MHence a necessary consequence of tne physical and 
at the same time, the moral predisposition in us, the 
latter being the basis and the interpreter of all 
religion, is that in the end, RnnlGIuE alLn GRADUALLY 
FRulED FROM LKFIR1CAL D^TElLuILIRQ- GRGULDO ARD FROM
STATUTES rfHICK R^ST Oh I ISTOnY AND *lilOH THROUGH THE 
AGnhCY OF LCCLLSIA3TICAL FAITH PROVISIOHA^Y UNITE MnN 
FOR THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE GOOD; AWD THUS AT LAST THL 
i Uiu; ic^LIGluh OF fL^A^Oh WILL RULn OV-aR ;ujL, "so that 
God may be all in all". (jvant's note - cf. 1 Cor. 13:8 ) 
The integuments within which the embryo first developed 
into a human being must be laid aside when he is to come 
into the light of day. The leading string of holy 
tradition with its appendages of statutes and observances 
wnich in its time did good service, becomes bit by bit 
dispensable, yea finally, when man enters upon his 
adolescence it becomes a fetter. While he (the human 
race) "was a child he understood as a child" (Kant's 
note - cf. 1 Cor. 13:11) and manages to combine a certain 
amount of erudition and even a i-hilosophy ministering to 
the churcn, with the propositions which were bestowed on 
him without his co-operation: "but when he becomes a man,
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he puts away childish tilings". The humiliating distinction 
between laity and clergy disappears, and equality arices 
from true freedom, yet without anarchy, because though 
each obeys ihe (non-statutor^J law which Le prescribes 
to himself, he must at the same time regard this lav: as 
the will of a ^orld nuler revealed to him through reason, 
a will which by invisible means UNITES ALL ULnER ONE 
COMMON GOVERNMENT INTO ONE STATE - A STATE PREVIOUSLY AND 
INADEQUATELY REPRESENTED AND PREPARED FOR LY THL VISIBLE 
CHURCH* All this is not to be expected from an external 
revolution, because such an upheaval produces its effect 
tempestuously and violently, an ef ect quite dependent 
on circumstances. Moreover, whatever mistake has once 
been made in the establishment of a new constitution, is 
regretfully retained throughout hundreds of years since 
it can no longer be changed ox at least only though a new 
(and at any time dangerous) revolution. The basis ior 
the transition to that new order of affairs must lie in 
the principle that the pure religion of reason is a 
continually occurring divine (though not empirical; 
reflation for all men. Once this basis has been grasped 
with mature reflection it is carried into effect so far 
as this is destined to be a human task, through gradually 
&s‘vancing reform. As for revolutions which hasten t.iis 
progress, they rest in the hands of rovidenee and cannot 
be ushered in according to plan without damage to freedom.
we have good reason to say, however, that "the 
ningdom of God is come unto us" once the principle of the 
gradual transition of ecclesiastical faith to the 
universal religion of reason, and so to a (divine) 
ethical state on earth has become gener 1 and has also 
gained somewhere a public foothold, even though the actual
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establishment of this state is still infinitely removed 
from as . " 7 1
Before comment on this passage and its significance,
a general comment about nant's classification of most
religions as churchly faiths* »«hile it is difficult not
to be sympathetic with him, the very gener-tlity of his
survey and classification, read in the light of more
modern uxscussion oi philosophy and phenomenology of
religion, is rather difficult to accept. Bearing in
mind the vastly differing conceptual backgrounds from
which the world's religions have sprung, and the centuries
of different cultures which lie behind them, comparison
let alone classificatioa is extremely difficult, ^ome
72would even say that it is almost impossible.1 Therefore, 
so far as world ieligions are concerned, want's views 
must be treated with caution.
Their importance and validity, as I see it, lies 
in the context of the great variety of manifestations of 
the Christian religion. If the heart of the true religion, 
tx-ue Christianity is the moral law, the basis of universal 
religion, then this may be used to assess the many 
expressions of Christian faith which exist. It can be 
used to criticise and censure many of tne denominations 
and traditions which have developed, by showing that it 
is merely critic dij.Lerences and therefore fetishist
7 1 R .. 11^-115.
n. Brede hxistensen Tne I.eanirv: of Religion (tr.
John n. o .man, tne nague l^oC p. 1 - 1  >> Kristensen objects 
to the term "Com^aritive Religion because it implied 
classifying into types, lie pioneered phenomenology of 
leiigion, in which the emphasis is upon the values of the 
believe, l, and those attached by them to what they do and 
say.
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I eripxierics which separate them. These factors have no 
mor-ii relevance, and therefore ray be dispensed vith at 
no loss, ror kant, the Church's function at an ethical 
commonwealth' is more important than its rystical function 
as the of Christ, with all its institutional theory
and ■ractice. Again while it is difficult not to feel 
sympathetic with Rant, in hat it i: theological wrangles 
over thw ion:! of Christ's Body that give rise to 
cenoitflnational splits over the Oacr^aents* Orders and 
dogmas, his position is not totally acce:.’table. The 
Chure. as the body of Christ is a more positive conception 
than that of it as an ethical com onwealth, unless tne 
ethical commonwealth implies a duty to -.ct always as 
Christ would have acted, but certainly, the Church in 
its conduct must always be morally scrupulous, and must 
never condone on 'religious rounds' what”* should be 
co -demned on moral grounds.
Therefore, while there is a little douut ;bout the 
a b i l i t y  oi juant's universalism to extend to all religions 
without some moaification or qualiiic tion, there is no 
doubt as to its ability to aprly to the Christian Church 
with lit le j/ualification,
The really vital passage is that i„i which Kant speaks
oi the churchly faiths, wnich have borne ure reli ious
fuit along witn them, as eventually disappearing. This 
tax.es place when religion becomes freeu oi ail empirical 
determining grounds anu the pure religion 01 reason is 
aole to sustain it sell on rationai/mor _ c,rounds.
Clarifying nant's view is important because this
passage is open to misunderstanding ind ^isi terpretation.
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Tne most obvious may be disposed of most easily. It 
could be argued that Aant was su ,gestinj a reductionist 
view of religion, which may be char icteiised in this way: 
"Morality is what makes man different from the beasts. 
Religion is at present a useful way in which to represent 
morality to man, but tne time is coating wnen he will be 
able to dispense with the pretence, ana when religion, aB 
an outward prop to morality may be dispensed with 
altogetner. Unce man sees the signific , oe of morality, 
religion becomes redundant. Religion, when critically
reduces itself tj i re mortiity nd nothing else".
This view would make ant appear a humanist agnostic,
if not a: atxicist• This inter retation m y be s fely
rejected for three reasons. First, isant is neither 
atheist nor agnostic, as has been demonstrated, and there­
fore, whatever he may say abo^t the uisap e-j. ranee of 
institutional religion, li^  is not iejecting the reality 
of God. ^econalj, early on in R , he establishes the 
. ositicn that morality It. ads ineluctably to reli ion in 
order- to explain the iact of morality as an aspect of 
human o. rience. Thirdly, in the actual passage itself,
itant dec! res that the purpose oi tne dis ppearance of
religion ia so that "God may be all in all1* * Therefore, 
wh tever ue his precise me .nin^  , he is not reducing 
religion to morality. He is saying something quite 
dil ercni ana distinct.
The other most arguable, but 1 thin.; misguided 
inter]retation of want's position as stated in the passage 
under aiscussion might be called an evolutionist position. 
This view may be generally staLeu in this way: "Mankind's 
history i~ the history ox tne evoaution oi a specie^. In
-  3 0 o  -
his primitive .iistory, man explained t in<_s he could not 
understand by reference to supernatural powers. Hence 
relgion bugan as organised superstition. Alongside this 
there was the need for men to organise themselves into 
.ocieties, for which rules were made to regulate conduct.
i.eli ion and morality thus grew out of primitive needs, 
and were closely allied. To give morality sanction, it 
was defended as originating in these higher powers, and 
therefore religion became the outward garb of morality.
In time, when man has evolved sufficiently, he will find 
that all his difficult questions are explained by 
physical science, ana that he sees the need for regulated 
conduct without reference to tj.e supernatural. Therefore, 
the need for religion will v nish with man’s evolution".
Modern versions of this general thesis may oe found
ii. the writings of, fo r example, uanies George Frazer.
it is most unlikely that Aant woulu have accepted
the implications for ethics contained in the view oi 
7rrs.fcer, considered as an example 01 the evolutionist 
position, i.ant would have maintained the autonomy of 
morality, nd would h ve rejected the view th.t morality
cai  avin* evolved irom religion. For
kant, morality could never ae interpreted in any 
natur listic language. The Categorical Imperative is part 
of the structure of human personality, and this does not 
COB6 by environmental influence, such as education. It 
is p rt of the essence of rational humanity. It le not
' - - I' - /!]; . - . ■ V. .. J u .
Frazer axgues th.t man's mental development it t 3 able 
through three stages - ma^ic, religion, ana science. In 
t - state, man aes self-reliant.
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related to religion as some! .in , which ^merges from 
religion, Rather, it is unconditioned .xor .l experience 
which gives rice to the need for faith. therefore, the 
idea that morality evolveu from religion i_ uite or.osite 
to the position wnich nant adopts. litre religious faith 
risci oui of moral experience, .nd not vice v^rsa.
element J . *ebb aces the terj~ evolution^ when 
speaking of this passa^*-, out it is as inappropriate 
term which carries aifxicult and aui u o u t  Ifrom the 
nantian point of view) overtones, tne li. ture of which has 
been de ined. evolution imj. lies the process of something
r
lupin o . i -. ometxCLA Let. U ..as been stated, 
in rent's view, religious faitk developed out of moral 
experience, and not vice Versa.
Therefore, how may want's view be described? It is 
neither reductionist oi evolutionist, out it does see a 
n^w phase or era of mankind's life coming into being.
"ihe integuments within which the embryo first
developed into a hunan being must be lard aside when he
75is to come into the ii ;ht oi day . ' This metapnor 
sug ects that the new era will emer e like the birth cf 
new life. ihe choice of this metaphor is app rently 
deliberate. It is related to bt. haul's words about 
'luankind growing up', and suggests some change in 
mankind itself.
A day will come when the pure reli ion of reason 
will be embraced by all men, <nd when the irroximations
74 rtebb . cit./ . 1 4 1 .
it p. llh.
1 dor. 1 3 :1 1 .
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t o  t r u t h  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  c h u r c h l y  f a i t h s  w i l l  v a n i s h  
w i t h  t h e  a d u l t h o o d  o f  m an.  Of w h a t  i s  r a n t  t h i n k i n g ?  
j e r h a p s  h e  was r e i i e c t i n g  on t h e  way i n  w h i c h  t h e  
R e n a i s s a n c e  g r e w  o u t  o f  t h e  K i d d l e  x i g e s ,  and o f  how t h e  
. . u f k i d i u n  hud s p r u n g  f r o m  w i t h i n  t h e  wo. b o f  E u r o p e a n  
c u l t u r e  i t s e l f .  i c r h a p s  h a  e v e n  s-.w th ®  A u f k l & r u n g  a s  
s e t t i n g  i n  m o t i o n  t h e  m e c h a n i s m  by w h i c h  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  
h e  saw w o u ld  come a b o u t .  T h i s  c o u l d  oe s u b s t a n t i a t e d  
f r o m  t h e  pi r a g r a p h  i n  R w h e re  he s a ^ s  t h a t  t h e  p r o c e s s
it t
i s  w o r k i n g  i t s e l f  o u t  now ariu t h a i  a  u b l i o  f o o t h o l d  f o r
77h i s  v i e w s  h a s  . I r e a d y  b e e n  g a i n e d  .
I n  c o n  e c t i o n  w i t h  / . a n t 1 ^ u n i v e r s a l i s m ,  t h i s  p a s s a g e  
i s  c e r t a i n l y  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t ,  j - e a v i n  a s i d e  t h e  q u e s t i o n  
o f  when t h i s  c h a n g e  c o m e s  a b o u t ,  a n a  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  how 
man w i t h  n i s  i n n t e  r a u i c a i  e v i i  c a n  e f i e c t  L u c a  a  c h a n g e  
f r o m  w i t h i n ,  t h e  Bignific n e e  o f  t h e  a s s  g e  i s  u n m i s t a k ­
a b l e .  K a n t  s e e s  c e r t a i n  t h i n g s  q u i t e  c l e a r l y .  F i r s t ,  h e  
c e  s  t h a t  c h u r c n l y  f a i t h s ,  w h i l e  c o n v e y i n g  t h e  t r u e  
r e l i g i o n  t o  men i n  t h e  p r e s e n t ,  w i l l  e v e n t u a l l y  becom e  
r e d u n d a n t  when men s e e  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  r a t i o n a l  f a i t h  f o r  
t h e m s e l v e s  S e c o n d l y ,  he s e e s  m o r a l i t y  a s  t h e  one common 
l a c t o r  i n  a l l  huiiL.n e x p e r i e n c e  w h i c h  c a n  t r a n s c e n d  
b a r r i e r s  o f  l a n g u a g e  a n a  r a c e ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  a s  THE 
u n i f y i n g  f a c t o r  f o r  m a n k i n d ,  He sc -e s  t h i r d l y  , t h e  f a i t h  
w u i c h  _ o r a l i t y  n e c e s s a r i l y  i m p l i e s  e v ~ n t u  l l y  s u p e r s e d i n g  
t n e ^ e  a p p r o x i m a t i o n s  o r  v e h i c l e s  o f  r e a l  f a i t h .  A d u i  g  
t o  t h e s e  c o n v i c t i o n s  t h e  o. t i r n i s u  o f  t h e  A u fk lsL ru n g  
i t s e l f ,  h a n t  i n e v i t a b l y  s e e s  t h e  d a y  o f  t h e  Kingdom o f  
God on e a r t h  -  t h e  d a y  when t h e  p u r e  m o r a l  f a i t h  o f  
r e a s o n  w i l l  be  t h e  u n i v e r s a l  f a i t h  o f  ' i l l  m en.  T h i s  w i l l  
come b o u t ,  n o t  by a  r e v o l u t i o n ,  b u t  by a  g r a d u a l
11 A p. 1 1 3 .
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transition, as mankind reaches true adulthood.
If this passage is to be properly understood, it 
must be seen in a proper context. xi belongs to rant's 
philosophy of history. However, .ant did not work out 
a philosophy of history in the sa.ae manner in which he 
worked out the otner aspects of the critic 1 philosophy.
By all accounts, he was deeply interested in every-
7bthin, ta t went on around him, ^ and he certainly was not
ignorant of eitnsr tne great movements oi history as/history existed for him, " nor was he una* re oi what
bOhappening even in other rte oi . world. However, 
he made no claim to be a nistorian. his interest in 
history was philoso nical. This meant th t there had to 
be a connection with reason of t uite definite form.
..hit i.ant meant by history is well uelined by newis .-nite 
neck: "lhilosophy for ivant is a priori knowledge from
concepts; history is euqirical, not a n o n ,  knowledge 
oi human events, noral philosophy requires us to assume 
that man is a non-temporal nomc noumenon, possessing 
re .1 freedom; science deals witn m^n oni^ aw a temporal 
homo phaenomenon, behaving uncier laws of nature. Hut 
human actions, including moral actions take place on the 
stage oi nature, ana history is the recounting of the 
movement of ^an irom tne stxte oi beiu0 a mere p„rt of
nis various correspondence with the nmperor on the 
subject of his writings, and hit rei jences to the situation 
indicate his understanding cf contemporary politics. Also 
L6 ol *is shorter writings on HS chw rmerei" or 'enlight­
enment" imply a clear grasp of the cor temporary thought.
*9 Kant was an early admirer of the french Revolution cf.
"An old question raised again: Is tne Human rice constantly 
progressing" H p. 144.
' u Kant refers to China and Japan i r. 105.
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the mechanism of nature to the state of bein0 the creator 
and citizen of the world of culture, where he can 
eventually come to know and perform hie duties and 
realise his moral ends.
The hiloso hy ox histor tnen, line the philosophy 
ol art ana the philosophy of biology as expounded in tne 
Critique of judgement, must be a conceptual link between 
nant’s two woxaaL ol nature ana morality .­
BecK. recognised tnat Kant never workeu out his 
ition in this regard in detail. Th t is to say, he 
never draited even tne outline 01 i complete philosophy 
of history. However, the notion of rational connection 
between the critical philosophy and the discussion of 
history is implicit. The terminology he uses should be 
read against the background of the KkV ana KPV. ror 
example, in the work he entities "idea for a universal 
History from a Cosmopolitan .oint of vi^w", tne term 
iuea has special significance. what he is looking for 
is an idea of jure Reason. This means Oj course a concept 
neces. ary for the explanation ana ordering of our 
theoretical knowledge or for our practical cr moral 
g idunce. «hut therefore t nt is looking xor in 1 istory 
is an idea, or a concept or set of concepts which are 
necessary for the understanding in order that historical 
experience may be rationally gr s ev., so th.*t men may 
better realise the ideal which is within history.
The first two theses of taat same essay indicate rprecisely this point: "First thesis: All natural
capacities of a creature are destined to evolve completely 
to their natural end ....  ^econd Thesis: In man (as the
vl u p. ii ff.
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only rational creature on earth; those n tural capacities 
which are directed to the use of A*is reason re to be 
fully developed only in the r Cu, not in the individual . 11
i& :en togetner these statements and the amplification 
which nant oilers of t..om imply tn.t he see~ within 
histoi^ some uite specific purpose 01 end, which is to 
be realised by man in community. He sees mankind * s 
greatest single problem as the need to achieve a universal 
civic society whic.. admlnistera 1  w uaily for all men. 
This of course raises t*ie i rooj>om oi world p>eace between 
different communities, anj Kant's Inter ««say, P, is an 
attempt to work out the oasis for such an international 
agreement. The eighth thesis of the essay states quite 
explicitly all that has been argued for thus far: "The
history of mankind can be seen, in the large, as the 
re. lisation oi* Nature's secret 41 n to b. ing forth a 
pencctiy constituted state as tne only condition in which 
the capacities of mankind can be fully developed, and 
also brinu forth that external relation among states which 
is perfectly adequate to this end1 .c  ^ Kant himself sees 
th .t philosophy mu.st undertake to ex ound the end which 
nature has designated as the goal o± history. He feels 
himself that better understanding of thie can only help 
men to achieve such a goal.
it should be a little clearer now tn t .nt's notion 
ol a time wnen ail churchly faitns disappear and tne pure 
moral faith of reason is established is related to a 
definite conviction about the pur osive^ess of human
H . 12-12. 
b ’-5 H .10.
H p. 21.
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history, and that he is not merely speculating aimlessly 
about a Utopian era. Pie is neither speaking about 
reducing religion to morality, nor about evolution in the 
s« Sv. ilreadj defined. He is speaking about a teleology 
within history, which is necessary for numan understanding, 
in order to view properly man's origin and destiny within 
history. The importance of churches in bringing about 
this ideal kant recognises, because they are temporary 
vehicles of puie moral faith. In time, f coarse, man 
maj dispense with them.
The specific role of Christianity is uiscussea in 
a snort worn entitled "Trie und of All Things" which
i 1 7 ^4 , , but whic useful supple;..ent•
^nt discui the apocalyptic conception oi the 
l h u oi the toor-LU ana the nlb±ical conception of a nast 
Judgement, his views here, whicli are basically that 
theoretical reason cannot discuss such ideas, ore 
fundamentally those which are contained in ii. he sees 
bo in moral v. lue and certain moral danger in the notion
bast Judgement. This ide. he h ^so expounue^ in R.
However, for the immediate discussion, the most 
icLev mi aspect 01 this short essay is tne clear contrast 
uant cir ws between tne contemporary ecclesiastical 
cleric .iism in G-erznany and the pure moral faith of 
re isor: - nis own m o n l  interpretation of Christianity.
This is oi course tne distinction between pur<. religious 
l^ iti.*, ana tne churcnly faiths which are dominated by 
ci.rics. .-ant sees true Christianity as a wa^ to avert 
an unnatural ena to the world, anu as a means of 
achieving the end for which it was createa. he says 
that "Christianity aimn to promote love for the observance
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of its duty in general t nd elicits it too, because the 
founder of this religion speaks not in U u  cl. racter of 
a dictator who impresses people bw a wil^ th t demands 
obedience, but speaks rather in the chi i ctar of a 
hum nitarian who brings to the heart ot hi. fellow-atnQ Stneir own well-understood wills, according to which
the would act spoilt meously of the selve^, if they
fcbrove, t eiselvec Jit tin. .
1‘hia passage draws tne contr st between ..ides
pne^icita, the freely assented faith 0 :.en of in h, * 
an . ia c lirerata. a commanded faith.
In the closing passage to the cisa, , he unioius in 
a summary form, his view 01 wh?.t Christi ity can uo if 
permitted to do so, ana now it may be distorted: "Should 
Christianity once reacu the point wnere it ceases to be 
worthy of love (which might well na; er: i. it were armed 
with dictatorial autnority instead o^  it; c.entle spirit; 
then a natural antipathy and insubordination toward it 
would be oouna to become the predominant moae of men1! 
thinking, since no neutrality prevail! in matters of 
morality ^still less a coalition oj conflicting 
.rinciples;. And the Antichrist who is considered to be
tne harbinger 01 Doomsda., woula then ta^e up his reign
~ * bB "presumably founded on lear and selfishness/1'.
It should oe quite clear th t Kant was referring to
ti.e dangers implicit in such a bod. as t. e Commission
set up to examine all religious writings proposed for 
publication. In h he speaks critically 01 clericalism 
in connection with the religious illusion. j.his nas
wohlvs standenen 
Cu ii . b^-fc3.
ii. p. 132.
^  H p. b4.
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already been discussed. however, hie closing sentence
is highly significant: ’’Then, however, Christianity
though indeed intended to be the universal world religion
would not be favoured by the workings of f te to become
so, and the (perverse) end of all things \in a moral
HOpoint of view, would come to pass''.
irom this, 1 tuinh two conclusions m j be safely 
drawn. .First, Kant sees morality and the faith it cnlls 
forth as i determining factor in the history of mankind.
..e sees it as the fr mework lor conduct and understanding 
01 life which hature or Cod has designed as the means of 
achieving the ideal ena. Secondly, that a time will 
come, (the end in a mor 1 se;isey when Christianity, the 
bearer of th t moral faith h s achieved universal world 
recognition* These two conclusions offer more.. adequate 
interpretation of the passage from R originally under
L i t C u t s i i o n .
however, it snoula ue remembered th t Christianity 
is onl^ . tne bearer of pure moral faitn, and thi^ is the 
aspect of it which in want's view will enable it to 
become the unive.:.x >. orld rel gios. This he olaiM, it 
..as intended to ut. ii it is x.. j. i-s rata, then it 
leads to moral perversion, history testifies to this, 
arm so too do tx*e intolerant attitudes of all authorita­
rian forms of Christianity. However, where men's minds 
re freely illuminated Eg the moral insights of rational 
faith s lirst conveyed t- them through tne edia of 
Christianity, then & waive real l'aith for all is possible, 
and bj the universal respect for the law, the Ideal of 
nistorj may Le acnieveu.
fcy h p. b4.
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These considerations take the argument to the peak 
oi Rant's Christian niversalism. This rovides the full 
context ol thought within which to view not only the 
original passage from R (p 112-3) under.discussion, but 
indeed all of R. Kant's philosophical theology leads 
him to the need for a philosophy of history. This philo­
sophy of history is tne Idea of a universal history, 
fhich being an Idea of Reason, is also . matter of faith. 
It is onlw within such a univers 1 history that the full 
significance of Christianity may be expressed.
x^ant's conception of Christianity founded axon his 
ethic 1 theism is the cance tion Ox Christian univers­
al ism which can be iull„ defined otily through the Idea 
of a universal histort .
whether or not Kant succeedeu in either auequ.ately 
expounding his full conclusion, or in substantiating the 
foundations upon wuich it stands, must be separate 
matten . At least he may uc commenced for his vision in 
reco juisiii_ the challen, e to create univers 1 history 
founded u on his own understanding o faith.
CHAPTER KIQHT
THK REXifiVAIfCK Of KANT1S VIat. OF FAITH
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Ilav defined, criticised where relev nt, and 
defended where necessary the Kantian view 01 faith, and 
having clarified the Glaubensmats which was Kant's 
considered conclusion to the Gritleal hilosophy, it 
remains n o . to ev luate his position, ana make some 
goner 1 observations upon the w y i which he influenced 
later thinkers, and upon whether or not his views have 
an relev .nee for the present.
Tnree features of Kant's whole programme make his 
view Ox faith both v luable and important, rirst, there 
is tne fact that he attempted to offer a rational defence 
for religious faith, uucce, sful or not, he at least made 
the attempt. Secondly, he completely secularised ethics. 
A.oweVwi, bj Scpar ting religion and ethics, he did not 
use this to the disadvantage of religious faith. He 
rather used the utonomy of etnics as a position from 
which to derive the necessity of faith. And thirdly, he 
attempted to lift Christianity out oi narrow form of
expression, and present it in a form which was all-
inclusive and potentially universally meaningful, if 
not ctually univerr lly acceptable.
Taking these points in turn, tnere is first his 
concern to present a rational view of faith. while many 
tninAc^c would be unhappy with the iueu oi reducing faith 
to a s ecies of reason, albeit moral reason, the fact 
that ivant uid this shoulu not be taken to imply th t he 
meant to emean faith, natner ho ap. oared to wish to 
olev xte faith, ana distinguish it fro.u biinu faith which 
red to ScLw&rmerel.
aant saw tne dangers whicn resulted from a wedge 
being driven uetween reason and faita: "rhe further
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story of the continued agitation for i Faith moving more 
b d more away from Reason is known. The examination of 
candidates for clerical offices was entrusted to a F iith 
Comi ission with a pictistic flavour which drove hosts of 
conscientious candidates away from theology to the 
overcrowded Law Faculty".^
i ant believed that people were being driven from 
religion in general, and that potential clergymen were 
being driven to study law an alternative to theology 
Decause oi the divorce within tneologicul thought of 
faith from reason. The fact that this concerned him 
BU 1 i vtL that he w s not unsympathetic to religion. 
This should also set in proper perspective .tamann’s 
comment" Lbout the theological students who scoffed at 
ieiigion.
nant in his writings was attempting tu maKu religious 
faith reasonable to iea« tie wa£ ttenptln say that 
it vafi no. ii 2 tional for man to have a religious faith -
, however, understood in a particular way*
In a letter to Frederick william, he declared uis 
concerns Wuile defending himself against the cnarges
madeiof his writings he sajs that M  they were only
written as souolarly discussioiis for spec! lists in 
theolo.-'j anu philosophy in order to determine how religion
1 "uar wtreit" GR . 3JC.
ham nn to Herder Cl tter dated 16th August, 17c[>; tr.
Qre :or Smith ...,>ann p. 2 6 4 : "Yesterday 1 visited 
our court preaches LLz, wno gave me tne papers 
concerning a phenomena ... haa caused quite a stir, 
it concerns a band of scoffers of .rtLi, ion, consisting of 
lixtj students of theology. They c a n  themselves r^antians
.......... ■' (Religion shoulu perhaps be understood as
that of churchly faiths as distinct from the pure religion 
oi reason/.
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may bo inculcated moct cle rly and forcefully into the
hearts of m e n .............  . I am not uilty of
depreciLting Christianity in that boot, since it contains 
no sees: ment of any actual reve iled reli ion. It is
3intended merely as an examination of r tional religion".
kant defends faith because, in his view, it arises 
naturally out of moral experience. The postulates of 
pure practical reason give rise to the need for rational 
faith, and therefore tnere was no blina 1 ap involved 
from reason to faith in ♦.ant's thought, neason in its 
ractical employment created the need for r tional fait... 
rikis is m t ' s  centr 1 argument.
in an excellent discussion of ^ nt's moral argument 
for iou's existence, contained in the K jV ^which is part 
of tne overall train of tnought which leaas up to the 
necessity for 'moral faith'} ii-ufessor *.H. W’alah makes 
. terestin^ ind relevant observations. he bc.gi
bj asking ti-is question: \«n <t is the attraction of
this (kant1®) way of looking at religion, and what is 
its value?""1
.is answer is that it 1unuamentally treats religion 
as something rational* iherefore he claimeu, xiant was 
aLteuq tin0 to be holpfal to tne c.nconmitted or discerning 
m i-i . Walsh thinks of tne person whu has sympathy for 
religious faith, out who h&a intellectual reservations, 
he believes that in nant's thought, he is presented with 
tne ilea wh t faith it. essentially u rational state of 
mind ana attituu^, anu therefor# faith is compatible with 
reason: j. ^uote his own excellent woras in fulls "The
etter to Frederick Willi October 12th 17^4; Z p. ^18. 
.rociodln&s of the British Academy Vol. 4‘J 1^63
pp
- 319 -
attraction lies in the possibility it offers, a 
oossibiiity which has a particular appeal to contemporary 
philosophers, of combining a tough-minded, scientific 
approach to claims to knowledge, with a repudiation of 
the extremer kinds oi materialism. It is not easy for 
people brought up on a diet of juocke, Berkley and Hume 
to escape the insistent question, 'Irom what impression 
was that iaea derived*: 1 ; the embarrassment of answering 
this (uestjon when the iuea concerned is that of God 
need not e described, nut to go on from there to the 
conclusion that rein ious beliefs are o merely socio­
logical interest is too violent a step for many of us. 
ueauy a- we are to acknowledge the tremendous advances 
which have been made in natural knowledge we are nonthe- 
iess reluctant to accent tne doctiine of the ojinicompe- 
tence oi science, tne view tnat the scientist has tne 
final answer to every question. A dispassionate survey 
of the evidence suggests th. t there are practices which 
can clai^i rational warrant in their own right, and among 
these it is suggested, are at any rate, some of thep.rae.ices ol religion'.
naving stated the dilemma of tne uncommitted thinker, 
the man ox reason, fcalfth indicates where ..ant's position 
may be helpful: "The attraction of the .antian type of
tneory is that it provides a philoso hical basis for ti.is 
way of thinking. It keeps the world safe for the scientist 
without snowing the door to tae moralist and the religious 
man. ;md though the religious man is not always grateful 
for thin kind of su ort - he complains that a Kant or a 
nraitnwiite faiii altogether to take account of the
.alsh o . cit.
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cognitive claims which religion involve^, or again he 
com; 1 ins that they are insensitive to the importance 
of corporate religious oiganis tions and traditions - 
it il.j well be that it is the best independent support 
he can get. Assuming that he does not want to put his 
trui i blind-fttith, in in so doi.g, .art company from
those jho would find such a step irrational and indeed
repulsive, there is probably no better philosophical 
position he can call to his aidM.°
.ant, according to .»alsh, has philosophically
argued for the compatibility of mui: taining the best 
insights of pi^sieal science along with moral ,nd 
religious beliefs.
want's rational, approach to reli ion deserves respect 
o* tnese ^rounae.
A rid^r may be adued, that acceptance of the entire 
Kantian system is not necessary in order to benefit from 
its existence, nant started from the moral law, and 
from there philosophically developed his understanding 
of f itn. It is not impiieu ir: acce ting the validity 
of tne exercise itself, that one .u t also accept in 
etall ti i ,er in which the ex rciee is conducted, 
h , - -rt c * ■ ny with Kant on one aspect,
ana others on mother aspect. xhis does not affect the 
nantian urjose of resenting religious faith in a 
rational light, nor does it affect the many valuable 
insights which thet programme contains, ror example, 
the distinction between the agent and observer standpoint, 
in m e  defence 01 freedom in U i extremely valuable, and 
has been used independently« ^hc .2 ument that morality
.«aisn Oi.. cit
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reads to religion, or the distinction between pure
i :oa. faith and churclxly faiths: or again the very 
conception of a pure moral faith of reason itself - all 
are very valuable and significant insights. Others 
coule be cite.2, and many have been already discussed at 
le th wi.ere this I as been relevant,
Kant's rational faith may do peremptorily uismissen 
by no one - neither by tne philosopher, or else ne refutes 
reason itself, nor by the religious men 9 ir elf rs
the searching light of reasoned thought.
The second important feature of want's view ox faith 
besides its rationality is that it ent iled first tne 
secularisation 01 ethics and secondly, the development 
of religious faith as a necessary consequence oi autonomous 
moral experience. Kant was attempting to discover an 
independent ground for the establishment oi religious 
faith from totally non-theological factors. This is 
a valuable contribution to tne philosophy of religion, 
xewis ..nue nec^ sa^s oi Kant's aeiinition of r_li4 ion 
that it 'acknowledges a dimension Ox moral law that was 
taxen from it by tne dopernican Ktvolution In ethics.
^iti. LLvtz and were relatively new words
in Uerumin .>hx.. osophj when x*ant wrote; and prior to ..ant
Li will oi God,
as a supplement to natur 1 and positive law. /.ant 
secularised «ne conception of morax law, against the 
tneonomic doctrines of both the . olffians (e.g. Baumgarten) 
and the critics oi toolff (especially CrusiuC; and thereby 
erected wnal has b^en called 'the fixot non-theologicaLl
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x\<*ixt related the aaej. tnat morality was a sub- 
au^art*u^iit of thwology, ana lifted it eutir^lj oat oi 
theological control. Use ai^tinctioxx b  ^lav o^ii the iuoa 
Of a xmtural raw oi a^u, or morality as the expression 
of Jjviiic lav, and. uor&Xitj! as tne
categorical imperative which nas authority oi itself was 
tie complete by Kant, ihe former notion of 'natural 
law1 as coDLuanded by doc, ~ucn as ma^ be found in the 
offacial teaching oi the homan Catholic Church therefore 
came to be in tne same ui^ficulty as th® book's in tne 
library of Alexandria which either contradicted the Koran 
r expounded it. To tne devout, neither was necessary.
..t ouC' that if church laws, even with alleged 
PiTine e actions, contradicteu the morallaw, then they 
were wrong. If th®y coincided with th® ’nral law, then 
it was their morality which entitled the; to claim human 
obedience, and no; their ecclesiastical ~t tue.
ixow^vcx, ixom this ]osition, Kant developed the 
ai1 aments iix th© KJ V ax^ u x. Yhiioxx from tne standpoint of 
ractic 1 reason establish the need j or tne pure moral 
faitn of reason. ..nit’s secularisation oi morality, so 
to £peak* becomes tne basis lor Lis mor 1 theology, 
namt's faith suouia ic distinguished iro... classical deism
7 newis vhite dec h uommsiitarj on K . n t h  Critique of
j ractic jl n^asoii . ; I ?boy p. ^bU.
c oeck* a reference ana quotation from aas^tz ax.a 
■-ittos^^s^tz bj rierbert . eigelberg. The an
tiie development of the concent of moral law 
as distinct irom the notion i natur.u or uivine law.
It underlines therefore, /ant’s originality in concepts 
and tenainology, and assists in clarifying his general 
position.
c 1philosophical ethics since Thomasius' .
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in that deism v:ac erected upon the founditions of a 
natural theology which isant himself rejects in the KRV.
His foundation is that of ethical theism which he defined 
and developed in R.
iQ rofeasor malsh said in the pass ge i earlier,
Kant offers the lest independent philosophical justific- 
itiou of the need for religious faith that has been
. .. , lsh ais< h is ri.u rked th t
not ail men of religious faith have unequivocally welcomed 
want’s contribution to the deb te. Many have reservations 
because .ant does not take account to their s itisfactjon 
of all the facets of what tue„ require as essential parts 
of such belief. 1 have already tried to argue that rant’s
views in R can be calleu Christian i.. tnat they re as
legitimate an attemjt to express the truths for which 
( hrif tianity exists as an,, that have bee_n made in the 
history of Christian thought. 1 ant was attempting to 
follow tj at xine of Christian tradition which has always 
felt that Christianity *s essential truth is capable of 
wider significance of expression than Christian theology
or the Church i^ c pable of affording it. nant has
attempted to do this, and this, of course, is the third 
t fe ture of ni3 t ought.
i.iesewetter, one of Kant’s contemporary disciples 
wrote to him in the following terms to ex; rers his 
recognition of Christian truth within Kant's system:
"1 an convinced ....  tnat the fundamental principle of
jour moral system is perfectly harmonious with the 
Christian religion, perhans even th t if Christ had heard
and understood you he would have said 'Indeed, that is
what I intended to say in speakin of the love of G o d . 1
1 L iias already been demonstrated that kant1 £ 
categorical imperative- not inconsistent *ith Jesus' 
teacuing i*i the "Sermon on the Mount”* and that the 
authority for ou^uc' pronouncements maj w d i  ee derived 
from their moral autnorit., , rathex’ than from his personal 
right to opeaxi. If tiiis is not ruled out by the manner 
in which oesus1 s;oke, then oesus could be assumed to 
have accepted the authority of the moral i . Therefore, 
a view of universalism should be detectable in His 
thought* The new Testament record of Jesus sayings 
confirms this o^cibifity.
In tne description oi tne final judgement scene,
) ■ ■ '• -> nteoasly,
and who have shown love - the highest expression of thelmoral law. In the narrative of t.ie ^.ood ^amaritan, 
creuit goes to the representative oi a religion which 
has been rejected, because he follows 2 is sense of duty 
while* tne followers of the true f^ith (so called/ failj
in tneir sense of dutj. x Again, when the woman of Samaria
speaks with Jesus at the well, he rejects the attachment
of the idea of worsnip to any geographical location, and
demands universal worsnip of uod in "spirit and in Truth*«
ijinallj, Jesus'own words about being complete, or perfect,
13are an indication of tne breadth of his own vision.
.etter to r.ant i.arch 3rd, 17^0 BA (sdn. 1^13; nl 37. 
lu matthew 25:31 ff.
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To that group of suggestive sayings and situations 
may be added the most famous of all, when He declares to 
His disciples ".« •• there are other siee| of mine, not 
belonging to this f o l d ....
whether or not oesus in fact uttered .11 tnese 
sayinc s himself, or whether the tradition oi the Church 
has influenced the transmission 01 t v m  creation of these 
texts, the hew Testament recognises a universal principle 
of uivxne self-revelation. In the course oi interpreting 
this through the historical form of eesus, the hew Testa­
ment writers, in their different ways and terminologies, 
tried to free oesus from any particularities which would 
make Him the property of any single religious group, 
oesus own sayings are quite at one with tnis idea, and 
so also is r. ant1 s it tempt to express Christianity through 
morality, nant’s thought in fact goes further, because 
insofar as Christianity is the only moral religion, then 
for kant morality is the Key to onristiun universalism. 
Christianity is moral in that it co. andc man to achieve 
holiness irrespective of reward and xt bases knowledge 
of the law’s demand upon man himself, and not upon any 
historical dogmas.
*-ven a stalwart opponent of heresy, like Ct.
Augustine was able to say that the true faith had always 
been in existence, out only was able to ue called Christ­
ianity after tne historical event called oesus of Lazareth. 
xhis certaii-iy is nant's position, ana it appears to be 
well supported.
is xvant's Christian universalism valuable or relevant 
to the present time? his univex*salis^ ta^en as the
**■4 John 10:16.
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conclusion of his whole position cat sever I defects 
and weaknesses.
first, on account of the inevitable historical 
loc trou oi nai.it, nt was sevciely limiteu in the range 
of materials uj n which he coula draw in order to construct 
ide , r teat ..is own xdeas of i Christian universalism.
As already stated, 1 have no doubt th t his insights are 
inv luable J the self— ( 1 the church, and
nicald . 1j ut' s
rnox'ai criteria were considered more seriously, there is 
here the basis for a u n i v e r s a l . c o n c e p t i o n  o f  the Christian 
Church, and therefore f o r  the c r e a t i o n  of a uniform set 
of symbols fox’ the basic common v.lux., of estern society 
as a wnoie. In other worat, Kant's value as a rrophet 
within western civilisation, where his presuj .ositions 
may be understood* is beyond doubt. ihether or not his 
claims to have discovered a formula for all faiths, (and 
bj this he meant 'Christian, Mohammedan, Jewish' and so 
on,) may ie defended, is open to sorae doubt.
The ability of Kant's universalism to extend beyond 
Christianity itself, while a valiant attest may not be 
viable. For example, hu nevex- mentions nuudhism in R, 
and this, therefore, excludet from his considerations 
the beliefs of several hundred million ople. In 
addition, modern scholarship -.as revealed the subtlety 
anu x. tiucjCi of the great varieties thougat withil 
even Buddhism itself. xhis, tc.,ke i ufon^, with the fact 
that almost every world religion springs from a different 
cultural setting, whose thought forms are . lkost incapable 
x cv z .a. Ui.| . .a t ': noti 1 fantasy.
however, to be fair to hi®, caretux attention should
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be paid to what he did surest, lie was not suggesting 
a programme of comparisons. lie was arguing from his point 
that the central core of Christianity w ie its ethically 
grounded faith, while this faith could stand by itself 
on ro tional grounds it was most ade uately expressed for 
human reason in the form of the Christian Charch. It 
was for such an ethical heart, which was essentially 
Christian, that Kant was looking in these other faiths.
Lis aim w s to find an ideal which c /uld bind all humanity 
into one, and this purpose is certainly close to the 
heart of the Mow Testament uni vers e-;1 ism. There, we find 
Christ used as a symbol, for Cod's r conciliation 4|| all 
humanity and the whole universe to Himself, haul's 
universalism was centred upon Christ a a historically 
txistent person. Kant's universaliCi: is based upon the 
i oral ideal, (which of course is the archety e in the 
mind equivalent to the idea of a on of Cod;.
So far as the problem of finning a coma cm ideal for 
all men in the moral law is concerned, Kant may be in 
considerable difficulty, however, one aspect of his 
pro, r -me is o* value. lie sees tne universally true 
religion extending through the processe. of history in 
the forit Ox the ethical commonwealth.
.uxte signiiicantay, the; three greatest passages in
the i.ew Testament which stress the 'univeraalist1 aspect
01  ^austianity aeai with the meaning oi universality^ as
15an aspect of the church's liie. Therefore, it is within 
the concept of the Christian com .unity that at Is-ast one 
important feature of the new ‘Testament's universalism 
is to ue found. This can be simply ieluted to Kant's 
idea of an ethical commonwealtn. lant, so to speak,
‘* 1 Corinthians 12:21-26; Romans 5:12-13; Colossians 
1:13-23.
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removed the first century mythology of the Church as the 
'body of Christ1, and spoke of it as an ethic 1 commonw­
ealth 01 men under the good rincipie, bindin themselves 
togetner to defend themselves a* ainit the assault of the 
evil principle. In a manner parallel to the way in which 
the hew Testament argued that since cnrist's saving, work 
haa. cosmic dimensions, ana that therefore tne Church must 
have a cosmic role to fulfil, I ant argued that since the 
uior.,1 urchety e w s present in m  reason, the ethical 
co> us on wealth shuulu linu, in time, universal acceptance 
by ail men. In these two re, ra. , nsn d j  universalism 
as _n aid to interpreting the cnureh’s role, and to 
assessing the different forms oi Christianity, n m t ’s 
views hav^ eoutemiorary value,
un the influence of lant'- ideac upon ;hilosophy, 
booKE enales. in number taVw been anu will continue to 
sc written, as the subtle facets of Kant's tnought 
disclose tm.msei.ves to sensitive schol rs. of his 
influence in theology, euwp ratively . it tie has been 
written, one oi the most succinct tiv< statements
of i ant1b Influence on theology wat oiferea to the 
Ame ioal hiloeophicai Association in u .,04 by G.w. nnox: 
‘'The iiiij-uence of i ant in theology* has be n un three 
principle lines. First, certain theologians accepted 
the arguments of the 'critique of ere Reason' and the 
conclusion that cod is therefore uni now ,i l . .oyietuelese 
the,, attempt a theology by exalting faith in revelation 
t. rou{Jh the Church and the Holy scriptures, tnus main­
taining tnat that which is unknowable by reason may oe 
. r'aith. The second movement f >wed lines 
laid down by -cnleiermacher o the one side and hegel on 
the other. Acce ting the position of aant s destructive
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of the old conception of God, they ttempt to find Kim
immanent in the world of feeling and reason. Under the
influence of iiegel, theology- wae reconstructed,, the
centr 1 point feeing iv.n tc the doctrine of the Trinity,
though this was stated in forms se rcely in accordance
the traditions of the Church• The theology,, however,
suffered the fate of tne philoso anu now has few
lbrepresentatives. The thira movement m .y be called neo- 
-. is oft te t itschl.
hitsciil, however, obtained hie pistemology through 
Lotze, tnough in isis later period, he made a renewed 
study of ivant, not perhaps altogether to the advantage 
of the system. This school I . tneology to be a 
.raotical science, its relations i to metaphysics being
tne relationship which ail sciences must hoia to it, and
its material being given in the facts of the religious
r»
experience oi m n ind' . '
The three lines of ii fluence which Knox detects are 
worth considering ir. a little more detail. .he first 
group of theologians he mentions is stilr re; resented, 
perhaps because they hold a position which is always 
congenial to some. accept t oumenal and there-
xore unknowable nature of Goo, but instead of looking 
more fully into the rantian position, they find refuge., 
from what they see as an inevitable agnosticism in a 
doctrine of revelation and a view of faith to which r-ant 
himself wouid under no circumstances h vt subscribed.
They make the same mistake of ext eslf at V ihinger,
This statement would requiit to be quaiiiied in light 
oi the revived interest in Legel from many quarters.
* y o ^ r n j u .  o f  x h i i o - o p u j  1 ^ 3  p h > - 4 o .
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only they take refuge in a positivism based on revelation, 
vrhereas Vaihinger settled for ■ itivis- based on 
science. finding that natural theology,
as a discipline conceived of o. traditional lines was 
impossible on the basus of the /, these theologians 
M ed a new style bt oeltlvism ad on revel tion. 
This positivism developed into an ortrea&e form which not 
only S3..: natural theology is im os sibl , but even
cc....... the very iae iz . i .urn n pride.
Karl BarthVa rejection of ill natural theology falls 
into this class. Scripture becomes tne source of human 
understanding of what is unknowable, uarth is the kuth 
Century’s aost full and complete ex, ociLioa ox this 
ition, bet there were certaim,; others oexore him.
J rofessor BrlU  Brunner has developed some lines of 
h «xa nd . ant
waiich suggest that in one or two r^s.eots only,
Kierkegaard drew implicitly upon Kant. He connects 
Kierkegaard’s development of thought with tne rantian 
recognition Ox the limits of reason. ierkegaard’s view 
of uod, and Kant's nouuen j1 world are paralleled by 
Brunner, and from ther. ue moves to t^e realm cf practical 
reason, and to tne problem of the weight reason carries 
in ethical argument and then on to rauic il evil. -hile 
perhaps tne comparison bet ,-een them u. t be strictly 
limited and controlled, so that it extends no further
inail Dranner ‘ eas Grundproblem aer hiloso hie bei
* C * ;  ^. v____________. . ; . ^1-47.
Brunner uevelopea the idea of a similarity between uant 
and .xei^egaaru much farther than most scholars woula 
probably accept. ihe article cont ins hie .irgu-
ment* *hile there are similarities even in the ethical 
thought of botn, there are fundamental dif erences which 
cannot oe overlookeu.
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than the recognition of a similarity between :.ierkegaard' s 
view of God, and Kant's noumenal order, such a limited 
comparison is v laable in its own right, however, 
comparison between the two concepts of faith which arose 
in each case is fruitless, because Kierkegaard also takes 
refuge in a positivism of revelation, with this same
of theologians who recognise the significance of 
rant's aijument.
i.or. recently, it has been su.g usted that r^ant's
view oi t^e umoiowabililj oi Sod has uaa an influence on
\tne development oi tut "heath of coa theoloLies which 
huTi eoer^ea. dames I Lins, i. icicle on this
theme, ci ins to detect three Karrti n roots in this1 udebate, sis argumenn, j. fiua to be unconvincing. **
11 is interesting to contrast C.*e analogous ueveloj - 
ment within philosophy anu theology of the Kantian d -ctrine 
of the -Limits of reason. ihe theologians revelled because 
the cause of tneolog^ ho.a seen justified, and a new place 
for faith diaoovtred - albeit, not the ,,lace for which 
K nt had mane room. Ihe philosophers were not so enthu­
siastic, since ivant had aug .tne grava traditional 
M L a physics. The logical completion of the philosophical, 
development was a positivism based on science, the one 
escabxisuea discipline. Philosophy was radueed to merely
 y&ing conoe ti id ol rifying the *eanin . . .
Ihe theologians developed positivism basea on revelation 
in contrast to tne philosop. rs1 . itivis . based on 
science/ ' ^uiu i^ as led to a s. irit oi rivalry between
^  ee Appendix V.
20 neaders in this school are Rudolph Carnap, Karl 
iO;per and J. Ayer.
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the disciplines concerned, which coulu hardly be a more 
ua-Kantian consequence of the development of . antian 
thought.
n 4e second i_xne which ■ nox identifies is developing 
f 1*0333 ant, iij as he 6 ys, u id j Mchxiennnchdr 011 the
ione siuo and ..euei on tne otiier. . 0 far as schlaient cher 
is concerned the opposition between JLani and H&manm should 
oe sufficient; to indicate tne v ct -.if fere nee which exists 
. lints 01 o eie - . . .
Bchii rmacner m.tde his starting ..oint lor theology what 
h ene within the believing soul, and tnis opened the 
lu.-'OU ^ates oi iridtxoittxiit^ • Re vOr 11 ng i.e^d, it is 
i.oo ooo difficult to sec how ti - chnection is mad© in
— 'u nt • tween tut and Hegel, Juct il it . • . between
nn 1 t s l <.*j 1 j-m ly , i u io ui ta I'iiL^ uiutid •
Hegel, in nis cxaim tnat human thought v.as aoit1 to
k ow reality, implied the ultimate identity of tnought
and being. He quite sim]iy elided the phenomenal and
noumenal worlds of K&nt, ana therefore claimed that 
knowledge oi reality was possible. 'iherefore, religion 
in negel'o view was defined as the ivine iiit’s 
knowledge oi Itself through the mediation, of tut f i n i t e  
s -init. “ it not until man views e-o . as subject or 
irit tnat he btcoiuoo knowable. k is ’ th© unitj 
inf ini te ana finite; ana our sole eo c o m  ie to lina
22out how the finite is incorporated with tne miinite .
-jittLe more of Hegel need be noted to illustrate
C--L Hegel .^ ...... i x.____ h..o;,n, I ul, Trech,
rubrier 1: yj tr. speirs, Vol. 1 . 2 ^ u .
i. ,hil0 sophy of neligion . . . - - p. Iso.
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that however majestic his thought, or breathtaking the 
dimensions in which he thinks, i i order to achieve such 
a possibility, he rejected the most, important distinction 
of the Critical Philosophy* However, theology did proceed 
on these lines, and Hegel became the progenitor of the 
Icie- li^t school ol philosophy with its corresponding 
theoiogic I partner.
ine t-.iru movement alter Kant which nox speaks of 
he carls neo-nantian, ana. identifier with Albrecht 
iLibsohl* nit3 chi began as a . egcli ;_n, but in time
rejected tne spec iutive rationalism of Hegel with
its clai- that the tiuo basis i i theology is found in 
x .culaiivt the- i .tic i ...cL ...lIl . t iiso simultan- 
>ui Lj rejected ill forme of subjectivism, and with it, 
-gent phenomeno _ .. sticissi* Litsckl-a
position has been characterised as a theology of moral 
values, wnich at least sounds Kantian. Tvo quotations 
from his works mi lit best illustrate his ideas: “The
distinction of worth or value of no importance what­
ever for the metaphysical theory oi tb«^  universe, whereas 
the religious view of things rest., o the fact that man 
distinguishes himself in wort.i from the .henomena around 
!:ln every religion what i. ^ou ht with the help 
oi the superhuman s iritual power reverenced by man 1l 
a solution of the contradiction in wx icn man finds
<-3 Albrecht Hitachi (lb...-1859; horn in herlin, studied 
at Bonn ana nalle, Heidelberg ^na Tdbingen* At XUbingen 
rc t i criticis of the daur j ot ocis. he was 
Professor oi dogmatics at UOttin,; eu from lyjj onwards 
and had a chair from lbo4 until his death.
ihoologle unj hetaphysic, p. ^ & 34.
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himself as both a p :rt of nature und a spiritual person-
J Kality cl iming to dominate nature’’. ^
i is theology is domiaateu by ethical rather tnan 
met hysic.1 categories. for example, ^is religious 
estimate ol Christ _b aoa perfectly revealed arises from 
tn^ etnicai estimate of Christ's moral perfection. This
is distinctively Kantian* The j  the hristian
religion is tne realis tion of the kingdom of God; which 
is both tne highest r-ii^ious goo ana t**e moral ideal
.n. This again i~ cle ] antian* In the second 
passage quoted aaove, tne distinction between man as part 
t c as 1 rcceb. n . . . * . - ..a.it ii, 2 . Q.
This too is nantian.
There is little uoubt that Ritechl nis theological
cine If logy*
others ioilowect in the* Su.cc^&sion of R its chi., *" but the 
entire tscnml mi^ut be criticised for the same fault as 
the theological positivists were guilty oi committing, 
it left the existence oi man dichoto ,h«a into a wcrld 
of scientific reality and an almost gnostiy world of 
moral values. The two worlds, while having some features 
in com on in their structure, have no com...<-rce with each 
o t m  r.
xhis was the basic motive behind the revival of .ant 
welch tool: lace amongst philosophers auring the latter
part of the iyth Century. *ilnelm fcindleband (lt4b-1915) 
s t*ie philosophy of Rant as material for a pniioso hicai 
position which wouiu reconcile physical science with the
t-u, J . .  a . . . :  . .. . . . .
2o fcllhelm Remnant1646-1922)x ... aering ilb4b-l92b)
and the famous liberal theologian Aaoli harnack (1650-1931) . re the .est examples of Ritschii 21 neo- atiarism in
t-LeoxOgy.
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necessary demands of morality and life itself, la he . 
wrote: MInilosophyr can live only s the science of values
.on are univwrB&llj v 1 1 4 ....  Phil . i its own
field and its own problem in those values of universal 
v lidity which re tne organising principle for all tne 
functions of culture anu civilisation ana for all the 
fcicul r values ol' life. But it will describe ana 
explain these values only that it may give an account of 
heir validity; it treats t c . ot .. t etc but norms’1 * 
But even iu trese words, ftiadleband cie ri; fo na fact 
i vaJLut t > di. tinct relmc.
inerefore, in both its theological *.nd philosophical 
forms, neo-..antianism as represented by the thinkers cited 
faixed to achieve the Kantian com tiLiiity between the 
world cientific fact ana the realm of mor- 1 values,
L^tw^en reason and faith.
aroiii thin emerges one oi ant's greatest attributes
.......■ r. * * c att* ted n t a synthesis oi faitn
and reason but a system x which tne i eiativu roles ol
faith ana rtfxon were aistinguishod and co tr stea. -aith 
, .. . to. . beaaiB© a. speciee of reason, whicn
cuuid. ie us od to *r0M.e the point ti t  ^ never really 
wiVwu the problem, lie . vl . , this is uiu air, because
' t I . .S'.  ^ - U. . . . m i t h |
is........  . . in this, i e b nc subsequent
historical equal. ihis is why i have criticised the so- 
c.iiiej uco- antian theolo0i ns who fonowed irtsc*a and 
the lieo-n intian y iiiiosophers who foliowea Windieband, 
because each group f iied to achieve this essential 
feature oi -ant's thought.
27 q history of Philosophy Vol. 11 p. 660.
Two obvious comments m y now be made on nox's view 
of the lines of influence which he sees as emanating from 
... t. first, of the movements he mentions, none have 
originated from Kant * They may have : isen because of 
Rant, but none could be called Kantian, bach group failed 
to see either the totality oi tue i intian josition, or 
the lAitimate goal which Kant was trying to reach: the 
reconciliation oi the insight: of physical science with 
the need for a religious faith, based on moiul experience 
which couid find univers 1 ucoo t uce.
ihe secona comment arises from the firct. There is 
ap.j rentlj no type of theology which has dr wn uireetiy 
upon or been influenced by Rant*a basic position that 
faith has moral origins. That is to say, no school or 
moral theology has arisen in consequence of rent's con­
tribution in this direction, neither is there obviously 
any theological movsauMit which h been inspired by -.ant's
. . e , 1 1 . ..t
be argued that r.ant's most important contriuution to 
theology has never been recognised, or if it was, it does 
within any of the sckoo t lo y w ich h:ve
to h :ve ori<inated from his position in some way.
The question rem: ins to be answereu: " ho are tue 
descendants of Rant in the contemporary theological scene; 
or wid ne die without an heir? ‘ ihe solution tj tiis 
problem, i would suggest, lies in eonsidering tue views 
ol tnose thinkers, who while they may not owe a direct 
ana obvious aeut to Rant, were gr .pi ling on nantian lines 
with the same set of questions with wnich ant was pre- 
cccuuied. i would ii e to make specific reference to men
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who although representing vastly differing standpoints ,
. ave these fact>rc in common. hv-taer or not the,, were 
directly influenced by want's writings Is not really 
important. In and through them, i ant’s problems remain 
alive, and the insights which he formulated, they in turn 
have developed.
First, amon^ those who have fastened on to tne idea 
th t etnical tin ism is defensible position, and erhaps 
l. c best independent uefence for religion that may be 
offered* is 4*. ... Taylor the philosopher. Also there is 
x. .1-.. Tennant, who is the principal theological advocate 
of t h e  osition.
-econulj, in m i  ti.i Buber’s philosophy of '1 and 
Thou’, there is . rest tement of certain tnemes in Kantian 
ethics, nuuer araws tht necessary theological implications 
which flow from tiiem in w *y which attempts to heal the 
. ~ . . .  in., to achieve
t is uy working out * Copernican Revolution1*, not for
te . o. rcs, but .or huma . xistence itself.
By nc stretch of the imagination couia ifcfbsr oe calleu a 
Kantian, However, his concern to close tne gulf between 
the language of science and the language oi religion is 
a mtiun concern.
iiiii , i:; t. niloso■ hi c ■ . :axth of rl casters,
1 would suggest that there is an extension of . nt’s pure 
moral faith of reason. A cruae compari: on or parallel is 
p ._^ible. There are vast differ.nces between Jaspers' 
iosition and rant's. However, in so far as some form of 
faitn is necessary h a  oxder to nave a full understanding 
of life, and in so far as in both cases, the faith arises 
oui oi philosophical consideration*., there aie common
- -
tc . Bpers likt i ant it: looking for ; faith which 
univers 1 significance which will u m t u  men towards the 
realisation of their historical destiny.,, wh tever it may
Ll «
finally, ii* the thought of contemporary - . theo 
logian, wolfhart iennenberg, t.ere 1  ^ th recognition of 
i/iic x. ol,(j;i| Li.ij .v ioi he rmc ne u 11 c s. Oi h^c cha 11 en ,o to 
at empt univers 1 history, starting fro biblicr1
• - . . t) . - t j ^ resaion
of t;.s t.roblam of univers? lity with which Aant was 
. * ■ i *o •
in none oi these instar ces am j. i.-in lying anj r.ind of 
l L ion. i am not sut • est^.. I t nt was >,.eiej.y 
an ethical theist, or that all ethical theist s aie neo- 
xitians. ..or agaj.ii at r sug^Ok.tiiiu that lUber is a 
t inti an oi* that kant was an ’existentialist' in the sense 
i: w ich huber maj be described by that tem. I am merely 
l v . i. u. t au l iiiLoiax as t..ese x.cii n.ivu x*.tcocjl the same
problem; which kant faced, Kant * s wor is continued in
t -1 * •
] hi ort be d d . jo h. . “v . Tailor
attempts to s ow that moral ex re ieuce, l.i order to be 
v . to the re . ‘ .eligion.
Taylor is well aware of the onslaught ox scientifically 
grount ed scepticism upon religious belief ir: general, and
. . 1. j c . 1 .1 S i  . t ,
he Insists that the world must be coneidered is one.
it i. to saj txi^ t i'.ut and value c nnot be separated.
«ere unis separation possible, it would then be impossible 
j argue frc ature of
lQ.g Jod .>ist (Montana 1961, k.li. Taylor ^Ibb9-1945;
I’aitii oi a ..or li^t (haexilian
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reality.
xne general position wi.ich Tayxor ado ts has certain 
distinctively hantian features. x>j considering the facts 
of experience, ana oy serious recognition ox the claims 
and jUugeuients of the moral life, faylor suggest® that it 
implies a natural theology of uod, grace nd immortality, 
ne eApicitly acknowledges his aebt to hant in these words: 
"The ' speculative' reason which discover- law in the 
se .uences of natuxe and tne practical 'reason which 
rescribe® law for the regulation' of our own volitions 
are, as kant properly insisted, ali. e functions of one 
and the same intelligence. This Is, expressed in its 
sim plest form, the e t hypothesis upon which all that 
we have o^en sxying aepends. -he justification of our 
assu-L tion tnat tne principles ol the moral law reveal 
the end fox* which nature exists is oouna uj with the view 
that the law is the expression of practical reason". 9 
la.,lor recognises that mor*.lity makes alarms which are 
x*atioral and justifiable, and that to deny this is almost 
to deny* reason itself. This is indeeu ulose to Kant* He 
-a,,s: "The old. fashioned agnostic's refusal to allow any 
t**eolo ic =1 or meta, hy sical inferences to be drawn from 
mor i prrnci les can only be justified b. the plea tnat 
these principles are no exigencies of universal reason, 
but mer ii.tiiicts, or sentiments, specific to the part­
icular animal man and so not truly authorit tive". This 
view, he ef actively x^efutes.
The recogiiition of moril law possessing authority 
is ox course a i.antixn insight wilier L >a been recognised 
by moralist® other than Aant, and a concept upon which
^  hoes noa nxlst? p. 1^9.
301 Ibid • p. 129-13U.
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31much has been built. Consid«rmtioi of Loral e x;eriencc 
le wh t iiadl Taylor to hi: particular style of ethical
u j 10 is •
1 u to me , tucn vti i t re Si Pious c jiiLiu6rua>
luii u *. w mors.1 _Lii.e Ox il xix iu Uw tu something *xiore
ui ja mere acceptance oi xmeism ©aye tnat
cOiioiaoinition u£ tue mor 1 iile ie de to ' b^riti i.* a 
roridecoe concerned with the destiny of ererj individual 
. i iv t. * o c o icti j . visible seene
;I the ..orxd's history lies an unseen secret drama of the
• • ,,33' . w. 1 wit the i >i u .j •. . •.
Ihe .antian spirit oi the mole argument should oe
\
I ru.it. in tne lar oi work, > - i i  -. j j ___________.
xiikj oOiiCoi ii i b nihi wuc na ttix o ox t:iu oo < «. r>>• xc»i tne
. 1 Li le xiiiio. x' or example, i. it ou which aay be
xc xxsuu v?ithin the liietiiLo ox Ann, or it unc which 
a iy lLv ho l to obtain aftui te&th*: ..c follows a line
ox i uirtunt x^.icii bears certain resemblances to the i rV 
arguments for &oou ana imi ortalitj. To be iware of the 
x Let t. t life is xinite is to have begun to see beyond 
its limitaticme, arid of course, within lifetime, tne
o x' x xde 1 i k. una 11ainahi © , anu the re x or© aco i o the
. xc. tne ©oral life Aim s* Iherelore the moral
. • . ■ ■ . . a  i . edit.
. . tthewby . p. 37 and 53/ utler makes
the oi t that conscience h's authority, whereas desire 
ot j -.i . ti on hai mere power or etrength to entice, ihe 
author i oi c^xiscicixcc Is cer tainl^ akin, to Aant s
- . . 
lutlei says: nihere is a superior irinciple of reflection 
or ou/.-^ v^ xoi-u^  d ev eiry d .... ■»- x. c. i< i ^ . 3\xt be 1 ng
.... Lsterially exerts j , and approve©
t s . . . .  . o3•
layxor /oec uoj ^ i s t 1 p. lo^.
lajlor uoes uou .uxi^t. p. llu.
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life points to an eternal good which is aiuil&r to Kant's 
u bonum. The moral life itself* also i lie. a faith 
in these thixi^s: "To perfpna even the si . lest and most - 
familiar act of duty in the dutifu^ spirit means to 
reco, ;ni«e it a- the thing which is s u r e  .^iv worthwhile 
and wuuld remain supremely worth while were my whole 
e. istence at stake| uf no act can it he demonstrated that
this c m e t , *• o . .... • hil- .......
mo , ., . i Ji : . in., onL t 1
or ort,
but the soul itself. If we escape its perils, we escape 
in the strength of a faith which "a;pearances" cannot*• / t
daunt .
a.nis is tne faith of the moralist which leads to the 
necessary 'affirmation of uod and j. . ortality*
Taylor's maiu aeparture irom Kant lies in that he 
^oes far beyond the limits which Kant set upon rational 
religion. Taylor accepts two concej ts w..icn .ant would 
. ve rejected. ilrsi he accepts grace as the necessary 
complement to man’s moral eifort. on Kant's own premises 
this ma*, logical. However, ant himself refused to 
L.cua t such an escape. The other concept which Taylor 
^ece t. is tnat 01 tn*e possibility historical
revelation as a complement to the work 0 #. n tural theology 
itself. iajlor felt that while the ■rimary concern of 
the philosopher is abstract and universal the concept of 
revelation was not unroasonuoie, if gr .ct exists to enable 
. tc attain tne moral ideal. Morality for Taylor, 
in a slightly different way from Kant i&nd in its impli- 
t ■ ~t, still leads ineluctafc „ to religion# 
nowtver, iaylor'^ view oi reli^i^n 1^ not 4uite as
.. . xayloi raith of a noralist . luC-lol.
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restricted as Kant’s.
"morality itself, when taken in earnest, tnus leads 
direct to the same problems abeut '0race' ,ma 'nature', 
'xdihi' ana 'worms’, with wnicn we are familiar in the 
no.iw Cu*  ^ jx cxix'j.e tiani ty , the x'cligion wixic-n s oands 
su x a.^ e aeove others in its 1 inwardness1 ana tares the 
thought of regeneration oi tne if om i n  centre with
u lqu&liiied seriousness" .
*ith the spirit ana in ent ot this, i m t  would have 
been in agreement, Gearing in mina the two .reservations
mentioned.
i'.R. Tennant (1166-1957; is a theolo ical exponent 
of ethical theism, made into a positive b sii for Christian 
theology. Like i.nt, Tennant too seriously the problem 
of evii, and found also, like Kant, that the Christian 
doctrine of original sin was quite ir.com; .tills with his 
et ical insights, he argued that .in ust he understood 
as "more i imperfection for which the gent is, in God's 
sight, accountable". lennant also was well acquainted 
with co temporary science, and felt th: t science and 
theolo j should not necessarily be i conflict.
iii hi .or ihe ^once i t ol . no he lls wit the
roulcm o- evil, and in tuu larger lhx^uu hical Theology 
.. wOx- - l tii> c.. u. i i. i i.i i ic . - L osition.
.... xay xor i i th of a xxonxi.at . rh •
Tennant 'Tr.i. eoncc- t oi h.; . d r .  Re inhold
ibuhr in nis hifford Lectures rejected mnant's views 
'uitc out Ox nand as moderrx irelagiahism i .atare i hestiny 
of i.air vol. - . 262;, his precise words eing that
rTtings were "The most elaborate of modern 
j eia^i n tx‘uatises". Oman's earlier remarks, already 
uo tc x, indicate kant * s afiinity v.ith . -lagi^a rather tnan 
Augustine, and the kinship of position between rant and 
xenoaixt in tnus stressed with regara to both tneir doctrines 
oi evil, and their ethical theism.
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..is ethical theism is the basis of his Chri. tian theology. 
In this respect he is close to *vant, b. c use he sees
- : trie ce to God.
factors lie it the basis of his . They are
distinct, and yet must be un erstoo in relation to each 
other - God, the ^oul and th aorld. he pattern sounds 
familiarly Kantian, and moreso the manner in which he 
roceeue to elaborate his arguments.
To suiii:..,.,rise brreflj the aspects of iennunt which 
r semble ..lit, first is the fact that the facts of 
ex crienee mast provide the raw il terials for any beliefs 
which c .. cli i— respect, experience begins with the self 
; na tne ..oria in which it is situated. human experience 
ad the rife of the self Tennant uctv au a ground for
. . iiffere nt. however,
he fastens on to the idea of a teieolo_ical approach to 
the w o n  which makes more sente than a purely causal
at tioft o ture. it certainly offers a core lull 
explanation of the world. Tennai interested in the
. , t thi tele >iogical form*
ver, r il m t  hi . >tion oi moral
«. • e: x . t  ^ . ct r . ic * . ba t c.. i a to account
c o • o 11.u . .-x x . _ i : . live; .
Tne moral argument, more or less as nt sdv need it is 
used to suggest th t since man . . moral - erisnce, this
iB part of t. e purposes of the Creator ».ho *»t man into 
the worlj. This is a thorough join ethic tneism which 
noids. th t the re lisation of the inaividual through 
mor 1 v lues is the purpose of liie.
irrou then., i'ennunt uses nis ethical theism to 
criticis nd reconstruct theology in the sa^ .e way in
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, .-ich Kant used the pure moral faith of reason to
. cos,
i tnin thexe 1s sufficient aimilarity to justify 
e« rison.
esi now a m : .  Buber't hi >bUfc»
ircis b &ojt • ■ • xaton says uxiat it c on t ins at least two
i i i . e i w i t h o u t  which reli i Ol c in au.ro iy hope to 
stand at the present st :g« of civilis itio ..
auc _irst principle is tnat icii ior ana science are
a o two rivai tueories professing tc explain tile wuiiu in
Li.*iciwin w s. if they were, there is no uouut that one
wouio have to oe ab&nuoneu, and w c mi of t . o &ci6nc6»
j-»uu it is OoSible tiiidt tacy may i\ [xa. t.i« two ui##artnt
, oints oi view from which the world may be regardeu, or -
perhaps t m s  is d setter way oi uttirig it - two different
att-».tuduL w^icxi away oe taken to tu<- world .xiu in virtue of
37wiiiCii tile wGi'lci itself may appear two—Xold to us' •
Ps ton sees difficulties i how thiw, s xould be worked 
out because he fears that it may leaa into doctrine of 
aoubie truth. With tnis reservation st ite , he proceeds
■
^he second principle is the one I have ropounded 
from t irst - th:*t reli io is for le man.
Religion ca.not be based on a special faculty, an extra 
cense, a unique feeling, even if these re uneasily 
tt - i tio ai concu u  . uber re. 1
advance by insisting that religion must nc .n attitude 
of tne whole man, an attitude necessarily accompanied 
both by feeling and by thought, and one which can be 
tested confirmed in actual living".
57 . #t; . , aton xhe ^odera . reuicament George Allen &
Unwin i^o i p. T7TT
pfa Oi . cit. . 17^.
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Again, Professor Paton has reservations in detail 
concerning the manner in which Bubar works o t the impli­
cation of ais position. However, he is in sympathy in 
principle with what -uber aims at achieving.
These two oinus aie of particular significance in 
lx^ht oi lac criticisms I made of t. c aeo— antian schools 
of philosophy and tneolo^ . _uber aims I reconciling 
the wuriu of scientific fact with the realm of values, 
anu of presenting an integrated view of man as a combin­
ation of reason and faith.
Having in his earlier years rejected mysticism as 
inconclusive, sporadic and not oo. munic tive about 
reality, Buber developed his philosophy of dialogue, 
centred on his doctrine of the person. distinguishes
two attitudes which man may d t towards tue world, and 
tnese attitudes are expressed in tne two rimary words 
"l-Thou" and "i-it".
"If i face a human being at my Thou, -mu say the 
primary word 1-ihou to him, he is not a thing among 
things, and aoes not consist of things*’.
"The prii.iar, word I-thou c n be spoke: nly with the
whole beiiig, Concentration aid fusion into the whole being
can never take place through my' a, exiay , nor c n it ever
take place without ine. 1 become through .ay i elation to
4 ethe Thou; as 1 become I say Thou11.
I-Thou is a word of relation, which means meeting
or encounter - between subject an subject, it is in 
contrast to I-it which belongs to the re 1m of ex; erience 
and things, where the relationship is t.xat of subject and
5^ I end Thou Martin Buber tr. ii.G. ^mith (T & T.
oxurk pT
46 jauber op* cit. p. 11.
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object.
"Take knowledge; being is disclosed 10 the man who 
is engaged in knowing, as he I ooj.s at what is over ag inst 
i^x~. he will indeed nave to grvxsj a. n o ^cct that which 
he has seen with the force of presence, ne will have to 
compare it with objects, tctauiicu n  in its order among 
classes of objects, describe ana analyse it objectively. 
Only as an It c m  it enter tne structure of nowledge"
while the language x-uber uses i- poetic, and far
removed from tne language of ant, tue similarity of their
aims shou.lu oe emerging. The third Kantian formulation
of the Categorical Imperative summ rises tuis thought in
a different way: Act in such i way tn t you always treat
humanity w#i.etner in yo r own person or the person of
any other, never simply as a means, but always at the
42same timc as an e n« .
There are differences of appro cn in each with regard 
to how they individually approach the concept of person. 
i\ nt is the more strict in definition, relating tne uoral 
law to personality, so that it uecomes part of the 
structure of personality. un tne otner n md, nuber'c 
thought is that tue person is more cx-eative and his 
attitude is decisive whether or not, for ni^, another 
. arson becomes an it or a Tnoi • It it nere tnat nubex's 
concept of dialogue finds no counterpart in Kant's thou htf 
ana here the two approaches vastly differ, nowever, the 
significance of the distinction between l-Thou and i-it 
ana want's third xormulation stij.i oe. r comparison.
B u D e r ' s  concept of relationshi , which is similar
41 nu^ex op. cit. p. 51,
4 U p. yO.
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to the realm of practical reason for Kant, legde on to 
the concept of in eternal Thou. . *
' L u e  e x t e n d e d  l i n e s  o f  r e l a t i o n s  m e e t  i n  t h e  e t e r n a l  
T h o u , n v e r y  p a r t i c u l a r  xiiQu i s  a  g l i m p s e  t h r o u g h  t o  t h e  
e t e r n a l  m o u ; by m e a n s  o i  e v e r y  . r t i c a j .  r  Tnou t h e  
p r i m a r y  * o r d  a d d r e s s e s  t h e  e t e r n a l  a i o u .  T h r o u g h  t h i s  
m e d i t a t i o n  o i  t h e  i h o u  o f  a l l  beings f u l f i l l m e n t , an d  
n o n - f  u l f  i l l m e i v t , o f  r e l a t i o n e  c o m e s  t o  t h e m ;  t h e  i n b o r n  
:h o u  i ^  r e a l i s e d  i n  e  c h  r e l a t i o n  a m  c j Hs j i l  *a te d  i n  
n o n e .  I t  i s  c o n s u m m a te d  o n l y  in t h e  direct r e l a t i o n  w i t h  
t h e  hou t h a t  by i t s  n a t u r e  c a n n o t  become I t " . ^
B u b e r  i s  c l e a r l y  t r y i n g  t o  cint t o  s^me ' n o u m e n a l '
r e a l i t y .  i f  y o u  e x p l o r e  t h e  l i f e  o f  t h i n g s  and o f
c o n u i t i o a e u  o e i n g  y O u .e o m e  t o  t h e  u n f a t h o m a b l e ,  i f  y o u
den y  t h e  l i f e  o f  t h i n g s  and  o i  c o n d i t i o n e d  b e i n g  y o u
s t a n d  b e f o r e  i x o t n i n ^ n e s s , i f  yOu n. lx o w  t x . r s  f i f e  y o u
44m u e t  t n e  l i v i n g  u o a '  .
i n  t h e  same way t h  i t  h a n t ' s  ' houmena* i s  t h e  
r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  r e a l i t y  o f  t h e  u n c o n d i t i o n e d  o r  
u l t i m a t e ,  t n e  u n d e f i n a b l e  t r a n s c e n d e n t , B u b e r  a f f i r m s  
t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  n t e r n a l  I h o u .  The n e c e s s i t y  o f  m o r a l  
e x p e r i e n c e  d r o v e  k a n t  t o  h i s  a f f i r m a t i o n ,  w h i l e  r u b e r ' s  
e x o e r i e n c e  o f  r e l a t i o n s h i p  g i v e s  him a  s e n s e  o f  s o m e t h i n g  
b c y o n u  w h i c h  i s  o f  a  s i m i l a r  o r d e r ,  r h e  ' m e e t i n g  p o i n t '  * 
o f  u b e r ' s  l i n e s  o f  r e l a t i o n ,  and k a n t ' s  i . o r a i  G o v e r n o r  
o f  t h e  U n i v e r s e ,  h a v e  mucn i n  common.
w i t h i n  m o r a l  e x p e r i e n c e ,  and w i t h i n  t h e  f r a m e w o r k  
o f  hum n r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  t h e r e  a r i s e s  b e f o r e  p e o p l e  t h e  
n e c e s s i t y  t o  r e c o g n i s e  c e r t a i n  t h i n g s .  U , on c o n s i d e r a t i o n  
t h e y  s e e  f u r t h e r  t o  t h e  n e e d  t o  s p e a k  a b o u t  some O t h e r
ft fittbtif o f c £ # *  0: ?§:
- 346 -
reality, which may be styled in many w ys. jrofessor 
Gregor -mith calls it transcendence, and in the following 
passage from him, the same insights of i\ant and Buber are 
expressed in his own unique way: .... when I say that
the problem of transcendence is in the midst of human 
life I am demanding from the hum aist ana the Christian 
alike the recognition of somethin, th t is not in the 
first instance a matter of faith, an* therefore of 
response to a given message about Christ, but simply a 
matter of sight, or everyday experience, i mean, that 
in every numan situation there is a relation; a relation 
between tne tool and the use of ti e tool; between the 
object under investigation and tne investigator, between 
yourself md  the other person witu whom you r.ave to do.
Life is characterised by these relations. Above all in 
tne relation between two persons it becomes clear that 
the relation is only possible because t ere is a difference* 
it is the otherness of the other which rises up before 
you, n conflict or in understanding. This is the basic 
manifestation of transcendence in human life. This is 
wh t faces you in every situation into which you enter 
without reserve or reduction. This otherness or trans­
cendence is not an extra brought in from some remote 
sphere of understanding, but it is the centr .1 element 
which makes this situation, that is, the relation, tno
humanity of life, possible at all. An absolute solitary
4bis not a human being".
*.hile Buber's 1-Thou, Gregor kith's transcendence 
in human life, and Kant's experience of the. Categorical 
Imperative which leads to belief in the . oral Governor 
of the Universe cannot be simply equated, they have some-
4p K.G. hmith Mew Man (BCh 195b) p. ob.
thine, in com..,on, 1 thin.-: it ic arguable tn t each was 
aware of an attitude of mind tow irds that which comes to 
people, compelling them to recognise something beyond 
themselves, nach characterises this in hie own way and 
in his own terms. It ia this similarity of origin rather 
than \ue liferent conclusions w ;ich each draws that is 
relevant. Again it could be, added th t . rofessor Gregor 
smith's concept of seaularisiu 1 8 an at er t to span the 
guxi between the world of science and ihe realm of belief 
and value, however, these points are offered for consid­
eration as illustrations of how important :.ant*s insights
47wore, nater thinkers, owing per £ 3 irect debt to
K nt, nave fastened on to the problems which took hold 
of him, and have felt that knowleige of 0 0 a may be 
possible from what in the widest possibl sense could 
be called human experience.
1 ohird line of descent which 1 would like to trace, 
not fxoin K&nt himself, but from problems with which 
he was concerned, comes through Karl Jaspers. Jaspers* 
conception oi reason uas a breadth .inch is topical of 
t n e  broau conception of reason founu in Katit. Jaspers 
reeo^nis^c the primacy of reason, but a reason which 
takes lull and proper account of the non-rational and
Smith decniar Uhristianit. { oliins 1^06/
47 ,\arl tieim Christian riith and i^ tural science ivarl 
nei , witn ^uber^s disline cion betwee- and 1-it as
a basis, attempts to find a found tioi for theology which 
is outside the reach of science, so that science and theo­
logy should not be seen as contestants fighting for 
su cy within the one aren°. 1-i'hou is the world of 
personal existence, whereas I-it ia the world of facticity 
and therefore of scientilic f ct. ex. ant's distinction 
between theoretical and practical reason, and with the fact 
tnat what one coula not bay in the sphere of theoretical 
reason, might necess ril^ have to De affirmed in the sphere 
of practical reason.
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even irrational factors in human experience. Le broadly 
recognises and draws distinctions between three areas of 
ihe re is the realm of objects, . an object can 
* include suiy thing that may be objectified. This could 
i.xlud i .rely physically existing entities, but also 
, Is, institutions, orga-.is t;“ . Secondly,
th^re is the realm of existe ce itself, and in its 
ch racteristic modes of making decisions id living and 
acting, it cannot be objectified. finally, there is 
j . cendence itself - God or J3ein : in itself. Kan in 
his existence encounters transcendence hen he reaches 
the .erimetei of his existence and when he realises that 
he is really helpless when confronted, for example, by 
death« i n then encounters transcendence, but not as an 
oo ective fact in the world. either, however, is it
- 1 r e v e l  t i o n ' .
Jasj ers cnlls the perception and acknowledgement of it a
t. - iio,o jc , . v * i recognition
nendence of the ii it r. u o le thing otner
and beyond - namely transcendence.
eis hilosophical l .it. has t c' racteristics 
which resemble Kant * s notion of the i-ure moral faith of 
reason, first, it is a coim-on fait, which he claims all
 ^ able oi r i . While tne t e n  s oi‘ its
delLnitio., differ- extensively from ant, the concerns 
_ - ch both spring iiavc f-ndli-irity about them,
o kt ^ces is hil; . o hie . . i * ice of
universal oasic knowledge. He says of the idea of
universal basic krowleage that 'it is indeed a matter of
itn. ut this faith has no religious content that 
wo 1 t; ere; it is solely t faith in the




pO£>sibilit„ of unlimited oiutual unde rst .ndin ,. It ie
4-9the faith that says: "Iruth ie ... t unites us". Ills 
concern like kant's is to identify i unifying factor 
through which men ca.: affirm themselves without aggression 
and conflict, .ant s.w his own *ure moral faith of reason 
as the basis of a Christian universaliso. Ja»p*r sees his 
philosophical faith as a way in which .estern civilisation 
can discover its true roots, wiioh he af irms re in 
biblical religion, and so rediscover th in aning of 
existence. Uf interest here i the fact that Jaspers 
speaks £imaiiij for esitern civilisatioi , although he 
do«s claim that his philosophical faith is capable of 
com r hens ion. by ill men.
Secondly, Jaspers' faith is, li:. e kantf s , a mode of 
rationality. "Philosophical fait! a. unlike the faithful 
obedience that accepts the inoomprehensijie in forms of 
finite ^nenomena and .uUnits to them s to the deity 
itaalf. * ho rejects completely anj xcluaivist concept 
of revel tion as a uource of faith. u  faith is cierived 
through reasoning and through the experience of trans­
cendence .
however, his Bain question in 1 hii^so; i.icax a ith
and Revelation* is whether or not philosophical faith and
91theological f ith can meet. nis i that they must,
and that this will come perhaps through change in the 
churches who will nave to abandon their exclusivist 
theology, ana recognise a universality Uu. t also a cultural 
diver, j.ty within revel ition.
“for the controversy between tneology and philosophy
49 i irl J* spers ihilosorhicH .it .volition
(tl. Asnton oouiins 19^7) p. i-.
ivarl oaspers o . cit. p. td.
51 uaspers oc. cit. p. 25b.
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to .w. proci .. :n would have
shed their character of revealed realities, dogmas,
52creeds ........ This would ae&n that the church
could truly participate i.i tn t hiloso.-hic 1 faith which 
can unite all men in truth. owever, recognises, in 
iniumer similar to -cant th t M hiiosophic. 1 faith does 
oX t - -x s ble, , ,.lic j henomenon.
53, , .. -l v. :n. a i . tion” •
Tor this philosophical faith to survive, and for men to
have a hope of being united in truth, they must be openly
interested in different .istories and culture: , without
unfaithful to the insights ir own. He declares
himself that there must be mutu .1 recognition and that we
must be more "concerned with the historic lly difierent
b 4-without being untrue to our own historicity.
ihere it reasonable ground ior .. l . g th t Xant
lid have been in full agreement «it*. t least daspers1 
sentiments, if not perhaps in cw ry et ii ol Lie formu­
lations. The esser.ti ii point oi cc np&risoi is that bot.. 
maintain the rationality of their own of faith,
in e .on case, it is i rationality .jnich . within it
the woru oi universality.
These considerations prepare tne ground for the 
discussion, finally, ox certain related views held by 
*olfi±art lannenberg. Again i would reiterate the caveat 
that there is no attempt being maue to su0gest that 
fteumenberg is a nuo-xautian, nor even that he was in any 
way? directly influenced by *ant. The id^as from lannen- 
beru , wiiich I shaml discuss, seem to me to be meaningfully 
related to tne issues which hant's formulation oi the
c s^ers o,. cit. p. .
casters o . m i ,  p. yj /.
easpers ...c ^iv.-nial Scope of . . uv p. 172.
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nature of faith was attempting to face, Because of 
this, I woulv*. eu goat that the ti n t x. as therefore 
Valid for theoiogj, a., ia accordingly . valid contribution
to the history of theology, and the hi! tor; .i man's 
attempt to verbally articulate the m  ti re a. faith. It 
must also be added that as in the case of the other 
thinkers whom I have sug .este l as keeping live the 
Kantian insights, u..ore is no attc . t to e:r ound the
fulness of innenberg'c thou t. Ihe reference is
confined to two s ecific 1st u . [here ia first the 
t robleai of releasing tue significance of oesus from
atorieal p&rticu j to iniverj I validity. econdly,
there is the challenge to face the tacj. of universal
i .
To afford balance to the discussion, 3 shall first
. reference to Pannenberg1a criticJ t's concept
of the Son 01 Goa as the moral ideal, or prototype within
b5human reason. . . . .  seec t i t .lling
ithin tnat train of Christo! io thought which attempts
to construct ....... . oteriological interest
in 'iosus. He ai~o accuses SGhliersiaciier, uultmann and 
.i.LUich of thw same error. However, his cuncern is not 
so far distant from *.ant, when in amplification of his 
criticism he says that "ihe establishment o. the universal 
sig If1C ce of Jesus, which is derive fro® God, cannot 
bt replaced by talking about the fulfilment of humanity 
through Jesus. Otherwise, both the -.n. versality of 
Jesus inu his savin^ significance for us become mere 
> . m'u .hile maintain! t ant' i >lution to
aoifhart Pannenberg i L-.ro (tr. by
... . . i.ifjiins Duane A.  •• ..er
uhris torogie 19ob) p. 44-4f.
annenber,^ o. . cit. p. 4b-
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the problem does not satisfy him, by implication, he is 
s .v iuw that i ant’s problem was c i< . himself v&J
concerned to face.
iic.Ur in the s&u*c «ora in a section ^.titleu
Ja.i v c ~ sa.*. aiiu. historically conditioned —-*-<. cuts in
oesus' Activity”, he criticises harl uat.c s, for wrongly
reiativising oesus ‘to 'only one among tne 'definitive men'*
57alongside nocrates, Buddha und Confucius”, who are
important t u_ because we "only know what v.t are and do 
as we see it from the perspective >i their shadow".-
oas ers interprets Jesus as "one-sided", to use lannenberg'* 
own term, ry this he means that t-esus is e eentiadly a 
radical ana extreme revelation of human nature, who is 
therefore a corrective influence u on history, ror 
v t*ers, he is tne iasu oi the ro hots oi tne biblical 
tradition which is tne historical founuatio^ oi our 
cultural existence within Western civilisation generally.
lannenberg tnen goes on to s o\ i ow the eschatological 
message of oesus remains relevant to tne present age, and 
i showing this, formulates his : ositioi in very interesting 
terms.
Le admits that the historical situatio. of Jes^s 
cannot be reproduced, nor eve that of the ezrl^ church, 
and th t therefore, the idea of following in Jesus' foot­
steps, so to speak, is doomed to failure. e also declares
th t a messa :e such as Jesus preacnea coul-. not arise in 
our contemporary situation. "heverthelesE, it remains 
valid for all time by confronting men i.: ev^r. situation 
with that which is always tne ultimate destiny of man, 
uven though it is often hidden by many otner things in
^  iannenberg op. cit. j. 237.
58 .Lannenberg op. cit. p. 237.
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everyday life. It confronts men with the coining Kingdom 
of God, wnich is nothing else than the ne rness of the 
Creator for whom man inquires in the openness of hisk Uexistence".
f'annenberg1 s interpretation of tuw meaning of the 
expression "Aingaom of God", while ucing uite distinct 
from rent’s ethical com onwealth, clearly borders on 
i nt's notion with regard to the significance it has in 
relation to the individual (or tne moral agent/. That 
is to say, in each case, the i in. aon: represents either 
the need to believe in something beyond the im ediately 
present forms of existence, or th t which enables the 
individual to hope that he can overcome the problems 
which beset him. If this can be substantiated, then 
perhaps lannenberg himself is guilty of creating Christ- 
ology out of cotcriological interest, or else, he was 
mistaken in his assessment of Aant. In his final state­
ment in the section under discussion, he comes ve y close 
to the spirit of Kantt "Nevertheless, Jesus, in the 
uniqueness or his activity which w a oi^ Lj possible in 
th-t time, and his effectiveness, places every man in 
every situation through all possible ch n._es of the times, 
before the ultimate decision in the f ce of the Cod who 
is coming, just as he did at that time in his earthly
ministry. This constitutes the universal validity of
, . . . , „ oQhis activity".
xannenberg is clearly searcnin<_, n r  an expression 
of tue validity of e^sus which transcends all particula­
rity not only of Jesus, but of eras since, lie sees it 
in thu perpetual nearness of the Creator for whom man
5^ Pannenberg o m  cit. p. 243
OL xannenberg op. cit. p. 244.
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seeks. uas this not the very experience ant was 
..escribing by means of his exi eiie ce of tne ategorieal 
Imperative - man's experience of th t whic is uncondit­
ioned unconditio,. 1. t robing for an
in or-retation of Christ which ai ords . i true 
universality.
hi:, j. 1 coocupatio. with this proble. emerges again 
in .n uj translated under the title: "hermeneutic
and Universal History'*1. In this essay, he exposes the 
defects in Gradamer's discussion of t.. hermeneutical 
problem, and he states his coneludiiig in itio;* in these 
: th< task of, a i logy of
*orla history aar^ not be sacrificed o account of the 
_ .rlure of the Hegelian solution, a.. It i. by Gadamer for 
the sake of a hermeneutical ontoxu y wit.1 i.i the horizon
gua~  we t j how it is possible
today to develop a conception of univers l! i tory which
  would i reserve the finitude of human ax erience
anu thereby tne o^emiess Of the „ uture a. well as the
i.-trir.sic claim of the indivluu il .
x.db insight ana thin aesire cue riy i. related to 
i— .nt's demand for a universal nistox^ . ~.i e Kant, rannen-
berg ~ees tnat Christianity has a uixi^u^ role to play in 
tn^ creation oi ~uen an iuea oi history when ne declares
that wthe biblical tradition constitutes the origin of-•7
universal historical thought as such . in this respect, 
Pannenfcerg is in agreement with Jaspers and ..ant. lerhaps 
.+^u, 'taia basic a0xeement of irtenti^ * svOuween theuj, may 
b^ furtucr underlined by tea i in mi: u. i c oi*.u
Pannenberg hr] sic questions in heology (SOW 1970)
fannenoerg o?. cit. p. iy4-l>5.
Pannenberg oi . cit. p. 136.
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Jaspers makes about mankind being concerned with the 
historically different, without being untrue to one's 
own historicity.
Thu vast differences between these thinkers have 
already been recognised and underlined. iowever, in 
spite of the difierences, there does see. to be a move­
ment of thought along common line.. The common problem 
in nunt, Jaspers and iannenberg, which each formulates 
in his own way, is the problem of the relationship of 
universality to particularity. It is no rev, problem.
It it the ~ocratic quest, but in the case of Kant and 
fannenber , it is centred upon the problem of the univer­
sality and particularity of Christianity. To profess 
Christi n faith is to relate to a particular tradition, 
hut in doing this, need the believer close himself to 
the possibility of a philosophy' of world history? If 
the believer's faith is exclucivist, the answer must be 
in the affirmative. If the believ^i's faith is willing 
to be open in its outlook and expression, then tne answer 
uniy be in the negative.
Stated in the more concrete terms oj the relationship 
ol Christianity to the »orlci religions, tn4 only way ahead 
for mankind is first dialogue, and then the discovery of a 
symbol which can unite men 01 good will anu nigh purpose 
in ui, common task or realising their ideological goals. 
Inc cxclusivist tocologies c m  proceed onl,, by conversion 
and ^nriftianisation. The univers. list c n offer Jesus' 
message about the kingdom of Cod, whet i an expression of 
transcendence, or in the form of m  eti.ic 1 commonwealth, 
as a symbol capable oi universalis!hg t o particularity of 
«ea©hdistinct exj ression of transcendence, tod, wisdom or 
ultimate reality. It is at least arguable that,
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i essence, this is whet Kant's Christian universalism 
w..s s jeking to attain.
This olo&Ing discussion, while far re .vcu from 
ti terms, is inspired Oj tne antiac. >miosophy* 
eri.aps tne i .ct that X nt can inspire ^uc^ a distant 
vision a form oi tribute to what 0-ottlried kartin 
described as tne inexhaustible depth of - ntian 
thought .
uottfried Kartin nant's Metaphysic aim -xiuory uf 
. v.
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ihe following passages snoul. illustrate ivant'e 
interest in the phenomena oi romanticism:
xicttei to i’rflulein vo: > nobloch \l'7b3) OH p. 12.
Swedenborg* s famed feat of the description of the fire 
in Stockholm which he claimed to have seen, and did 
describe when he was in Gttteborg intrig e uan.t. At the 
end of the letter, .ant writes: M .ht can one say against 
the credibility of this occurrence? The friend who reported 
it to me investigated all t is himself* both in utockholm 
and in GOteuorg; he also told me Swedenborg*s ideas about 
the condition of the departed souls and about the manner 
in which his communion with the spirits too., place.
"Kow 1 wish th.it 1 coulu have questioned that remark- 
„.ole in; n nijself! If'or my friend is not so expert in the 
methods of asking those questions which can shed most 
light i the .. ... 1 am waitii *ingiy .or the book
which S»edenborg intends to publish ix o m ........ 1
- ov^n admitted having written to w .deuborg, but
confessed that ~weatuoorg*s promised reply h&d not come, 
it was net mere bine th .t made nant rule romanticism out 
as a source oi knowledge. He clearly made his enquiries.
io; nre .a of a ~ i iri i-^-er tl7oo)
closing sentence ox the fourth sec xon of the 
first part reads: "This study, 1 boluij assert, conveys 
ill that is known aoout the ^ uuject. . uin :i pneumatology
may be L.aiea ^ doctrine oi our u^.avoiu-.ibi^ ignorance
concerning a supposea kind of b^ing. Ana now I put aside 
t.ie whole aoct^in« of spirits as settled and finished.
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It ill not concern me further. 1 snail be able to apply 
amal.1 intellectual capacity more profitably to other 
to o l  " . (Oh . bG;
tl ! ant then wedenborg.
He i'. es the following indictment: (second part* second 
►.wedenborg'c great work 1 .r^  eLestia' 
coj t ins eight quarto volumes full of nonsense**
it entire debate, .ant hac this to say, and thus
ciolul. the essay anu the subject: ' i d  us go onto our 
g n t  . and work! * . p. t4/
»
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Gottfried wilhel; ^eibnis: Tht; o m  :n!o ^dn. Oxford,
Clarendon Jress 1898 tr. h. Latta) . 2>b-9•
the iiii id. i ^ iwOti c x tni n^  > uuw t yu In u
necessary k.uuGtcinc^| Id wiii.cn thi Vnxiefj e1 
pax1ticular cnances v^xistx ciijLy ®min®ritly, us
11 S k>0 Ul'C Q j UiiU thi X- IS la O i t tii 10© >v<_ C ill. cCl •
^ . Now .il txiie substanc* is a sufficient reason
oi all this Variety oi particul_.ro, which are 
al^o co-nnected together throughout; t..ei‘e is 
orJ-^  one God, ant tni~ Gou ii k ufficient .
On these per igra >hs fro.u the *1 ona .o 1 , . tta makes
tiiio co merit: 'That is to say, il , articular things
_re connected together in one system, which implies one 
rinciple, one necessary substance, one Gou. The argu­
ment i. not merely fro the existence o* order in the 
world to the existence of an intelligence /.uich produces 
t m s  ordex, but from tne fact that t h , whole forms one 
s. stem to the existence oi one ultimate sufficient reason
Of the . otherwise there ;m . i be vari . 'orders*
oi ‘disorders’ in conflict with one mother, each pre-
posin* its own first princi le or 'cod’. m i s  is
l«ibniz* form ox tne cosmological prooi of tne existence 
OX uod • note ol. Oil p. •
The neat and conclusive mariner In which .eibniz uses 
the idea of uod in uis syste... is sin. rised well in 
c. . ..orris's Introduction to the .vcr,, -tion of
.ei n m ’s xhilosophical writings 1 . xi:
!l ri ..ary souls are the living mirrors of created things, 
whereas minus are also images of the Divinity ilimself,
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the Author of mature, and are ca< ble of knowing the 
system o. tue universe. lvhis m tes i o. auxe of
ent ring into a xina oi society with uou ....... oust
. . ...a., t 6 world 1 iture there armony . • • • •
.o there is a harmony between the physic*x kingdom ol 
a tuic and the moral kingdom oi grace; tnat is, there 
is a^cur- between God as *xrexxitect oi tne achine ox 
the Universe xnu uoa as rionarcn Oi tu^ divine City of
X . 1  - U, w
by* reason of this harmony, there is no gooa action 
witiioi v reward, a..d no evil ction without punishment. 
Ux. things w rk to ;ether for the j o oi the righteous 




i. G. i. ol footnote: 11 a maxim is ?. suojective
piincipic oi action ana lamt be distinguished from an 
objective principle - namely a practical law. The 
ioiuer contains a practical rule determined by reason 
in ucsord mce with the conditions of tne subject soften 
his ignorance or again liie inclinationsJ; it is thus a 
princi le on vnkich the subject actc. A law, on t.^ e 
otner hand, is an objective principle, valid for every 
rational oeing; ana it is princi.le on which he ought 
t ct - th t is, an imperative .
. ant's maxims are really disguised i orms of reasoning.
.« . aton vop. cit. p. makes the folio.ing comment 
which helps to clarify the concept of maxim: "*'rom self
love i make it my principle to shorten ..y life if its 
continuance threatens more evil than it promisee pleasure”. 
xiiie is really the major pr .miss of a syllogism. However,
. nt sa^s tnat only the moral *-aw cai. be tne major premise 
bs-cause it h s the uality of universalis Dilitj. It 
could tnu^ . bo stated to avoid contusion: tne moral law 
is tne only maxim which does not lead to anu contradiction 
when taken as the major premiss oi a morar syllogism which
recudus mor.iL action.
j • John uman Grace jc rersonalit., { ont na 1^37; p. 36 
says of maxims: "Acknowledged or unac novle ed, every 
really ersonal action is done on what ant calls a 
maxim - a v luation not only of a articular way of 
acting, but of ourselves and of our world in relation 
to it. The hand is not put forth to steai bj force of 
nunger s t *e piston rou to work by force Oi steam, but
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the course oi action involved in thus s tisfyiu0 hunger 
is consciously accented in s.«.ch a wat. that 11 contrary 
motives our whole conscious world are ruled Out.
Thus for the moment at lenst, the ...ole level of our 
personal world is brought down or up to the level of 
I .ion, id its f i .. . ; fleeted"
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1. -.1 O-L, tus (.ihilos. x:24) "for Christ is the universal 
God who determined to wash men clear. Irom sin, making the
t • • • • • V.llOS. ‘Xj CC - , O * |
becominw . good imitator of the jog , o. will be Honoured 
bj him as bein^ his likeness  M
wii.-.oii M ne aufiiced for tne salvation of tne
whole world, ror the rest put a w ^  by entreaty, He
alone by power ....  through whom let the world hold
spiritual least days, not to the s.tiety of the flesh,
Lut to the profit of th<_- ^oui, tne mind being purified
t rough tne offering of spiritual sacrifices .... "
vaOt . hum. xxiv, 1;
'Iven apart from tne value for all ol .as ce th on behalf 
of man, He snowed men how they ought to die for righteous­
ness sale . (Contra Celsus ii:lw;
oi -Assa. in speaking of Christfs death, said:
"....  both freeing man from evil, and healing even him
introduced the evil, ror the chastisement of moral 
uisease, however painful it maj be, is a healing of its 
infirmity . (Or. oat. ^o;
Gregory of hyss was a reeognisau exj onent of the 
transaction theory oi tne atonement, and yet he still 
introduce* highly ethical note, as aoes Origen on the 
theme of the morai. example oi Christ in going to His 
de th in the manner in which he aid.
■ re. :or. of uazianus was one of t e fathers who rejected 
completely the Hansom theory. He argued that humanity is 
tu be saved through the Humanity of eod, and the Incarnation 
becomes for iiim of less importance as a historical fact
Al.nNDl^ IV
tii t as in eternal fact of the Divine bei,. . hile 
thix as oct of hie thought hai other significance for 
. tio t kjOt , the Kant 12 n idea of the good 
ri ii - being eternal is not in o position to Gregory’s 
ids . •vci: Gregory's mystical thoughts ire amenable to
. ethical interpretationx ”God becam -nd died that
we mi^ht live: we h ve died with im to b. urified; we
are r Jsed fro:, the dead with ±x. si ot we h ve died with
Him; we are glorified with M s  ecau. t *,e have risen with 
5 rom tne gr: ve' . .
xxie objective 01 these uotation. is not to attempt 
to suggest or prove that ant's position /.as identifiable 
th t of iSaateni theology. It is to demonstrate that 
•o -v- elements of the s trisiic tradition are not incon­
sistent ..ith kant's ethical inter retation of the concept 
i the 3on of God. That is to &ey that t.» two sets of
i^eas ar.. not utually exclusive. The fact that the
^asteri. :ath<.rs drew heavily fro.. Gree culture showed 
that they were not afraid to borrow t e r m  from appa.’ ently 
alien sources in order to exresc their view of faith, 
if Kant1& views do not conflict with theirs, then his 
general position of intexprating the conee t of the uon 
of uod in ethic ii terms should be accepted as a valid 
..tv.. . i statement h the risti a it .
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dames uollins in an article entitled "A aantian 
Critique of the Gou-is-head Theme”'1' professes to detect 
three nantian roots of this debate. Tue approach he 
tikes is called by him Kantian by virtue 01 the meaning 
of tne term Kantian with which ne ic operating. The 
meaning, m  his own words designates an independent 
treatment of a problem, in tne course of whicu special 
attention is paiu to the leads suggested by n&nt for 
itt> resolution”
The suggestion that Kant had anything to say 
specifically auout the problem ret resented o tne 'God- 
ls-ne&d' theme seems to me unjustifiable. . uwever, 
insofar as colline offers positive evidence of a relation­
ship uetween the careful philosophical analyses of hant 
and the rather bizarre and often imprecise uiscuseion of 
what might be called a 'protest movement' within th^o- 
lo> y itself, serious consideration of nir position is 
required.
xh|5 three rools he detects are dosi. ;n ted speculative, 
moralistic and reli ious respectively. The speculative 
root lies in the rejection of speculative roofs for 
God's existence. Collins concludes thi. ortion of his 
argument by saying: "Thus for Kant, the uncritical claims 
made for speculative proofs of God are a in jor source of 
UocL-is-de&d conviction" . xhis particular sentence, which
1 vames Collins: "A Kantian Critique oi the uou-ie-heau 
rheme" wpnist 19^7 p. (reprinted in j ant studies
Tod a., eu. oy Beck Open Court Press IlI.19o9) *
* op. cit. (hant Studies Today pagination) p. 409.
- op. cit. p. 426-429*
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is the conclusion of the argument I find particularly 
difficult. For example, what does he mean by "for Kant", 
and again v/hose is the conviction spoken of? Is it 
Kant's, or that of some contemporary theologian? \hat 
he T o rs tc ray is that the rejectio 3 of s ecuMive 
theolo/y in the ICltV has opened u t g possibility of the 
Go.;-i. -de .d theme. However, a. I already been affirmed, 
sue a partial reading of the vllV itself is unjustifiable, 
ternative possibilities are dare. the 'Dialectic',
The moralistic root he describes in tnis way. "The
- otif urifiee t . jox *. n of the tempta-
4tio/i toward moralistic inwardism . ..oralis., is
confusion of action done out 01 respect for the moral
1   s such with a cutting off of hu:. n ction from its
4consequences in the world’. I conies t . tt I fail 
completely to see how the God-is-dead theme can offer any 
bsistance to the moral agent ,ho, in ant’s view, first 
recognise© the autonomy of the sphere of ethics, and 
who then sees the need to refer ultimately to God in 
order to _ive this concept a full context of meaning.
If Kant's secularisation of ethic is w t is meant, 
this is fair comment. owever, the ids of God being 
dead 1 would imagine to be a notion co leiely alien to 
Kant. Therefore, it is misleading tc co ect the Kant's 
secularisation of ethics wit any notior of Uie death 
oi God.
Tne third, root which Collins detects is religious,
and he refers to a as a "prolonged iu against the
efforts of religious assent to bre c . ly from the central
4hub of man's moral life". He claims that 'when religious
. 4^-430.
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conviction does not make a noticeable difference in 
the sphere of moral attitude and soci 1 use of power, 
it has a deathly rather than an en.livenin influence
u o the human person and the commu n i t y   The
hypocrisy behind this falsity he cl ime it 1 source 
of the Goa-is-Dead theme, surely, ho.ever, such 
hypocrisy would have made people reject, for example, 
the Church as an institution, but not necessarily the 
idea of God. Their very rejection im»lies the existence 
of some idea or influence operating within them as a 
criterion of judgement.
with Collins' view of K, 1 cou.ot juirrel, but as 
a final assessment, I thiriK more must be s; id. The 
connection he sug ests to the ropts ol tne resent debate 
o v l  v-od's death i s  not helpful either for ant studies 
or for the resolution of the debate v . n i e h  is being 
c naucted in a vastly different set oi tei:c. It is 
interesting at best and potentially mislc i n g  at its 
worst. However, insofar such an e eici. e is possible 
at 11, if illustrates once moie the ver.:_. lility of 
i nt, arid the fact that his influence n w be detected 
in many surprising quarters.
op. cit. p. 43C.
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